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Errata 
Page ii text line 10. Replace "has" with "have" 
Page 51 Section 3.3 .2 text line 2. Replace "That is, the historical and cultural. .. " with 
"In this regard, the context pertains to the historical and cultural ... " 
Page 51 Section 3.3.2 text line 6. Replace "That is, to develop an understanding" with 
"These sources were selected to develop an understanding" 
Page 78 text line 36. Replace "coming" with "come" 
Page 91 text line 12. Replace "One characteristic of which, is a tendency ... " with 
"One characteristic of these moulded attitudes is a tendency ... " 
Page 97 text line 1. Replace "so it assumed" with "so it is assumed" 
Page 100 text line 22. Insert "attitudes" after "disinterested" 
Page 120 text line 25. Replace "the World Bank)," with "the World Bank," 
Page 125 text line 12. Replace "repealed" with "replaced" 
Page 172 text line 31. Replace "Thailand's" with "Thailand" 
Additional Note to Readers 
In regard to Section 7.4.4 Regulatory lnstrunients 
It should be noted that the drawback to command and control regulation is the 
tendency for regulators to specify the methodology and technology to be applied, 
rather than the objective to be achieved. The "how to" regulatory technique inhibits 
rather than encourages the application, because the new technology does not adhere 
to the law. The Texaco experience in Ecuador clearly shows that merely adhering to 
the law is inadequate. While there should be a minimum set of standards to which all 
petroleum operations must adhere, there also has to be an opportunity for goal setting 
regulation to which top performing companies can subscribe. Allowing for the 
achievement of goals also provides the opportunity for creative measures to be 
implemented that go well beyond minimum regulations. The "bottom line" -minded 
manager would not invest any funds beyond minimal compliance without an 
opportunity to realise gains of a fiscal or reputation nature. 
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The principal focus of this study is corporate social and environmental responsibility 
and stakeholder relations. These are issues that have emerged as key concerns for the 
upstream petroleum industry in recent years. ('Upstream' refers to the exploration and 
production sectors of the petroleum industry, as compared with the 'downstream' sector 
activities of product transportation, refining, distribution, and sales). 
Over the last decade corporate business strategy has increasingly being influenced by 
'green' environmental pressures and social pressures from stakeholders to demonstrate 
corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER). Such challenges pose 
business risks to industry, with far-reaching commercial implications. The underlying 
theory for CSER suggests that in order for industry to maintain its legitimacy ('licence 
to operate'), it is in industry's long-range self-interest to be environmentally and socially 
responsible. 
Researchers have suggested that the corporate strategic responses to such challenges are 
determined by the interaction of a set of key external and internal influences and 
constraints. Thus environmental strategy will be a product of business influences, 
industrial contingencies, and the rewards that a company can expect to achieve by 
executing a specific environmental strategy. Attempts have been made to define a 
relationship between decision-making processes and the development of strategic 
environmental policies, and hence the investment decisions that flow on from these 
actions. One approach is to take into account internal and external behaviour-altering 
factors that have an impact upon a company. Such factors include market influence, 
legal-regulatory influences, social expectations, corporate culture and ethics, 
organisational adaptability, capital availability, opportunity and cost assessment and 
technology. 
The key objective of this study is to test the influence of these factors and prevailing 
regulatory frameworks on the corporate social and environmental management practices 
of upstream petroleum companies operating in South-East Asia, and Thailand in 
particular. Using qualitative techniques, this empirical research project investigates the 
influence of corporate behaviour-altering factors on the practices adopted by upstream 
petroleum companies. Case studies from Thailand are used as in-depth analytical 
examples. 
The findings of this study suggest that the petroleum industry, in general, is moving 
along a path towards improved environmental performance and acceptance of its 
corporate social responsibilities. However, despite the good intentions of many 
managers, the petroleum industry, like any commercial business, will depend upon 
profit-making for survival. Petroleum exploration and production are commercial 
activities that are strongly motivated by the bottom line-the industry's primary 
business objective is to maximise profit. Expenditure and innovation are directed 
towards improving efficiency and effectiveness in finding oil and gas reserves and 
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recovering these at least cost. Environmental issues are often viewed as hurdles that 
interfere with project scheduling, and add expense, with no tangible benefit. Where 
environmental management is actively practiced, it is commonly driven by a strong 
regulatory regime; or managerial initiatives where there is a perceived market benefit 
from being seen to be 'green', or as a result of lessons learnt from punishments for past 
misdemeanours. 
The findings of this research also suggest that inappropriate legislation, regulations and 
administrative approaches result in poor process and outcomes and, in some cases, may 
deter companies from fulfilling their corporate social responsibilities. When the 
environmental regulatory system and third party monitoring framework are ineffective, 
company managers can easily find other higher priorities to which they should turn their 
attention. The practical reality and financial pressures of conducting profitable 
businesses in a highly competitive market will continue to be the key influence on day-
to-day operations of petroleum companies. 
Changes in corporate performance objectives towards greater corporate social and 
environmental responsiveness will inevitably take tin1e. Long-held assumptions and 
working practices will need to be continuously challenged. Governing regulatory 
frameworks need to incorporate sufficient flexibility to allow con1panies to pursue 
1narket opportunities, while also harnessing the povver of peers and third parties to 
maintain corporate social responsiveness performance standards. Some form of 
regulatory change is therefore required to make both the industry and its regulators more 
accountable and responsible for addressing the broader demands of society. 
The findings of this research suggest that opportunities for improvement may lie in the 
harnessing of the assistance of industry peers and third party stakeholders. Within the 
petroleum industry, joint venture partnerships and industry associations provide 
mechanisms for applying performance pressures to other petroleum companies. They are 
well aware that reputation has a tangible value in the marketplace, and that the industry 
is judged by the performance of the worst performer. Marketplace pressure may also be 
harnessed through shareholder investment preferences, stock exchanges, and financial 
institutions that provide venture capital. These stakeholders, together with special 
interest groups have the ability to apply financial and shaming pressure to companies to 
drive continuous improvement of their social and environmental responsiveness. 
Governments may not be able to dedicate more personnel resources to enforcement of 
performance standards, but some reform of legislation to broaden corporate governance 
requirements that address CSER within directors liabilities, together with strengthening 
of public standing and public involvement in planning and development approvals 
processes, could empower third parties to take a more active role in sharing the 
enforcement burden. Other benefits include more constructive engagement in finding 
multilateral solutions to local and regional environmental problems. 
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"For multinational oil players, much can be gained from the 
experience of others when looking at how to handle potential areas of 
controversy, be they in the environment, human rights, labour 
standards or corruption. Dealing with potential problem areas early 
on-before they become expensive public relations nightmares-will 
make all the difference in the long run . ... As many have already found 
to their cost, one option unlikely to be available is trying to ignore the 
issues raised by pressure groups. ... The big question must surely be 
how oil as the ultimate "risk business" squares the growing calls for it 
to exercise its social responsibilities with a continuing drive to find new 
reserves in ever more remote parts of the world" (Valebrokk, 1997b ). 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 RESEARCH FOCUS AND HYPOTHESIS 
The business world has undergone extensive changes over the last three decades, as 
evidenced by the emergence of globalising companies operating across many geographic 
boundaries; increasing performance expectations of society; and changing regulatory 
frameworks. For the petroleum industry, the modern business envfronment presents 
many challenges. One of these is the increasing demand for the industry to take on more 
corporate responsibility for its social and environmental impacts, under the implicit 
threat that society will revoke its 'licence to operate'. This pressure first emerged in the 
developed countries of North America and Europe, but it is now becoming more widely 
evident in developing countries. Increasing levels of education, affluence, and 
communication with external groups, have given local communities in these countries a 
new level of empowerment. 
In light of the changing character of society and community expectations, government 
policymakers are recognising the need to encourage companies to be more responsible 
for their activities. At the same time, reductions in government spending have led to 
downsizing of regulatory agencies and diminished regulatory enforcement capabilities. 
The challenge for regulatory reformists in developing countries is to design cost--
effective, efficient and equitable regulatory frameworks to reduce the burden of 
regulatory enforcement on resource-constrained governments, while ensuring that 
stakeholder expectations of industry performance are met, and the business continuity of 
industry is preserved. 
It is increasingly recognised that regulatory reform frameworks need to be tailored to 
suit the context in which they are to be applied-this is the essence of 'responsive 
regulation '-regulation that responds to the particular circumstances of the industry in 
question (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Gunningham, 1998a). In the petroleum industry, 
business strategies are closely linked to the global market price of oil, gas and liquefied 
natural gas, and the need to quickly respond to pricing changes, for example by curbing 
exploration and operating expenditure and down-sizing. Within this industry there are 
also distinctive cultures in its 'upstream' and 'downstream' sectors. The upstream 
(production and exploration) sector is characterised as a risk-taker, with a tendency to be 
transitory, i.e. moving from location to location in search of exploitable reserves, as 
economic, political and techn0logical opportunities and constraints allow. Whereas the 
downstream sector, with its refineries and associated infrastructure, operates more like 
the chemical industry, making long-term investments in a particular locality. These 
unique cultural characteristics influence management attitudes to regulatory 
requirements and the interests of stakeholders, and are reflected in the social and 
environmental management strategies of individual petroleum companies. 
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A role for academic research is to improve our understanding of how particular industry 
sectors operate from a regulatory perspective (Fischer and Schot, 1993; Moser, 1998; 
Gunningham, 1998b). Such knowledge can enhance the basis upon which regulators and 
policymakers formulate regulatory frameworks, in their quest to harness corporate virtue 
and develop industry-regulator-community partnerships. This thesis analyses how 
upstream1 petroleum companies perceive and respond to the performance expectations 
expressed by their external stakeholders (regulators and the public), with a view to 
identifying how best to harness these influences to encourage responsible social and 
environmental management practices. This study focuses specifically on the contextual 
issues associated with upstream petroleum companies operating in South-East Asian 
countries, using Thailand as a case study. 
The fallowing hypothesis forms the basis for this research: 
The social and environmental responsiveness practised by companies is moulded by 
their assessments of the business risks posed by the stakeholder environment. In the 
absence of a socially acceptable balance of power between companies, their regulators 
and third party stakeholders, company ,nanagement practices will tend towards a 
minimalist position to maximise financial returns. 
The supporting propositions of this hypothesis are as follows: 
Proposition 1. Command and control regulatory approaches are unsuitable for 
application in developing economies where the enforcement capacity of regulators is 
constrained by political and financial factors. In these circumstances, companies may 
exploit regulatory and/or political loopholes in the interests of business expediency. 
Proposition 2. Companies make strategic choices in the formulation of their business 
plans. Company managers will adopt self-regulatory initiatives and move beyond 
compliance where they perceive that they will derive benefits, such as avoidance of 
increased regulatory compliance costs, ilnproved internal management of operating 
risks, and improved reputation; and/or ·where setting higher industry standards will give 
them an advantage over their competitors. 
Proposition 3. Companies most amenable to making changes that improve their social 
and environmental management practices will be those whose managers have 
1 
'Upstream' refers to the exploration and production sectors of the petroleum industry as compared with 
the 'downstream' sector activities of product transportation, refining, distribution, and sales. This study 
focuses on the issues associated with corporate environmental management performance by the upstream 
petroleum sector, but it is recognised that the commercial drivers of the upstream sector are inherently tied 
to the business objectives and operations of the midstream and downstream sectors of the industry. Hence 
references to the midstream and downstream sectors are also made throughout this study. 
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undergone learning processes as a result of corporate experiences within their own 
organisation, or those of their peers; and/or are subject to stringent corporate 
governance systenis, ho,ne-country environmental standards and regulatory controls. 
1.2 THESIS STRUCTURE 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
Chapter 1 provides the background and introduction to the research topic, and outlines 
the research hypothesis and propositions. 
Chapter 2 outlines a theoretical framework that describes the behavioural dynamics of 
company-stakeholder relations and their influence on corporate social and 
environmental management strategies. These are drawn together into a conceptual 
model to describe influence-response relationships that form the basis of corporate 
social and environmental responsiveness, for the purpose of analysing the corporate 
strategic management practices of upstream petroleum companies. 
Chapter 3 presents the research approach and methodology that was applied in this 
study. 
Chapter 4 provides an empirical overview of the characteristics of the upstream 
petroleum industry. Detail is presented on the history and structure of the upstream 
petroleum industry, its business culture and practices, and its responses to business 
pressures exerted by stakeholders (i.e. regulators, joint venture and contract partners, 
contractors and consultants, industry associations, non-government organisations, public 
interest groups, local communities and the media). 
Chapter 5 provides an overview of the environmental regulatory frameworks of 
developing countries in South-East Asia, focussing specifically on Thailand. 
Characteristic problems of the existing Thai framework are discussed in the context of 
the upstream petroleum industry, using empirical examples. 
Chapter 6 presents two empirical case studies from the Thai petroleum sector to 
illustrate the tensions between company project objectives, regulator expectations and 
third party stakeholder expectations. The case study observations are used to identify: (i) 
the factors that affect company managers' perceptions of their corporate social and 
environmental responsibilities; and (ii) how and why companies chose particular 
management strategies. 
Chapter 7 analyses the meaning of corporate social and environmental responsibility in 
the Thai context, to identify a framework for its guidance through the creation of roles 
for the petroleum sector, regulators and third party stakeholders ( community and public 
interest groups). 
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Chapter 8 presents the conclusions and recommendations arising from this research. 
1.3 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
1.3.1 Community Expectations and Influence 
The social framework within which the petroleun1 industry operates is rapidly changing. 
At the community level, these changes are evident through: (i) increased levels of public 
education; (ii) weakening of the role of governments ( due to increasing political and 
fiscal constraints); (iii) reduced public respect for the authority of government and 
business; (iv) increased public expectations in regard to openness and accountability; 
and (iv) globalisation of communications and rapid dissemination of information 
through multimedia (Winsemius and Guntram, 1992). 
As a consequence of these changes, the petroleum industry is experiencing increasing 
expectations from the stakeholder community in regard to social and environmental 
management (Thomas, 1992; Hoffman, 1995). Williams et al. (1993) suggest that 
externally-driven performance demands are appearing as: (i) increasingly stringent 
environmental legislation and enforcement; (ii) increasing costs associated with 
pollution control, waste disposal, and effluent disposal; (iii) increasing awareness on the 
part of investors of companies' environmental performance in view of the cost 
implications associated with liability and the 'polluter-pays' principle; (iv) increasing 
training and personnel requirements, together with additional information requirements; 
and (v) increasing stakeholder expectations in regard to environmental practices. 
If ignored or disregarded, these demands may have broad and substantial adverse 
implications for petroleum companies. For example, the associated business risks may 
include increases in: (i) establishment costs (seed investment); (ii) compliance costs 
(technology and business practices necessary for compliance); (iii) costs of sanctions 
(fines, imprisonment, personal liability of directors and managers); (iv) financial 
assurance requirements; (v) civil claims (common law damages); (vi) statutory and 
common law clean-up obligations; (vii) natural resources damages claims; (viii) direct 
lender liability; (ix) adverse publicity; (x) loss of production and staff morale; (xi) 
increased insurance premiums; (xii) increased financing costs; (xiii) legal costs in 
defending criminal and civil actions; (xiv) future liability to provide indemnification 
agreements and warranties; and (xv) revocation of regulatory licenses and permits 
(Stevenson, 1993). 
To illustrate, the Brent Spar disposal controversy caused the Royal Dutch/Shell 
corporation losses of several million dollars, through public outrage over a proposal that 
had been approved by the regulatory authorities. Brent Spar is a large floating storage 
facility that was used by Shell Expro (an operating company of the Royal Dutch/Shell 
Group) between 197 6 and 1991 to store oil extracted from the Brent Field, offshore 
north-east Shetland, UK. At the end of its functional lifetime, Shell Expro investigated 
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options for disposal of the buoy. Owing to its structural weakness, and the risk of 
structural failure if it was brought ashore for disposal, Shell Expro focussed on the 
possibilities of dumping the storage facility at sea. Dumping in the shallow waters of the 
North Sea was rejected on environn1ental grounds, but disposal in the deeper waters of 
the North Atlantic was adopted as Shell Expro's favoured option (Neale, 1997). The 
British Government duly approved this option. However, a large-scale, community 
outrage campaign ensued, primarily orchestrated by the environmental non-government 
organisation (NGO), Greenpeace. Finally, in response to the intense public pressure, 
Shell Expro revoked its decision to dump the Brent Spar at sea, and embarked on a 
multipartite stakeholder consultation programme to determine a more socially 
acceptable disposal option. 
From the industry perspective, there is a concern that such community hostility will also 
result in long-term business risks, such as barriers to resource access in sensitive or 
contested areas. Greenpeace's point, in regard to the Brent Spar controversy, was that 
decisions about petroleum industry practices such as pollution control and waste 
disposal should not be determined on strictly technical scientific grounds, nor by 
industry and its regulators alone. 
"The Brent Spar campaign ... was not an attack on science, it was about the limits of 
science-the uncertainties and the areas where politics, economics and industrial 
policy, not ecology and toxicology, determine what is best for the environment" 
(Melchett, 1995 cited by Neale, 1997, p. 98). 
From his case study of the Brent Spar incident, Neale (1997) concluded that: 
"While the Brent Spar experience was unique, there are valuable lessons which other 
businesses seeking to improve their environmental peiformance might learn from it. 
One might be to develop an external focus before this is imposed on them by forces 
outside their control, by building the alliances that are needed to innovate 
environmental best practice in all countries in which they operate, ending the 
exploitation of national differences which can expose them to the charge of operating 
double standards. Most importantly, they could recognise the contested nature of the 
environments in which they operate, and seek to 'engage not enrage' the various 
interests involved" (Neale, 1997, p. 101). 
Grolin ( 1998) suggests that this incident clearly showed that reduced public regard for 
the institutions of state and science has caused corporations to lose their previous key 
sources of legitimacy, while public demands of accountability by corporations have 
increased significantly. Examples like the Brent Spar incident have signalled that 
petroleum companies can no longer function in isolation from the society in which they 
operate-external stakeholders will not allow them to do so. 
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As Carroll ( 1996, p. 95) candidly states, 
"Business has been and will continue to be subjected to careful scrutiny of its actions, 
practices, policies, and ethics. This is the real world in which management lives, and 
management must accept it and deal with it. Criticisms of business and cries for 
corporate social responsibility have been the consequences of the changes in the 
business/society relationship, and the stakeholder management approach to viewing 
the company has become one needed response. To do less is to refuse to accept the 
realities of business's plight in the modern world and to fail to see the kinds of 
adaptations that are essential if businesses are to prosper in the present and in the 
uture. fi JJ 
Chris Fay, in his role as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Shell UK, suggested 
that the petroleum industry has passed the point for excuses-concerns over the 
environment, health and safety, and broader social goals are not "optional extras" for 
companies. "We can no longer say to society, 'Trust us'. Now it's a 'show me' society" 
(Fay cited by Knott, 1998, p. 37). 
Such messages suggest that in order for the petroleum industry to maintain its 
legitimacy to continue to operate within a changing society, it is in "business ' long-
range self-interest to be socially responsible" (McPhail and Davy, 1998). 
1.3.2 Corporate Social and Environmental Responsiveness and Regulatory 
Reform 
Corporate social responsiveness (Frederick, 1978; Carroll, 1996) or corporate 'virtue' 
(Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992; Shearing, 1993; Haines, 1997) refer to the way in which 
companies act on their perceived corporate social responsibility (CSR). Put simply, 
corporate social responsibility refers to the interaction of the corporation with the legal 
and social obligations of the societies in which it operates, and how it accounts for those 
obligations2. Processes of corporate social responsiveness may include, for example, 
2 There is no universa1ly acceptable definition of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The cornerstones 
of CSR are defined by Wood (1991) as the institutional principle (legitimacy), the organisational principle 
(public responsibility) , and the individual principle (managerial discretion). Sheikh (1996, p. 1) defines 
CSR as "the assumption of responsibilities by companies, 1,-vhe ther voluntary or by virtue of statute, in 
discharging socio-economic obligations in society". Carroll (1996, pp. 37-38) prop osed a more 
comprehensive four-part definition of CSR: "The social responsibility of business encompasses the 
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic expectations placed on companies by society ata given point 
in time." More recently , the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) Stakeholder 
Dialogue on CSR, held in The Netherlands in 1998 , proposed the following definition: "Corporate social 
responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to beha ve ethically and contribute to economic 
development while improving the quality of the workforce and their families as well as of the local 
community and society at large" (WBCSD, 1999a). 
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environmental assessment, stakeholder management and issue management; while 
outcomes may include social programs and social policies (Wood, 1991). 
The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) has engaged in a 
stakeholder dialogue program to frame the debate on corporate social responsibility; 
identify the perspectives of a broad cross-section of stakeholders; and identify ways in 
which industry, government and community groups could work together to alleviate 
current concerns. As part of this program, the WBCSD, in association with the Thailand 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (TBCSD) and the Thailand Environment 
Institute (TEI) consulted a cross-section of Thai opinion leaders, to define CSR in the 
Thai context3. The stakeholders reviewed the WBSCD Working Group's draft definition 
of CSR for its relevance to them, and suggested the following modifications highlighted 
in bold: 
"CSR requires the continuing or increasing commitment by business to behaving 
ethically and contributing to economic development, increasing the obligation in 
improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local 
community and society at large" (WBCSD, 1999b). 
This definition, however, was perceived by the Thai stakeholders to be m1ss1ng 
recognition of the need to: (i) mitigate environmental impacts (including impacts on the 
social environment); (ii) prevent environmental impacts; (iii) demonstrate transparency 
and protect consumer interests; (iv) improve people's attitudes towards the environment 
through education; (v) be good corporate citizens; (vi) demonstrate good governance; 
and (vii) address youth and gender issues (WBCSD, 1999b ). 
For the purposes of this research, the definition of corporate social responsibility has 
therefore been expanded to specifically address environmental management 
responsibilities. Herein it is referred to as corporate social and environmental 
responsibility (CSER). 
Another outcome of the Thai stakeholder dialogue were the following definitions of the 
rights and responsibilities of business, government, and society in making business more 
sustainable through market mechanisms: 
i) The government's key role and responsibility is described as that of the regulator 
and enforcer. Government's role is also perceived to be to create reliable 
framework conditions that reward good company behaviour, and enhance market 
3 The program consisted of a dialogue session in Thailand in June 1999 involving interviews with 15 Thai 
opinion leaders from the business and non-business community, and a full day workshop with 
approximately 25 local experts from various fields including business, media, government and NGOs 
(WBCSD, 1999b). 
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mechanisms that promote the development of more sustainable products and 
services. 
ii) The role of business, at a minimum, is perceived to be to respect the laws and 
regulations. Additional performance expectations include: adoption of international 
environmental standards (e.g. ISO 14000 series); improvement of the 
environmental awareness of consumers and employees, participation in voluntary 
initiatives (such as compliance with codes of practice); integration of 
responsibilities and accountabilities for sustainable development; and allocation of 
part of annual profit to help improve society. 
iii) The main role of civil society is perceived to be to act as a watchdog. Specific 
duties are perceived to be to: pressure government to enforce regulation and 
"modernise" infrastructure; pressure business to behave responsibly; increase 
environmental and social awareness within civil, business and communities and 
governmental institutions; and raise consumer demands for "greener" products. In 
addition to the role of civil society, the mass media is perceived to have a 
particular role in raising the profile of sustainability issues, reporting on examples 
of both good and bad practices, and putting pressure on laggards from all 
stakeholder groups. 
Such opinions indicate that the challenge for policymakers and regulators is to identify 
the most effective means of encouraging or coercing industry to adopt greater 
responsibility for managing its social and environmental impacts in a manner that is 
acceptable to the broader stakeholder community (Sheikh, 1996). 
To address this challenge, the regulatory reform debate has become focussed on the 
concept variously known as 'responsive regulation' (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992) , 
'responsible regulation' (Vaitilingam, 1993), or 'smart regulation' (Gunningham, 
1998a). 
The aim of this type of regulation is to provide a judicious mix of persuasion and 
punishment with which to harness the virtue within organisations (Ayres and 
Braithwaite, 1992; Porter and van der Linde, 1996; Stone, i987; Stone, 1996). 
This approach to regulation is defined according to its suitability to simultaneously 
satisfy three criteria (the 3E-test): effectiveness (contributing to improving the 
environment); efficiency (improving the environment at the minimum cost); and equity 
(showing fairness in the burden sharing among players) (Vaitilingam, 1993). Recently, 
other researchers ( e.g. Gunningham, 1998a) have also added a fourth criterion, political 
acceptability (which includes factors such as liberty, transparency and accountability). 
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The specific design objectives of this regulatory approach are to: 
i) ensure accountability and responsibility by regulators and industry; 
ii) allow industry sufficient flexibility to be innovative and adapt to the continually 
changing demands of the marketplace, without being constrained by overly 
prescriptive regulations; and 
iii) provide a safety net for society's interests4. 
To ensure that these objectives are achieved, Gunningham ( 1998a) suggests that the 
implementation of regulatory instruments can be enhanced by providing roles for a 
range of participants or stakeholders to participate in watchdog or partnership roles. 
Based on this premise, it is suggested that design of 'smart' regulation needs to be 
grounded in a solid understanding of how business managers perceive their corporate 
social and environmental responsibilities, and how they perceive and respond to 
stakeholder expectations. Furthermore, it is recognised that the context within which 
organisations act is fundamental to our understanding of corporate responsiveness 
(Shearing, 1993). 
Every industry sector has its own distinctive character and set of behavioural influences. 
The objective of 'smart' (responsive) regulation is to strive to define the optimal balance 
between the objectives of the regulators, the community, and companies, recognising 
their respective strengths and weaknesses, and the opportunities and threats that are 
posed by the situations in which they operate. Therefore it is suggested that legislators 
need to have an understanding of the business environment in which particular industry 
sectors and subsectors operate, in order to identify the appropriate regulatory 
instruments for application in that context. This study seeks to contribute to that 
understanding by defining those parameters for the upstream petroleum industry 
operating in South-East Asia. 
4These criteria have been widely espoused in policy discussion papers by industry organisations and 
legislators, alike. The Australian Manufacturing Council (AMC) published a discussion paper on 'Best 
Practice Environmental Regulation' (AMC, 1993, cited by Stone 1996) that identified 10 principles for 
best practice regulation: certainty, communication, consultation, cost-effectiveness, efficiency, flexibility, 
integrity, practicality, responsibility and transparency. AMC (1993) believes "best practice regulation is a 
regulatory regime that is demonstrably predictable, strategic, integrated, relevant, systematic, 
responsive, has high levels of scientific, financial and social integrity, is collaborative and visible". 
Similarly, Clinton and Gore (1995, cited by Stone, 1996) emphasised 10 key principles in their policy 
paper on 'Reinventing Environmental Regulation'. Their principles include: (i) environmental regulations 
must be performance-based, providing maximum flexibility in the means of achieving environmental 
goals, but requiring accountability for results, and (ii) decision-making should be collaborative, non-




"We've now come to an important moment in the consideration of the 
environment It is a moment when we need to go beyond analysis to 
seek solutions and to take action. It is a moment for change and for 
rethinking of corporate responsibility" (John Browne, Chief Executive 
Officer, British Petroleum Co. plc, 19 May 1997). 
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CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social and environmental responsiveness reflects a deliberate, strategic choice 
by company managers to acknowledge and address particular internal and external 
performance expectations. These expectations may be communicated via cultural, 
political, legal and/or economic demands from stakeholders. By developing an 
understanding of how companies perceive and respond to these demands, one can 
develop a conceptual model with which to analyse empirical observations of corporate 
management behaviour in specific situations, and hence identify the triggers that 
promote the desired behavioural change towards corporate responsiveness. 
The aim of this chapter is to review theoretical models of corporate management 
behaviour to construct a framework to explain the dynamics of company-regulator-
stakeholder relations and the resultant impact on the processes of corporate 
respons1 veness. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the theory of corporate 
strategic management and its key components. This provides a structure for analysing 
the steps that companies may follow to assess their corporate responsibilities and 
develop management strategies. Section 2.3 explains how the external influences of the 
stakeholder environment, such as corporate governance and stakeholder claims, can 
influence company managers' perceptions of their legal and ethical responsibilities. 
Section 2.4 reviews some theories of strategy formulation, i.e. strategy development as 
'managerial intent', 'the outcome of cultural and political processes', and 'imposition'. 
Section 2.5 discusses the types of legitimation strategies that companies may employ to 
achieve their business objectives. Section 2.6 reviews theoretical models for 
categorising corporate social and environmental strategies. Section 2.7 synthesises the 
theoretical concepts discussed in this chapter, to construct a conceptual analytical of 
influence-response relationships to demonstrate how internal and external influences 
mould corporate social and environmental responsiveness. 
2.2 CORPORATE STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
The fallowing discussion is based on the tenet that company managers exercise 
'strategic choice' when formulating and implementing management decisions. That is, 
they may select the contexts in which the company will operate (sectors, markets, 
countries, etc.), and that within the selected contexts, there may be some scope to 
negotiate and work with external stakeholders (Child, 1972). 
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A 'strategy' can be described as: 
"the direction and scope of an organisation over the long tenn: which achieves 
advantage for the organisation through its configuration of resources within a 
changing environment, to 1neet the needs of markets and to fulfil stakeholder 
expectations" (Johnson and Scholes, 1997, p. 10). 
'Strategic managen1ent' is 
"the process by which top management determines the long run ( strategic) direction 
and performance of the organisation by ensuring that careful formulation, proper 
implementation, and continuous evaluation of the strategy takes place" (Alkhafaji, 
1989, p. 265). 
The formalised practice of strategic management has evolved over the last four decades 
in response to increasing turbulence in business' surroundings or business 
'environment' (Hunger and Wheelen, 1996; Forster and Browne, 1996). The core 
components of the strategic management process are: (i) environmental analysis, (ii) 
goal formulation, (iii) strategy formulation, (iv) strategy evaluation, (v) strategy 
implementation, and (vi) strategic control (Alkhafaji, 1989; Carroll, 1996). This process 
is depicted in Figure 2-1. This generic model of the strategic management process is 
applied to the following discussion to frame the linkage between company 
decisionmaking and influences applied by the stakeholder environment. 
The main external influences on strategy formulation are introduced through analysis of 
the business environment, or the strategic context. This is an assessment of the 
company's strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT analysis). Strengths 
are the internal capabilities of the company that help to promote the company's 
objectives in the competitive market. Weaknesses hinder the accomplishments of the 
organisational objectives. Opportunities are the external circumstances that provide the 
company with an extra opportunity to achieve or exceed its objectives. Threats are 
external forces that could adversely affect the company and prevent it from achieving its 
objectives. The SWOT analysis is a process of scanning, monitoring, forecasting, and 
assessing information on trends, events, and issues that are occurring in the stakeholder 
environment. This information includes social, ethical, and public issues along with 
economic, political, and technological factors. The results of this analysis are then fed 
into the strategic management process, as depicted in Figure 2-1. 
The goal and strategy f onnulation components of this process address the establishment 
of the corporate mission and objectives or goals, and development of strategy and 
policies. The company's mission statement identifies the business lines in which the 
company is involved, and sets the company's boundaries for its operations. Formulation 
of the company's philosophy and policies defines the values and beliefs of the company 
that guide the behaviour of its members in all aspects of business activities. These may 
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be articulated in the form of an internal code of conduct, for example. Company policies 
provide guidelines that define ( or constrain) the area within which objectives are 
established and strategies are determined, implemented, and controlled. Policies are 
usually formulated by executive managers and therefore reflect their beliefs, as well as 
the company mission statement. 




















ORGANISATIONAL (COMPANY) ENVIRONMENT 
· ............................................................................................ · ............................................... . 
(Adapted from Carroll, 1996, Figure 18-5, p. 644). 
Determination of strategic objectives ( expected business outcomes) is based upon the 
company's mission, and is moulded by both internal and external factors. Performance 
objectives may be diverse, and include economic, social and environmental performance 
goals. 
Determination of the company's strategy(s) defines the method(s) by which the 
company will achieve its objectives. This may include establishment of alternative 
strategies by executive management in order to give the company some flexibility 
should the preferred strategies not prove to be appropriate. This strategic plan and its 
associated 'tactical moves' (e.g. public relations, lobbying activities, company alliances) 
are the measures aimed at gaining an advantage over competitors or strengthening the 
company's capacity to defend market positions. 
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Strategic iniplenientation is the means to fulfil the company's stated m1ss1on, and 
usually includes the use of programmes, budgets and procedures. The implementation 
process may cover the entire range of managerial activities including motivation, 
compensation, management appraisal, and controlled processes. 
Strategic evaluation and control involve the analysis and evaluation of the strategy and 
its implementation measures to determine their effectiveness in meeting the corporate 
1nission and objectives. Where deficiencies are identified, this component also provides 
for the identification and implementation of corrective measures. 
Strategies may be developed at different levels within the company to address the 
specific needs of the business. For example, in order to address the diverse demands of 
conducting business in a range of geographic market places, it is often necessary for 
corporations to develop a number of strategies for each business unit. Carroll ( 1996) 
identified the following four levels of organisational strategy that are applicable to large 
businesses (like multinational petroleum companies): 
i) Enterprise or societal level strategy is the broadest, overarching level of strategy. 
Its focus is on the role of the company in society and within its industry sector. It is 
manifested by way of mission statements, codes of ethics, 'core values', public 
issues committees, and the definition of the public affairs function. 
ii) Corporate level strategies focus on the overall purpose and scope of the company. 
Formulation of these strategies may involve consideration of diversification and 
acquisition; how the company is to be run in structural and financial terms; and 
how resources are to be allocated to different operations around the world. All of 
these are influenced by the overall mission of the company. 
iii) Competitive or business unit strategies focus on how to compete successfully in a 
particular market. For example, how to achieve competitive advantage; what new 
opportunities can be identified or created in markets; which products or services 
should be developed in which markets; and the suitability of these products or 
services to meet customer needs and achieve the company's objectives. 
iv) Operational or functional strategies focus on how the components of the company 
(i.e. resources, processes, people, and their skills) are integrated to form a 
functional architecture that will effectively deliver the overall strategy. 
Various models have been developed by researchers to depict how companies develop 
corporate social and environmental management strategies, such as Shrivastava (1992)'s 
"process of greening" model. 
Estrada et al. (1997) developed a step-wise process to specifically describe the way in 
which social and environmental issues are incorporated into the strategies of petroleum 
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companies. They segregated the socio-economic set-up (external and internal factors) 
into three overlapping areas in which petroleum companies operate, namely: (i) social 
acceptance of the company's activities (e.g. legitimacy); (ii) the regulatory framework 
(e.g. state regulations); and (iii) the market place (e.g. inter-fuel competition and 
competition between petroleum companies). They assume, for example, that social and 
environmental concerns can translate into political demands on government, which in 
tum affect the business framework of the industry. Once threats and opportunities have 
been assessed, the company will have to evaluate alternative strategies to handle 
perceived issues. In Estrada et al. 's model, the long-term development plan embodies 
activities like investments/divestments and organisational changes. The underlying 
assumption of their model is that the definition of these alternatives, the choice of 
strategy and its incorporation in a long-term development plan will depend on the 
company's structure, e.g. owners, assets, organisational style and degree of 
internationalisation. 
Similarly, Ghobadian et al. (1998) have defined a relationship between decision-making 
processes and the development of strategic social and environmental policies, and how 
investment decisions flow on from these actions. Their approach defines three 
categories of behaviour-altering factors that can affect company strategies: (i) external; 
(ii) mediating; and (iii) moderating. These behaviour-altering factors are depicted in 
Figure 2-2. 
Figure 2-2 Interaction of External, Mediating and Moderating Factors 
Mediating Factors 
External Factors 
Leadership (style, commitment, concern, objectives, e.g. reward) 




Market behaviour Technology 
Opportunity, cost assessment 






(Source: Ghobadian et al.. 1998, Figure 2, p. 17) 
All of these examples of strategic management models indicate that a company should 
assess the effects of demands exerted on the business by the external stakeholder 
environment. This involves identification of the company's stakeholders, and 
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determination of an approach to manage the relationship with stakeholders, so that their 
respective interests and goals are not irrevocably opposed to one another. 
2.3 INFLUENCES OF THE STAKEHOLDER ENVIRONMENT 
Analysis of the business environment ( external and internal factors) is the process in 
which stakeholder expectations are identified, assessed, and addressed in the company's 
management strategies. Johnson and Scholes ( 1997) suggest that there are four core 
questions that guide the analysis of its business environment and formulation of 
management strategies: 
i) Who1n should the company be there to serve and how should the direction and 
purposes of a company be determined? This is the province of corporate 
governance, which relates not only to the power to influence purposes, but also to 
the processes of supervising executive decisions/actions and the issues of 
accountability and the regulatory framework within which companies operate. 
ii) Whom does the company actually serve in practice? This is addressed through the 
concept of organisational stakeholders and the extent to which they are interested 
in and/or able to influence the company's purposes. 
iii) Which purposes should a company fulfil? This issue is influenced by ethical 
considerations. At the broadest level, these issues impinge on corporate 
governance-particularly in relation to the accountability of companies. The 
ethical agenda is also strongly culturally driven and is concerned with corporate 
social and environmental responsibility to the various stakeholders-particularly 
those with little formal power (such as the community at large). It is also 
concerned with the ethical standards and behaviour of individuals within 
companies. Businesses' responsibility to be ethical is the obligation to do what is 
right, just, and fair and to avoid or minimise harm to stakeholders. 
iv) Which purposes are actually prioritised above others? In addition to the 
abovementioned considerations, this issue is also related to a variety of factors in 
the cultural context in which the company is operating. These include the broader 
issues of national cultures through to important reference groups, such as 
professional groups/bodies, to the subcultures within a company. 
Each of these influences is discussed in the fallowing sections. 
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2.3.1 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is the systen1 of rules and practices by which organisations are 
directed and controlled. It is a "direct outgrowth" of the paradigm of legitimacy1• That 
is, for a business to be legitimate and maintain its legitimacy in the view of society, its 
governance must correspond to the will of its stakeholders (Carroll, 1996). Corporate 
governance has emerged as an important theme in the external control of corporations in 
many countries. It is recognised that reliance upon command and control regulatory 
processes to control the performance of companies and the interests of its stakeholders 
is not practical-governments cannot afford the resources to police compliance with the 
regulations. Companies commonly object to 'over-regulation' which they claim 
interferes with their primary objective-to make profits. The intent of corporate 
governance is therefore to force corporations "to take into account the non-economic 
interests of ·workers, consuniers, and the general public" (Parkinson, 1995). 
"The governance role is not concerned with running the business of the company per 
se, but with directors giving overall direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and 
controlling the executive actions of the management and with satisfying legitimate 
expectations for accountability and regulation by interest beyond the corporate 
boundaries" (Sheikh and Chatterjee, 1995, p.6). 
Corporate governance requirements are defined by the regulatory regime within which 
companies operate, and may vary considerably between jurisdictions. Corporate control 
mechanisms defined by corporate governance systems can include: (i) legislation under 
"companies acts", that may contain certain safeguards for the protection of shareholders 
and creditors; (ii) the common law duty of directors to act with reasonable care and 
skill; (iii) civil liability of directors for breaches of their fiduciary duties; and (iv) self-
regulation demands, such as compliance with Codes of Conduct (Sheikh and Chatterjee, 
1995; Sheikh and Rees, 1995). 
1
"Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions" 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 574). From the company perspective, Carroll (1996, p. 592) defines legitimacy as "a 
condition that prevails when there is a congruence between the company's activities and society's 
expectations. Legitimation is a dynamic process by which business seeks to perpetuate its acceptance. 
The dynamic process aspect should be emphasised because society's norms and values change, and 
business must change if its legitimacy is to continue." Gray et al. (1996) suggest that legitimacy theory 
has two variants in this context: the legitimacy of individual companies (referred to by Carroll (1996) as 
the micro level), and the legitimacy of the system as a whole (referred to by Carroll (1996) as the macro or 
business institution level). For example, the first variant may involve challenging the ongoing operational 
legitimacy of a petroleum company that is involved in a major oil spill. The second variant may involve 
challenging the legitimacy of the petroleum industry to continue to exist, given the issues of non-
renewable resource depletion and greenhouse gas emissions. 
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Strong cultural influences have resulted in different traditions and frameworks in 
different countries (Johnson and Scholes, 1997). The concept of directors' liabilities, for 
example, has become particularly important in the enforcement of environmental, health 
and safety laws in developed nations like the United Kingdom (UK), the United States 
of America (US), Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
Some stock exchanges have also introduced compulsory environmental reporting 
requirements in their company listing rules. Public companies listed on US stock 
exchanges are obliged to disclose both their US and foreign environmental liabilities. A 
notification on information disclosure requirements, issued by the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1989, includes an obligation for listed companies to 
disclose existing and potential environmental liabilities. The SEC' s disclosure 
requirements apply to both foreign operations and subsidiaries of reporting US 
companies that may have a material effect upon the corporation as a whole2. The 
Australian Stock Exchange and the Stock Exchange of Thailand also have disclosure 
rules that require listed companies to report environmental liabilities in share proposals, 
offering circulars, etc. 
The influence of corporate governance obligations on company performance will 
depend upon the company's home country and host country rules. 
2.3.2 Stakeholder Claims 
The corporate governance framework within which companies operate provides an 
indication of how the company should define its stakeholders. Namely, whether the 
company is legally obliged to consider the interests of just its shareholders, employees 
and customers, or a broader group of stakeholders. However, the community's 
perception of industry's stakeholders does not always equate with the definition 
provided by the corporate governance rules of the jurisdiction. Identification of the 
company's stakeholders, their claims and their rights ( economic, legal, ethical, and 
philanthropic) can pose a managerial dilemma as to who should be regarded as a 
stakeholder. 
Stakeholder theory and the related concept of 'stakeholder salience' provides some 
insight to explain how managers identify stakeholders and perceive stakeholder claims. 
Stakeholder theory has been described as 
2 The SEC has also demonstrated its intention to bring major environmental disclosure enforcement 
actions This responsibility was tested and proven by the Caterpillar Inc. case (In the Matter of Caterpillar, 
Inc., Rel. No. 34-30532 March 31, 1992, cited by Nelson and Maiden, 1995). 
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"an explicitly systems-based view of the organisation and its environment which 
recognises the dynamic and complex nature of the interplay between thenz" (Gray et al., 
1996, p. 45). 
'Stakeholder salience' describes "the degree to which managers give priority to 
conipeting stakeholder clainzs" (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 854 ). 
There are essentially three recognised variants of stakeholder theory. The first variant is 
the organisation-centred franiework, also known as 'managerial view' (Freeman, 1984 ), 
or 'strategic approach' (Goodpaster, 1991). In this model, stakeholders are narrowly 
defined as "any hiunan agency that can be influenced by, or can itself influence, the 
activities of the organisation in question" (Gray et al., 1996, p. 45). 
Stakeholders are identified by the extent to which the company believes the involvement 
with each stakeholder needs to be managed in order to further the interests of the 
company, such as pursuing profits for the company's shareholders. Acknowledgment of 
stakeholder claims is narrowly based on the company's perception of their legitimacy. 
Certain individuals and groups have legitimacy in the eyes of management, i.e. they 
have legitimate interest in, or claim on, the operations of the company (Carroll, 1996). 
Stakeholders are also viewed as instruments that may use their legitimacy to facilitate or 
impede the company's pursuit of its strategic objectives. For example, managers might 
take stakeholders into account because offended stakeholders might resist or retaliate 
( e.g. through political action, protest, or boycott). 
In essence, this narrow view is based on the practical need for managers to optimise use 
of their limited time and resources, necessitating the ability to define relevant 
stakeholder groups in terms of their direct relationship to the organisation's core 
economic interests or moral claims. The more important the stakeholder is to the 
company, the more effort will be exerted in managing that relationship (Gray et al., 
1996). 
The second variant of stakeholder theory is the organisation-stakeholder interplay, also 
known as the 'stakeholder view' of the company (Freeman, 1984), or the 'multifiduciary 
approach' (Goodpaster, 1991). It is a socially grounded variant that involves 
responsibility and accountability (Gray et al., 1996). This broad view of stakeholders 
holds that management has a fiduciary responsibility to all of its stakeholders, and that 
stakeh9lders are to be accorded a comparable standing with company shareholders. 
In this variant, "a stakeholder in an organisation is any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation's objectives" (Freeman, 
1984 ). Company managers define their stakeholders as not only those groups that 
management believes have some stake in the company, but also those parties that 
themselves believe they have a stake in the company (Carroll, 1996). 
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The focus of this view of stakeholders is their power3 base (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Po\ver is a key indicator of the potential influence of stakeholders in relation to a critical 
operational issue or formulation and implementation of a particular business strategy. 
As observed by Hardy and Phillips (1998, p. 227), 
"The ability to participate in domain development and to define the problems that 
characterise it, depends either on having the power to make oneself heard or on the 
goodwill of powe1ful domain members to allow low-power participants to participate." 
This definition leaves the notion of stake and the field of possible stakeholders open to 
include virtually anyone-only those who cannot affect the organisation (have no 
power) and are not affected by it (have no claim or relationship) are excluded from 
having a stake (Mitchell, et al., 1997). These stakeholders may or may not have 
legitimate claims, but they nevertheless may be able to affect, or are affected by, the 
organisation, and thus can affect the interests of those who do have legitimate claims. 
Stakeholders in a company may therefore be numerous and diverse, and include 
employees, communities, special interest groups, society, the State, customers, 
suppliers, competitors, local government, stock markets (shareholders), industry bodies, 
foreign governments, future generations, and custodians of the natural environment. 
The third variant, the stakeholder synthesis approach, represents the middle ground. 
This view holds that companies have moral responsibilities to stakeholders, but that they 
should not be seen as part of a fiduciary obligation. This approach evolved in 
recognition of the need to have a practical balance. 
"The broad concept of stakeholder management must be better defined in order to 
serve the narrower interests of legitimate stakeholders. Othenvise, influencing groups 
with power over the finn can disrupt operations so severely that legitimate claims 
cannot be met and thefinn may not survive" (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 863). 
In this variant, management's basic fiduciary responsibility to company shareholders is 
kept intact, but it is also expected to be implemented within the context of ethical 
responsibility. That is, companies should be managing strategically and morally at the 
same time. 
Assessment of stakeholders to determine their overall influence in regard to a particular 
issue may be performed by what is termed 'stakeholder mapping', whereby individuals 
or groups of stakeholders are categorised according to the attributes they are perceived 
to possess. There are several approaches to stakeholder mapping. For example, 
stakeholders may be mapped according to their legitimacy-primary stakeholders are 
3 Power is defined as the extent to which individuals or groups are able to persuade, induce or coerce 
others into following certain courses of action (Johnson and Scholes, 1997). 
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defined as those that have formal, official, or contractual relationships with the 
company, and all others are classified as secondary stakeholders. 
Another approach is to focus on linking stakeholder power and their interests by 
developing power/interest matrices (Mendelow, 1991; Savage et al., 1991). The 
situational power dynamics will influence the strategies of engagement adopted by 
companies and their stakeholders. The development of specific stakeholder management 
strategies 111ay be based on a classification of stakeholders according to the concepts of 
the potential for cooperation/level of interest and threat/power. High power-low 
interest stakeholders are viewed as "supportive"; low power-low interest stakeholders 
are considered "niarginal"; high power-low interest stakeholders are regarded as 
"non-supportive"; and high power-high interest are viewed as "niixed blessings". 
Hardy and Phillips ( 1998) have advanced this concept by developing a framework that 
highlights three aspects of power: (i) formal authority; (ii) the control of critical 
resources; and (iii) discursive legitimacy. They suggest that by "asking who has formal 
authority, ·who controls key resources, and who is able to nianage legitilnacy 
discursively, we can also identify various power dynamics. " In this context, formal 
authority is defined as 
"the recognised, legitimate right to make a decision. In an interorganisational domain, 
such power might rest with one particular organisation, such as the government; it 
might be shared between organisations as in a joint venture; it may rest with a 
convener; or it may be dispersed" (Hardy and Phillips, 1998, p. 219). 
Scarce or critical resources, such as expertise, money, equipment, and information are 
sources of power when one organisation or group relies on another for that resource, 
thereby placing the dependent organisation at a relative power disadvantage. 
The third aspect of power, in this framework, is discursive legitimacy. For example, in 
the case of the Brent Spar disposal proposal, environmental groups like Greenpeace 
were able to affect public understanding, attract media attention, and pressure the 
government, because they were perceived to be legitimately speaking on behalf of the 
environment. As was evident in that example, discursive legitimacy may afford such 
organisations more influence than resource-rich corporations or formal decision makers 
whose self-interest is more obvious. 
-
The Brent Spar incident highlighted another important consideration in stakeholder 
mapping-the element of urgency. Urgency is defined by Mitchell et al. ( 1997, p. 867) 
"as the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate attention". Its degree of 
influence is contingent upon the existence of two conditions: (i) time sensitivity-the 
degree to which managerial delay in attending to the claim or relationship is 
unacceptable to the stakeholder; and (ii) criticality-the importance of the claim or the · 
relationship to the stakeholder. Stakeholders can quickly change their status with a 
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change of circumstances. This can occur with the media or special-interest groups when 
the urgency of a claim (as in a boycott or demonstration) takes precedence over the 
power of that claim. 
"In today's business environment, the media have the power to instantaneously 
transform a stakeholder' s status with coverage on the evening news" (Carroll, 1996, 
p. 77). 
Urgency, like power and legitimacy, is not a steady-state attribute, but can vary across 
stakeholder-manager relationships or within a single relationship across time. Mitchell 
et al. ( 1997) therefore suggest that stakeholder mapping should consider power and 
legitinzacy in the context of urgency, to give the model a dynamic dimension. They have 
identified seven types of stakeholder that emerge from mapping various combinations of 
the attributes power, legitimacy, and urgency. Three possess only one attribute, three 
possess two attributes, and one possesses all three attributes, as depicted in Figure 2-3. 

















The low salience classes, represented by types 1, 2 and 3 (dormant, discretionary, and 
demanding stakeholders), are identified by their possession or attributed possession of 
only one of the attributes. Mitchell et al. ( 1997) refer to them as latent stakeholders. The 
moderately salient stakeholders represented by types 4, 5 and 6 ( dominant, dangerous 
and dependent stakeholders) are identified by their possession or attributed possession 
of two of the attributes, and are referred to as expectant stakeholders. The combination 
of all three attributes (including the dynamic relations among them) is the defining 
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feature of highly salient stakeholders (type 7), referred to as definitive stakeholders. 
Those individuals or entities possessing none of the attributes are non-stakeholders (type 
8). The characteristics of stakeholder types 1-7 are summarised in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 Stakeholder Typology Characteristics 
Type Attributes Characteristics and Salience 
1 Power Without a legitimate relationship or an urgent claim, their power 
Latent: remains unused. Dormant stakeholders have little or no interaction 
Dormant with the organisation. However, they have potential to acquire a 
second attribute and increase their saliency, so management should 
remain cognisant of such stakeholders. 
2 Legitimacy Without power and urgent claims, there is no pressure on managers to 
Latent: engage in an active relationship with such a stakeholder, although 
Discretionary managers may choose to do so. 
3 Urgency Demanding stakeholders are bothersome, but not warranting more 
Latent: than passing management attention, if any at all. Where stakeholders 
Demanding are unable or unwilling to acquire either the power or the legitimacy 
to increase their saliency, the 'noise' of urgency is insufficient to 
project a stakeholder claim beyond latency. 
4 Power and Characterised as 'dominant', in deference to the legitimate claims they 
Expectant: Legitimacy have upon the organisation and their ability to act upon these claims. 
Dominant They may or may not ever choose to act on their claims. Managers 
may recognise this power and legitimacy, and put in place some 
formal mechanism that acknowledges the importance of their 
relationship with the organisation. For example, corporate boards of 
directors generally include representatives of owners, significant 
creditors, and community leaders, and there is normally an investor 
relations office to handle communications with investors. 
5 Legitimacy and Characterised as 'dependent' because these stakeholders depend upon 
Expectant: Urgency others ( other stakeholders or the organisation's managers) for the 
Dependent power necessary to carry out their will. Power in this relationship is 
not reciprocal, so its exercise is governed either through the advocacy 
or guardianship of other stakeholders, or through the guidance of 
internal management values. For example in the Exxon Valdez oil 
spill case, several stakeholder groups had urgent and legitimate 
claims, but they had little power or no power to enforce their will in 
the relationship. To satisfy their claims, these stakeholders had to rely 
on the advocacy of other, powerful stakeholders, or on the 
benevolence and voluntarism of the organisation's management. 
-
6 Power and Lacking legitimacy, these stakeholders will be coercive and possibly 
Expectant: Urgency violent, making the stakeholder literally 'dangerous' to the 
Dangerous organisation. The actions of these stakeholders are not only outside 
the bounds of legitimacy, but are dangerous to both the stakeholder-
manager relationship and to the individuals and entities involved, e.g. 
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Characteristics and Salience 
. )'\ 
The most common occurrence is likely to be the movement of a 
dominant stakeholder into the definitive category, e.g. actions by 
shareholders of a company to remove top management if they 
perceive that their legitimate interests (share values) are not being 
served by their actions. Any expectant stakeholder can become a 
definitive stakeholder by acquiring the missing attribute, e.g. 
dependent Alaskan citizens became definitive stakeholders of Exxon 
during the Exxon Valdez incident by acquiring a powerful ally in 
government. Managers have a clear and immediate mandate to attend 
to and give priority to a definitive stakeholder' s claim. 
Source: Compiled from characteristics identified by Mitchell et al. (1997). 
In essence, those stakeholders that hold two or three of the key attributes are those 
expected to gain most attention and be engaged in some form of dialogue with 
managers, whereas latent stakeholders may not even be recognised by managers. 
Nevertheless, latent stakeholders can increase their salience and move into the 
'expectant stakeholder' category by acquiring just one of the missing attributes. If the 
stakeholder is particularly effective, for example, in coalition building or political 
action, that stakeholder can move into the 'definitive stakeholder' category 
(characterised by high salience to managers), starting from any position-latent, 
expectant, or potential (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
It is recognised, however, that all three attributes (power, legitimacy and urgency) are 
socially constructed perceptual phenomena, which may be perceived differently by the 
stakeholder, the manager, and other participants. 
The stakeholders in a company's activities potentially represent a broad cross-section of 
the community. The demands of the stakeholder environment may therefore be diverse 
and in conflict with each other, leading to managerial confusion about how the interests 
should be prioritised. 
"One major criticism relates to the complexity of identifying, assessing, and 
responding to stakeholder claims, which constitute an extremely difficult and time-
consuming process. Also, the ranking of stakeholder claims is no easy task. Some 
1nanagers continue to think in stockholder terms because this is easier. To think in 
stakeholder terms increases the complexity of decision making, and it is overly taxing 
for some managers to determine which stakeholders' claims take priority in a given 
situation" Carroll (1996, p. 95). 
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Stakeholder saliency will therefore be determined on the basis of how managers 
perceive the stakeholder claims in relation to their potential influence on business 
continuity. 
" although groups can be identified reliably as stakeholders based on their 
possession of power, legitimacy, and urgency in relationship to the firm, it is the firm's 
managers who determine which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive 
management attention; that is, one can identify a firm's stakeholders based on 
attributes, but managers may or may not perceive the stakeholder field correctly. The 
stakeholders winning management's attention will be only those the managers perceive 
to be highly salient" (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 871). 
Mitchell et al. ( 1997) suggest that managerial characteristics should, therefore, be 
regarded as a variable that may affect stakeholder salience. Managers vary greatly in 
their scanning practices (Daft et al., ] 988) and in their values (Hambrick and Mason, 
1984). Greer and Downey (1982) have found that managers' values relative to social 
regulation have a strong effect on how they react to stakeholder claims. Other 
researchers suggest that management's sense of self-interest or self-sacrifice is also an 
important value in this relationship (Dawkins, 1976; Wilson, 1974; Granovetter, 1985; 
Pe1Tow, 1986). 
2.3.3 Summary 
Corporate social and environmental responsibilities infer that companies should adopt a 
broad view of stakeholders. However, company managers are driven by commercial 
pressures that require them to prioritise their responses to stakeholder claims on the 
basis of their perceived influence on the business. The factors that may affect 
stakeholder salience include their legitimacy, power, urgency and the relevance of their 
claims as determined by the values systems of the company managers. 
2.4 STRATEGY FORMULATION 
There are several ways in which management strategies may be formulated, depending 
on internal factors ( e.g. the structure of the company and the levels at which strategies 
are formulated, and the company culture(s)); and external factors (e.g. stakeholder 
influences on the company). 
Company managers assess the environmental and social risks posed by internal and 
external factors through consideration of their: (i) legal requirements and liabilities; (ii) 
public perception; (iii) ability to reduce risks; (iv) ability to share risks with other 
parties ; and (v) the amount of risk that they and their shareholders are prepared to 
accept. 
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Fischer and Schot (1997) suggest that strategies may, therefore, emerge as the product of 
one or more of the following influences: 
i) As a result of deliberate managerial intent. That is, through a planning process, or 
through the command of an influential individual (e.g. chief executive) or a small 
group (e.g. senior executives). 
ii) As the outcome of cultural and political processes in and around companies. 
iii) By imposition, for example by a parent holding company, or regulatory 
requirements. 
2.4.1 Strategy Formulation as Managerial Intent 
The formal approach to strategy development subscribes to the view that it should be the 
outcome of "careful objective analyses and planning", managed through a sequence of 
steps. These steps involve objective setting, the analysis of environmental trends and 
resource capabilities, the evaluation of different options, and the planning for strategy 
implementation (Johnson and Scholes, 1997). 
In the context of corporate environmental management, Gladwin (1993) refers to this 
purposive approach as "greening as strategic choice". 
[Organisational leaders] "are seen to anticipate future threats and opportunities, 
engage in sound strategic analysis, set strategic objectives, and marshal, develop and 
dynamically allocate resources to implement strategy" (Gladwin, 1993, pp. 51-52). 
The apparent rigour behind formal planning may mislead observers to believe that 
management strategies have the full commitment and support of the companies. For 
instance, there is increasing social pressure, through quality management system 
standards (e.g. ISO 9000 series), environmental management systems standards (e.g. 
ISO 14000 series), and corporate annual reporting requirements, for companies to 
publicly declare their values, beliefs and purposes, through written mission statements 
and policy statements. Some external stakeholders have interpreted these statements as 
reliable indicators of the companies' organisational culture. However, as cautioned by 
Johnson and Scholes ( 1997, pp. 217-8), 
[These statements] "are likely to be at best only partially accurate, and at worst 
misleading, descriptions of the real organisational culture. This is not to suggest that 
there is any organised deception. It is simply that the statements of values and beliefs 
are often statements of aspiration or strategic intent of a particular stakeholder ( such 
as the chief executive officer), rather than accurate descriptions of the culture as it 
exists in the minds and hearts of people within and around the organisation." 
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Fro111 such observations, Johnson and Scholes ( 1997) conclude that there are "dangers 
in the fonnalisation of strategic planning": 
i) Strategies are more or less successfully implemented through people. Their 
behaviour will not be determined by plans. So the cultural and political dimensions 
of companies have to be taken into account. Planning processes are not typically 
designed to do this. 
ii) The strategy resulting from deliberations of a corporate planning department, or a 
senior management team, may not be owned more widely in the con1pany. 
iii) The managers responsible for the implementation of strategies, usually line 
managers, may be so busy with day-to-day operations of the business that they cede 
responsibility for strategic issues to specialists. However, the specialists do not 
have power in the company to make things happen. The result can be that strategic 
planning becomes an intellectual exercise removed from the reality of operation. 
iv) The process of strategic planning may be so cumbersome that individuals or groups 
in the company might contribute to only part of it and not understand the whole. 
v) Strategic planning can become concentrated on detail, \Vhich, while sound in itself, 
may miss the major strategic issues facing the company. 
vi) Planning can become obsessed with the search for absolute determinants of 
performance-a set of economic indicators, for example-or a definitively right 
strategy. It might be more important to establish a more generalised strategic 
direction within which there is flexibility. 
2.4.2 Strategy Formulation Through Cultural and Political Processes 
Johnson and Scholes (1997, pp. 24-25) suggest that strategic management and strategy 
development can also be viewed 
"as a process of crafting-strategic management is seen not as a formal planning 
process, but rather in terms of processes by which strategies develop in companies on 
the basis of managers' experience, their sensitivity to changes in their environments 
and what they learn from operating in their ,narkets." 
Recognition of stakeholder claims in the context of business objectives is influenced by 
the values systems of companies. Ethical choices are closely linked to the cultural 
context in which companies operate and the company's own culture. Pfeffer ( 1997) 
suggests that control in companies is exercised through the company's culture, and 
individual, interpersonal influence, in which those in roles of authority motivate and 
direct others to act in a preferred manner. This organisational paradigm has implications 
for how the company views itself, how it perceives the outside world, and the openness 
28 
CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
of its management ranks to accepting ranging opinions from both inside and outside the 
company (Johnson and Scholes, 1997). 
The origins of a company's culture are of importance in developing an understanding of 
how individual companies are structured, make decisions, and formulate and implement 
strategies. Within large companies there is typically more than one type of culture-
subcultures exist. These subcultures may arise in a number of ways, for example under 
the influence of trade unions or specialist professions. The subcultures may also relate 
directly to the structure of the company. For example, as a result of differences between 
geographical divisions in a multinational company, or between functional groups such 
as finance, marketing, operations, and environment, health and safety (Johnson and 
Scholes, 1997). 
Organisational culture is typically built up over time, from the accumulation of 
individual, group and organisational experiences, to form a 'taken-for-grantedness', 
which is passed on over time through the company or workgroups to its individuals 
(Alkhafaji, 1989; Johnson and Scholes, 1997). Johnson and Scholes (1997, p. 53) define 
'organisational culture' as 
"the deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an 
organisation, that operate unconsciously and define in a basic taken-for-granted 
fashion an organisation's view of itself and its environment." 
In the context of corporate environmental management, this approach captures what 
Gladwin ( 1993) has described as "greening as organisational learning". Empirical 
evidence suggests that the way in which senior managers within corporations interpret 
issues can influence the form of organisational response (Daft and Weick, 1984; Dutton 
and Dukerich, 1991; Isabella, 1990). In this respect whether environmental protection 
issues are perceived as a potential threat (Walley and Whitehead, 1994) or opportunity 
(Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995) can affect an organisation's strategic 
choices (Dutton and Duncan, 1987; Welford, 1996; Estrada et al., 1997). 
Johnson and Scholes ( 1997) observed that the more rational, planning view of strategy 
tends to be used most by senior executives, particularly chief executives. Whereas the 
cultural and political processes tend to be used most by managers below the level of the 
executive management to formulate business unit or operational level strategies. They 
suggest that this observation can be explained by the fact that it may be the chief 
executives who have developed procedures from a strategic perspective, whereas the 
functional managers are operating on a case-by-case basis, responding to issues as they 
anse. 
Johnson and Scholes (1997) emphasise that organisational learning between vanous 
parts of the company is a necessity in the successful implementation of this approach to 
strategy formulation. Organisational learning refers to experience-based improvement in 
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organisational task performance, and is reflected in the improvement in performance of 
individual decision-n1akers whose learning comes to be encoded in what Argyris and 
Schon ( 1978) term "organisational maps, 1nemories and progranis"4 . 
Of particular in1portance is the sharing of learning experiences from the experimentation 
with new or 1nodified approaches within divisions of the company, followed by the 
broader implementation of successful, proven approaches. The 'Post-Altman model' 
developed by Post and Altman ( 1992, 1994) links corporate greening to organisation 
learning. Post and Altman ( 1994) suggest that 
"effective responses to social concerns occur where managers have explicitly 
processed lessons learned from past experience". 
The Post-Altman model identifies three phases of corporate greening: (i) adjustment 
(incremental in nature, and driven by regulatory and market pressures); (ii) adaptation 
(anticipating future trends, and partially driven by environmental values); and (iii) 
innovation (where environmental values are institutionalised in all parts of the company, 
and environmental performance is systematically measured). 
Organisational learning (particularly deutero-learning5) is critical for corporate greening, 
as environmental concerns affect all company operations and moves to\vard sustainable 
development require transformed business values (Neale, 1997). A frequently cited 
example of this process was the transformation in corporate policy that evolved within 
Royal Dutch/Shell during the course of the controversy over disposal of the Brent Spar 
oil storage facility (1995-1998). 
4 Argyris and Schon (197 8) suggest that organisational learning occurs when individuals, acting from their 
images and 'maps', detect a match or mismatch of outcome to expectation that confirms or contradicts the 
organisational theory-in-use. The correction process requires the individuals to detect the sources of error 
(i.e. errors in strategies and assumptions in the existing theory-in-use), and then develop new strategies, 
based on new assumptions in order to co1Tect error. This is followed by evaluation of the new strategies 
and actions, once implemented. However, in order for organisational learning to occur, the individuals' 
discoveries, inventions, and evaluations must be embedded in the organisational memory. That is, in the 
individual images and the shared maps or organisational theory-in-use from which individual members 
will subsequently act. If this encoding does not occur, individuals will have learned, but the company will 
not have done so. 
5 Organisational learning theory is commonly described in terms of 'single-loop learning', 'double-loop 
learning' and 'deutero-learning' (Bateson, 1971). Deutero-learning or second-order learning (Argyris and 
Schon, 197 8) involves reflection on and inquiry into previous episodes of organisational learning, or 
failure to learn. "They discover what they did that facilitated or inhibited learning, they invent new 
strategies for learning, they produce these strategies, and they evaluate and generalise what they have 
produced. The results become encoded in individual images and maps and are reflected in organisational 
learning practice" (Argyris and Schon, 1978, p. 27). 
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The concept of organisational learning is inherently linked to the theory of 
organisations.6 Argyris and Schon (1978, p. 9) suggest that 
" [ t J he organisation needs to be seen not as a stable hierarchy, but as an adaptive, 
continually changing learning organisation .... Our organisations live in economic, 
political, and technological environments which are predictably unstable. The 
requirement for organisational learning is not an occasional, sporadic phenomenon, 
but is continuous and endemic to our society." 
A 'learning organisation' is defined by Senge (1990, p. 14) as "an organisation that is 
continually expanding its capacity to create its future. " The establishment of a learning 
organisation is not easy task. Organisations are associations of individuals-it is the 
individuals who must learn in order for the organisation to learn, although individual 
learning does not guarantee organisational learning. A core learning dilemma for 
companies is that the best learning is gained from experience. Yet the most critical 
decisions made in companies have system-wide consequences that may extend over 
years or decades, so that those responsible for the decisions may not directly experience 
the consequences of those decisions, and the ref ore have no precedent from which to 
learn (Senge, 1990). 
Argyris and Schon (1978) also note that organisational learning is not the prerogative of 
the organisation's leader to learn for the organisation. In large and complex companies, 
leaders come and go, while the company largely maintains its integrity, and learns or 
fails to learn in ways that often may be largely unrelated to the incumbent leader. 
Companies must also confront sectoral and internal barriers to learning associated with 
their culture(s). Within an industry sector, like the petroleum industry, there tends to 
develop a common view about organisational purposes and a 'shared wisdom' on how 
to develop and manage companies in that industry. Estrada et al. (1997) suggest that 
staff perceptions and attitudes directly influence the importance that a petroleum 
company gives to social and environmental issues. Attitudes are grounded in both the 
experiences common to the industry at large and the company's own business culture 
(e.g. managerially driven or financially driven). 
6 Argyris and Schon (1978, pp. 322-3) view organisations "as the instruments for the achievement of 
social purposes ... The organisation is itself a subject which is conceived as sentient, active, intelligent 
and purposeful. ... Organisations-as-agents are involved in the effort to achieve objectives by the 
judicious selection of appropriate means. The focus is upon the acquisition and application of knowledge 
useful for effective performance of the organisation's tasks ... The salient elements are decisions, for it is 
through decision-making that knowledge is applied to the performance of organisational tasks. The 
organisation acts upon its environment through the decisions made by individuals in key roles". As 
defined by Pfeffer (1997, p. 8), "organisations are ... a process of organising support sufficient to 
continue existence. Organisational survival receives focus as a goal because survival must be continually 
accomplished and is never automatic." 
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Many industries also have trade or professional associations that reinforce these norms. 
Against this background, it may prove difficult for individual companies to step out of 
line fron1 this 'industry recipe' without being labelled as mavericks or cowboys 
(Johnson and Scholes, 1997). While there is clearly an advantage to such cultural 
influences, in terms of rnaintaining rninimum standards and consistency in operational 
processes, Johnson and Scholes, 1997, pp. 216-217) caution that 
"[t}he danger is that managers may not look beyond their industry in thinking through 
strategies for the future. They become victims of industry 'groupthink'7 and do not see 
the lessons 1vhich can be learnt from outside their own industry". 
Within companies, managers are often faced "not 1vvith a continually changing learning 
organisation, but with resistance to change" (Johnson and Scholes, 1997, p. 452). This 
resistance to change may be the result of the company becoming trapped in its on 
paradigm and routines. Proactive management is required to "unfreeze" this paradigm. 
2.4.3 Strategy Formulation by Imposition 
In some companies, strategies are formulated in response to the demands of influential 
stakeholders, such as government regulators, or by imposition of directives under the 
command of senior executives. Substantial changes in the external business 
environment, such as major technological advances, regulatory shifts, upheavals in the 
socio-economic environment can lead to leaps in organisational evolution, as the 
company's leadership is forced to implement major shifts in strategy, power, structure, 
control, etc. in order for the company to survive. 
- . 
Johnson and Scholes ( 1997, p. 358) caution that 
"It is important that, if strategies are selected in this way, they have some completeness 
and are workable in practice . ... A dangerous combination can be powe,ful visionary 
stakeholders who are able to dominate the processes of strategic choice, but who are 
badly informed about the practicalities of making strategies work." 
In the context of corporate social and environmental management, this approach 
captures what Gladwin (1993) has described as "greening as institutionalism", which 
suggests that 
_ "changes in the features of organisations ( such as greening) are often introduced to 
make organisations more aligned with the changing norms and expectations of the 
institutional environment" (Gladwin, 1993, pp. 47-48). 
7 
'Groupthink' is "a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive 
in-group, when members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise 
alternative courses of action" (Janis, 1982, cited in Neale, 1997, p. 94 ). 
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Greening in this model is viewed as a process of normative conformity and/or external 
legitimation from which advantages may be derived, such as greater stability and 
predicability, enhanced legitin1acy and status, greater ease of access to resources, greater 
invulnerability to questioning. 
The influence of externally imposed pressures is also captured in what Gladwin (1993) 
has described as "greening as natural selection". This view is based on population 
ecology theory, vvhich suggests that 
"organisational survival is the result of external pressures that differentially select 
forms of retention in an organisation's population" (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984, 
1989, cited by Gladwin, 1993, p. 49-50). 
The focus of this theory is not individual companies, but the entire populations of 
organisations over time. Hence, the theory downplays the consequences of managerial 
discretion or action and suggests that organisational change is limited by 
"strong inertial pressures or constraints such as investment in plant, equipment, and 
specialised personnel; limits on the internal information received by decision makers; 
internal political constraints supportive of vested interests; and organisational history, 
which justifies past action and prevents consideration of alternative strategies. 
External pressures for stability include legal and economic barriers to entry into new 
areas of activity; constraints on the external information gathered by decision makers; 
legitimacy considerations; and the problems of collective rationality and the general 
equilibrium" (Gladwin, 1993, p. 49). 
According to this theory, the assumption of strong structural inertia implies that 
organisational change toward greening lags behind or fails to meet the external demands 
for greening. Organisational transformation toward greening may be adaptive in the long 
term, but difficult and disruptive in the short term, and therefore greening may occur as 
a result of selection and replacement (the creation and demise of companies and 
structures of companies) rather than as a result of organisational transformation. 
"Adaptation, in other words, will largely be determined fro,n without, with the external 
environment selecting green organisations and allowing only those firms with 
appropriate green variations to survive" (Gladwin, 1993, p. 50). 
Characteristic of this approach, according to DiMaggio and Powell ( 1983), is the 
tendency of companies within an 'organisational field' ( e.g. industry sector) to come to 
resemble one another over time in their structures and practices. Competitive pressures 
serve to eliminate those companies that deviate from the norm, and a variety of 
institutional pressures encourage the remaining companies to imitate their more 
successful rivals to enhance their legitimacy. These include coercive pressures, such as 
laws that compel conformity; mimetic pressures, by which companies model themselves 
on others to reduce uncertainty; and normative pressures involving authorisation or 
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legitin1ation of organisational practices by superordinate collectives, such as compliance 
vvith professional standards or guidelines (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Of particular relevance to organisations like multinational petroleum companies, is the 
imposition of a particular business strategy, as a result of enforced direction or 
significant business constraints. For example, petroleum companies seeking to conduct 
exploration and production operations in most developing countries are required by host 
country regulations to form local alliances and enter into production sharing contracts 
with the state-owned oil companies. Similarly, an operating business unit within a 
multi divisional corporation may regard the overall · corporate strategic direction of its 
parent as an enforced choice; or a subsidiary may have strategies imposed on it from 
corporate head office. 
Business environment constraints can also place limits on strategy choice. Johnson and 
Scholes (1997, p. 62) cite the example of the petroleum industry, where 
"senior executives argue that they have to manage strategy for a commodity in a 
market dorninated by raw material prices and availability, and that all they can do is to 
keep costs down, learn to be as good as possible at forecasting changes in that 
environ,nent, and respond as rapidly as possible to such changes." 
In situations where the influence of commodity price pressures company managers to 
take a minimalist approach to expenditure, this influence can act as a major constraint to 
adopting a committed, long-term approach to the process of greening. 
According to Gladwin (1993), this punctuated equilibrium model 8 of organisational 
evolution suggests that only shallow corporate greening, managed by middle managers, 
is likely during periods of relative continuity of strategy (known as convergence 
periods). 
Deeper greening, involving fundamental changes in core values, product and market 
strategies, and resource allocation, may depend on exposure to major social or 
environmental crises that threaten organisational survival. It may also arise by way of 
managerial imposition, if it is driven by a strong visionary. This approach may be 
appropriate where there is a perceived need to counterbalance the risk of strategic drift9, 
8 Historical studies of organisations have shown that typically there are long periods of relative continuity 
during which established strategy remains unchanged or changes incrementally; and there are also periods 
of flux in which strategies change but in no clear direction. Transformational change, in which there is a 
fundamental change in strategic direction, does take place but is infrequent. This pattern has become 
known as 'punctuated equilibrium' (Johnson and Scholes, 1997). 
9 
'Strategic drift' is defined by Johnson and Scholes (1997) as the process in which an organisation's 
strategy gradually moves away from addressing the forces at work in its environment, often as a result of 
organisation wanting to continue to work within a framework with which is it familiar and comfortable. 
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which is likely to occur because of the power of the paradigm of the company. For 
example, where a company's leaders or key stakeholders wish to introduce an impetus 
to the company to change its direction by pursuing transformational strategies or "great 
leaps fonvard. }J 
2.4.4 Summary 
Corporate social and environmental responsiveness, or 'greening', is described by 
Gladwin (1993) as a process that can occur via one or more of the following six paths: 
greening as institutionalisation; natural selection; strategic choice; transformational 
leadership; organisational evolution; and/or organisational learning. The first two 
greening processes essentially infer that companies do not take an active role in the 
greening process, rather they reactively adapt their strategies and performance to avoid 
losing their legitimacy. By contrast, the latter four theories of greening all involve an 
element of deliberate, proactive strategic direction setting. However, these paths are not 
discrete, and it is probable that some companies wi11 proceed along one or more of the 
paths simultaneously. 
Greening may involve very extensive organisational change, innovation, and 
entrepreneurship, as well as substantial administrative change-fundamental 
transformations of mission, structure, and political, cultural, and technical systems 
(Gladwin, 1993; Bhargava and Welford, 1996). It is apparent that company leadership 
plays an important role in this process. 
Gladwin (1993, pp. 52-53) suggests that rapid proactive greening may be dependent on 
'charismatic green leadership', defined 
"as the force of personality that induces a high degree of loyalty1 com,nitment, and 
devotion to the leader; identification of people with the leader and the leader's 
mission,· adoption of the leader's values, goals and behaviour,· a sense of being 
inspired by the leader,· a sense of self-esteem from relationships with the leader and the 
leader's niission)· and high degree of trust in the leader and the correctness of the 
leader's beliefs " (Daft, 1992, cited by Gladwin, 1993). 
Followers, especially top management teams, are motivated by charismatic and inspired 
leaders to: 
"believe in the vtszon of corporate transformation, to recognise the need for 
revitalisation, to sign on for the new vision, and to help institutionalise a new 
organisational process " (Daft 1992, cited by Gladwin, 1993). 
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2.5 LEGITIMATION 
Company managers are constantly faced with demands from stakeholders whose 
collective claims may be broad ranging and sometimes in conflict. While stakeholders 
exert their legitimacy to make claims on companies, they are also challenging the 
legitimacy of those companies. In response, companies strive to preserve their 
legitimacy. They may do so for many reasons, but Suchman (1995, p. 574) suggests that 
perceptions of the importance, difficulty, and effectiveness of legitimation efforts are 
linked to two key dimensions: "the distinction between pursuing continuity and 
pursuing credibility", and "the distinction between seeking passive support and seeking 
active support". The reason for seeking legitimacy will thus influence the way in which 
companies actively seek to gain and/or maintain their legitimacy. 
2.5.1 Strategies 
In order to manage the level of uncertainty associated with challenges to company 
legitimacy, managers must devise appropriate legitimation strategies, within the context 
of the company's social and environmental responsibilities and business objectives. A 
company may seek legitimacy in several ways. For example, it may adapt its methods of 
operating to conform to what it perceives to be the prevailing standards. Alternatively, it 
may try to change the public's values and norms to conform with its own practices by 
advertising and other techniques; or it may attempt to enhance its legitimacy by 
identifying itself with other companies, persons, values, or symbols that have a powerful 
legitimate base in society (Epstein and Votaw, 1978; Lindblom, 1994). 
For example, in the case of a failure of a petroleum company's performance, resulting in 
a serious accident or a major pollution incident, the company may seek to: (i) 'educate' 
its stakeholders about the company's intentions to improve that performance; (ii) change 
the stakeholders' perceptions of the event (but without changing the company's actual 
performance); (iii) distract (i.e. manipulate) attention away from the issue of concern 
(concentrate on some positive activity not necessarily related to the failure itself); or (iv) 
change external expectations about its performance. 
Fischer and Schot ( 1993) observed that direction setting in corporate environmental 
management strategies typically involves implementation of an approach that is 
essentially either 'defensive' or 'innovative'. Companies that take a defensive strategy 
regard environmental concerns as external problems and restrictions on company 
operations. Environmental concerns are not integrated in the overall business strategy, 
or in research and development and marketing policies. These companies do not try to 
identify possibilities to excel in environmental protection to gain a competitive position. 
A defensive environ,nental strategy implies that companies do their best to comply with 
regulations and react to public pressures. For example, they may make substantial 
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investments in end-of-pipe technologies to achieve required emissions and waste 
reductions. 
By comparison, an innovative environmental strategy is centred on a company's pursuit 
of its own policy to minimise the environmental impact of its operations; such as 
through substantial reductions in waste and emissions, often beyond the requirements of 
government regulations. A company's implementation of an innovative or proactive 
strategy is based on the expectation that environmental excellence is necessary to secure 
continuity and could lead to competitive advantages. This approach implies that efforts 
will be made to improve the company's structural ability to innovate and to develop 
new, environmentally friendly products and processes (Fischer and Schot, 1993). 
Both defensive and innovative forms of strategic direction setting involve an intentional 
assessment by management, of the perceived nature and levels of business risk 
associated with their activities. Van den Bosch and van Riel (1998) observed that top-
level managers are a key determinant in the choice between adoption of a 'bridging' or 
'buffering' environmental strategy. 
Regardless of the legitimation approach that is chosen, all involve a need for companies 
to engage their stakeholders in some manner. 
2.5.2 Stakeholder Engagement 
From their research and empirical studies, Hardy and Phillips ( 1998) have identified 
four strategi~s of stakeholder engagement-collaboration, compliance, contention, and 
contestation; and four countervailing strategies that may be implemented either to 
defend the interorganisational domain from change, or to influence the direction that 
change takes-reciprocal collaboration, regulation, marginalisation, and cooptation. 
In this framework, collaboration is viewed as a mutual engagement strategy in which all 
parties voluntarily participate in a cooperative manner, invoking reciprocal 
collaboration. Collaboration is often seen as a means of reducing uncertainty, acquiring 
resources, and solving problems (Chen et al., 1998; Hardy and Phillips, 1998). Research 
on cooperation within work groups, has identified four interaction dimensions 
associated with a cooperative goal relationship: (i) exchanging and combining 
information, ideas, and other resources; (ii) giving assistance; (iii) discussing problems 
and conflicts constructively; and (iv) supporting and encouraging each other. 
Neale (1997) suggests that in this mode, organisational learning promotes innovative 
ideas and there is an ability to mobilise and sustain a coalition of interests that can 
translate the visions into reality. Challenging stakeholders may be able to 'participate' in 
modification of the social interorganisational domain by collaborating with other 
stakeholders to collectively improve the saliency of their claim. 
37 
CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
However, it cannot always be assun1ed that stakeholders collaborate voluntarily, sharing 
co111n1on goals and equal power. While an acknowledged mutual dependency may bring 
participants together in a collaborative manner to solve a common problem, it can also 
provide an incentive to a participant organisation to negotiate with others, in order to 
derive a solution which is most favourable to itself, rather than to all of the participants 
(Boons, 1998; Chen et al., 1998). The structure of a co-operative partnership often 
favours certain participants over others, and thus the solution that is developed is not the 
socially optimal result of a collective 'learning process', but instead is a negotiated 
compromise reflecting the balance of power between participants (Boons, 1998). 
Knights et al. ( 1993) have noted that issues such as exploitation, repression, unfairness, 
and asymmetrical power relations have an influence on collaborative arrangements, 
particularly when partners have different goals, values and beliefs (Waddock, 1989) and 
when the distribution of power between them is unequal (Gray and Hay, 1986). For 
example, more powerful stakeholders may force collaboration on weaker players to 
control them; or they may cooperate with other powerful allies to prevent opponents 
from reconstituting the domain (Rose and Black, 1985; Hasenfeld and Cheslar, 1989). 
"Collaboration may mask moves by powerful organisations to protect their privileged 
positions and to disadvantage less powerful stakeholders: those who collaborate are 
coopted,· those 1rvho do not are excluded" (Hardy and Phillips, 1998, p. 218). 
Collaboration and reciprocal collaboration may, however, be positive where there is a 
genuine willingness by companies to ally with others to achieve real change. The level 
of integration in cooperative ventures is related to the concept of dependency and 
dependency relationships between the stakeholders. According to Boons ( 1998), 
companies need access to both physical and social resources (such as legitimacy) in 
order to be able to attain their environmental goals, and may be dependent upon parties 
such as governmental agencies, environmental groups and the media to provide this 
access. Similarly, when a governmental agency decides to develop a policy plan to 
reduce industrial emissions, for example, the agency may depend upon industry to 
provide information and support in order to be able to develop rules that are enforceable. 
Dependency may thus exist in both directions and need not be symmetrical. An 
organisation can also be dependent indirectly, by being influenced by the actions of 
another organisation. For example, Greenpeace and other interest groups influenced 
Shell Expro' s final proposal for disposal of the Brent Spar. 
Co,npliance is a contrasting form of cooperation, where power is neither shared nor is 
participation, strictly speaking, voluntary. In this strategy, the dominant partner uses its 
power to regulate weaker parties that have no choice but to cooperate. This is the basis 
of relationships between regulators and companies in traditional command-and-control 
regulatory frameworks. 
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Contention and contestation are based on conflict rather than cooperation. In contention, 
"new entrants struggle to overturn existing doniain parameters in order to 1nake space 
for themselves and, in doing so, challenge dominant stakeholders. As new contenders, 
such organisations may not possess either formal authority or critical resources-if 
they did, they would probably already be active in the domain. They may, therefore use 
discursive legitimacy to secure a voice, which may both depend upon, and lead to, a 
substantial overhaul of existing domain parameters. We suggest that the likely response 
to such a threat is marginalisation, at least initially, when the new contender's 
legitimacy is most vulnerable and tenuous. If the new contender is successful in 
establishing its legitimacy, the definition of the problem that frames the domain will 
change and its place within it will become 1nore secure" (Hardy and Phillips, 1998, 
p. 226). 
In the case of contestation, a stakeholder challenges existing powerholders, but only 
within the limits of existing domain parameters, allowing it to maintain legitimacy in the 
eyes of quite different stakeholders. The phenomenon of corporate 'groupthink' may 
inadvertently fuel contestation. Company managers can become preoccupied with 
looking inward for strategies and not therefore be insensitive to the different perceptions 
that outsiders ( consumers or environmental groups) may have of options favoured by the 
company. Different groups, with different understandings and interests often contest the 
natural environment, yet groupthink sees only the company's own image of 'its' 
environment. This attitude may cause the company to become involved in confrontation 
with other stakeholders if the 
"company's conviction that its actions are right may lead it to avoid the dialogue that 
would be needed to explore whether or not common ground can be established, and 
produce less damaging outcomes" (Neale, 1997, p. 95). 
In other situations, contestation may produce some concessions, but Hardy and Phillips 
(1998) believe that it incurs the risk of cooptation by powerholders. 
2.5.3 Summary 
Strategic choice of the terms of corporate responsiveness is a means of ensuring that 
companies maintain some control over the achieving their business aims and objectives. 
However, corporate culture and other internal influences may compromise the initial 
choice of stakehold·et engagement strategy. For example, companies bound up in 
groupthink may exclude themselves from opportunities for collaborative advantage, if 
they fail to see the lessons which can be learnt from outside their own industry, such as 
through alliances with stakeholders. It appears that the ability of companies to maintain 
their legitimacy in a dynamic business environment will depend upon their capacity to 
be flexible and amenable to modifying their engagement strategies in response to the 
changing salience of stakeholder issues. 
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2.6 ANALYTICAL MODELS OF CORPORATE RESPONSIVENESS 
Over the years, researchers in strategic management have developed various typological 
models to link corporate attitude to observed behaviour. The inference is that if we 
understand what 'category' a company belongs to, then we will be able to predict its 
behaviour and therefore know how to manage it, for example with regulatory measures 
to achieve socially desirable behaviour. 
Models of strategic choice have traditionally implied that companies can be categorised 
according to the stand they take on social issues, essentially ranging from recalcitrant 
through to leading edge. For example, Miles and Snow ( 1978) categorised organisations 
into three basic types in terms of how they behave strategically, i.e. the 'defender', the 
'prospector', or the 'analyser'. They developed this categorisation as a means of 
assessing the dominant culture of the organisation-that culture which will determine 
the strategic approach taken by the con1pany. For example, they suggest that 'defender' 
cultures find change threatening and tend to favour strategies that provide continuity and 
security, and hence tend to apply a bureaucratic approach to management. In contrast, a 
'prospector' culture thrives on change, favouring strategies of business line and/or 
market development using a more creative and flexible management style. 
In regard to corporate environmental responsiveness, some researchers 10 have suggested 
that, over time in response to internal and external pressures, companies will move in a 
linear manner towards more proactive and environmentally responsible behaviour. They 
may migrate through one of more typological categories, with the ultimate aim of 
achieving environmental excellence. 
These models, however, infer a commonality of incentives and circumstances that may 
not be uniformly applicable. Theoretical models designed to categorise the 
environmental policies of companies have often failed to recognise or accommodate the 
need for companies to be flexible and responsive to both the positive and negative 
challenges that arise in their business environment. Ghobadian et al. ( 1998) reviewed 
numerous existing categorisation and linear sequence models, in the context of their 
empirical research on corporate environmental strategies. From this review, together 
10 An extensive literature on environmental responsiveness models has developed over the last 30 or so 
years, based on earlier models of social responsiveness (e.g. Davis and Blomstrom, 1975; Fischer, 1983; 
Keim, 1981; McAdam, 1973; Miles, 1987; Post , 1978; Sethi , 1975; Tombari, 1984; and Wilson , 1975). 
Essentially researchers in this field have attempted to categorise company strategies on the basis of their 
attitude towards environmental management (e.g. Ansoff, 1990; Beaumont, Pedersen and Whitaker, 1993; 
Simpson; 1991; Steger, 1993; and Vandermerwe and Oliff, 1990). Some researchers have developed 
models that infer that companies will progress in a linear manner to categories of increasing virtue, as they 
become more environmentally aware and responsible (e.g. James, 1992; Roome, 1992; Welford , 1994; 
and Welford, 1995). 
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with the findings of their survey of 78 of the top 200 UK grossing companies, they 
concluded that 
" it is highly questionable whether organisations will necessarily, or inevitably, 
pursue a logical or incremental approach to environ,nental management. ... the 
strategic positioning of companies is determined by the interaction of a set of key 
external and internal influences and constraints, the relationship between which often 
produces strategic policy positions which appear not to conform to the behavioural 
archetypes established by linear sequential models. This suggests that such 1nodels may 
not allow the full impact of the reality of business necessity to be recognised" 
(Ghobadian et al., 1998, p.13). 
Ghobadian et al. ( 1998) concluded that there are three areas where "the prevailing 
linear approach to environmental policy is based upon underlying assumptions which 
are not defensible". 
Firstly, linear models imply companies will move along the continuum automatically 
over time. Although some models acknowledge that companies can move backwards, if 
they do not maintain levels of dedication and commitment, the underlying implication of 
linear models is that once the process has begun, a central rationale will propel the 
company forward, along what is essentially an incremental path, leading to 
environmental excellence as the eventual goal. Ghobadian et al. ( 1998)' s survey data 
show that these assumptions do not inevitably hold true-the need to address the 
specific requirements set by a customer regularly took precedence over a company's 
formal environmental policy, and companies qualified their support for environmental 
programmes, principally in favour of customer demands. 
Secondly, the understanding of linear models is that the process will be sequential and 
that companies will have to spend time at various milestones along the way to the 
eventual destination of environmental excellence. Whereas, Ghobadian et al. (1998) 
argue that, given the external inducements and appropriate behavioural mediating and 
moderating factors, it is reasonable to assume companies are able to move from any 
position to any other position. 
Thirdly, linear models can only reflect an overall attitude of a company on a particular 
issue, without showing the complexity of factors contributing to that position, or any 
temporal influences. Whereas, the question that drives many short-term company 
decisions is 'what are the strongest influences at work on our operations here and now?' 
Ghobadian et al. ( 1998) sought to overcome the shortcomings of the linear models 
through a non-sequential approach to model companies' decision-making processes and 
the development of strategic environmental policies, and hence the investment decisions 
that fallow on from these actions. Their model is depicted in Figure 2-4. It is based on 
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the linear model of Roome (1992), with the additions of 'restrained', 'speculative' and 
'conditional' commitment categories. 
Figure 2-4 The Adapted Non-Linear Progression 
Restrained 
t-
.. I ,Spe~ulpti; e .,I 
Compliance 
Conditional 
(Source: Ghobadian et al., 1998, Figure 3, p. 20) 
Restrained companies are perceived to be separate from the continuum (Figure 2-4), as 
they have no real incentive to advance towards a position of excellence. 
"The restrained company may, if circumstances shift and real pressures develop, find 
itself having to develop active policies to meet its previously espoused environmental 
commitments. The restrained position is therefore a delicate one for a company to 
hold-they must be sure that the need to prove commitment does not arise, or that they 
have the capability to develop a position to match their commitment in the short term. 
Restrained companies are therefore expected to have well-developed contingency 
plans. The determination of contingencies rests with the perception of the mediating 
actors, based upon their perception of likely moves in external factors, and the 
potential offered by the company's moderating factors" (Ghobadian et al., 1998, p. 20). 
The speculative-commitment company is depicted in Figure 2-4 as being part of the 
continuum, but taking what may be seen as a fast track approach to achieving 
environmental excellence. However, in reality such excellence cannot be achieved in the 
short-term, and therefore Ghobadian et al. (1998, p. 21) argue that "commitment of this 
type may be cosmetic, and more achievable in industry situations where little effort is 
required in order to achieve the appearance of change. " 
The conditional commitment company is represented in Figure 2-4 as being outside the 
continuum because, due to its multi-site nature and pragmatic approach, the underlying 
logic of the continuum does not appear to apply. The company may not adopt any of the 
positions within the continuum, dependent upon the dominant conditions under which it 
operates. Ghobadian et al. (1998) suggest that companies can exhibit different attitudes 
in different circumstances, and that such behaviour is entirely consistent with the proper 
operation of a company. 
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The particular appeal of Ghobadian et al. (1998)'s model, when compared with its 
predecessors, is that it acknowledges the real-life demands on business to meet practical 
operational considerations, and that as a consequence, there may often be substantial 
discrepancies between espoused policies and operational reality (espoused theory versus 
theory-in-use) 11 . Observations of these discrepancies can be used to tell us more about 
how company decision-making processes function in reality. 
2.7 SYNTHESIS 
The theoretical concepts and models reviewed in this chapter suggest that the extent to 
which companies engage in social and environmental responsiveness, or greening, will 
be dictated by a complex web of competing internal and external influences, that have 
spatial (e.g. geographic) and temporal (e.g. short-run versus long-run) dimensions. 
Stakeholders play an important role in influencing the stance companies take on social 
and environmental issues. However, company managers often cannot attend to all 
stakeholder demands, so they must adopt some way to prioritise the claims and their 
consideration of claimants. This is achieved by assessing stakeholder salience, that is, 
the influence that stakeholders can exert and the degree of threat (risk) they pose to 
business continuity. The strategies of stakeholder engagement chosen by companies may 
be deliberate or reactive in response to challenges imposed by highly salient 
stakeholders. 
Regardless of whatever path(s) companies follow to develop their management 
strategies, the strategies are likely to be subject to on-going evaluation and change in 
response to internal and external influences. The business environment in which 
petroleum companies operate, for example, is highly dynamic and therefore in order for 
companies to survive, they need to frequently re-evaluate their corporate strategies to 
determine what best suits the current market place. 
For instance, social pressures may emerge unexpectedly, as occurred in the Brent Spar 
disposal controversy, and prompt company managers to change their strategies to 
minimise associated business risks. As observed by Gladwin (1993): 
"While some part of greening must surely arise from intentional strategic behaviour, 
the processes of organisational choice are likely to be affected by considerable 
ambiguity, incrementalism, and bounded rationality". 
It is concluded that the influences on corporate social and environmental responsiveness 
can be described using a model that integrates aspects of the theories of strategic 
11 Espoused theories are "what we say", whereas theories-in-use are those theories that lie behind our 
actions, i.e. "what we do" (Senge, 1990). 
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management, organisational behaviour, and stakeholder mapping and engagement. This 
researcher has constructed a conceptual framework to show the influence-response 
relationships between company managers and the stakeholder environment, to 
demonstrate how internal and external influences mould corporate social and 
environmental responsiveness. The framework, depicted in Figure 2-5, has been 
constructed by drawing together the following approaches: 
i) The advanced stakeholder model of Mitchell et al. (1997) and power-based 
framework developed by Hardy and Phillips (1998), to explain the influence of 
power, legitimacy and urgency on stakeholder-company relations, and 
consequential managerial responses to those challenges; and 
ii) Ghobadian et al. ( 1998)' s explanation of the interaction of external, mediating and 
moderating factors, to incorporate the dimension of behaviour-altering factors that 
can potentially affect managers' (decision-makers') perceptions and attitudes 
towards a situation and determination of stakeholder saliency. 
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In essence, this framework suggests that corporate responsiveness is the product of 
external factors (market pressures, legal-regulatory obligations, and community 
expectations), company attitude (mediating factors) and available resources (moderating 
factors). The influence of external factors is dependent upon the actions of stakeholders, 
whose influence, in turn, is dependent upon their attributes as perceived by company 
decisionmakers. 
This framework is applied in this study to test the following research hypothesis: 
The social and environmental responsiveness practised by companies is moulded by 
their assessments of the business risks posed by the stakeholder environn1ent. In the 
absence of a socially acceptable balance of power between companies, their regulators 
and third party stakeholders, company management practices will tend towards a 




The purpose of this chapter is to outline the approach and methodology employed in 
this study to gather, analyse, and interpret theoretical and empirical information. 
3.1 APPROACH 
Much of the research on environmental management within business organisations has 
been subject to criticism because it has been based "on oversi,nple and modernist 
categorisations which, in turn, hide the co,nplexities of the individual business 
organisation" (Welford, 1998, p. 2). 
Based on a review of contemporary corporate environmental management research, 
Welford ( 1998) suggests that the research has often taken a positivist approach. That is, · 
an approach which focuses on objective-order paradigms, using theories of 
behaviourism, cognitive psychology, structuralism and management science to build 
models of causal relationships and explain behaviour. Research undertaken using this 
approach reports how particular companies have taken account of the social and 
environmental consequences of their actions, but such studies are often narrowly 
focused on social behaviour, and have not addressed the political aspects of these cases 
and their connection with broader community agendas. 
Alternatively, some business-related studies have been based on an interpretive 
approach, with a subjective-order orientation. This approach takes into account the 
complexity and diversity of the real world, and attempts to describe situations by 
outlining the relationships between key paradigms and associated behaviours , in the 
context of social norms, values and beliefs. Interpretivism recognises the limitations of 
simplified models to describe complex situations, but Welford (1998, p. 7) suggests that 
"it tends not to be critical or visionary and its approach is difficult to build into useful 
models ·with practical value." 
It is suggested that more valuable contributions to learning can be obtained from 
interdisciplinary empirical studies that focus on development of an understanding of the 
tensions that exist between business, its stakeholders, and desired outcomes. The 
critical theory approach to research draws upon both the objective and subjective 
approaches, while aiming to produce an outcome that creates change (Morrow and 
Brown, 1994 ). Critical theory places emphasis on identifying the structures that prevent 
progress-the barriers to improvement. It also emphasises that knowledge is never 
independent and neutral, but is inherently linked to the interests of those people and 
institutions vvith power (Welford, 1998). The critical theory approach was selected for use 
in this study for these reasons. 
The objective of this study is to analyse the drivers influencing corporate social and 
environmental responsiveness by upstream petroleum companies within the context of 
their business environment. The critical theory approach provides a guiding framework for 
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inquiry into the characteristics of influence-response relationships, and linkage to problem 
identification. This approach to research comprises four core phases: (i) preparation; (ii) 
design of the research structure; (iii) information gathering; and (iv) evaluation. Details 
of how each of these phases was addressed in this study are presented in the following 
sections. 
3.2 PREPARATION 
The preparation phase involves the identification of a real-life problem to be solved. 
Groups and individuals who are affected by or who are part of the problem 
(stakeholders) are also identified at this point in the research. 
As introduced in Chapter 1, the 'real-life problem' that drives this research is the 
perceived need for reform of the environmental regulatory processes that control 
industry activities, to reduce the burden of regulatory enforcement on resource-
constrained governments. Other researchers have identified that such reforms should 
endeavour to encourage industry to deliver responsible environmental and social 
performance to meet stakeholder expectations, while ensuring that the business 
continuity of industry is preserved. Stakeholders in this context can be broadly defined 
as the host community, industry and its shareholders, special interest groups (such as 
non-governmental organisations), regulators and consumers of industry products and 
services. 
To develop appropriate regulatory frameworks, it has been that suggested context-
specific information is required to develop an understanding of the business 
environment in which industry operates, and hence identify the influence-response 
relationships that affect company management decisions. This study endeavours to 
provide an insight into those relationships for the purpose of identifying opportunities to 
harness their associated influences on industry behaviour, through regulatory 
frameworks. 
The scope of such a study is potentially too broad to be addressed within a single 
research project of 3-4 year duration, therefore key focal points were sought to guide the 
inquiry. Based on a review of international perspectives and research needs relating to 
environmental strategies for industry, Fischer and Schot (1993) suggested the following 
foci for such research: 
i) In-depth case studies to determine how organisational learning processes, that lead 
companies from a defensive mode of action to a more proactive mode, can occur 
within and among organisations. This work should employ, and be inspired by, 
theories developed within the framework of strategic management, organisational, 
and innovation studies. Eventually, this research could lead to a classification of 
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groups of companies that go through si111ilar learning processes under specific 
conditions. 
ii) Cooperation among companies on the environmental aspects of products is a 
growing trend, but it is still in its infancy. Investigations are needed on the forms 
of environmental cooperation that develop, on the kinds of barriers that are 
encountered, and on the kinds of driving forces that work. Research should focus 
on the factors that influence particular patterns of cooperation, such as product and 
commercial characteristics. 
iii) Research should be focused on how government policies can induce the transition 
from a defensive to an innovative environmental strategy in companies. In this 
respect, comparative research on national environmental policies can greatly 
improve understanding of the appropriate types of government intervention. 
iv) Much of the existing empirical research on this topic deals with the behaviour of 
companies in the Western ( developed) world. More research is needed into inter-
company and intra-company dynamics in non-Western countries. This research 
should take into account the effects and implementation of policies set by 
companies that are based in the Western world. 
v) Public pressures have been among the most important driving forces for changes in 
company behaviour. To deal with these pressures, companies and industry 
associations have developed codes of conduct and programs that have led to a new 
kind of social interaction and learning process between companies and the public 
and to changes within companies. Research is needed to map these evolving new 
relations and their effects on company behaviour. 
The scope of the research project was defined on the basis of these suggestions, and the 
researcher's specific interests in South-East Asia and the upstream petroleum industry. 
This study therefore focuses upon the upstream petroleum industry sector (including 
local and multinational companies) operating in the developing region of South-East 
Asia, using Thailand as a case study. The analytical framework for the study was 
developed from the theories and models of strategic management, organisational 
learning and stakeholder relations discussed in Chapter 2. 
Qualitative empirical information, including case studies, was chosen as the basis upon 
which to: (i) illustrate organisational learning processes; (ii) identify the impacts of 
government policies and regulatory frameworks on company behaviour; and (iii) 
analyse the influence of public pressures and inter-company and intra-company 
dynamics on petroleum company behaviour. Qualitative data gathering was selected in 
preference to quantitative data, because the aim of the study is to gather in-depth 
contextual knowledge on the subject matter, rather than data for representative or 
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con1parative application. Qualitative techniques, like case studies, are commonly used 
for this type of study (Morrow and Brown, 1994; Yin, 1993). 
All primary and secondary data gathering, analysis and interpretation was performed 
solely by this author. To maintain a measure of independence, the study was conducted 
without any financial support, directive or brief from industry, government agencies, 
environmental organisations or academia, apart from a post-graduate research 
scholarship from the Graduate School of The Australian National University and some 
logistical support from the Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies (CRES) of 
The Australian National University. No other organisation has provided any formal 
logistical or financial support, and none was sought. 
3.3 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
3.3.1 Interpretation 
The research structure guides how the 'problem' is defined, researched, and the study 
findings presented. This phase is divided into five steps: interpretation, empirical 
examination, dialectics, awareness, and change. 
The aim of the interpretation step is to develop a detailed understanding of each 
stakeholder' s view of a situation, based on dialogue between the researcher and 
interested individuals and groups, to gain an understanding of the social, cultural and 
historical context. 
This step was framed by defining the context within which the 'problem' was set. 
Literature covering the fields of strategic management, organisational behaviour and 
stakeholder theory was reviewed to develop a framework that could be used t6 define 
the context of the 'problem' (see Chapter 2). From this review, it is concluded that the 
context can essentially be described by three groups of factors and their interactions, i.e. 
the external, moderating and mediating factors. In this study, the external factors are 
represented by: (i) the market in which the upstream petroleum industry operates (at the 
national, regional and global levels); (ii) the legal framework within which the industry 
currently operates in South-East Asia (including home country corporate governance 
requirements); and (iii) the socio-political environment in which the industry's 
stakeholders live and operate. The moderating and mediating factors refer to the 
structure and character of petroleum companies and the internal company attributes that 
influence the decision-making processes of their managers. 
The conceptual model of corporate responsiveness presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-5) 
was developed and applied to use these factors to define the business environment of 
the upstream petroleum industry and the company-stakeholder relationships that are the 
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focus of this study. This model was used to guide the scope of data gathering and 
interpretation of the empirical information. 
3.3.2 Empirical Examination 
The enzpirical exa,nination step aims to provide an empirical account of the context in 
which the ideas of the stakeholders have developed. That is, the historical and cultural 
development of the social structures and processes which relate to the subject of study. 
Suitable qualitative empirical information sources (primarily interviews and literature) 
were identified to describe each of these factors and their inter-relationships in a broad 
sense. That is, to develop an understanding of how the business and culture of the 
petroleum industry have evolved over time in response to local and global influences 
from its markets and stakeholders. Information was also sought at regional and national 
levels to form an understanding of how the environmental regulatory framework has 
been developed in South-East Asia, and specifically Thailand, and to canvas perceptions 
of its associated strengths and weaknesses. 
The following questions were developed and applied to guide the research: 
i) How are business pressures (especially environmental and socio-poiitical issues) 
perceived and assessed by petroleum exploration and production companies, and 
how do these assessments affect their management strategies? 
ii) How do regulatory frameworks affect the way that petroleum companies: (i) 
perceive and address statutory environmental management obligations; and (ii) 
perceive the salience of third party stakeholder interests? 
iii) How can private and public sector policymakers apply the findings of this research 
to design and implement regulatory approaches to improve corporate 
environmental management practices of upstream petroleum companies? 
To complement this information at a more focussed, in-depth level of inquiry, a case study 
approach was selected as a tool to develop an understanding of the influence-response 
relationships between the petroleum industry, the regulatory framework and stakeholder 
expectations. Two case studies were selected to demonstrate how community perceptions 
of the rules for acceptable company behaviour have evolved in Thailand, and how those 
changing perceptions can affect community-industry-regulator relations and influence the 
environmental and social management strategies employed by petroleum companies. The 
case studies are: 
i) Case Study 1. The issue of marine ecological contamination and human health 
risks associated with handling and discharge of produced mercury from gas fields 
in the Gulf of Thailand. 
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ii) Case Study 2. Ecological conservation, environmental risk, human rights, and 
community consultation issues associated with the development of the Yadana gas 
field in the Gulf of Martaban, Union of Myanmar, and the installation of the gas 
sales pipeline from Myan111ar to Thailand. 
These case studies were selected on the basis of their geographic focus, the focal issues, 
the key participants, and timeframe. As indicated in Table 3-1, both case studies are 
based in Thailand, and share common timeframes, key issues and participant groups, 
but a fundamental difference is the project proponent. Case Study 1 involves an 
independently owned multinational petroleum company, while Case Study 2 focuses on 
a Thai state-owned petroleum company. The differences in the ownership of the 
projects (state versus private ownership) and the dominant culture of the proponents' 
management team (Thai versus US) provided useful variables to assess whether these 
differences affected the way they responded to the stakeholder challenges with which 
they were confronted. 
Table 3-1 Case Study Selection Criteria 
Criteria Gulf of Thailand lVIercury in 1\1yanmar-Thailand Yadana Gas 
Produced Formation Water Pipeline 
Geographic Thailand Thailand 
focus 
Key issues Environmental degradation, Environmental degradation, stakeholder 
stakeholder consultation and cci1sultation and participation; regulatory 
participation; regulatory processes processes 
Project Independently owned multinational Thai State-owned petroleum company 
proponent petroleum company (Unocal Thailand (Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT)) 
Co.) 
Key actor Thai government regulators, Thai Thai government regulators, Thai 
groups newspapers, environmental NG Os newspapers, environmental NGOs 
Timeframe 1995-1998 1995-1998 
Information derived from the empirical examination forms the basis of Chapters 4, 5 
and 6. 
3.3.3 Dialectics 
The dialectics step involves comparison of the stakeholders' understandings of the 
situation under study and the perceived relationships between different groups, with the 
ain1 of identifying the inconsistencies and contradictions that exist in a particular situation, 
and hence the nature of the power structures relating to each group and interest. 
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The dialectics step was approached through the analysis of the behavioural relationships 
that were observed in the case studies, and further inquiry into the external factors that 
influence stakeholder perceptions of the definition of corporate social responsibility, 
and the associated roles and responsibilities of industry, regulators and the community. 
The outcomes of this step are described in the latter sections of Chapter 6 and in 
Chapter 7. 
3.3.4 Awareness and Change 
The awareness and change steps aim to: (i) communicate the findings of the research to 
the stakeholders in order to help them see their position differently, and open up 
opportunities to pursue alternative ways of behaving; and (ii) translate the acquired 
awareness into action, for example through the development of improved stakeholder 
identification and consultation approaches for companies. 
The awareness and change steps form the basis of the study conclusions and 
recommendations presented in Chapter 8. They address the factors that affect corporate 
responsiveness in the Thai (and South-East Asian context), the stakeholders who are 
influential in the business environment of the upstream petroleum industry, and the 
potential opportunities for harnessing stakeholder influence through reform of existing 
regulatory frameworks in that region. 
3.4 INFORMATION GATHERING 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of information gathering is to describe the structures, cultures and 
historical events that have shaped the present situation, as well as to provide 
information that describes the competing objectives between different groups and their 
power structures and relationships. 
To address these objectives, the research essentially followed two lines of inquiry: 
i) Primary and secondary data collection to: (i) provide a profile of the upstream 
petroleum industry; and (ii) gain a more in-depth understanding of the driving 
influence·s behind corporate environmental management strategies of petroleum 
companies, specifically in reference to their operations in South-East Asia. 
ii) Primary and secondary data collection to look at some specific examples of 
corporate environmental management strategies in application, through case study 
research. 
To gather information for this research project, the following tasks were performed: 
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i) A literature review of available, relevant published and unpublished 
documentation, covering underlying academic theories, trends in corporate 
environn1ental management, information for the case studies, and reports on other 
relevant case studies. 
ii) Field research involving attendance at academic and industry conferences, and 
interviews with regulators, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), institutional 
strengthening donor agencies, industry representatives and academics. The 
objective of this consultation was to identify local issues and perspectives on the 
case studies, and perceptions of the corporate social and environmental 
responsibilities expectations placed on the petroleum industry. 
The approach taken to information gathering was qualitative. The principal forms of 
primary data collection were semi-structured and unstructured interviews with key 
informants; observations made during participation in seminars and conferences, and 
past and on-going consultancy work. The insights and opinions offered in the 
interviews, together with the author's own professional experience 1, form the basis for 
much of the empirical component of study. Primary data collection was undertaken 
opportunistically between November 1996 and December 1998. 
Secondary data sources included articles from newspapers and industry periodicals, 
Internet websites, and published conference proceedings, journal papers, and textbooks. 
3.4.2 Interviews 
An important empirical element of this study was research based on interviews 
conducted during 1997-98. To obtain a range of perspectives on the broader issues of 
environmental managen1ent trends and expectations, respondents were selected from the 
groups of stakeholders listed in Table 3-2. 
For the purpose of developing a broad perspective on the contextual aspects of the 
study, strategically targeted intervievvs were conducted with key informants, selected 
using the snowball sampling technique (Weiss, 1994). An initial group of respondents, 
identified by the researcher through existing contacts, were interviewed. They were 
subsequently asked to provide referrals to other potential sources whom they knew to 
have an interest in, or particular experience of relevance to, the topic of study. Those 
referrals in turn provided other referrals for information. In the majority of instances , 
1 I have worked for some 15 years as an environmental scientist and environmental consultant performing 
environmental impact assessments, environmental audits and development of environmental management 
plans and environmental, health and safety management systems for the upstream petroleum industry in 
the Asia-Pacific region. 
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the referred respondent agreed to be interviewed. For the case studies, the referral 
process was focussed on identifying key individuals who had first-hand experience of 
the situations. Less than IO percent of prospective respondents declined or were unable 
to be interviewed, primarily for reasons related to unavailability rather than 
unwillingness. 
Characteristics of the respondents are summarised in Table 3-2. 
Table 3-2 Profile of Interview Respondents 
.l 
;;' 
Respondent Cat~gory . Base Location 
- =~; 
No~ot Respondents .,,:-::-,;: 




.," i', ,, ., ., ,, . 
Petroleum Company Employees Australia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, 32 
Thailand, Vietnam, United Kingdom, United 
States of America 
Petroleum Industry Consultants Australia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 12 
and Contractors United Kingdom, United States of America 
Representatives of Petroleum Australia, Thailand, United Kingdom 5 
Industry Associations 
Regulators Australia, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam 10 
Representatives of Australia, Malaysia, Thailand 3 
Environmental NGOs 
Representatives of Print Media Singapore, Thailand 7 
-Representatives of Financial Philippines, Thailand 5 
Donor/Institutional 
Strengthening Agencies 
Academics involved in research Australia, Singapore, Thailand, United 11 
relevant to the petroleum Kingdom 
industry sector 
Interviews were usually arranged in advance and were generally were held in the 
respondent's workplace, or some other mutually convenient location. Almost all 
interviews were conducted one-on-one and face-to-face. Only a few interviews were 
conducted by telephone due to logistical constraints. All interviews were conducted in 
single sessions, which usually took between 1-2 hours. In some cases, key respondents 
were interviewed twice during the course of the research to gather further information, 
following initial analysis and evaluation. All interviews were conducted in English. 
While English is not the native language of many of the foreign respondents, all were 
fluent English speakers and language barriers were not encountered during the 
interviews. 
The aim of the interviews was to explore the beliefs, op1n1ons and attitudes on 
environmental, economic and social issues that have developed in regard to the 
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upstream petroleum industry and within it. The lines of questioning were focussed, but 
maintained flexibility to ensure coverage of the major issues as identified by the 
respondent. The interviews sought to elicit the cognitive and emotional sources of 
respondents' reactions to events that they had experienced or processes with which they 
were required to work. As described by Weiss (1994, p. 208), this style of qualitative 
interviewing, \vhen applied to stakeholders in a particular situation, regards the 
"respondents as subjects whose response to the event is the material to be understood, 
rather than as reporters fro,n whom we will learn about the event itself". 
At the beginning of each interview, I explained to the respondent my research interest, 
my background in the industry, and the purpose of the interview. Interview respondents 
was assured that their responses would be anonymous and confidential, unless 
otherwise agreed. Interview structure varied according to the interview respondent and 
their relevance to the topic and/or case study. Both semi-structured and unstructured 
interview techniques were used. 
In this context, semi-structured interviews are defined as those in which an interview 
guide was used to frame the topic and key points to be covered in the interview. Key 
topics canvassed in the interviews addressed the themes of the four key research 
questions listed above. 
The unstructured interviews were conducted more like a discussion in which a topic for 
discussion was introduced by the researcher, and then subsequent questioning by the 
researcher was based on the information that was provided by the respondent in the 
course of the discussion. Unstructured interviews were used to gather oral histories for 
the two case studies, and anecdotal accounts of other relevant real-life situations. The 
interviews focussing on the case studies sought to discover how each of the interests 
perceived the involvement of themselves and of other participants in the situations and 
how those participants were observed to use their attributes to achieve their desired 
outcomes. 
Both the semi-structured and unstructured interview techniques provided the 
oppo1iunity for the researcher to probe the depth of the respondents' knowledge and 
experience and insights. For this reason, I often took an active participative role in the 
interview dialogue to facilitate further discussion on key observations. 
Intervie\v notes were written down during the interviews and written out in detail 
immediately following each interview, while details of the dialogue were still fresh in 
my n1emory. Interviews were not tape-recorded because respondents were offered 
anonymity, and I perceived the absence of a tape-recorder as being more conducive to 




Attendance, as an observer-as-participant at petroleum industry-hosted seminars and 
conferences, was used as a method to study interactions between petroleum companies, 
their industry groups, their regulators and NGOs. The interactions between the 
participants in public discussions were observed to gain insights into how petroleum 
companies seek to portray their messages to stakeholders and engage stakeholders in 
discussion of issues. 
Six fora, in particular, were attended for this purpose: 
i) The Second Annual International Workshop on Oil and Gas Development in 
Continental Southeast Asia: Regulations and Policies on the Prevention of 
Pollution in the Oil and Gas Industry, held in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, on 10-
13 September 1996. 
ii) The Third Regional Petroleum Industry Environment, Health and Safety 
Conference: A Regional Approach to Cooperative Environment, Health and 
Safety, held in Chiang Mai, Thailand, on 4-7 November 1997. 
iii) The Atlantic Frontier Environmental Conference (AFEC), held in Aberdeen, 
Scotland, on 6-7 October 1998. 
iv) Four annual conferences hosted by petroleum industry group, the Australian 
Petroleum Production c=i.nd Exploration Association (APPEA) in Darwin (July 
1996), Melbourne (April 1997), Canberra (March 1998), and Perth (April 1999). 
The former two conferences were organised and hosted by a group of petroleum 
companies and government ministries, with leadership from the Texaco Foundation and 
the Asia Foundation. The purpose of these conferences was to provide a forum for 
explaining the approaches petroleum companies are taking to environmental, health and 
safety management, and sharing of perceptions about the industry's impact and 
responsibilities between the industry, regulators and community representatives (i.e. 
NGOs and the media) in the South-East Asian context. These conferences provided the 
researcher with an insight as to how these fora are used by petroleum companies to 
build stakeholder understanding of their operational environmental and management 
initiatives, and attempt to influence regulators to consider regulatory options on the 
merits of the outcomes they will achieve. Observations at these conferences also 
provided an insight into how regulators and NGOs use these fora to seek funding and 
capacity building assistance from petroleum companies to address environmental issues. 
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The AFEC conference was organised and hosted by The Atlantic Frontier 
Environmental Forum (AFEF)2. The purpose of the conference was to "involve a wider 
audience in discussing environnzental issues arising fronz oil industry activities in the 
Atlantic Margin". It provided a forum for interested groups and individuals to receive 
information and insights from recent scientific research , as well as provide a forum for 
stakeholder concerns and expectations to be discussed. 
This conference provided a contrast to the forrner two, in several ways. The petroleum 
industry in the West of Shetland area is addressing many of the same multiple resource 
use issues that are of relevance to the petroleum industry operating in the Gulf of 
Thailand. However, in the West of Shetland area, the petroleum companies are 
operating in a developed 'Western' region with a well-established regulatory 
framework. While the West of Shetland area is a relatively new petroleum development 
area, the petroleum companies and regulators involved have been operating in the 
adjacent North Sea area for over 30 years and have a depth of experience to draw upon 
in terms of co-operative arrangements and stakeholder involvement. 
The AFEC conference provided the researcher with an opportunity to research a 
different situation to Thailand, and compare and contrast the way in which petroleum 
companies addressed environmental stakeholder challenges. In particular, it provided an 
opportunity to probe whether, the benefit of some 30 years of industry learning in the 
region was being applied to the planning and management of the upstream petroleum 
sector's new ventures in the sensitive West of Shetland environment. 
The other key fora were the annual APP EA conference. APP EA is the leading upstream 
petroleum industry association in Australia. The APPEA conferences are generally well 
attended by a range of senior management and technical level representatives from 
petroleum companies, industry service and supply contractors and consultants, 
regulators, academics and special interest groups. Technical and plenary papers 
presented at these conferences cover the range of operational and policy issues that face 
the industry's business activities in Australia, but also in Asia and globally. These 
conferences are regarded by this researcher to provide an informative and 'real-time' 
indicator of how the industry perceives the impact of moderating, mediating and 
external factors on its current business, as well as identifying emerging trends that are 
influencing business direction. 
2 The Atlantic Frontier Environmental Forum (AFEF) is a consultative fo rum, established to represent 
the interests of stakeholders in the Atlantic Margin region. It has an independent Chairman, and 
representatives from local authorities, wild! ife and other conservation group s, central government and 
government agencies, academia and the offshore oil and gas industry. 
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As an observing participant at the APPEA fora, I had the opportunity to talk to key 
respondents about their perception of industry-related issues and challenges. 
Presentation of technical papers on this research, at the 1997 and 1998 APPEA 
conferences also provided me with an opportunity to stimulate some debate on the 
issues of legal liabilities and corporate social responsibilities associated with petroleum 
company operations in Australia and South-East Asia. 
3.4.4 Secondary Sources 
Secondary data used for this study comprised technical information, and accounts of 
similar studies obtained from published statistical data, corporate annual reports and 
other literature, including Internet websites, the sectorial and academic literature, 
authoritative public opinion surveys, and media reports. 
Secondary data for the case studies was largely drawn from two English language Thai 
newspapers, the Bangkok Post and The Nation, both of which carried extensive and 
long-running coverage of the case studies. Reliance upon these English-language 
sources was due to the fact that the researcher does not speak, read or write Thai. It is 
acknowledged that as a consequence of this language barrier, other valuable sources of 
inf0rmation and different media perspectives may have been precluded from the study. 
However, opinion sought on this issue from bi-lingual peers, resident in Thailand 
indicated that the Bangkok Post and The Nation accord more attention to environmental 
issues and critical analysis of those issues than the Thai language newspapers. As one 
respondent stated: 
" ... Th e main thing to point out here is that the Bangkok Post and Th e Nation serve far 
more than expatriates-they are) to use the British media terminology) the broadsheets 
of Thailand) 1vhile the Thai dailies are th e tabloids. It 's generally only when there are 
some major scandals associated with th e environment that the environment gets good 
coverage in Thai niedia. The environment does get good coverage on the television, but 
mostly as a human interest type thing-not exactly incisive analysis, tnore promotional 
stuff and sloganising of environmental problems." 
On the basis of such perceptions, together \Vith use of other substantiating sources of 
information for the case studies, the researcher is confident that the Bangkok Post and 
The Nation articles are credible sources of public comment on current environmental 
issues. 
3.4.5 Application 
Information derived from primary and secondary sources has been incorporated and 
integrated throughout this thesis , so that vvherever possible, theoretical discussions on 
corporate behaviour and perspectives are illustrated with accounts of empirical 
observations. In the case of some of the one-on-one interviews , information and 
59 
CHAPTER3.METHODOLOGY 
opinions were provided by respondents on the understanding that their comments would 
not be directly attributable to the individual, for reasons of professional confidence. In 
such cases, the anonyn1ity of the informants has been maintained in citation. Where 
information and analyses are not attributed, they are based on my own experience. 
3.5 EVALUATION 
The final phase in the critical theory approach is the evaluation of the study findings. This 
step involves the synthesis of study findings to describe the situation under study, based 
upon the perspectives of the stakeholders and other information sources, and to identify 
what improvements are required and how they could be put into action. 
Primary data analysis in the context of a qualitative, exploratory research project 
involves some interpretation of meaning by the researcher, based on the context of the 
interview and the respondent. Data analysis was based on an inductive approach in 
which ideas were shaped and formed during the research process. 
For the case studies, the secondary data were used as the starting point to describe the 
chronology of events and identify key actors. Primary data were used to gain more in-
depth retrospective view2 of key informants of the meaning behind actions; the lessons 
learnt from the projects and the outcomes. Inductive analysis was undertaken on an on-
going basis throughout the primary research period ( 1997-1998) as more information 
was acquired through interviews and other sources. The data were reviewed and 
compared with the conceptual framework of corporate responsiveness developed by this 
researcher (see Chapter 2) to test the fit to the model, and to substantiate or 'disprove' 
the study hypothesis. 
3.6 CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This researcher considers that the approach and methodology employed in this study 
provided the necessary flexibility to follow 'leads' that exposed in-depth perspectives 
on the underlying issues and inter-relational dynamics, and to gather and interpret 
information in an iterative way throughout the study. As knowledge and understanding 
evolve through the course of the research, they can be re-applied to lead to a more focussed 
level of inquiry into the cause and effect linkages in company-stakeholder relationships. 
It is recognised that the qualitative 1 investigative style of this type of research can 
potentially be open to criticism. This research does not attempt to discover through 
intensive analysis and experimentation, relationships between specified processes and 
outcomes. Instead, principles or constructs of corporate social and environmental 
responsiveness are derived from this researcher's interpretation of the way in which 
petroleum companies interact with their stakeholders and the results of their actions. 
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Many of the contextual issues are emotive and their analysis can be influenced by 
subjective interpretation. It is acknowledged that my background experience invariably 
introduces some unavoidable researcher bias to this study. Interpretation, biased by the 
researcher's existing background knowledge of the context, may cause the researcher to 
draw conclusions too quickly about what is happening. Throughout the research, I did 
not assume the position of an impartial and objective scientist. I made it known to each 
informant that my interest in this topic had evolved from my over decade-long 
involvement as a consultant to the upstream petroleum industry. A positive aspect to 
_ this open approach is that it can facilitate access to some otherwise potentially 
inaccessible respondents. My background experience with this industry, and work 
experience in Thailand, provided me with personal contacts, connections and an 
acceptance from key informants, that perhaps may not have been as readily available to 
a researcher from "outside" the industry. 
In choosing only two case studies, I was also aware of the inherent criticism that the 
significance of the in-depth research would be limited to those two cases. This 
interpretive risk is, however, balanced in other ways by past experience that enabled me 
to recognise recurrences of past observations or situations, and identify trends or 
patterns of behaviour, as compared with isolated, random events. Observations drawn 
from the case studies were also compared with other case studies reported in the 
literature, which shared similar characteristics. The case study research was used to 
generalise the findings to broader theoretical models and issues of stakeholder relations , 
rather than to conclusions about the differences between multinational company 






"[O]ur shareholders want top performance and profits whatever the oil 
price or business environment. Society wants cheap, reliable, safe and 
sustainable energy, produced with no damage to the environment. 
Local communities want jobs and long term commitment to investment 
with responsible environmental performance ... One of the biggest 
challenges for the oil and gas industry is to show that we can be good 
'corporate citizens'. To show that the economic, environmental and 
social impacts of our activities are on balance positive for everyone -
for our employees, for customers, for all of those with whom we do 
business and for the national and local communities affected by our 
operations" (Hayward, British Petroleum Co. plc, 1998). 
CHAPTER 4. THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2 suggests that an analysis of the 
business environment in which petroleum companies operate will lead us to an 
understanding of how companies perceive and respond to their corporate social and 
environmental responsibilities within the framework of strategic management. It is 
recognised that corporate social and environmental responsiveness may be influenced by 
deliberate managerial intent, cultural and political processes in and around companies , 
and imposition of regulatory standards. Ghobadian et al. ( 1998) suggest that a 
relationship between decision-making processes and the development of strategic 
environmental policies, and hence the investment decisions that flow on from these 
actions, can be defined using an approach based on three categories of behaviour-
altering factors, as listed in Table 4-1 . 
1'able 4-1 Corporate Behaviour-Altering Factors in Decision-Making Processes 
. ,, 
External Factors Mediati~g Factors Moderating Factors 
. ::~:-: :•:•:, :~: 
:.' :-;,: ~: 
• Market behaviour • Leadership (style, • Organisational 
• Legal-regulatory commitment, concern, adaptability 
influences objectives) • Capital availability 
Social expectations • Corporate tradition Human resource • • (culture) 
availability 
• Corporate ethics Opportunity, cost • 
assessment 
• Technology 
Adapted from Ghobadian et al. (1998) 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a profile of the upstream petroleum industry, 
based on this approach, to develop an understanding of the context in which the industry 
operates. 
Section 4.2 provides an overview of the industry's market environment and ways in 
which the industry has positioned itself to adapt to on-going marketplace changes . 
Section 4.3 explains industry-specific aspects of the regulatory environment. Section 4.4 
provides examples of the influence on corporate behaviour that can be wielded by peers , 
shareholders and third party interest groups. Sections 4.5 and 4.6. highlight aspects of 
corporate culture, ethics, and leadership styles and company performance standards that 
can influence corporate management strategies. Sections 4.7 and 4.8 demonstrate the 
role of capital, technology and cost-benefit analyses in moderating corporate 
management behaviour. Section 4.9 looks at the effects of human resources and 
organisation learning on corporate management strategies. Finally, Section 4.10 presents 
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an analysis of the profile and draws conclusions about contextual aspects that are of 
relevance to regulatory design. 
4.2 MARKET INFLUENCES 
4.2.1 Industry Profile 
Petroleum ( oil and gas), by virtue of resource and market geography, is a transnational 
industry. During a large part of the 20th century, oil, in particular, played an important 
role in economic, social and technological development, and has developed as a highly 
influential factor in transnational affairs (trade, finance and interstate relations) 
(Mikdashi, 1986). Between the 1940s and the 1960s, the world oil market was largely 
dominated by a few major multinational petroleum companies (the 'majors')-the US-
based companies: Amoco, Exxon, Mobil, Texaco and Chevron, and the European 
companies, British Petroleum (BP) and Royal Dutch/Shell. These companies were 
commonly known as the 'seven sisters' (Ketola, 1993; Sampson, 1993; Yergin, 1992). 
Until the 1960s, the seven sisters were able to use their large concessions 1 (in their home 
countries and overseas) and inter-company cooperation to effectively exclude new 
entrants to the upstream industry (Sampson, 1993; Yergin, 1992). 
These multinationals were often accused of socially irresponsible business practices, 
such as the use of capital-intensive technology with minimal local citizen employment; 
acquisition of supplies from abroad, rather than locally; use of transfer prices and 
technology agreements to avoid taxes; and repatriation of earnings to their home 
countries. As a consequence, the benefits of their activities accrued to the home country 
and to only a small part of the host population allied with the corporations (Roland, 
1998b ). Host governments, especially those in the Middle East, became increasingly 
concerned about the economic domination of these companies over their domestic oil 
sector. In the 1960s and early 1970s, these nations took measures to improve their own 
positions and reduce the market control of the major multinational petroleum 
companies. Their actions included nationalisation and expropriation of foreign-operated 
petroleum facilities (McKern, 1996). 
Mikdashi ( 1986) identified several factors, which contributed to the improved 
bargaining stand of host countries during this period. These include: (i) political 
independence and growth of nationalism; (ii) increased sophistication and civic 
consciousness of national decision-makers, coupled with their easier access to 
independent international expertise; (iii) the desire to emulate governments in developed 
countries which had obtained attractive terms for oil leases on their public land (notably 
1 A concession is a licence area that is leased to a company for a given period for exploration and 
development under specified terms and conditions. 
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the US); (iv) the ability to invite competitive bidding from 'i ndependent' 2 companies; 
(v) the exchange and sharing of information and experiences, and concerted joint efforts 
through groupings of a regional or interregional nature to improve terms, such as the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC3); and (vi) the greater scarcity of 
oil or increased market value of the commodity, especially after 1969. 
As a result of the changes introduced by host governments and the oil crisis of the early 
1970s, many new petroleum companies joined the majors in the international upstream 
market. Mikdashi (1986) classified these new entrants into three main groups: 
i) Medium-sized companies (also known as mini-majors), many of which are US-
based firms that formed during the 1950s. They formed at that time to search for 
cheaper sources of foreign crude oil, to replace declining or increasingly expensive 
national production for their refining and marketing outlets in the US, and compete 
on more equal terms with the low-cost foreign crude supplies of the majors. 
ii) European and Japanese state-owned or state-supported companies which sought to 
reduce their dependence on the majors for economic and national security reasons, 
e.g. Total and Elf-Aquitaine (France), the Japan National Oil Corporation (Japan), 
and Statoil (Norway). 
iii) Companies from developing countries which have attempted to develop national or 
foreign oil resources, especially since the oil price increases of the 1970s. Their 
activities have often been initiated by the nationalisation of domestic foreign-
owned assets or through participation in joint ventures with foreign petroleum 
companies, e.g. PETRONAS of Malaysia and PETROBRAS of Brazil. 
By the 1980s, the emphasis of developing countries on permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, had been overtaken by the problems of heavy debt burdens and the 
collapse of commodity prices. By contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, the negative image of 
the multinationals was essentially disregarded and was replaced by the "present 
scramble by third world governments for attention by prospective investment by 
multinational companies" (Roland, 1998b, p. 106). In the 1990s, more new frontiers 
2 The independent petroleum companies (commonly referred to as the 'independents') are those which are 
neither one of the major transnationals nor state-owned. 
3 OPEC was formed in 1960 by Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran, to challenge the price 
cutting activities of the transnational majors they hosted and defend/restore the price of their oil exports 
(Yergin, 1992). At the time of its creation, member countries' share in the production of their petroleum 
was only about 2%. In 20 years it rose to over 75%, mainly as a result of the purchase or nationalisation of 
oil assets ( oilfields, refineries, and distribution networks) previously owned and operated in the OPEC 
host countries by the major transnationals (Mikdashi, 1986). 
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opened up due to: (i) political changes-the abandonment of socialism reduced political 
barriers to Western companies in the former Soviet Union and in parts of Latin America, 
Asia and Africa; and (ii) technical advances, which have made it possible to explore for 
oil and gas in previously inaccessible places, notably offshore, e.g. West Africa, South-
east Asia and the North Atlantic (Bray, 1997). 
The 1980s and 1990s were characterised by oil price crises, which precipitated further 
changes in the industry's business strategies. Prior to 1986, the majors, independents, 
state oil companies and service sector companies played defined roles in the upstream 
petroleum business. National oil companies held significant reserves and looked to the 
majors to help them expand the oil and gas industries of their countries. Independents 
targeted niche opportunities, primarily in the US. Oilfield service companies focused on 
providing discrete, commodity-like services, seismic surveying, and drilling and 
completing wells. 
The oil price collapse of 1987-1992, however, resulted in a changed industry structure 
and business roles. The majors took decisive action to restore profitability. They 
terminated 372,000 employees during 1985-95; cut their research and development 
budgets at a compounded annual rate of almost 5 % during 1990-94; restructured their 
portfolios around core businesses and assets; and divested more than US$10 billion in 
non-core exploration and production assets during 1989-95. The divestments often went 
to independents (which consequently gained a platform from which to launch future 
international ventures) (Murphy et al., 1997). Along with these cuts, the majors began 
out-sourcing and forming alliances with oilfield service companies to source services 
they used to provide internally. As a result, oilfield service companies are now filling 
roles in the upstream petroleum business that formerly belonged solely to the majors. 
Along with providing traditional commodity-like services, the oilfield service 
companies are delivering high-end technical services and, increasingly, playing the 
project integrator role 4. 
The petroleum industry is now comprised of numerous petroleum companies ( explorers 
and producers), ranging from large international groups of affiliated companies, to small 
domestic companies. 
In response to the changing market place, and policies and commercial activities of host 
countries, the petroleum industry has been characterised by phases of 'vertical 
integration', 'deintegration' and 'reintegration' (Mikdashi, 1986). The majors and many 
state-owned companies, in particular, have undertaken vertical integration of business 
4 For example, in a joint quest to exploit oil reserves in deep water of the US Gulf of Mexico, Conoco 
established a joint venture with drilling contractor, Reading and Bates, to build a state-of-the-art drill ship 
capable of drilling in a water depth of 10,000 ft (Crump, 1997). 
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functions. They commonly own and operate (or franchise) upstream (exploration and 
production), mid-stream (transportation) and downstream (processing, refining, 
distribution and chemicals) businesses. As integrated firms they can control activities, 
extending from the production of raw materials to their transport, transformation and 
distribution to end users (Mikdashi, 1986; McKern, 1996). 
The multinationals are commonly characterised by structures that attempt to combine 
the local responsiveness of the international subsidiary with the advantages available 
from global co-ordination. They tend to be organised into groups of companies bound 
together through shareholding. The group of subsidiaries or affiliated companies is 
typically controlled ( directly or indirectly) by a parent company, which is often based in 
a Western home country. The affiliated companies may operate in any country in the 
world, subject to the availability of viable prospects for exploration and production, and 
political access. These affiliated companies ( operating companies) are the entities that 
seek to obtain legal permission (licenses or contracts of work) to operate in a host 
country (Taverne, 1994). 
The key to this model is the creation of an integrated network of interdependent 
resources and competences. The multinational ( or transnational) model exhibits the 
following features: (i) each national unit operates independently, but is a source of ideas 
and capabilities for the whole corporation; (ii) national or business line units achieve 
global scale through specialisation on behalf of the whole corporation; and (iii) the 
corporate centre manages a global network by first establishing the role of each 
subsidiary, then sustaining the culture and systems to make the network operate 
effectively. For example, in the late 1990s Unocal set up a joint global headquarters in 
Malaysia to reflect the company's growing business in Asia. According to Unocal 
President John Imle, 
"We are operating a twin headquarters system with our chainnan and key officials still 
based in Los Angeles". The Kuala Lumpur headquarters "makes us more Asian in 
terms of our understanding of the region and the outlook" (Upstream, 1997a). 
Another trend in the highly competitive marketplace of the mid-late 1990s, was a 
marked increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions amongst the majors and 
independent petroleum companies. Perhaps the most notable of which was the merger of 
the two vertically-integrated majors, Exxon and Mobil (announced in December 1998), 
to form the world's largest petroleum company, or what has been termed a 'supermajor'. 
This was followed shortly after by the announcement of the merger between BP Amoco 
and ARCO. Amongst the independents, competitive performance pressures are also 
driving mergers and hostile takeovers between petroleum companies in order to pool 
their financial resources and form larger companies, termed 'superindependents'. 
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One of the emerging trends amongst the majors is to becon1e energy companies in 
pursuit of the 'total energy solution'. This strategy involves linkage of upstream, 
midstream and downstream assets within and across regions to create 'competitive 
space' between themselves and smaller, niche specialists, and to capture the vertical 
integration benefits that still exist in many emerging markets. A few majors, like Exxon-
Mobil in the Asia-Pacific liquefied natural gas market, and Unocal in South-East Asia, 
appear to be n1oving in this direction (Murphy et al., 1997). Unocal Corporation 
Chairman Roger Beach, has stated that Unocal' s growth portfolio is focused on six 
areas. This portfolio includes the Thailand-Myanmar-Vietnam region which "combines 
known hydrocarbon basins with rapidly developing gas-to-power niarkets" (Battersby, 
1998e). The company's local strategy was reflected in the President's Message in 
Unocal Thailand's 1998 GO-HES Review and Action Plan: 
"During 1998, we will face new challenges as the economy of Thailand adjusts and we 
conipete with other Gulf of Thailand gas producers. To meet these challenges, we will 
be placing emphasis on planning in all aspects of our operations, a very necessary step 
to maintain our leadership position" (Unocal Thailand Ltd, 1998). 
Globalisation means opportunities as well as challenges to the oil and gas industry, 
including globalisatior: of environmental concerns. Transnational operations by 
companies serve to expose companies to an increasingly demanding political agenda 
(Fowler, 1995). At the same time, the globalisation of environmental concerns means 
that domestic regulations are no longer the only rules to play by for oil and gas 
companies. With regard to global warming, for instance, this means that investments in 
any part of the world may have to take into account future provisions under the Climate 
Convention. This may fundamentally impact upon corporate strategies. Global warming, 
however, may also bring new opportunities for forward-looking energy companies, with 
increased market shares for lower carbon fuels and technologies and involvement in 
joint implementation and emissions trading (Roland, 1998d). 
To summarise, although petroleum companies vary considerably with respect to origin, 
size, structure, strategy, management, innovation, flexibility, and performance, 
Mikdashi ( 1986) suggests that two key objectives essentially determine their behaviour: 
(i) high profits and growth, and (ii) the stability and long-term survival of the company. 
More specifically, the operational objectives are: (i) to enhance the security of product 
flows from sources of supply to outlets; (ii) reduction of transaction costs; and (iii) 
achievement of information advantages that assist rational programming of investments 
and activities. 
4.2.2 Current Asian Market Opportunities 
Within East Asia, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand have for many years been centres of 
upstrean1 petroleum sector investment. Over the last decade, Cambodia, China, Laos, 
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Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, South Korea and Vietnam have also been opening 
up their acreage5. Investment in the oil and gas exploration and production sector in 
South-East Asia grew steadily throughout the 1990s. The prospects for future gas 
discoveries in the region are believed to be as good as and, in some areas, better than oil 
(Norton, 1994). The opportunity to access prospective acreage is therefore still 
improving, although investors will still have to make economic choices about where 
they place their risk capital. 
In the past, exploration focus in Asia was on oil-natural gas discoveries were 
lamented. However, the rising local electricity market demand for gas, together with 
advances in liquefied natural gas (LNG) liquefaction and transportation technologies 
have made natural gas a very attractive and viable commodity for sale within South-East 
Asia and North Asia (Japan and South Korea) (Eklof et al., 1997). Strong growth in the 
use of natural gas is seen as desirable to increase diversity of energy supply, to reduce 
environmental en1issions problems for coal-fired power stations, and to assist in meeting 
the rapidly growing demand for electricity (International Energy Agency (IEA), 1996). 
The devaluation of South-East Asian currencies and stock market fluctuations that 
occurred in 1997-98 also en1phasised the need to develop domestic gas supplies to meet 
the energy needs as an alternative to relatively expensive oil imports. 
With the regional growth in gas supply demand, a number of gas transmission pipelines 
have recently been constructed or are being planned. A survey by World Gas 
Intelligence ( cited by IEA, 1996) reported that by 1995 some 4,500 km of gas 
transmission pipelines had been constructed in South-East Asia, and a further 6,000 km 
of transmission lines was projected to be installed by 2000. Similarly, the number of 
existing and planned facilities for the export and import of LNG have been increasing 
rapidly in recent years, in response to improving cost efficiencies6. However, the costs 
of building pipeline infrastructure are considerable, at a cost of around US$1 million per 
kilometre to build a 30 inch diameter pipeline, as well as the considerable expense of 
building associated compressor stations (IEA, 1996). In many cases, the costs of 
building future pipelines will be beyond the financial capabilities of existing state-
owned pipeline operators and this is expected to increase pressure on governments to 
allow greater private sector participation in the gas transmission sector (IEA, 1996). 
New investment opportunities for petroleum companies may also arise in the future 
once new gas pipeline and associated infrastructure have been installed. IEA ( 1996) 
5 Areas of land or territorial sea designated for petroleum exploration and production. 
6 Compared to 1969, liquefaction costs in 1995 were reduced by 60%. It has been estimated that between 
1990 and 2000, LNG shipping costs will decrease by about 40%, mainly through larger vessels, new tank 
designs and more efficient use of space (Roland, 1998c ). 
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suggests that as don1estic grids become more wjdespread they are likely to encourage 
greater gas production, particularly from smaller fields that are close to the new grids. 
These are fields with reserves that , on their own, might be too small to justify the 
construction of the pipeline infrastructure that would be needed to supply the gas to 
consumers. However, if the infrastructure is already in place then the economics of 
developing such a field improves significantly. Similarly, the existence of pipeline 
interconnections between countries in the region could also lead to the possibility of 
such gas being exported. 
"There will be more large energy projects involving several Asian nations. Companies 
will increasingly need to think beyond national borders, and a company's ability to 
structure international projects will be a plus. Natural gas, the fuel of choice for much 
of Asia, will challenge oil and coal and cross national boundaries as countries expand 
their horizons for energy supplies" (Cambridge Energy Research Associates cited in 
Crow, 1997a, p. 33). 
In this regard, South-East Asian governments are discarding their nationalistic 
preoccupations and demonstrating a willingness to cooperate and work together. 
According to Naisbitt (1997, p. 141), "a decade ago, alliances and cooperation aniong 
governments and businesses were unheard of and unthinkable. Much of the integration 
in Asia today happened in the niarketplace - as a direct consequence of demand and 
supply." 
In most Asian countries, the initial gas infrastructure was built, owned and operated by 
vertically integrated, state-owned utilities or companies. These companies had a 
monopoly over the provision of gas transportation in their respective countries, that is, 
they imported ( or produced) the gas, distributed it and marketed it. However, many of 
the developing countries, following the earlier trend in developed countries, are now 
privatising their state-owned petroleum companies in a move to reduce government 
budgetary expenditure. For example, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) 7 , 
Thailand's state-owned petroleum company, is currently undergoing corporatisation of 
7 
The Petroleum Authority of Thailand Act established PTT on 29 December 1978, as a state enterprise 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Industry. Its purpose was to function as a fully-integrated 
petroleum business ranging from exploration, development, procurement, transportation, refining, 
distribution to other related businesses, and to act as a state mechanism in stabilising national economic 
and energy security. Between I January 1992 and 1 February 1996, PTT was reorganised from a 
functional to a business-oriented structure. The supervision and management were decentralised to four 
business units: the Exploration/Production and Gas Sector, the Downstream Oil Sector, the Refining 
Sector, and the Petrochemical Sector. These four sector groups assumed responsibility for supervision of 
newly established affiliated companies and subsidiaries including PTT Exploration and Production 
(PTTEP), PTT Oil, PTT International and PTT Gas. The Head Office retained a strategic leadership role 
(PTT, 1996). 
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its management and operations in preparation for public listing, and to reduce its 
reliance on borrowings guaranteed by the Thai Ministry of Finance. This trend changes 
the contractual arrangements between private companies and the former state-owned 
enterprises, and introduces new competitors into the global marketplace. 
The global trend towards competition and privatisation is expected to profoundly 
influence the gas sector over the next 25 years. The major policy objective behind this 
process is to deliver a more efficient energy sector and lower prices to end-consumers. 
In the long term, energy sector analysts suggest that there are three key megatrends that 
face the petroleum industry. These are: (i) open markets and competition, such as 
deregulation of the gas market; (ii) technology improvements, which have significantly 
reduced costs and increased the efficiency of extracting, converting and utilising energy; 
and (iii) environmental concerns-" the environment is possibly the most important 
f orce shaping the future of energy industries and markets" (Roland, 1998c, p. 83). 
4.3 LEGAL-REGULATORY INFLUENCES 
4.3.1 Overview 
Legislation, regulations and standards have played an important role in the petroleum 
industry since its inception. US anti-trust legislation that led to the break-up of the 
Standard Oil Company, and legislative changes that nationalised many of the seven 
sisters' assets in the Middle East during the 1960s, are notable examples. Over the last 
30 years or so, environment, health and safety legislation have also become major 
commercial factors for the industry. 
The current regulatory framework is a sophisticated system of national and international 
or inter-state regulation of petroleum activities that has evolved over the last 140 or so 
years since commercial oil exploitation commenced. This framework is typically 
comprised of petroleum legislation, relevant legislation and fiscal legislation. Taverne 
(1994) describes these as follows. 
The objectives of 'petroleum' legislation are to regulate the conduct of petroleum 
operations, and to determine the sharing of the petroleum revenues and income between 
the State and the entity authorised to undertake these operations. Such legislation 
comprises those statutes and regulations which have been specifically enacted to 
regulate: (i) petroleum operations ( e.g. construction and operation of petroleum 
installations and pipelines, methods of working, and the health and safety of workers); 
(ii) the imposition of any specific or special charges or duties on petroleum revenues 
(e.g. royalties, petroleum profit sharing) and the imposition of tax on income realised 
from petroleum operations; and (iii) licenses and contracts of work-the authorisations 
permitting the licence holder or contractor to undertake one or more types of petroleum 
operation, subject to fulfilling the obligations imposed in the licence or contract. The 
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competent government authority (usually the government m1111ster responsible for 
petroleum affairs) grants a licence. A contract of work is usually entered into with the 
designated state oil enterprise, subject to the approval of the competent authority. 
'Relevant' legislation refers to all legislation, other than petroleum legislation, that is 
relevant to the conduct of petroleum operations. It includes legislation concerning the 
conservation and protection of the living and non-living natural resources and of the 
environment generally, as well as legislation concerning the occupation, use and 
restoration of surface areas. Relevant legislation is typically administered by 
government ministries and by provincial and municipal authorities and administrations. 
Relevant legislation in a host country is often a key determinant of environmental 
performance obligations for petroleum companies, but typically varies considerably 
from country to country, and between states in federations. In the US and Australia, 
there are well-developed systems for the imposition of liability for environmental 
damage, whereas in many third world countries, there is little such regulation. 
'Fiscal' legislation refers to all generally applicable legislation concerning taxes on 
income and other taxes. Petroleum legislation may restrict or otherwise qualify the 
application and scope of the fiscal legislation as far as petroleum revenues or petroleum 
income are concerned and in the context may provide for exemptions, special tariffs, 
etc. 
Petroleum legislation operates in conjunction with relevant legislation and fiscal 
legislation. An authorisation to undertake petroleum operations under petroleum 
legislation (through licences or contracts) generally does not imply or guarantee a 
similar authorisation under relevant legislation. The government agencies in charge of 
administering relevant legislation will usually apply activity or project-specific criteria, 
to address issues such as pollution control, access to and use of land, and protection of 
wildlife. If these agencies refuse to grant a licensee or a contractor the necessary work 
permits, it usually not possible for these entities to exercise their rights as granted to 
them under petroleum legislation. Similarly, operational authorisations granted under 
petroleum legislation or relevant legislation become meaningless, if fiscal legislation 
does not allow the licensee or contractor to run a profitable operation (Taverne, 1994). 
4.3.2 Petroleum Agreements 
Petroleu1n legislation is country- or state-specific and thus may vary considerably 
around the world. One of the fundamental differences in approach is in the use of 
production sharing contracts versus licences or concessions. 
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Production Sharing Contracts 
Commonly, the petroleum legislation of developing countries is based on the 
establishment of a state-owned national petroleum company and the use of contracts. 
The purpose-built state petroleum enterprise is assigned responsibility for all petroleum 
activities and an exclusive licence to obtain and extract petroleum. The foreign 
petroleum industry (usually comprising petroleum companies based in Western 
industrialised countries) is only permitted to undertake petroleum activities within the 
jurisdiction of such countries on the basis of a contract of work to be entered into with 
its state oil enterprise (Taverne, 1994). These contracts are commonly known as 
production sharing contracts (PSC), and are characterised by the following features 
(Taverne, 1994): 
i) The contractor ( e.g. a foreign petroleum company that who entered into the 
contract with the authorised state enterprise) will render technical and financial 
services and within this framework undertake and finance the petroleum operations 
described in the contract. 
ii) As compensation for rendering these services the contractor will receive a certain 
part of any production that might result from its \vork. If no production is realised, 
a contractor will receive no compensation for its investments and other services. 
iii) The compensation is partly related to the capital and operating costs incurred and 
partly representing a profit element. The State and the state enterprise obtain and 
share the remaining part of the production. 
iv) Investment in exploration and appraisal activities is exclusively for the account of 
the contractor. Investment in the development of a field is either also for the sole 
account of the contractor or may be shared with the state enterprise. 
Within this framework, onerous state-imposed taxation can inhibit a contractor 's 
willingness to exploit reserves, vvhile favourable taxation regimes can encourage 
investment. Traditionally those countries with proven petroleum reserves, such as 
Indonesia and Malaysia, have had the bargaining po\ver to demand more restrictive 
financial terms in their PSCs (IEA, 1996). Whereas those countries with little or no 
proven deposits, such as the Philippines, have traditionally offered more lenient terms to 
attract investment (Valencia, 1985). 
Over time, however, there has been a shift away from agreements focusing primarily on 
fiscal benefits, towards more complex arrangements intended to capture both direct 
benefits and externalities. Developing countries are interested in the positive 
externalities of foreign direct investment such as improved technological skills, 
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management and know-how, induced investment in other industries, the provision of 
infrastructure and upgrading of the general ski1ls of the workforce. Those requirements 
are frequently written into contracts, as in Indonesia's later generation of production 
sharing contracts (McKem, l 996). 
Similarly, increased demand for petroleum products and the availability of a wider range 
of investment locations, has improved the bargaining power of contractors. Traditional 
PSCs are now also being modified to make investment terms more attractive to foreign 
petroleum companies (IEA, 1996). For example, in March 1997, Malaysia's state-owned 
petroleum company, PETRONAS, offered new PSC terms. These included a revenue-
over-cost clause to spur new investments in smaller and higher risk areas, with the 
intention of allowing contractors to recover their investments faster, taking into account 
increased risks and costs, diminishing prospects and the exploitation of smaller fields. 
Malaysia is reportedly eager to draw explorers to its deep-water blocks off the coast of 
the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. However, the depreciation of its 
currency (the Ringgit) against the US dollar during the Asian currency crisis of 1997-98 
increased costs of operation (due to reliance upon imported goods and services) and 
eroded the international competitiveness of Malaysia as an investment location 
( Upstream, 1997b). 
Licences and Concessions 
The other forms of petroleum agreement, more commonly used in Western countries, 
are licences or concessions, granted to petroleum companies by the government in a 
competitive bidding process. The licence entitles the holder to obtain and extract 
petroleum and constitutes a transfer of title to petroleum if and when produced. The 
transfer is between the owner of the petroleum in situ (in most cases the State 
represented by a government agency, known as the 'competent authority') and the 
licence holder (Taverne, 1994 ). However, like PS Cs, licence and fiscal terms may vary 
considerably between these countries (and from cabinet to cabinet), and thus are an 
important factor in determining investment preferences by both domestic and foreign 
petroleum companies. 
Environmental Protection Provisions 
Statutory environment protection obligations typically have not received the same level 
of attention in petroleum legislation as fiscal terms. From a survey of petroleum 
agreements in over 100 developing countries, Gao ( 1994) found that the agreements 
have followed a pattern of providing a general principle of, or reference to, 
environmental protection, but systematic and substantive requirements are absent. The 
only explicit reference to environmental protection may be a broad-based clause, like: 
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"Contractor shall ... carry out operations in such a manner as to cause minimum social 
and ecological disruption and use its best endeavours to cause no damage to public 
and private properties. If pollution results from contractor's operations, contractor 
shall promptly carry out cleaning operations to the satisfaction of the appropriate 
governmental authorities and the costs therefore shall not be chargeable as 
exploration, development or production costs." 
For example, the PSCs for offshore exploration activities in Myanmar only refer to 
environment protection requirements in a generic sense: 
"The contractor shall take such precautions for protection of navigation and fishing 
and the prevention of environmental pollution as are consistent with international 
oilfield practices". 
Myanmar's petroleum legislation (the Oilfields Act 1911, the Petroleum Act 1934, the 
Essential Supplies Act 1947, the Oilfield (Workers and Welfare) Act 1951 and the Oil 
and Natural Gas Concession Law 1991) also lack any substantive environmental 
management requirements. 
Gao (1994) attributes the lack of environmental protection clauses in petroleum 
contracts of developing countries to the fact that economic development usually 
outweighs environmental protection. 
"Both parties to the contract view the environmental obligation as somehow in conflict 
with their own interests. The producing countries are afraid of scaring away potential 
investors by imposing strict environmental requirements. The investing companies 
consider the environmental obligation as an extra burden to exploration cost" (Gao, 
1994, p. 250). 
Such vague references to environmental management obligations under petroleum 
legislation make definition and hence measurable fulfilment of these obligations 
difficult for petroleum companies. However, Taveme (1994) notes that rules regarding 
methods of working, abandonment of installations, matters of health and safety and the 
conservation and protection of natural resources ( other than petroleum) and the 
environment, are often not included in PSCs or licences or concessions, but can be 
found in relevant legislation. 
4.3.3 Company-Regulator Relations 
Developing countries are typically keen to encourage foreign investment to stimulate 
economic growth and employment. vVhere these countries have limited legal 
administrative capability, development is often promoted ahead of appropriate 
regulatory controls. For example, Myanmar is hosting the development of two major 
offshore gas fields (Yadana and Yetagun) and associated export pipelines by foreign 
petroleum companies. However, Myanmar currently has no environmental act as such, 
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and no legislative requirements for environmental impact assessments of such projects. 
Developments are managed on a sectoral basis through the regulations and policies of 
the responsible ministry-in this case, the Ministry of Energy. 
The character of the legal framework of host countries is an important influence on 
foreign investment by petroleum companies, particularly in regard to fairness and 
transparency, and flexibility exhibited by governments in the implementation of 
resource policies. Petroleum companies generally consider a supportive bureaucratic and 
institutional framework to be desirable, e.g. the existence of a major agency with the 
power to approve and facilitate the i1nplementation of projects, coupled with limits on 
the individual discretion allowed to officials (Walde, 1993). For example, in early 1997, 
Vietnam, in response to petroleum industry complaints of inconsistency and confusion 
over accompanying regulations for its 1993 Law on Oil and Gas, issued formal 
regulations to clarify definitions of terminology and requirements of the 1993 statute. 
These new regulations address safety measures, environmental protection, contractual 
rights and obligations, personnel policies, training, taxation and inspection procedures. 
Vietnam is also reportedly drafting a law targeted at corruption in its administration. 
Faced with waning foreign interest in Vietnam's fledgling oil industry, the government 
is reportedly eager to send a clear message to investors that it is serious about reforming 
its bureaucracy (Tham, 1997b). 
Host government policies (and policy changes) in respect of foreign investment are 
often determined by dominant interest groups and their perception(s) of national 
welfare, such as concerns about protecting and increasing their socio-economic 
prosperity and political stability. The influence of such interest groups may affect 
activities of enterprises (private or state-owned), fiscality and regulations, competition, 
and inter-government relations (Mikdashi, 1986). Governments have also increasingly 
responded to public demands for cutting d~wn on external and social costs, such as 
health, safety and environmental hazards. Host government prescriptions, therefore, 
often aim at obliging companies to assume the costs of eliminating or minimising health 
and environmental damage to society. 
In their studies of multinational petroleum and chemical companies (MNCs) operating 
in China, Taiwan, Colombia and Peru, Moser and Tsai ( 1998, p. 13) reported that: 
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"The experience from both geographic areas indicated that legislators will make an 
example of MNCs, to provide an indication to the rest of the industry that they are 
serious about environmental protection. Relative to other types of co,npanies, MNCs 
are more easily identifiable and likely to comply with any penalties for non-
compliance. As a consequence, the regulatory authorities impose their policies upon 
MN Cs, with the intention of inducing the rest of the industry to incorporate responsible 
environmental business practices. These cases exemplified the strategic manoeuvring 
of the host governments to derive maximum benefits fro,n institutional conformity." 
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The political nature of government decision-making poses a significant business risk for 
petroleum companies, which they attempt to minimise through lobbying activities. Over 
the years, the petroleum industry has established numerous national and international 
industry representative bodies, whose role is essentially to lobby governments to protect 
the business interests of the industry (Estrada et al., 1997). These industry groups 
operate as networks to foster sharing information and exchange of ideas. They 
collectively represent competencies, capabilities and power that goes beyond the 
attributes held by the individual company members (Boons, 1998; Chisholm, 1998; 
Roome, 1997). Given recent changes in social and political debate, these groups have 
increasingly become involved in the field of environment, health, and safety issues, and 
many of the industry associations have developed codes of practice and guidelines for 
their members as informal mechanisms to set industry performance standards. 
One of the key international industry groups is the Oil Industry International Exploration 
and Production Forum (the E & P Forum). The E & P Forum is a non-profit-making, 
umbrella organisation, headquartered in London, that represents the worldwide oil and 
gas industry before international regulatory bodies. In 1998, the E & P Forum had 
almost 60 corporate members worldwide, the majority being private and state-owned oil 
and gas companies operating in 60 different countries. Other members include a number 
of national oil indu-stry associations and petroleum institutes. 
The work of the E & P Forum covers: (i) monitoring the activities of relevant global and 
regional international organisations8; (ii) developing industry positions on issues; (iii) 
advancing the positions on issues under consideration, drawing on the collective 
expertise of its members; and (iv) disseminating information on good practice through 
the development of industry guidelines, codes of practice, checklists, etc. The E & P 
Forum is currently working closely with the UNEP' s Industry and Environment office, 
to internationally promote the concept of performance-based regulations. Their belief is 
that such an approach "has the potential to stimulate more innovative and effective 
environmental management in all areas of the vvorld" (E & P Forum and UNEP, 1997). 
Petroleum industry organisations have also been established at a national level in many 
countries. Examples include the United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association 
(UKOOA), the American Petroleum Institute (API), the Australian Institute of 
Petroleum (AIP), the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association 
8 The E & P Forum has observer status as a non-governmental organisation with a number of global and 
regional regulatory bodies. The organisation works closely with various United Nations agencies , 
including the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), 
International Labour Organisation (ILO), and other regional bodies to represent its members' interests in 
regard to regulating the exploration and production of oil and gas, with particular emphasis on safety of 
personnel and protection of the environment (E & P Forum, 1998). 
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(APPEA), the Petroleum Institute of Thailand (PTIT) and the Indonesian Petroleum 
Association. The extent to which they operate as industry lobby groups varies. 
The petroleum industry associations in Australia and the United Kingdom, as examples, 
have recognised that their members' continued access to sensitive or perceived sensitive 
marine areas, or areas long claimed by other interests, such as commercial fisheries, no\v 
depends on extensive proactive programmes of focussed and co-operative 
environmental management and stakeholder involvement. In recent years, APPEA, 
through its Environmental Affairs Committee, has been active in encouraging its 
members and government agencies to work together in a more cooperative manner to 
share environmental information and recognise the need to accept and work within a 
framework of multiple use management of the marine environment, in order to defend 
the industry's continued access to offshore acreage. 
"We do not believe that this issue [making multiple use happen] is just one for 
governments, or conservation groups, or industry-it is an issue all of us have an 
interest in. However, often in our marine areas, industry may be the only presence. In 
these circumstances, industry can play an important role in management issues that 
extend beyond its immediate activities. A government presence can be expensive and 
may be unnecessary if objectives, roles and responsibilities are clear and agreed, with 
sensible management arrangements drawing on -all the interests involved" (Young, 
1995, p. 7). 
The Petroleum Institute of Thailand (PTIT) does not view itself as a lobby group, rather 
as a technical support group. PTIT' s mission is as follows: 
"The Institute shall assist in the development and strengthening of organisations, 
personnel, and facilities throughout the Kingdom of Thailand to meet the needs of the 
petroleum and petrocheniical industries with respect to human resource development,· 
information service; technical service, research and development; policy and 
regulatory issues ... all this with a view to optimising the benefits to be derived from 
petroleum and petrochemical industries development in Thailand" (PTIT, 1998). 
The PTIT has produced an Environmental Code of Practice for Hydrocarbon 
Developn1ent in Thailand, which focuses on the use of environmental management 
systems. 
_ "Through working with the Government, Industry can implement an Environmental 
Management System that focuses on the key aspects of operations that may impact the 
environment. This approach will effect the greatest environmental protection at the 
lowest cost" (Thailand Upstream Petroleum Industry Task Force, 1996, p. 6). 
Nevertheless, the PTIT has coming under increasing pressure from its upstream 
multinational company members to take a more assertive role in the regulatory debate in 
Thailand, as it pertains to the industry's interests. The companies have proposed that 
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PTIT establish new sub-committees to focus more on environmental issues. Unocal 
Thailand and Thai Shell have been some of the driving forces behind these initiatives. In 
July 1998 the members appointed an industry representative to facilitate this process, in 
the capacity of PTIT Project Coordinator and Interim E & P Secretariat. In a discussion 
document, "Executive Briefing. PTIT E & P Sub-Co,nniittees Developnient Project" 
issued by the PTIT Project Coordinator and Interim E & P Secretariat in June 1998, the 
E & P industry's plan was elaborated: 
"The Exploration & Production operators of the Kingdom of Thailand have recognised 
that there is a need to enhance the effectiveness of dialogue between E & P operators 
and govern,nent agencies. The E & P operators, through their PTIT E & P Standing 
Committee have initiated the develop,nent of permanent industry working groups under 
this Standing Committee to deal with the health, environment, safety, legal and 
operational issues that are currently facing the industry. These working groups will 
parallel similar organisations such as NOGEPA in Holland and UKOOA in the United 
Kingdom." 
One of the first projects of this new initiative is reportedly to gain more involvement in 
development of legislation to fill existing gaps, such handling and disposal of hazardous 
materials. 
These industry organisations are usually only active within their own national 
boundaries, but can also be important sources of technical guidance for their members in 
their overseas operations. Multinationals tend to retain a strong technical link with 
industry advisory groups in their home countries. For example, US-based companies 
tend to look to the API for technical standards, while UK-based companies look to the E 
& P Forum and UKOOA. In other situations, governments have formed strong links 
with these groups as a source of technical advice. For example, Vietnam has strong links 
with North Sea petroleum producing countries, like Norway, while Thailand has 1n 
some instances sought guidance from Australian and US standards. 
Another business risk is associated with host government policies that seek to maximise 
external benefits from the company operations. The centralised nature of government in 
many developing countries is such that remote communities derive little or no benefit 
from state-allocated resources. For example, governments may structure payment terms 
to optimise their profits (in money or kind) from petroleum production operations for 
their own vested interests (Mikdashi, 1986). Fiscal terms may require petroleum 
companies to make significant contributions to national governments in the form of 
royalties and taxes, but little ~r none of the financial benefits may accrue directly to 
local affected communities in the area of operations. This can become a source of local 
disaffection and conflict with the operating petroleum companies (McPhail and Davy, 
1998), as has been the experience of Royal Dutch/Shell in Nigeria, Texaco in Ecuador, 
and Total and Unocal in Myanmar. 
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Con1munity concerns about environmental damage and/or incompatibility of petroleum 
industry activities with other land uses, can result in pressure on governments to reduce 
or renege on access to prospective acreage. This has occurred in Western Australia 
where effective community lobbying prevented offshore petroleum exploration 
proceeding near the Ningaloo Reef, despite the fact that the explorer was operating 
vvithin its legal licence conditions. 
4.4 SOCIAL EXPECTATIONS 
4.4.1 Joint Venturers 
Petroleum operations inherently involve high levels of business risk (geological, 
technical, commercial and political). Exploration and production are also capital-
intensive, and in the case of exploration, may produce no investment returns. Hence, 
petroleum companies usually seek to share the risks and investments with other partners 
by entering into a legally-binding co-operation agreement with each other, commonly 
known as a joint operating agreement (JOA). The partners are referred to as joint 
venture (JV) participants. Such agreements are usually entered into prior to obtaining a 
licence or PSC, in which case those rights are applied for jointly by the JV. After the 
award of the licence or contract the JV participants become licensees or co-contractors. 
A JOA may also be entered into after one of the parties has already obtained a licence or 
contract-a process referred known as 'farming-in' (Taverne, 1994 ). 
The terms of the JOA are negotiated between the partners, on the basis of apportioning 
responsibility, cost sharing, and financial returns. Typically, there will be a clause in the 
JOA which provides for the establishment of a management or operating committee (the 
management committee), comprising representatives from all of the JV participants. 
This committee decides on matters of policy, supervises the operations and reviews and 
approves the annual work programmes and corresponding budgets and production 
schedules as prepared by the entity acting as 'operator' 9 for the JV. The management 
committee makes its decisions in unanimity or by majority vote, depending on the 
importance of the matter in respect of which a decision has to be taken and/or on the 
distribution of the participating interests, all as stated in the JOA (Taverne, 1994 ). Joint 
venture participants can challenge operators where they fail to adequately implement JV 
9 It is usual for a JOA to contract one person or company to be the operator, to act as the agent of the joint 
venture . This party can be a participant, a subsidiary of a participant formed for the specific purrose of 
managing the project; or a corporation formed and owned by the participant to manage the project. 
Commonly, the operator is the company that holds the majority stake in the JOA (expressed as a 
percentage) . The operator is typically financed either for the joint account of all parties or for the account 
of one or more but not all parties, depending on whether any particular investment was agreed to by all 
parties or by less than all parties (Taverne, 1994). 
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directives and agreed performance standards, unless the operator can demonstrate that 
practicality or an evaluation of viable alternatives drove their contrary actions 10. 
Perception of risk plays an important role in the conduct of the industry's operations and 
hence in investment decisions, selection of JV partners, and JV decision-making 
processes. By entering into JO As and conducting joint operations, JV participants place 
the corporation's assets, earnings and staff at risk, as well as incurring liability risk for 
their actions and those of third parties. Through JOAs, JV participants share legal 
responsibility for the actions taken by the operator in conducting exploration and 
production programmes. Where operators fail to comply with statutory requirements, the 
non-operator joint venture participants can incur significant potential and actual 
liabi Ii ties, depending on the provisions of the relevant laws 11 in the host country ( and 
the home country in the case of some foreign companies). 
The majors and large independents typically have adequate financial resources to initiate 
large projects, but are cautious about where they engage in these ventures, because they 
potentially put a large asset base at risk. Many of the larger, high profile companies are 
also concerned about public image and scrutiny by pressure groups. Moser and Tsai 
( 1998) observed increasing social pressure on large foreign companies in developing 
countries. In their studies of multinational companies (MNCs) operating in China, 
Taiwan, Peru and Colombia, they found that, 
" ... in those countries where legislation appeared weak, MNCs attract the largest share 
of attention from the 'informal legislators'. e.g. in Peru, local and international NGOs 
1naintain a close eye on the major MNCs undertaking exploration and production 
activities. Meanwhile, local and non-MNC foreign companies undertake their activities 
almost unnoticed" (Moser and Tsai, 1998, p. 14). 
10 The operator must act in the interests of the joint venture in the course of undertaking day-to-day 
operations and managing jointly owned property (Slattery and Stammer, 1996). In performing this 
contractual role the operator must prefer the interests of the joint venture to its own, i.e. they should 
consider the legal , commercial and reputation interests of the participants and the business activities of the 
joint venture. The operator also has a duty to disclose information or concerns which may affect the joint 
venture participants, such as environmental issues, or prompt notification of an incident such as an oil spill 
which may incur penalties. Further, as an agent appointed by a contract, the operator owes a duty of care 
to the contract principal, i.e. the joint venture. This is particularly important as the operator controls field 
activities and manages third party contractors. 
11 Where operational risks cannot be removed by management controls (such as staff and contractor 
training and supervision, engineering measures, etc.), it is usual for the joint venture participants to share 
financial risks through indemnification (Ashton, 1992). The non-operator participants indemnify the 
operator for loss of damage incurred in the conduct of the activity, while the operator may indemnify the 
non-operators for loss incurred by gross negligence or wilful misconduct of the operator. The chain of 
indemnity is also usually maintained by apportioning public liability to third party contractors. 
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Petroleum companies usually apply caution when selecting their JV partners and 
appointing an operator for the JV. The performance of these partners, especially the 
operator, can make the difference between a well-run, profitable operation, and a 
catastrophe. An interviewee from a large independent told this researcher that their 
process of selecting JV partners involves looking at their mutual interests, compatibility 
of company policies (including environment, health and safety policies), company 
objectives and ways of doing business. In some cases they assess their environmental 
performance records. Past experience and tn1st also play an important role-they 
characteristically look at selecting partners they have previously worked with. 
Petroleum company interviewees indicated that on-going peer pressure to adhere to 
performance standards, including environmental management, can play an important 
role in some JV management committees. The Gabe project in Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) was cited as an example. In this instance, the operator, Chevron, had a well 
established environmental policy and reportedly insisted that responsible environmental 
management practices be employed on the project. In the case of the mercury disposal 
controversy encountered by the Unocal Thailand-operated JV (see Chapter 6), a Unocal 
interviewee stated that the issue immediately became a key agenda item at management 
committee meetings and received positive support from the JV participants. 
Joint venture participants do not have to be major shareholders to exert their influence 
on environmental performance. In reference to the Kutubu project in PNG, an 
interviewee stated that BP (20% shareholder) set the environmental performance 
conditions for the JV to implement. For the North West Shelf Project in Western 
Australia, the interviewee stated that BP set an environmental challenge for the JV-the 
company wants the projects to be a leading example of how to operate an LNG facility. 
In terms of working within joint ventures, the interviewee stated that BP prefers to 
engage its JV partners to set and agree to performance targets, rather than exercise its 
JOA voting rights and powers. 
By contrast, small independents (and relatively lower profile companies) are often more 
willing to take relatively large investment risks in small projects, often in remote 
locations. In some JVs, particularly those comprising small independents or poorly 
resourced companies, interviewees perceived that environmental issues were often not 
considered to be of high importance. "They avoid the issues because they can". Non-
operating joint venture participants, particularly small companies, or those operating in 
geographically isolated locations or poorly regulated jurisdictions, may perceive the 
legal risks to be low and may pay scant attention to the social and environmental 
management practices of the JV operator, choosing to focus their attention on the up-
front financial aspects of the operations (Martin, 1997). 
Financial expenditure priont1es of state-owned PSC or JV partners can also pose a 
dilemma for their operating partners. Where the PSC or JV partner is unwilling or 
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unable (due to other investment interests) to contribute their share of expenditure 
towards environmental improvements, the petroleum company may need to compromise 
its performance improvement objectives. For example, in 1998 , Royal Dutch/Shell 
announced that it will have to reschedule earlier promised environmental improvements 
in its Nigerian operations. The improvements included objectives to reduce disposal of 
gas through continuous flaring from the current 9 million tonnes per year to 5 million 
tonnes per year by 2002, and to completely eliminate such flaring by 2008 . The reason 
given was that its Nigerian JV budget was cut by 40% in 1997, owing to funding 
shortfalls from the government-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, its JV 
partner. The company said it "is clearly a difficult area and provides us ·with a dilemma 
we are working hard to resolve" (Hopson, 1998c ). 
Peer pressure enforcement of environmental management (and other) practices can be 
also be constrained by pragmatic considerations. A unique characteristic of the 
petroleum industry is the practice of formin g shifting alliances between petroleum 
companies, in pursuit of exploration and production opportunities. "A competitor today 
is an ally tomorrow. A strategic partner in one market is an adversary in another" 
(Crump, 1997, p. 59). As a consequence, companies are sometimes reluctant to criticise 
the social and environmental management practices of others, in case they suffer the 
consequences of future reprisals when those companies are a potential partner or 
competitor. 
Joint venture partners may also keep quiet during controversies to protect themselves 
from adverse publicity. For example, Exxon was a co-owner of the Brent Spar oil 
storage facility. However, during the public outcry over its disposal, "Exxon ducked its 
head and left Shell to take the heat" (Grolin, 1998, p. 216). Similarly, during the PTT 
Yadana gas sales pipeline controversy (see Chapter 6), the JV proponents for the 
Myanmar component of the project publicly distanced themselves from PTT' s handling 
of the controversy in Thailand. 
4.4.2 Shareholders 
Companies often argue that their corporate social performance is constrained by market 
forces and the obligation to return profits to its shareholders in the short-term. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, corporate governance systems of many Western countries are 
based on the principle that management is appointed by and accountable to 
shareholders, who exercise their control by using their voting rights or by disposing of 
their shares. The criticism is often made that investors are short-termist, and therefore 
they place management under undue pressure to produce dividends, at the expense of 
reinvestment in items like equipment, research, staff training and social and 
environmental management (Rappaport and Flaherty, 1991). As a consequence, it has 
been suggested that this market pressure is likely to lead to management opting for 
short-term payback wherever possible (Gunningham, 1994; Maltby, 1997). 
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Parkinson ( 1995, p. 99) reviewed the 1narket forces which influence shareholder 
behaviour in response to company expenditure on its corporate social responsibilities, 
and found that 
" ... in practice managers have some freedom to sacrifice profits in the interests of non-
shareholder groups, but they are nevertheless discouraged from doing so by the 
antagonistic market setting in which they operate." 
The rationale for curtailing social expenditure due to the risk of negative shareholder 
reaction, is a defence commonly used by companies based in the US where hostile 
corporate takeovers are an ever-present threat. A belief that the market demands short-
term returns, prompts companies to avoid expenditure that would arguably enhance the 
company's social performance and be beneficial to the company in the long term. For 
example, a reputation as a business that is concerned for the environment is likely to 
bring benefits to the company, yet implementation of the programs that lead to that 
reputation may be expensive in the short n1n. Parkinson (1995, p. 100) suggests that 
"Respect for the law 1nay even be eroded under the pressure to boost short-term, 
results. The company might, for instance, engage in bribery to attract business or 
economise on safety precautions, endangering the well being of employees, customers, 
or neighbours. The possible costs resulting from prosecution or reputation damage 
may be dismissed as problems for another day." 
This concern about the market for control assumes that shareholders' decisions to buy 
and sell shares are influenced purely by the expected financial return. However, the 
behaviour of some shareholders, especially ethical investment bodies, may be affected 
by other factors. A new trend of social and environmental activism amongst 
shareholders appears to be modifying the nature of shareholder expectations of 
corporate performance. As observed by Carroll ( 1996), public companies are now being 
required to deal with two broad types of shareholders: (i) the traditional shareholder 
groups that are primarily interested in the company's financial performance, such as 
large institutional investors like pension funds and many private shareholders; and (ii) 
growing numbers of 'social activist' shareholders. Specific shareholder actions have 
been categorised by Carroll (1996) into three overlapping areas: (i) the rise of 
shareholder activist groups; (ii) the filing of shareholder resolutions and activism at 
annual meetings; and (iii) the filing of shareholder lawsuits. 
According to Parkinson ( 1995), the market price of a company's shares can be affected 
by its social record and the market for control might have the effect of bringing 
management conduct into ljne with investors' social aspirations, or, at least, might 
provide managers with some latitude to respect ethical considerations. For example, 
investors who disapprove of contact with the military regime of Myanmar may refuse to 
buy shares in petroleum companies with business interests there, no matter how 
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profitable, or dispose of their holdings even though this may be contrary to their 
financial interest. 
However, it does not see1n likely that these effects are currently significant in practice, 
as ethical investors typically constitute only a small proportion of the market. Parkinson 
( 1995) concluded that it is probably fair to assume that the majority of shareholders are 
motivated more or less exclusively by financial concerns, especially in the case of the 
institutional investors who owe this to their beneficiaries. The decisions of ethical 
investors to sell may accordingly be counter-balanced by the decisions of others to buy 
shares that may now be perceived as bargains. Similarly, where ethical bodies retain or 
acquire shares in a company that announces an ethically attractive, but profit-reducing 
policy, the result is likely to be outweighed by decisions on the part of other 
shareholders to sell. Despite the presence of ethical investors the direction of market 
pressure will accordingly be against the adoption of the policy. 
"The reality is that the market for control is a mechanis,n that aligns ,nanagement 
conduct with shareholder preferences and in the absence of an implausible, widespread 
transformation in shareholder attitudes its effect will be to suppress social initiatives 
that do not promise to have at least a neutral impact on profits" (Parkinson, 1995, 
p. 99). 
Nevertheless, there has been a noticeable increase in the incidence of shareholder protest 
about petroleum companies' performance, in relation to issues like environmental 
protection, human rights and business dealings with oppressive governments. 
Shareholder activism is particularly evident in the US and the United Kingdom. Several 
examples of shareholder agitation at petroleum company Annual General Meetings 
(AGM) have been cited in recent years: 
i) In April 1994, 14.1 % of those present at a Unocal shareholders' meeting called on 
the company to issue a report justifying its activities in Myanmar (Bray, 1997). The 
company was also subject, at its June 1998 shareholders' meeting, to protests by 
the Burma Forum, Project MAJE, Maryknoll Fathers and Brothers, EarthRights 
International and the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers' Union. There were also 
two shareholder resolutions presented by a representative of the Catholic Foreign 
Missionary Society of America. One resolution called for a report by a group of 
outside directors that would inform shareholders of the legal, human rights, media 
and environmental implications of doing business in Myanmar. The other 
resolution called for the basing of executives' salary packages on a combination of 
corporate financial considerations and social. concerns (Gilleland, 1998b ). 
ii) In 1996, a group of Texaco shareholders put forward a proposal to end the 
company's operations in Myanmar (Ahmad, 1997c). 
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iii) At the 1997 Shell Transport & Trading AGM in London, the company faced a 
resolution drafted by shareholder, Pensions Investment Research Consultants, 
den1anding that: (i) the company should adopt global standards on environmental 
and social issues management; and (ii) the company should have independent 
external environmental and social auditing of all its work (Valebrokk, 1997 a). 
iv) In 1998, two proxies were submitted at the ARCO shareholders' meeting-one 
that \Vould set up guidelines for selecting countries where ARCO can do business, 
and another calling for an investigation into allegations that state oil company 
Myan1na Oil and Gas Enterprise acts as a conduit for drug running and money 
laundering. The request for investigations was submitted by both the Burma Forum 
and the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (Gilleland, 1998a). 
In most cases, the company shareholder majorities vetoed the protests of shareholder 
factions. Nevertheless the actions served to highlight the increasing willingness of key 
shareholder groups to actively express their concerns about corporate social 
responsibilities. Although such groups are currently vocal minorities, the media and the 
Internet have assisted to give them a global profile. 
4.4.3 Public Interest Groups 
Third party interest groups, such as environmental NGOs and human rights campaigners 
are using advances in global communications to promote their challenges to the 
industry. Extensive media coverage of local and global environmental issues is 
reinforcing the political potency of environmental NGOs. Concerted international 
campaigns by large NGOs like Greenpeace and Amnesty International, attempt to 
pressure the industry to change its strategies on extraction of non-renewable resources, 
and take more responsibility for protection of indigenous communities in their areas of 
operations. 
The global nature of environmental concerns and treaties and the debate about the 
overall sustainability of fossil fuel-based energy futures is also being used as the basis of 
Greenpeace's 'No New Oil Campaign' (Tham, 1998b). Radical factions of the 
environmental NGO community have mobilised to question and block further 
exploration of petroleum resources. Even if not representative of the overall 
environmental movement, the perceived need to plan today for a rapid transfer from 
fossil fuels to renewable alternatives is gaining hold in broad segments of international 
political opinion (Roland, 1998d). BP Amoco ARCO and Royal Dutch/Shell have 
acknowledged this trend and established business units that are now developing solar 
energy technology. 
The media also plays a role in lifting the profile of environmental concerns. They 
commonly now treat local environmental problems, such as oil spills, as issues that 
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concern the international audience. Some NGOs capitalise on such images, translating 
global threats into salient local political challenges and bringing local violations firml y 
into the international spotlight. Royal Dutch/Shell's heated controversies with NGOs 
over what to do with the Brent Spar storage buoy, and Shell's presence and political 
responsibilities in Nigeria exemplify the recent changes in global influence patterns. The 
Nigeria example also demonstrates the extent to which environmental concerns and 
social and political concerns are mutually reinforcing-bringing a growing number of 
complex cases to the attention of corporate boards (Bray, 1997; Roland, 1998d). 
Concerns about questionable social and environmental performance by foreign 
companies are also being used to launch legal action by third parties in their home . 
countries. Cameron and Ramsay ( 1996) note the increasing occurrence of litigation in 
which a corporation is sued in its home jurisdiction on the basis of allegations of 
environmental harm arising from the corporation ' s activities in a foreign jurisdiction. 
For example, lawsuits over environmental and social concerns have been filed against 
petroleum companies in the US in regard to their involvement in Myanmar. At the time 
of writing, Unocal is facing a lawsuit in its home state of California, in relation to the 
company's involvement in construction of the Yadana gas sales pipeline. The lawsuit 
was filed in September 1996 by the exiled National Coalition Government of the Union 
of Burma (NCGUB). The NCGUB has claimed that construction of the Yadana pipeline 
in south-east Myanmar involved repressive acts by Myanmar army acting on behalf of 
the ruling government junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) 
(formerly SLORC). SPDC is responsible for protecting the pipeline right-of-way and is 
engaged in armed conflict with nearby ethnic minority groups. Among the charges-
denied by the companies involved-critics claim forced labour has been used on the 
onshore segment of the pipeline, and that entire villages have been relocated to 
accommodate pipeline routing. The NCGUB has accused Unocal of accepting the 
support of the Myanmar military government knowing that the authorities would be 
engaged in human rights abuses on its behalf (Bray, 1997). 
Another 'class action' lawsuit for alleged human rights abuses in Myanmar was filed in 
the California federal court in 1996, against Unocal and Total, by Thailand-based group 
EarthRights International and the New York-based Centre for Constitutional Rights on 
behalf of 14 Burmese citizens. EarthRights contends Unocal and Total are legally 
responsible for alleged abuses by the SPDC because the project could not have gone 
ahead without the participation of the two oil companies. Therefore the SPDC was 
essentially acting as a contractor to Total and Unocal. Also named in the lawsuit are 
Unocal Chairman Roger· Beach and President John Imle, because they are believed to 
have had personal knowledge of the effects of partnership with a military dictatorship 
known for its history of human rights violations. The plaintiffs are seeking 
compensatory damages, punitive damages and an injunction barring Unocal from 
operating in Myanmar (Gilleland and Hopson, 1998). This suit is of particular interest 
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because, while a US judge has ruled that the US courts have the authority to adjudicate 
violations of human rights law in other countries, it has yet to decide whether Total, a 
French con1pany, falls under US jurisdiction (Gilleland and Hopson, 1998). 
While such lawsuits may not be successful, they can nevertheless cause companies to 
suffer the consequences of adverse international publicity and incur significant financial 
costs. A notable example is the legal action taken against Texaco over contamination in 
the Ecuadorian Oriente region of the Amazon River basin 12. Texaco has argued that it 
has fulfilled its legal obligations, and while Texaco's conforn1ity with the then law of 
the country 1nay strengthen its legal position, the laws have not been sufficient to protect 
it from accusations of environmental irresponsibility. The legal battle inflicted heavy 
costs on Texaco, in terms of adverse publicity, financial costs and management time 
(Bray, 1997). 
4.4.4 Home Country Policies 
Third party resistance to petroleum company activities can also come via home country 
foreign policy. Sanctions and embargoes have become levers for influencing foreign 
governments and denying access to companies. The US National Association of 
Manufacturers found that between 1993 and 1996, the US enacted 61 laws and 
executive actions authorising unilateral economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes 
against 35 countries (Crow, 1997b ), thus constraining US investment in these countries. 
John Cheatham, then President of US-based ARCO International Oil & Gas Co., was 
reported by Crow (1997b, p. 40) to say: 
"With international growth, ARCO is learning to manage a new set of risks associated 
with govern1nents and business environments very different from the US. What's more, 
12 Oil production by US companies commenced in this region in 1967, without any formal environmental 
impact assessment, and very little regulatory control. In 1972 Texaco and Petroecuador (the state-owned 
oil company) commissioned a 312 km oil pipeline through the region. Texaco operated the pipeline. Over 
the next 17 years, it was alleged that the pipeline ruptured at least 27 times, spilling 16.8 million gallons of 
crude oil (as compared with the 10.8 rrullion gallons spilled by the Exxon Valdez oil tanker in Alaska). In 
addition, untreated wastes and leaks from secondary flowlines had reportedly been discharged into the 
catchment on a weekly basis. This acute contamination was linked to neurological disorders and birth 
effects in the local indigenous communities (Kane, 1995). 
For political and commercial reasons, the Ecuadorian government was apparently unwilling to prosecute, 
but in 1993 an Ecuadorian lawyer and a US law firm filed a US$ I billion civil suit against Texaco in New 
York, on behalf of the local indigenous community. The points at issue were the scale of the pollution, and 
the extent of the company's responsibility (Bray, 1997). The suit was brought in Texaco's home country 
because the plaintiffs were not expected to receive justice in an Ecuadorian court (Kane, 1995). The US 
judge dismissed the suit in November 1996 on the grounds of inappropriate jurisdiction. 
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we must come to grips with an added layer of uncertainty created by US government 
policies toward countries where we invest. Managing the co,nplex risks associated with 
overseas host governments and the added dimension of risk created by US foreign 
policy is the most difficult part of international growth". 
In April 1997, the Clinton administration banned further US investment in Myanmar in 
protest against human rights abuses by its military regime. The European Union's (EU) 
Council of Ministers also suspended EU tariff preferences for Myanmar in March 1997, 
to protest against the government's failure to make progress towards advancing 
democracy and human rights (Crow, 1997b). 
In response to the US sanctions on Myanmar, Unocal President John Imle was reported 
by Crow (1997b, p. 40) to say: 
"Historically, unilateral sanctions have proved to be ineffective. During our 30-year 
history in Asia, we've seen that responsible foreign investment is the most effective way 
to promote long-term economic and social development in countries throughout the 
region. We are concerned the [US] administration's action may impede, rather than 
advance, these developments in Myanmar ". 
Dick Cheney (former US Defence Department Secretary) , speaking as Chairman, 
President and Chief Executive Officer of the major oilfield services company, 
Halliburton Co., has predicted that the US Congress will continue to impose sanctions 
on oil producing countries until the industry takes a "proactive approach" to battle the 
trend. "When prices are low, lawmakers feel free to use oil as a sanctions weapon." Oil 
and gas companies must explore where the reserves are, and that means doing business 
in countries that may have policies that the US does not like. "The long-term horizon of 
the industry is at odds with the short term nature of politics. The US government needs 
to extend its horizon and avoid quick, light-switch diplomacy" (Cheney cited by Crow, 
1997b, p. 44 ). 
In defence, William Ramsay (US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Energy, 
Sanctions, and Commodities) stated that the public and stockholders are increasingly 
vocal about whether US companies operating abroad are contributing to, or detracting 
from, protection of human rights, the environment, and other "non-business 
considerations" ( cited by Crow, 1997b, p. 42). He reportedly believes that sanctions can 
be effective, demonstrate US leadership, show US disapproval of certain actions, are 
perceived as a "low-cost" option, and "they certainly meet the need to do something 
visible. " 
However, Ramsay also reportedly admitted that sanctions are not actually low-cost and 
can lead to bad business relations and eventual exclusion of US firms from markets 
(Crow, 1997b, p. 42). For example, the Myanmar government has publicly stated that it 
will favour investment from nations that do not support such sanctions. The Prime 
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Minister of Malaysia, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, has worked to improve relations with the 
military regime of Myanmar, despite repeated warnings from the US. Dr Mahathir was 
the most vocal supporter of the country's successful entry into ASEAN 13 in 1997, and 
reportedly believes that more economic involvement with ASEAN will prompt 
Myanmar's State Peace and Development Council (formerly known as SLORC) to 
adopt internationally acceptable forms of governance (Tham, 1998a). 
In return for this 'friendship', the Myanmar government indicated that it would award 
all future oil and gas concessions to South-East Asian companies. According to Ahmad 
(1997c), Ohn Gyaw, an aide to Myanmar's Foreign Minister, said that Myanmar's 
decision was made after it was accepted into the ranks of ASEAN "as a friend despite 
our different political beliefs and pressures from the West and the US". Ahmad (1997c), 
also reported that U Kyaw Nyein, Managing Director of state-owned petroleum 
company, Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise, said that Thailand's PTT, Malaysia's 
PETRONAS and several independent Indonesian companies were among the companies 
that will be offered exploration acreage. U Kyaw Nyein reportedly also added that even 
US and European companies presently operating in Yangon would not be considered for 
future exploration rights, because "we trust our South-East Asian brothers more." 
PETRONAS, has subsequently been successful in acquiring Texaco's stake in the 
Yetagun gas field and the Malaysian company, Dtatran Isibumi, was awarded four Gulf 
of Martaban concessions. 
Britain also has not endorsed the US sanctions on private investment in Myanmar. 
Investment figures released by the Myanmar Embassy in Singapore indicate that Britain 
ranked highest in investments in Myanmar for 1997, with 29 companies contributing 
US$ l .32 billion 14 (Ahmad, 1997 d). A British Foreign Office spokesman was reported as 
saying: " ... we cannot dictate how companies conduct themselves commercially, even in 
countries with bad rights records. " The UK government reportedly has no plans to 
impose sanctions in Myanmar, as it believes these can cause real hardship to the 
population while having very little effect on the regimes in place. The spokesman stated 
that the UK government will continue to provide practical help and financial support to 
companies wishing to operate in Myanmar or attend trade missions there (Battersby, 
1998b) . 
For British independent petroleum company, Premier Oil plc., the US investment 
sanctions created an oppo~tunity to support one its key business strategy objectives, i.e. 
13 ASEAN (the Association of South-East Asian Nations) is a regional economic grouping that currently 
includes Brunei , Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam. 
14 Singapore ranked second with US$ l .22 billion and Thailand was third with US$1. l 3 billion (Ahmad, 
1997d). 
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to develop its Asian gas portfolio. In late 1997, the company took over operatorship of 
the Yetagun gas/condensate field development from US-based Texaco, when it 
withdrew from Myanmar in response to US stakeholder protests against its involvement 
in the country. Myanmar is now viewed as one of the Premier's promising investments 
(Oil & Gas Journal, 1997c). 
4.5 CULTURE AND CORPORATE ETHICS 
In their capital-intensive, but often unsuccessful, quest to discover viable hydrocarbon 
reserves and favourable development terms, upstream petroleum companies may enter 
and exit countries or particular geographic areas over a relatively short period. An 
operational environment characterised by this combination of high risks and high 
rewards, and constant change, has helped mould the culture and business practices of 
these companies, and influenced their attitudes towards corporate social responsibility. 
One characteristic of which, is a tendency towards short-term views on externalities , 
like social and environmental issues. 
Many of the independent petroleum companies specialise in exploration, often in remote 
locations. Their business strategy is to find viable reserves which they can later develop 
with farm-in partners, or divest their interests to a major petroleum company. Since 
geology is paramount to these explorationists, they may be less concerned with broader 
social, political and environmental issues. Small independent companies in particular, 
appear to tend to take the approach that if the resources are present, political problems 
will be resolved at a later stage, with the assistance of their partners. If the geology is 
acceptable, political and security risks are typically seen as challenges rather than 
obstacles that deter investment. According to Premier Oil plc. Director, Richard 
Haythornethwaite, 
"There are an amazing number of opportunities where people's understanding is that 
they are not attractive . ... The industry moves as a herd-we operate to one side and 
find countries before them." Premier invested in Pakistan in the late 1980s, "when 
Pakistan was seen as a pariah both politically and technically. Now it's desirable " 
(Haythomethwaite cited in Oil & Gas Journal, 1997c, p. 34). 
Major companies are often more sensitive than smaller independents, to the need to 
protect their international reputations, but the attitudes of individual companies are 
influenced by their origins and values (Hastings, 1999; Moser, 1998). To illustrate, 
subsidiaries of multinational companies are often found operating in developing 
countries with questionable social policies. Critics argue that if a multinational invests, 
or has prior investments, in a developing country with questionable human rights and 
democratic records, it has an ethical responsibility, given its size and power, to pressure 
the relevant authorities for democratic reform and respect of civil rights (Moser and 
Miller, 1997). However, petroleum companies often take a pragmatic stance on these 
issues. They argue that petroleum resource development projects take several years and 
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major financial investments before they come into production, but once they do so, they 
may continue to yield dividends for 10 to 30 years. While other industries ( e.g. clothing 
or beverage manufacturers) may withdraw relatively easily if unwelcome government 
policies or unpopular political leadership changes take place in a host country, the scale 
and term of investment made by petroleum companies generally makes them reluctant to 
pull out. This necessarily long-term approach is often poorly viewed by human rights 
campaigners and other opponents, who may interpret this reluctance to withdraw as 
evidence of lack of ethical principle. 
For instance, many critics suggested that Royal Dutch/Shell should have intervened in 
the case of Ken Saro-wiwa in Nigeria, or at a minimum should have terminated their 
operations (as Pepsi did in Myanmar). Multinational companies have in tum responded 
that, while they have a duty to behave in an environmentally and socially responsible 
manner, they have neither the power nor the internal mandate to influence broader 
political change. In an October 1996 speech, Royal Dutch/Shell Chairman, Cor 
Herkstroter referred to the company's challenged involvement in Nigeria: 
"Various lobby groups, mainly here in Europe, say that Shell is s01nehow responsible 
for recent political events in that country. They point to our significant econo,nic role 
there and say that we should use the perceived power that role gives us to mould events 
in that country. When we say that we do not have the power - they simply do not believe 
us" (Herkstroter, 1996). 
Partly out of self-interest and partly out of a natural pragmatism, companies often favour 
constructive engagement with difficult host governments. They argue that confrontation 
is not feasible because their attempts to influence political processes, however well 
intentioned, can be interpreted as undue interference in the country's sovereign affairs 
and they may be expelled if they step outside the terms of their commercial licence. 
They also contend that, if they do not themselves invest in a country, other lower-profile 
and potentially less scrupulous companies-which may be less sympathetic to human 
rights concerns and may have lower standards in other areas- will then move in (Moser 
and Miller, 1997; Bray, 1997). 
Unocal is one of the strongest US advocates of constructive engagement. Unocal 
executives have on several occasions testified to US Congressional committees, arguing 
that the company's influence is benign. Unocal believes that if it withdraws from 
Myanmar, it will be replaced by another oil company, most likely from Asia, which may 
have lower performance standards (Bray, 1997). Similarly, a spokesperson for ARCO, 
92 
CHAPTER 4. THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR 
operator of two exploration blocks in the Andaman Sea 15 , reportedly said that the 
company did not consider that it should be obliged to withdraw from Myanmar, 
"First, we adhere to and obey US law and our pre-existing investments are fully legal. 
Secondly, Arco does not believe in unilateral sanctions. By re,naining in the country, 
we can have constructive engagement to reinforce our ethical and business standards 
and do some good for the people of Burma" (Gilleland, 1998a). 
Petroleum company executives sometimes claim that their activities are apolitical. In 
regard to his company's controversial investments in Myanmar, Premier's chief 
executive Charles Jamieson said: "We have to be apolitical. We believe constructive 
engagenient does lead to the development of a country for all its people." He said the 
company has a dialogue with the UK-based Burma Action Group, and is spending more 
than US$300,000 over a three-year period on "socio-economic projects" that would 
benefit 20,000 local people (Battersby, 1998b). 
Bray ( 1997, p. 29) argues that "there is no doubt that companies are political actors: 
the main questions concern the scope of their 'mandates'; the extent of their power in 
particular situations,· and the manner in which they exercise it". For example, French 
oil company Total has embarked on an aggressive drive to expand its global oil and gas 
production, taking it into politically sensitive areas closed to many of its larger rivals. 
According to Total Exploration and Production President Daniel Valot, 
"It is deeply rooted in French culture that we do not believe the best way to reduce 
tensions in the world is to put the bad guys in a ghetto and humiliate them-instead, 
it's to establish a relationship with them." ... "vVho can say what type of government 
will be charge of Bunna in the near future? However, }Ve are not like a manufacturing 
company that can easily quit. We are a long-term industry that has to plan years in 
advance." 
" ... Although we have been very heavily criticised for our involvement in Burnia, Iran 
and Libya, when you sum up the maximum production we will get from these three 
countries, th ey will account for less than 10% of our worldwide output so we are 
getting a lot of noise for something that is not that big 11 (Hopson, 1997d). 
Valot is also reportedly resolute in his defence of Total's involvement in the 
controversial US$1 billion Yadana gas project in Myanmar, which he has described as 
the "perfect proj ect"-on time and within budget (Hopson, 1997 d). 
15 Nevertheless, shortly after announcement of the US sanctions, ARCO decided to reduce its investment 
interests in Myanmar. The company negotiated with Malaysia 's state-owned Petronas to take over 
operatorship and most of its stakes in Myanmar blocks M7 and M9, in exchange for the majority of stakes 
held by exploration subsidiary Petronas Carigali in the Malaysia-Thai IDA (Ahmad, 1997b). 
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" It is the part of the world i,,vhere Total is carrying out the job I am most proud of 
Nobody will make us feel ashamed of what we are doing . ... Total has spent around $2 
million a year on a social programme providing new clinics, schools, farms and many 
other amenities for local communities. We have only hired volunteers who have been 
ve1y decently paid by Local standards-some 30% more than local wage rates" 
(Hopson, 1997d). 
Other problems can arise when governments allow local communities access to the 
infrastructure (roads, ports, etc.) originally built by the petroleum industry for its own 
operations. This has proven to be an ethical problem for petroleum companies in parts 
of Papua New Guinea, Indonesia and other developing countries, where illegal loggers 
and other illicit businesses subsequently use their access roads for their own purposes. 
Petroleum company entry into remote locations can also present ethical dilemmas with 
regard to their relationships with local indigenous communities (Hastings, 1999). A 
Mobil-led JV (Mobil (33.4%), Exxon (33.3%), and Elf (33.3%)) encountered protests 
from environmental and human rights groups after discovering previously uncontacted 
Indian tribes in its search for oil in the Peruvian jungle. Pen1vian social activist groups 
(Associacion Interetnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana, the indigenous people's 
lnbby Comision de Emergencia Ashaninka and the human rights group Associacion Pro-
Derechos Humanos) have protested against Mobil's exploration and production plans. 
They reportedly claim the tribes could be exterminated as they lack resistance to 
Western diseases, and they want the Peruvian government to guarantee "the right to life 
of uncontacted indigenous" as laid out in Convention 169 of the International Labour 
Organisation (Lewis, 1997). 
From Mobil's perspective, the project is of key importance to its future strategy for 
working in environmentally sensitive areas. It is considered to represent a benchmark 
project for Mobil precisely because it penetrates sensitive tropical rainforests and 
indigenous tribal habitats. Cynthia Thetra of Mobil Exploration and Producing Peru 
reportedly said: 
"We are doing the best that a responsible company can do . ... We are aware of the 
possible consequences so we are taking each and every measure to avoid contact . ... 
This project is so important because it goes beyond the borders of this country and 
beyond these times. It is something for the future . ... Even if we don't find oil or gas this 
will be used as a model for us" (Lewis, 1997). 
4.6 LEADERSHIP AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
Petroleum companies take pride in their ability to operate and make a profit in physical 
conditions which would deter other industries, but the qualities required to meet 
physical challenges are not the same as the skills needed to address social and political 
difficulties (Bray, 1997). Skilful and often very expensive engineering may solve 
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logistical problems, but social and environmental management problems de1nand a more 
interdisciplinary and openly consultative approach. Amongst the majors, British 
Petroleum (now BP Amoco) and Royal Dutch/Shell have emerged as industry leaders in 
these aspects. 
BP has its origins as the British state-owned oil company, which was subsequently 
privatised. It has undergone an internal renovation from a civil service culture where 
managers had a decisive influence, to emerge into a tough, competitive business with a 
1nodern image, where environmental excellence is a key ingredient. The tendency to 
reveal detailed information, set qualitative targets and use highly visible public relations 
techniques fits well into this context (Estrada et al., 1997). Sir John Browne, Chief 
Executive Officer of BP Amoco has emerged as a strong and vocal advocate of 
corporate social responsibility: 
"No company can be really successful unless it has the capacity to keep using its skills 
and to keep expanding its business. Of course, that requires a competitive financial 
performance. But it does require something 1nore, perhaps particularly in the oil 
industry . ... Real sustainability is about simultaneously being profitable and responding 
to the reality and the concerns of the world in which you operate. We 're not separate 
from the world. It's our world as well" (Browne, 1997). 
Browne spoke at his company's annual general meeting in April 1998 about "a new 
BP" which, while setting itself tougher financial goals, will focus on the "environment 
and human rights in tern1s of ethical standards and employment policy" (Valebrokk, 
1998b). BP overall goal is "to do no harm or damage to the natural environment". 
According to Browne (1997), the corporation's method is to focus on one item at a time, 
to identify what can be delivered, and to establish monitoring processes and targets as 
part of the corporation's internal management system and to put in place an external 
confirmation of delivery. In most cases, Browne states that the company has been able 
"to go well beyond the regulatory requirements." For example, in the North Sea, 
"We've gone well beyond the legal requirements in reducing oil discharges to the sea. 
And now at our Hound Point cn1de oil export terminal in Scotland, which handles 10% 
of Europe's oil supplies, we' re investing $100 million to eliminate emissions of volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs). These VOCs would themselves produce CO2 by oxidation 
in the atmosphere. No legislation has compelled us to take that step; we 're doing it 
because we believe it is the right thing to do. Now, as well as continuing our efforts in 
relation to other greenhouse gases, it is time to establish a similar process for CO2 " 
(Browne, 1997, p. 16). 
Browne has become a vocal advocate of the need for constructive action to be taken by 
the world's governments to combat climate change. An interviewee from BP indicated 
that by tackling the petroleum industry on greenhouse/climate change, the company has 
chosen to break away from the pack, despite strong opposition from big oil companies , 
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the steel industry, and the automobile industry, especially in the US. The next challenge 
for BP was perceived to be human rights-to address external criticism of the industry 
on this issue. The interviewee indicated that BP' s aim is to stay distinctive-to be the 
first to set and meet targets and therefore the first to gain the financial benefits. Other 
benefits are perceived to be encountering less aggression and opposition to activities, do 
business more easily and smoothly. 
The corporate environmental strategy initiatives of BP (now BP Amoco ARCO) have 
been well received by both industry and environmental activists. Chris Rose, 
Greenpeace's deputy executive director was reported as describing Browne as "the most 
progressive chief executive of the oil niajors" (Hopson, 1997 c). 
Royal Dutch/Shell has been widely regarded by managers as a 'model' multinational in 
terms of its business management skills. The corporation has been praised for its 
decentralised structure, its consensus approach to decision making, and its explicit 
philosophy of social responsibility (Neale, 1997). However, as observed by Valebrokk 
(1997c), "Shell has traditionally been a most conservative conipany that likes to say as 
little as possible, even when faced ·with difficult political situations such as the one in 
Nigeria". A Royal Dutch/Shell company interviewee described it as a conservative 
company that is not keen to be an innovator-it prefers to "follow the pack, or at least 
follow the leader, rather than be a leader". 
Soon after BP announced its position on greenhouse gas emissions, Royal Dutch/Shell 
followed in its footsteps by acknowledging the need for action to prevent changes to the 
world ' s climate. This example highlights the dynamic nature of corporate decision-
making in response to on-going analyses of the external operating environment. Estrada 
et al. ( 1997) reported an empirical case study analysis of Shell Group and concluded 
that the organisation had an apparent "self-confident" attitude to its corporate social 
responsibility: 
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"It does not need to underline being a 'world leader' nor to respond to demands for 
overall quantitative information and targets. It can safely leave responsibility for 
environmental performance, reporting and lobbying to its operating companies, 
thereby reinforcing the diversity of the Group. If Shell had chosen a particular line in 
its environmental policy, it would have run the risk of committing its future to a definite 
trend. When it leaves roon1 for national variation in response according to political 
- and cultural setting, the Group deliberately stimulates corporate diversity. In line with 
modern ecology, Group managers are well aware that this reduces vulnerability and 
increases the chances of survival. Unlike all the other companies, Shell also has the 
advantage of playing different roles on the American and European scene-funding 
anti-environmental groups, like the Global Climate Coalition, in the USA, while talking 
a more lax position in Europe" (Estrada, et al., 1997). 
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Estrada et al.' s study did not mention the Brent Spar incident, so it assumed that the 
research was completed (albeit not published) · prior to that incident. Clearly, events 
subsequent to Estrada et al. 's research caused Shell to rethink its approach, and quickly 
take action to rescue its business reputation. Neale ( 1997) observed such change in his 
study of the Brent Spar dumping incident. He concluded that both Shell's actions and 
the public statements of its managers suggest that some form of double-loop learning16 
occurred within the company during the course of the controversy-the strength of 
opposition to the dumping plan brought about not only a reversal of the decision, but a 
re-think of the cultural assumptions on which it had been based. This was associated 
with a move from groupthink to translation, based on a recognised need to win allies for 
. l . . 11 environmenta 1nnovat1on . 
Shell has recently been taking active steps to implement the lessons learnt from its past 
controversies. In regard to its proposed Camisea gas development in the isolated and 
biodiversity-rich south-western jungle of Peru, Shell Peru's reported aim was "to 
produce a textbook project that it hopes will avoid the widespread protests it faced over 
Nigeria and the Brent Spar" (Hopson, 1998a). A Shell Peru spokesperson was reported 
as saying: 
"We have approached more than 200 non-governmental organisations in Peru and 
internationally to ask what they would like to see from the project . ... The industry has 
made mistakes in the past and Shell has had its share of difficulties. This consultation 
process involves a leap of faith for many within the company"18 (Hopson, 1998a). 
Strong corporate leadership can be highly influential in setting company environmental 
performance objectives and standards of operation. However, the extent to which 
responsible environmental practices are driven by corporate management appears to 
depend upon how social and environmental business risks are perceived by senior 
management. 
16 Double-loop learning describes situations where error correction requires correction of the identified 
problem as well as changes to the organisational norms. As described by Argyris and Schon (1978, p. 22), 
double-loop learning entails "a double feedback loop which connects the detection of error not only to 
strategies and assumptions for effective pe,formance but to the very norms which define effective 
pe,formance." 
17 Although in this case, the change was forced by Greenpeace's actions, customer boycotts, and pressure 
from continental governments, rather than evolving, either from an internal learning process or from 
'appropriate communication' with stakeholders. 
18 As part of the extensive consultation process, Shell Peru held workshops in London, Washington and 
Lima in an attempt to inform pressure groups how it is looking to operate the Camisea project. Included in 
discussions at the meetings were issues of native rights, protecting isolated peoples, the move to 
sustainable development, security and protection of facilities and controlling access to the region. 
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In many cases companies begin to develop an innovative strategy as a means to reduce 
uncertainty in the face of unpredictable or destabilising actions by the government or 
environmental pressure groups. For example, Barrett ( 1991) reported that some 
companies have moved beyond compliance, in anticipation of future legislation and 
have converted what might have become legislation into voluntary codes of conduct. 
"Such a strategy enables a company to minimise the disruption caused by complying 
with new regulations, and to seize market opportunities ... by spending now, one avoids 
having to spend much more at a later stage, e.g. Shell UK has started incinerating all 
its solid waste in accordance with US legislation, in anticipation of similar legislation 
in Europe in the near future" (Bhargava and Welford, 1996, p. 25). 
Another example is Chevron Corporation's Policy 530 19 for safety, health and 
environment worldwide and its associated Protecting People and the Environment 
implementation plan. A driver for this policy and implementation plan was "the public's 
ever increasing ernphasis on health, safety and environmental protection" (Chevron, 
1995). According to Bob Common, then Managing Director, Chevron Europe and 
Middle East (cited by Anon., 1995): 
"Anticipating and responding to society's heightened expectations has become a 
condition of doing business that ranks as one of the most critical challenges." 
Company managers may also construe a strategic competitive advantage in lobbying for 
strict environmental legislation if they know that their competitors will be unable to 
comply with its requirements without incurring significant financial costs (Barrett, 1991; 
Tsai and Child, 1997). 
Estrada et al. (1997) reported an empirical case study analysis of the environmental 
strategies of five major petroleum companies: the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Exxon, 
British Petroleum plc, Amoco and Statoil. Of these, Statoil was the only one to conform 
to their description of managerially driven company. Its owner, the Norwegian State, 
does not exert the kind of financial pressures that shareholders normally do. All the 
other companies they studied were perceived to be to a large extent financially driven. 
Estrada et al. ( 1997) suggest that this explains why Statoil has been able to take a long-
term view of its strategic investments, including costly environmental components, in its 
refineries. By contrast, Exxon was perceived by Estrada et al. (1997) to be an 
environmental laggard, preoccupied with short-term profits and suffering from the 
19 As part of this plan, Chevron UK introduced new cradle-to-grave waste handling procedures for its 
Ninian and Alba production fields in the North Sea. The new procedures were reported to save the 
company an estimated £35,000 per year (40% of previous waste handling costs), and enabled the company 
to more accurately forecast disposal quantities, set reduction targets, and share ideas and techniques with 
other business units (Chevron UK, 1995 cited by Anon., 1995). 
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Exxon Valdez accident, which, it was suggested, may explain its introversion. Unlike 
many other companies it does not publish regular environmental reports and seems to 
rely more on anti-environmental lobbying than the others, as witnessed by its active 
involvement in industry lobbying to stimulate uncertainty about the science of climate 
change. 
Distinctively different management strategies may also be evident within the affiliated 
companies of a single organisation, according to the specific nature of their businesses 
and perceived business risks. Differences in perceptions of environmental, social and 
political risk may also arise at different management levels within corporations. The 
perceived or actual attitude of companies towards the environment is most commonly 
considered to be represented by the verbal and written rhetoric of the corporate 
management, and the actual performance of the company in the field, however, these are 
not always closely aligned. 
An exainple of this gap between stated intent and reality ( espoused theory versus theory-
in-use) is evident in a case study of the publicly stated environmental policies of some 
corporate, divisional and operating unit levels within the petroleum companies, Shell 
and Texaco. Ketola ( 1997) reviewed the written environmental policies and compared 
them with the actual practices of the business units, using the theoretical rationale that 
environmental policies could be used to "link strategic visioning and planning" and 
"also communicate the environmental goals of a company and the means to reach those 
goals". Ketola found that: 
"All in all, the integration and co-ordination role of environ,nental policy is hardly 
fulfilled by Shell and Texaco. Texaco Pembroke ranks best in terms of the integration 
and co-ordination of environmental policies and business goals, and the Shell Group in 
the area of business strategies. Otherwise, there is little integration or co-ordination 
between environmental policies and business goals or strategies in Shell and Texaco " 
(Ketola, 1997, p. 31). 
Many of the large petroleum companies operate through small branch/in-country offices 
or affiliated companies. In these situations, the company's incumbent country manager 
may wield considerable control over how the company's business is conducted in that 
location. Moser and Tsai ( 1998) observed the influence of pressure to comply with local 
norms. 
"Although a number of MNC environment managers in both case study areas stated 
that their corporate policy was to comply with their own internal policies, unless local 
legislation was 1nore stringent. In reality the research suggests that of the two 
competing isomorphic pulls, whatever the context of the operation, local legislation is 
the most important determinant. ... Unless MNC subsidiaries align with the local 
institutions, they risk losing their licence to operate. This is not the case if MNC 
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subsidiaries fail to align themselves with their headquarters" (Moser and Tsai, 1998, 
p. 16). 
The holder of that position can also positively or negatively influence the environmental 
performance of the company, depending on their personal aspirations and how they 
perceive risks for their career paths. Clark (1993) has observed that firms at the leading 
edge of innovation and environmental enhancement in the minerals industry seem to 
share a common set of values, which can be thought to derive from shared cultural and 
professional backgrounds, as well as shared experiences inside and outside the firm. 
Clark suggests that for many managers, career promotion depends upon their industry 
reputations; the small numbers of workers in the industry contributes to a sense of 
shared identity. However, in small minerals firms dominated by owner-managers, Clark 
believes there are reasons to be sceptical of the internal resilience of a pro-
environmental culture. "The putative micro-econo1nic efficiency of combining the 
principal (owner) and agent (manager) may translate into an over-whelniing personal 
interest in maximising short-terni inconie and 1naxin1ising long-terni wealth." 
An interviewee ('X'), with over 20 years' of professional experience in the upstream 
petroleum industry in Australia and Asia, suggested that there are essentially three main 
'types' of country manager in foreign companies operating in the region: 
i) Those who are on short-term or temporary managerial postings to gain experience, as 
they progress along rapid career advancement paths. These mangers have only a passing 
interest in the environmental performance of the local operation. 
ii) Those who have been side-lined in their careers and may have cynical and disinterested 
in environmental performance objectives. 
iii) Those who, through training and/or long-term experience, recognise the environmental 
implications of their business actions, and hence take a professional interest in 
environmental management. 
Associated with these character types, the interviewee has observed a range of 
behavioural patterns in terms of compliance with environmental laws and corporate 
environmental management policies: 
i) Those who comply because they fear the personal implications of something going wrong. 
ii) Those who acquiesce and comply, but have no real personal interest in the objectives or 
actions. 
iii) Those who comply and take an active interest in environmental management, because 
they see practical benefits for the business. 
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iv) Those who do not make any particular effort to comply because they do not fear being 
caught, or have made "protection payments" to influential individuals in government 
circles. 
From a corporate influence perspective, interviewee 'X' stated that the business 
objectives assigned by company headquarters to the Business Unit Manager drive local 
performance. These objectives can differ significantly between business units (local 
operations) in various geographic locations. Furthermore, corporate-recommended 
standards for consideration of environmental issues often differ for new projects as 
co111pared with upgrades to existing projects. 
These observations are supported by the findings of Moser and Tsai ( 1998) in their 
study of multinational companies operating in Greater China and Latin America. They 
observed that the environmental behaviour of the companies did not always appear 
optimal. 
",,, despite the headquarters of many MNCs issuing strict internal guidelines 
concerning minimum expected subsidiary environmental pe,formance, on a number of 
occasions, actual subsidiary behaviour was observed to vary (negatively) from these 
expectations. Variations in environmental behaviour were observed both between MNC 
subsidiaries, operating within the same country and in different countries. The level of 
variation in environmental behaviour appeared to be largely dependent on a 
combination of the age of the production or 1nanufacturing facility operated by the 
MNC subsidiary and the strength and level of local legislation enforcement" (Moser 
and Tsai, 1998, pp. 10-11). 
With regard to drivers of company environmental performance in South-East Asian 
countries, interviewee 'X' perceived that most companies are generally "lagging", 
unless they are responding to the negative legacy of an incident in the company's 
history. One of the local dampeners on performance was perceived to be staff cynicism 
arising from observations of host government and local company and community 
attitudes to the environment. They often observe that poorly managed and more 
polluting industries are allowed to operate without any apparent sanction. In a relative 
sense, the exploration and production industry perceives itself to be a non-intrusive 
industry with relatively low impacts, as compared with refineries, mining operations, 
hydro-electricity dam construction, forestry and agriculture, or even local villagers' 
waste disposal practices. Their personal perspective on the impact of their own activities 
is adversely affected. They may also fail to see the value of adhering to high standards of 
performance and incurring the associated expenditure, when their local competitors 
and/or the local community demonstrate an apparent lack of concern for the local 
environment. 
Furthermore, they are often not concerned that the governments will actually enforce 
environmental legislation. They believe that they can put forward an adequate argument 
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on the basis of practical engineering feasibility, to counter demands to comply with 
legislation, particularly where prescriptive regulations have been poorly designed. 
Enforcement may only be a significant risk if a regulatory breach will cause 
embarrassment or a problem for the government, especially the responsible cabinet 
minister. 
Interviewee 'X' also noted that companies may be reluctant to 'whistleblow' on other 
con1panies that they perceive to be demonstrating poor environmental management, or 
to argue with regulatory authorities for a 'level playing field'. They reportedly fear that 
they will cause embarrassment by exposing payment of "protection monies" to an 
influential government official, and subsequently suffer business reprisals. Similarly, an 
interviewee in Thailand spoke of problems that the downstream operations of his 
company incurred with loss of diesel stocks to a local smuggling racket. The issue 
required careful handling, as company personnel perceived that they could easily 
become assassination targets. 
The extent to which country managers control local operations and environmental 
performance standards can, however, be subject to strict oversight by head office or 
corporate management. Some companies with a strong environmental policy and 
committed leadership, can effectively set and enforce standards throughout their 
international operations, which are based on the parent company's home jurisdiction. In 
these cases, their operating companies may be required to operate at standards more 
stringent than those of their host countries, and will be audited for compliance by the 
corporate parent company. As observed by Moser and Tsai ( 1998, pp. 13-14 ), the 
corporate headquarters' mandates "generate deliberate suboptimal economic decisions 
at the subsidiary level with respect to local environmental protection deniands, where a 
niore lax protective measure could be implemented". 
To illustrate, an interviewee from Unocal Thailand stated that the company's 
management system is based on corporate directives with customisation for local 
conditions. The parent, Unocal Corporation, audits the Thai operations (and its other 
foreign operations) every two years or so. It sets minimum company standards, which 
the local operations are free to improve upon if they perceive a local need. Unocal 
Thailand conducts an internal audit every year. Target objectives are increased every 
year in line with the continuous improvement policy. Compliance of individuals with 
company performance objectives is assessed in annual staff performance appraisals. 
Performance bonuses are linked to audit results, i.e. actual versus target objectives. 
Interviewees from Royal Dutch/Shell subsidiaries in Thailand and Australia spoke of 
similar corporate directives for their operations. In each country, Royal Dutch/Shell 
companies have a mandatory requirement to develop and implement health, safety and 
environment (HSE) management systems tied to performance indicators. Individual 
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tasks and targets with five year horizons are reportedly set for personnel at all levels of 
the company, and performance is assessed as part of annual staff appraisals. 
Corporate objectives for improved environmental performance may also be perceived 
favourably by country managers, if they are given development budget support and 
encouragement to be more innovative. In their studies, Moser and Tsai ( 1998, p. 15) 
found that 
"A number of the MN Cs further considered good environmental behaviour to present a 
strategic opportunity ( operationally and otherwise) and not necessarily a threat. This 
was especially the case for MNCs with new or recently established operations, where 
the flexibility in choice and strategic benefit from selecting the most up-to-date 
environmental technologies and practices is greatest. For instance, MNCs in China 
with manufacturing operations configured to global standards are able to save in 
process design time and adhere to a set of resource saving maintenance codes. This 
enhances central planning capability as operations become streamlined on a world-
wide level." 
Theory suggests that leadership and organisational learning play an important role in 
guiding company business practices and fostering company progress towards improved 
environmental and social performance. Interviewee 'X' noted that despite his generally 
negative impressions of the industry's attitude, he had observed a more environmentally 
interested and responsible attitude in the younger generation ( <40 years age group) 
coming through the industry ranks. However, he perceived that their influence may be 
10-15 years away from achieving a widespread positive impact on industry practice, i.e. 
when they reach senior management positions. 
One of the other emerging benefits of enlightened company leadership is increased 
openness and transparency. Secrecy has been a hallmark of petroleum industry culture. 
Knowledge (geological, engineering technology, etc.) is perceived to give companies a 
relative competitive advantage and is closely guarded. The public's perception of the 
"deep pockets" of oil companies, endorsed by images of well-appointed corporate 
offices at expensive addresses, have also made these companies cautious about releasing 
information which may be used against them in lawsuits. In conducting research on the 
environmental effects of offshore drilling operations for the Australian Petroleum 
Exploration Association-commissioned "Independent Scientific Review", the 
researchers encountered the legacies of the industry's traditionally secretive culture: 
"The most useful information was found in conference proceedings and reports 
prepared by industry participants and consultants-comparatively little has found its 
way into the peer-reviewed scientific literature. Information on the Australian industry 
was found to be fragmented and difficult to access, as it was often proprietary and 
confidential nature, though some industry reports were made available for review" 
(Hinwood, et al., 1994, p. 127). 
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Increasing pressure and willingness to produce corporate environmental and social 
environmental reports is helping to break down this culture, and improve community 
understanding of the industry. Lober et al. (1997, p. 73) suggest that there is a mutually 
reinforcing relationship between reporting and environmental management. 
"Producing an environmental report can help a company to better evaluate its 
environmental programmes, policies and performance as managers must organise, 
measure and present their entire set of activities. Reporting can encourage companies 
to develop data collection systems. It can be a tool to increase employee involvement in 
environmental management, increase employee ,norale and win top management 
support. It can also be a means to educate managers about 1'vhat type of environmental 
perfonnance external stakeholders desire. For these reasons, reporting is a potentially 
powerful management and performance improvement tool, rather than just a part of 
communications." 
Similarly, Prothero et al. (1997, p. 75) argue that "in the 1nedium to longer term the 
niost iniportant issues are not to do with the communication of greener company 
strategies, but to do with strategy formulation and execution in pursuit of greener 
products, production processes and companies. However, without credibility in the 
marketplace created by good communication this may not happen". 
Royal Dutch/Shell's efforts in corporate environmental reporting have been particularly 
progressive. In regard to its 1997 report, Valebrokk (1997a) wrote: 
"The Health, Safety and Environment [HSEJ Report makes interesting reading from a 
company that has hitherto been a secretive organisation. Shell lays its cards on the 
table, outlining the steps it has taken to be more accountable." 
The 1997 HSE report uncovered problems of verification in internal reporting data, so 
its second report was checked for accuracy by independent auditors KPMG and Price 
Waterhouse. The company's chairman, Cor Herkstroter said: "Those involved in the 
verification will attest to the difficulties in this truly pioneering effort. There ·were no 
teniplates to copy because as far as we know no other worldwide organisation has 
attempted such a large and thorough job" (Hopson, 1998c). 
While the community and shareholders favourably receive these advances, the practical 
reality and financial pressures of conducting profitable businesses in a highly 
competitive markets will continue to be the key influence on day-to-day operations of 
petroleum companies. 
4. 7 CAPITAL AV AIL ABILITY 
Capital availability within petroleum companies is characteristically tightly controlled. 
In the case of companies operating on behalf of a JV, capital availability to conduct 
exploration and operate production facilities may require the approval of all of the JV 
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partners, which can be a tightly contested and compromised process. Any decision to 
invest funds will always need to balance a variety of risks-with risk being a critical 
theme that dominates com111ercial decision making in the petroleum industry. Oil and 
gas prices are a key determinant of exploration expenditure. In the competitive oil and 
gas markets, there is an incentive to reduce costs in order to maximise profits. Declining 
and/or highly volatile oil prices give an extra impetus to reduce costs. To illustrate, the 
average world oil price dropped from approximately US$20 per barrel in 1996 to 
approximately US$11 per barrel in 1998, returned to hover around the US$20 per barrel 
mark by mid 1999, and had reached record high prices, in excess of U$32 per barrel, by 
mid 2000. The short-term effects of such price volatility and uncertainty, coming on top 
of the Asian financial crisis, in many cases resulted in cuts to exploration budgets by 
petroleum companies, and a general wariness about long-term expenditure 
commitments. 
Petroleum company interviewees commonly stated that for new exploration or 
production business ventures, regardless of size, the new venture manager is given a 
'shoestring budget' and a clear directive that the primary objective of the business is to 
get established. Short-term cost minimisation is often the main concern of the business. 
Little financial or policy incentive is typically given to introduce innovation to 
environmental management practices if they will cost more, or cause time d~lays 
relative to the conventional approval process or "basic necessities" in the host country. 
Only where there is a clear, supported directive from the operator's head office or the 
joint venture, is there a deviation from this general practice, which is otherwise driven 
by commercial considerations. 
Usually the single most capital-intensive phase is development of a production field and 
design and construction of production facilities and associated infrastructure. For large 
development projects, petroleum companies may seek finance from external lenders like 
commercial banks, and in the case of developing countries, international institutions like 
the World Bank. Project development budgets are formulated on the basis of perceived 
risks. According to Ramsay (1992), from a lender's perspective these most commonly 
include the following elements: (i) technical risks (i.e. reserves, deliverability, 
technology, completion, operational); (ii) regulatory risks (i.e. political, transfer) , and 
(iii) commercial risks (i.e. project viability, sponsor/joint venture, market, 
environmental, catastrophe). 
Regulatory risks reflect uncertainty of future government actions with respect to policy 
matters that may affect project development and operations. Regulatory risks include 
political and transfer risks which can range-Irom changes in government energy policy 
which may cause an increase in taxation to controls over foreign ownership, restrictions 
on the transfer of funds and uncompensated seizure of assets. Project financiers are 
usually conscious that Government licensing and permitting agencies and even local 
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authorities can prevent, defer, or even shut down a project at the development or 
operational stage (Ramsay, 1992). 
In regard to environmental risks, project financiers usually require all necessary 
environmental approvals to be in place, or in the process of being approved, before they 
will consider applications for project finance. Some finance lenders prescribe the 
standard of environmental impact assessment and management plans that must be 
prepared in order to qualify for funding. For example, the World Bank has issued 
Guidelines for an Environmental Assess1nent of Energy and Industry Projects (World 
Bank, 1991) and Sectoral and Project Performance Indicators in Bank-Financed Oil 
and Gas Operations (World Bank, 1995). A primary concern of lenders is that an 
environmental mishap may result in suspension of an operator's production licence, 
clean-up costs and even fines. The cost of site clean-up and rehabilitation is a very 
important issue in resource projects. Project lenders are becoming increasingly worried 
about being held liable for environmental damage caused by a project they have 
financed, especially if it becomes necessary to take control over a project after 
environmental damage has occurred. 
4.8 OPPORTUNITY, TECHNOLOGY AND COST ASSESSMENT 
In the upstream petroleum sector, large companies are perceived to have the bargaining 
and lobbying power, capital, and technical and technological resources to enable them to 
acquire, develop and operate potentially lucrative concessions in operationally and/or 
politically challenging locations. A consequence of the market changes during the last 
two decades has been the increased foreign investment attractiveness of a limited 
number of countries with good resource potential and stable investment climates 
(McKern, 1996). Such opportunities increase the bargaining power of petroleum 
companies. Therefore, where a host government's exploration and production terms do 
not reflect the geological prospectivity and perceived risk of operating there, the larger 
companies will simply look for opportunities elsewhere. For example, many 
multinationals are understood to be wary of the inherently unstable current political 
situation in India. The companies also apparently want the government to be more 
enthusiastic in inviting them to invest. A Bombay representative of a European oil 
company was reported to say: 
"India is not the only country wanting upstream investment. We'll go strictly by merit 
to whoever offers the best deal" (Taneja and Ahmad, 1997). 
Through such cost-benefit screening processes, large companies can, by default, create 
niche opportunities for small independents. For example, in the US, the majors 
commonly di vest their interests in production fields as they enter the depletion phase. At 
this stage there are still opportunities to enhance production by deepening existing wells 
to new producing zones and infill drilling, but the cost-to-return ratio often does not 
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favour large companies with high overheads, whereas the smaller independents , with 
relatively lower overheads, are able to invest in and operate these fields profitably for 
some time (Henry, 1996). 
Similarly, in some remote areas, smaller companies perceive themselves to have an 
access advantage over larger companies. For example, the strategic business objective of 
independent Soco is to increase its value through exploration success and the pursuit of 
low-cost development projects, particularly in frontier regions: 
"Ideally what we like to do is go to a count1y, negotiate and sign an agreement and 
cany it out .... It is only where you are into wel_l established areas where there is 
competition from the larger oil companies that you find yourself with a substantial 
financial conimitment" (Ed Story, Soco Chief Executive Officer, cited by Hopson, 
1997a). 
Size also has an impact on investment in corporate environmental management 
strategies. In a study of the minerals and petroleum resource industries, Clark (1993) 
found that, in general, large firms seem more able (and willing) than small firms to 
capitalise on the existence of environment-enhancing economic incentives in the 
industry. While large firms do not control their markets, due to competitive forces, the 
close relationships between large producers and consumers of products like petroleum 
are such that long-term issues dominate corporate planning. By comparison, small firms 
are short-term oriented. Small firms, more than large firms, depend upon the spot-
market for sale of their products. This part of the market is notoriously unstable, being 
very vulnerable to the raiding, dumping, and predatory pricing practices of larger firms. 
Consequently, the flow of revenue to small firms is very unstable. This affects both their 
ability to develop nevv projects and make long-term investments in environmental 
quality. Small firms are very sensitive to short-term price fluctuation. Inevitably, they 
have a vital interest in minimising the costs of production even if this means discounting 
environmental quality (Clark, 1993). 
Technological advances are providing opportunities for the industry to recover 
hydrocarbons from formerly inaccessible or non-viable geographic locations, like the 
deep water environments of the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of Africa. Enhanced 
oil recovery technology, horizontal drilling, and three-dimensional (3D) seismic data 
acquisition, for example, are making it economical to extend the life of existing oil and 
gas production fields and re-activate abandoned fields. Consequently, recoverable 
reserves in a geological structure have tended to increase substantially beyond initial 
estimates, as has been the case in the North Sea and elsewhere. Where production was 
once expected to peak early in a field's or geological province's life, and then decline 
quickly, production now commonly continues longer and is more stable (Roland, 
1998a). 
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Most resource companies' costs of production are dominated by the enormous initial, 
non-recoverable expenditures in infrastructure, environmental controls and equipment 
(Clark, 1993). In the case of established production operations that have a steady 
revenue stream, interviewees indicated that controls on expenditure tend to be more 
relaxed. Improvements to the environmental management of the operation can be made 
incrementally, and the business can afford the time and money to appoint and properly 
train staff in environmental management practices. 
Once production levels starts to decline, or profitability is adversely impacted by sudden 
commodity price shifts, corporate priorities inevitably change and impact on 
expenditure. In 1997-98 there was a collapse of many of the East Asian currencies, 
followed by a regional economic downturn, curbed government and consumer 
expenditure and reduced demands for petroleum products ( oil, refined products, gas and 
LNG). In Indonesia, Royal Dutch/Shell and Mobil re-evaluated their exploration 
programme given uncertainty over whether a market for any gas discoveries would exist 
with the state-owned gas distributor. The state enterprise was reportedly unable to pay 
for the gas it is taking from ARCO's Java operations as a result of its currency 
devaluation. Delays to new gas field developments or the expansion of existing projects 
were also considered if LNG sales contracts could not be secured (Battersby, 1998a). 
Such commercial influences can lead to short-termism, or sporadic financial investment 
in the business and hence in social and environmental management programmes. 
Long-term profitability depends upon max1m1s1ng production levels and rates of 
utilisation until sunk costs are fully accounted for. Higher than average profits may 
potentially be achieved by extending the life of a production site beyond the accounting 
life of sunk costs. The downside to these situations is the need to extend operation of 
production facilities beyond their original design lifetime, which can have negative 
safety and environmental implications. There are three key considerations in this regard. 
Firstly, as these facilities age, they require an increasing level of maintenance, and the 
chances of hydrocarbon and chemical leakages or spillages from equipment failure also 
increase. For example, aging (25 years plus) offshore production facilities in the 
Norwegian sector of the North Sea are said to "have huge requirements for maintenance 
and observation" (Olkvam, 1998). Aging equipment also increases the risk of 
catastrophic failures such as explosions that can endanger workers, and cause 
environmental pollution. 
Secondly, in the current climate of minimising operating overheads, cost-cutting 
measures applied to aging facilities may increase worker exposure risk in routine work 
practices. In a workforce survey conducted of NOPEF members (Norway's biggest oil 
union), "a majority of Nopef niembers surveyed believed the NORSOK process 
[Norway's petroleum industry cost-cutting programme] has had a detrimental influence 
on health, safety and the environment. Among the negative effects of the Norwegian 
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cost-cutting initiatives are tighter time schedules, lower manning, and a reduction in 
bed capacity offshore" (OJkvam, 1998). The latter constraint has forced more daily 
workforce commuting by helicopter, not surprisingly (based on calculable risk factors) 
resulted in a fatal commuter helicopter crash in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea in 
1997. 
Thirdly, financial budgets for the design, construction and operation of these facilities 
have been based on a projected operational lifetime. Where the lifetime is unexpectedly 
extended, concurrent legislative changes may require improved environmental 
perfonnance (e.g. reductions in produced waste products and emissions) with which the 
facilities are not equipped to comply, and the operators are not financially supported to 
address. JV partners are characteristically reluctant to invest large sums of money in 
upgrading pollution control equipment once a facility has been constructed, unless there 
is a financially viable opportunity to upgrade the facility to increase production. As 
observed by Clark ( 1993), even if higher environment-enhancing production methods 
and techniques become available, companies have a strong economic interest in 
continuing to operate sites of production using existing capital. Innovation in 
environmental control at existing sites of production may be limited to just the extra 
standards imposed by public agencies. 
Even good intentions to go "green", will always balanced by sunk development costs. 
One such example is Saga Petroleum's proposed pollution control innovations for its 
Haltenbanken South multifield development in Norway's offshore sector. According to 
Ridgen and Olkvam (1998), 
"Saga Petroleum has been forced to ditch a raft a green innovations from its plans to 
bring down spiralling costs. The flagship project was set to pioneer many new 
environmentally friendly technologies aimed primarily at reducing carbon dioxide 
emissions and increasing energy efficiency on the tension-leg production platform 
[TLP]. Now it appears that Saga has had to bow to economic pressures and abandon 
many of its plans as the topsides of the TLP grew during preliminary engineering to 
around 60,000 tonnes." . . .. "Sources say equipment to strip carbon dioxide from 
exhaust gases and export gas have been jettisoned as have facilities for harnessing 
power from the wellstream through turbines." An industry source reportedly stated, "It 
is a bit embarrassing for Saga as it will now be seen as putting economic 
considerations before the environment but they have no choice". 
Nevertheless in other situations, technological advances in em1ss1ons control and 
treatment of wastes are being used by companies to improve their capability to comply 
with increasingly stringent pollution control regulations, as well as to lobby for the 
rights to access sensitive environmental areas. Companies with access to such 
technologies may be perceived to have a competitive advantage relative to other 
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petroleu111 companies (Nehrt, 1998). Unocal has developed and patented new technology 
to treat and dispose of mercury in its produced water20 discharges from the Gulf of 
Thailand (see Chapter 6). An interviewee from the company told the researcher that 
Unocal will now apply the technology to a proposed new project in Argentina that will 
also have to address mercury disposal. 
4.9 ORGANISATIONAL ADAPTABILITY AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
In the op1n1on of Victor Burk (Arthur Andersen) and Joseph Stanislaw (Cambridge 
Energy Research Associates), "The oil industry is one of the most flexible in the world" 
( Oil & Gas Journal, 1997 a, p. 35). Petroleum companies have been restructuring and 
downsizing, and out-sourcing in the name of increased efficiency and profitability. 
According to J. Michael Yeager, then President of Mobil Exploration & Producing US 
Inc., 
"We 're just now beginning to touch on some of the financing activities that other 
industries have been doing for years; we 're just now understanding the commercial 
markets; we 're just now understanding the spirit of win-win and how not duplicating 
creates hundreds of millions of dollars in wealth". [The majors, independents, and the 
service/supply sector are going about technology in different ways, but} "we 're 
sharing more, we're not duplicating as much" (Oil & Gas Journal, 1997c, p. 36). 
Out-sourcing has been in practice for some time, especially in regard to oilfield services, 
such as seismic surveys and drilling operations, through which service companies like 
Halliburton and Schlumberger have become "multinational giants". However the scope 
of out-sourcing has increased (Crump, 1997). Re-engineering has changed large 
petroleum companies from integrated and self-contained giants, to lean, decentralised 
service and knowledge-based entities. 
One of the major and on-going constraints encountered by petroleum companies, given 
the complexities of the industry's activities, is the limited availability of qualified 
personnel. Financial capability is not an insurmountable problem where managerial-
technical talents are available (Mikdashi, 1986). Downsizing of the company 
workforces , to increase profitability, has often resulted in critical staff losses, through 
redundancies and worker disenchantment. After Chevron merged with Gulf in 1984, it 
reduced the combined workforce by nearly half, to about 50,000 people. It cut another 
6,500 people in 1992-93 (Korten, 1995). J. Michael Yeager reportedly observed that one 
of the negative aspects of the current industry structure is a shortage of available 
experienced personnel, "We 're short [sic] people-we 're feeding off each other" ( Oil & 
Gas Journal, 1997c, p. 36). 
2° Formation water is the water that occupies pore spaces in rock formations. It may be 'produced' when 
gas , condensate or oil are pumped from wells inserted into hydrocarbon reservoirs. 
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As a consequence, there has been a significant shift in the use of contractors over the 
past decade. Annual returns to the international oil industry body, the E & P Forum, of 
hours worked by companies and their contractors, showed that in 1985, 32% of hours 
worked were by contractors, but by 1996 this had risen to 60% (E & P Forum, 1998). 
Non-core businesses like accounting, transportation and legal services are often out-
sourced (Roland, 1998a), as are environmental management services. 
The increased dependence on contractors has been accompanied by a shift in 
responsibilities from companies to contractors and, in many cases, involvement in new 
types of work. In these circumstances, there is increased risk that industry standards on 
health, safety, environmental protection and social assessment, and transfer of 
technology and skills will be compromised, unless there is close cooperation between 
petroleum companies and their contractors. "The oil and gas industry will be judged not 
on the perforniance of the oil and gas companies alone but on the joint performance 
with all its contractors" (E & P Forum , 1998, p. 11 ). 
Management of change is a critical component in mainta1n1ng and improving upon 
performance standards, but even reputable, experienced majors can be swept up in 
short-term demands to meet their annual exploration and production targets, and fail to 
recognise the implications of poor operations management. An interviewee from a 
multinational subsidiary operating in Australia relayed the following example. 
The subsidiary had been given a corporate mandate to undertake a demanding 
programme of exploration, particularly in its offshore concessions. Over the period of 
less than two years, the subsidiary underwent a rapid growth phase (from a staff of 50 to 
150 over about 12 months), essentially starting from 'scratch' and importing company 
technical personnel from overseas, together with a large number of contractors to fill its 
staffing needs. Along with this mixed labour force came a range of operating cultures, 
not all of which were aligned with, or prepared to align with, the corporate culture of the 
subsidiary and its corporate parent. Further, while the subsidiary had operated in 
Australia in the past, many of its locally experienced staff had left or been transferred 
elsewhere when the company went through a low activity phase in the intervening years. 
With the turnover of those staff, the subsidiary had lost valuable 'corporate memory' 
within the organisation, and this was not compensated for by an increased usage of out-
sourced contractors. 
Middle managers in the re-staffed subsidiary were also not empowered to make 
decisions. Consequently, many of the well-established corporate management system 
procedures, such as critical 'no-go' decision-making practices , were not employed or 
enforced. Similarly, due to a "lack of planning ethos", critical planning steps were by-
passed and potential problems and risks were inadvertently overlooked. In the 
subsidiary's haste to take advantage of offshore drilling rig availability (the rig hire 
market at the time was very 'tight'), short-cuts were taken to fast-track operations, and 
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key (and usually routine) activities like hazard and operability studies (HAZOPs), risk 
assessn1ent, risk management and quality assurance were overlooked. 
The subsidiary failed to adequately involve the drilling rig company in planning the 
drilling progran1me, and had not adequately briefed company personnel on the 
complexity of the geological conditions. The rig that was contracted was 
inappropriately-equipped for the geological conditions in which it was required to 
perform, and had a drilling rig crew that was inexperienced in dealing with those 
conditions. Not surprisingly, one of the offshore drilling programs encountered a 
technical difficulty and lost well control, which resulted in a potentially fatal incident. 
Ironically, the incident was stopped from developing into a catastrophic situation by the 
instinctive actions of an on-site drilling contractor who performed an action to regain 
well control, which by conventional petroleum industry standards was considered highly 
unsafe and was in breach of company drilling procedures. 
From the drillers' perspective, depressed petroleu1n commodity prices and associated 
cost-cutting practices in the petroleum industry, during the 1980s and 1990s, have had 
the effect of lowering field workers' wages (relative to other industries and the earlier 
lucrative days of the petroleum industry), and field worker confidence in the industry as 
a desirable long-term employer has diminished accordingly. 
According to a drilling consultant interviewed by this researcher, many experienced 
field operations personnel, such as drilling rig and platform workers, have left the 
industry, while potential new entrants have chosen to enter other industries, rather than 
train to work in the petroleum industry. Consequently the industry is now facing a 
workforce shortage, especially of experienced drilling rig hands. Those that remain in 
the industry are therefore sought after by drilling contractor companies, and as such they 
can be selective about where they work, often taking into consideration prevailing 
personal income tax regimes (Australia is not favoured). 
As a consequence, the interviewee reported that drilling rig operators in Australia have 
been forced to employ untrained labour. On one of the interviewee's offshore 
supervision shifts in 1998, the most experienced drilling crew members under his 
supervision had only three weeks' practical_ experience. These workers typically not only 
lack technical knowledge and experience, but they also often do not have an inherent or 
instill~d HSE culture, and hence have a poor understanding of operational risks and the 
necessity to comply with stringent safety precautions. For their own personal wellbeing, 
as well as the overall safety and integrity of the operation, these workers reportedly need 
constant close supervision, which in turn creates increased responsibilities, concerns 
about professional and personal liability, and associated higher stress levels for the 
drilling supervisors. Such working conditions are understandably not attractive to these 
supervisors, who themselves are then tempted to seek other work elsewhere. 
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The interviewee perceived that such problems have arisen partly as a result of the oil 
price crisis of the mid 1980s, when petroleum companies began to downsize and 
increasingly rely upon drilling contractors to provide skilled and experienced drilling 
staff. However, while petroleum companies had previously invested time and money in 
training its staff in both technical aspects, and the importance of quality and HSE 
management systems, the interviewee did not perceive that drilling contractors have the 
appropriate cultural or organisational background to adequately train drilling 
supervisors. Furthermore, competitive pricing pressures discourage drilling companies 
from investing in staff training. According to the interviewee, "the oil industry is paying 
the price for not having trained anyone since the 1980s ... no new generation of drilling 
supervisors is being trained to replace the current workforce". 
These observations are supported by reports from the US. Valebrokk ( 1998a) observed 
that the "tremendous boom in offshore activity, both in the US and elsewhere", has 
forced the industry to recruit outside the normal channels and this has been having an 
impact on safety. 
"Over the last 12 months total manhours in US waters have increased from 32.8 
million to 41.2 million while the number of fatalities has risen from three to eight, 
according to the International Association of Drilling Contractors . ... Critics feel there 
is a danger now [ 10 years after the Piper Alpha disasters and subsequent reforms to 
safety regulations} that complacency is setting in among oil companies and offshore 
service contractors. The unions say the rhetoric of top company bosses on safety does 
not always translate into action on the oilfields" (Valebrokk, 1998a). 
The E & P Forum has recognised within the industry that with more out-sourcing of 
work by petroleum companies there is a need to ensure that contractors adopt practices 
that are as safe as those used by the operators. 
"Looking at it sectorally, we are finding seismic contractors are performing excellently 
while drilling contractors are lagging behind in their safety performance" The basic 
problem is that drilling contractors tend to do more "one-off" type contracts while 
seis,nic contractors do a multitude of ''follow-on" jobs. "It is easier to get a safety 
culture engrained if you have longer term projects and only a few contractors" (Terry 
Thoem, chairman of the E & P Forum committee dealing with safety, health and 
personnel confidence, cited by Hopson, 1998b). 
The E & P Forum is now involved in identifying opportunities for "collective training 
programmes". From a company standpoint, Thoem reportedly believes that the only way 
to improve overall safety statistics is through education and exerting pressure on the 
senior executives of poorer performing firms (Hopson, 1998b). 
A constraint to improved performance in exploration and well development is perceived 
to be the continued use of the traditional 'bundled' approach to provision of services. 
This approach is basically cost driven and focuses on reducing direct costs through 
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competitive tendering and bulk discounting. The process of acquiring services is firmly 
controlled by the petroleum company operators, where services and materials are 
utilised on an 'as needed basis' (Petroleum Gazette, 1996). According to David Ward, 
Business Development Manager, Dresser Drilling and Production Services, 
Australasia/South East Asia (cited by Petroleuni Gazette, 1996), each contractor was 
typically hired to carry out a predetermined operational program which had progressed 
through the internal tiers of approval and could not be easily changed. In very few cases 
were the ability and experience of the contractor called upon to refine or change the 
program. The culture of the industry was one that relegated the contractor to the role of 
executioner and maintained responsibility for planning and on-site management strictly 
as the preserve of the operator. 
An integrated approach to provision of services is increasingly being favoured for field 
development and production operations. This approach focuses on aligning the 
contractor's and operator's business drivers to deliver a quality product. The four main 
principles of integrated services or alliancing are: (i) alignment via performance-based 
incentive programs; (ii) commitment to behavioural change; (iii) teamwork and 
enhanced communications; and (iv) benchmarking and continuous improvement. 
Supporters of alliancing suggest that 
"the key to modern-day partnering or alliancing is the establishment of a relationship 
between participants based on trust, dedication, common goals, and an understanding 
of each other's individual expectations and values" (John Kava, Project Integration 
Manager, North West Shelf, Western Australia, cited in Petroleum Gazette, 1996, p. 
22). 
Performance incentive schemes may be: (i) time-based (where there are bonuses for 
early delivery and penalties for late delivery; (ii) cost-based (where bonuses are awarded 
for delivering under budget); (iii) health, safety and environment-based (where good 
practice is rewarded and poor safety or pollution incidents are penalised); and (iv) 
quality-based (where high quality is rewarded and poor quality is penalised) (Petroleum 
Gazette, 1996). In terms of behavioural change, the operator must fully release the 
control that has been assigned to the contractor. Equally, the contractor must 
enthusiastically embrace their added responsibilities in accepting non-core activities and 
take the lead in driving performance improvement. Continuous performance 
in1provement requires contractors to define targets, measure performance against these 
targets-and use the results to improve the tasks. It also calls for a far-sighted approach so 
there is no discouragement of any new procedures or technologies that may initially 
have a small negative impact, but which ultimately have a long term benefit to a project 
(Petroleum Gazette, 1996). 
The entrenched decision-making and operating approaches of the petroleum companies 
may, however, take some time to adjust to this new cooperative approach. One 
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interviewee used the analogy of a supertanker-" it takes a long tinie to change course 
in response to prevailing currents". Similarly, in reference to advances in corporate 
environmental performance, Chris Fay, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Shell 
UK observed: 
"Changes will inevitably take tinie . ... If anyone expects a Big Bang, they' re going to be 
disappointed. Long-held assumptions and working practices will need to be challenged 
and then challenged again" (Knott, 1998, p. 37). 
4.10 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This industry sector profile has endeavoured to identify the character of upstream 
petroleum companies and the complex and dynamic nature of their business 
environment. Key characteristics of the industry that are of importance in understanding 
their business context are summarised below. 
Although petroleum companies vary considerably with respect to origin, size, structure, 
strategy, management, innovation, flexibility and performance, two key objectives 
essentially determine their behaviour: (i) high profits and growth, and (ii) the stability 
and long-term survival of the company. Evolving marketplace influences, and associated 
ongoing restructuring of the petroleum industry, have several implications for future 
corporate business strategies of companies The specific operational challenges currently 
facing the upstream petroleum industry include: (i) the development of remote gas and 
oil fields; (ii) the development of smaller fields; (iii) greater attention to greenhouse gas 
emissions; (iv) continued high priority to safety and environmental performance; (v) 
reduction of the environmental impacts of facilities and processes; (vi) cessation of 
production from uneconomic fields; (vii) exploration and production in deeper waters; 
(viii) increasing use of floating production systems and subsea installations; (ix) 
innovative processing technologies; (x) increased automation; (xi) reduction in costs; 
and (xii) continued access to acreage. 
"With the exception of the ever present challenge to ensure government demands for a 
greater share of the economic rent from resource developments does not beco,ne 
prohibitive, the above changes and challenges all require continued effort to ensure 
this industry can ,neet the high expectations it has of itself let alone the externally 
induced para,neters from governments and the community" (Wells, 1995). 
Petroleum industry business strategies are closely linked to the global market price of 
oil, gas and LNG, and the need to quickly respond to pricing changes by curbing 
exploration and operating expenditure and restructuring. Institutions created in response 
to various challenges posed by the petroleum sector will have to evolve by adapting 
their functions and operations to changing realities-if they are to survive and develop. 
"The essence of longevity is adaptability" (Mikdashi, 1986, p. 177). 
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In the foreseeable future, private sector exploration, development and supply of local 
petroleum resources will be encouraged by the national governments in the East Asian 
region. Gas, in particular, will increase in importance in this region. From the 
perspective of the petroleum industry, the main determinants of the relative 
attractiveness of petroleum investment in host countries are the prospectivity, fiscal 
regime, macro-economic risks, business environment, political risks and corporate 
strategy. The economics of gas are also dependent upon factors such as gas prices and 
the timing and level of gas supply opportunities (Allinson and Elliston, 1994 ). 
Economic development and industrialisation of Thailand and its East Asian neighbours 
over the last 50 years or so, has- created an increasing demand for locally produced 
hydrocarbons. However, East Asia is, in per capita terms, short of oil and gas resources, 
although the region is also relatively still under-explored, and potentially may hold a 
significant share of the world's hydrocarbon reserves. 
Size is considered to be a particularly important competitive advantage in the petroleum 
industry. Besides geological risks, commercial risks can be incurred following 
inopportune fluctuations in prices. Further, political factors, such as 
boycotts/embargoes, nationalisations or conflicts, can cause large financial losses. Large 
size enables a company to absorb such losses without jeopardising survival (Mikdashi, 
1986). Major petroleum enterprises have, over the years, built extensive networks of 
affiliates, subsidiaries and joint ventures in various parts of the world. This strategy of 
geographical spread enables the company concerned to exploit business opportunities 
rapidly. This can make up for unexpected disruption of supplies, transport or refining 
facilities in a given region of the world by increasing activities in other regions of the 
world. It also serves to reduce over-dependence on one region or one market, thus 
attaining greater corporate stability-with one market's profits covering temporary 
losses in another market (Mikdashi, 1986). Small, independent companies are often able 
to find niche opportunities in frontier exploration, the development and operation of 
small production fields which can be connected to existing neighbouring supply 
infrastructure, and in the operation of declining fields which are no longer profitable for 
the large, overhead-laden companies. 
Companies best positioned to benefit from the regional business opportunities will be 
those with an existing presence, proven track record of capability, and well-established 
working relationships with the host governments. However, these host governments 
have also demonstrated that they are sensitive to political interference by Western 
nations, such as US sanctions on Myanmar. Malaysia has openly attacked Western 
countries for their hypocrisy in criticising Third World countries for environmental 
damage when they consume the bulk of the world's resources (Jesudason, 1996). 
Consequently, the investments of foreign, especially Western, petroleum companies face 
political risks associated with both their home countries and their hosts. These 
companies must therefore tread carefully with both. 
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Business risk assessments need to be conducted on a regular basis, as legislative 
changes and public opinion may quickly move the performance goal posts, particularly 
in terms of social and environmental management performance. Environmental risks 
have, for some time, been a high profile concern to the petroleum industry in western 
countries, such as issues of indigenous land usage rights, community acceptance and 
access to environmentally sensitive areas in Australia. However, in South-East Asia, 
environmental risk has been less of a business concern to petroleum companies, relative 
to their concerns over political stability and investment terms. 
This situation is now changing. Expectations of corporate social responsibility emerging 
in the international arena will increasingly affect business in South-East Asia. Bray 
( 1997) suggests companies will face closer scrutiny from shareholders, NGOs, the 
media and, increasingly, their own staff. Commercial activities in one part of the world 
will help determine a company's reputation , and profitability elsewhere around the 
world. The companies best able to adapt to this operating environment will be those 
which anticipate problems, maintain communications with NGOs and key interest 
groups, and present clear, reasoned explanations of their policies during crisis incidents 
(Hastings, 1999; McDaniel et al., 1998). 
Investment risks and returns are influential in determining petroleum company attitudes 
towards their environmental management responsibilities. Estrada et al. (1997) 
concluded from their case study analysis that despite some observed differences between 
the large US and European petroleum companies they studied, the similarities were 
'striking'. The company visions were almost identical for most of the companies, and 
environmental management was basically the same in each of the companies. The long-
term view of the market held by each company did not differ significantly, and there was 
a uniform trend towards concentration on core business. 
However, while petroleum companies share common business interests and v1s1ons, 
their individual perceptions of, and implementation of environmental and social policies 
may differ markedly at the business unit level , according to the business unit's 
priorities. Where market pressures impose the need to tighten expenditure, industry 
examples demonstrate that companies can be quick to respond, and some will readily 
sacrifice environmental management as a 'non-essential' item. Many company 
executives, driven by bottom line profit targets, still consider environmental obligations 
as a burden to exploration and production costs-an expenditure for which they may see 
no tangible return, particularly in the short-term. 
Many of the industry interviewees expressed optimism that individual company and 
petroleum industry attitudes toward the environment have positively changed and will 
continue to improve over time through education and training. However, many observed 
that the industry's progress towards improved corporate environmental and social 
responsiveness will be tempered by commercial pragmatism. The attitude was simply 
117 
CHAPTER 4. THE UPSTREAM PETROLEUM SECTOR 
expressed by one interviewee as "business is business", meaning that companies 
operating in market economies are always forced to consider the financial 'bottom line' 
implications of their actions. Despite the advent of environmental economic principles 
based on the accounting of environmental externalities and the 'triple bottom line' 
(Elkington, 1999), petroleum business accounting still appears to be firmly entrenched 
in the ways of traditional cost accounting. 
In the case of autonomous business units or country offices, middle-ranking executives 
win the support of senior executives, and ultimately financial rewards, if they run 
profitable operations (Clark, 1993; Bray, 1997). Operations managers who are pre-
occupied with the 'bottom line' may compromise corporate environmental management 
objectives and standards. Even large well-intentioned multinational companies cannot 
necessarily control the environmental performance of their subsidiaries, if the local 
business units withhold information from corporate managers. Furthermore, if activities 
like environmental impact assessment and environmental monitoring are not host 
country compliance requirements, then these tasks may be avoided or only given token 
attention (Fowler, 1995). 
The findings of this chapter demonstrate that external, mediating and moderating 
influences play an important role in determining corporate business strategies of 
petroleum companies. In terms of environmental management practices, both market 
and other external forces, and internal factors, such as culture, ethics and leadership, 
determine petroleu1n company performance. The external forces are characteristically 
highly dynamic, and often require rapid reactive responses from companies in order for 
them to maintain their market position. Governing regulatory frameworks therefore need 
to incorporate sufficient flexibility to allow these companies to pursue market 
opportunities, while also harnessing the power of peers and third party interests demand 





"A consequence of the increased importance of civil society is that the 
differentiation between legal and social legitimacy has sharpened. As a 
result, companies may find it more difficult to obtain social legitimacy 
































CHAPTER 5. REGULATORY APPROACHES AND PROBLEMS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As indicated in Chapter 4, petroleum companies have historically used host country 
regulatory requirements to guide formulation of their minimum environmental 
performance criteria. However, in the developing nations of South-East Asia, some of 
the components of the regulatory systems are in flux or in the early stages of 
development. In this form, the regulatory processes are neither particularly transparent 
nor effective, and often fail to provide appropriate regulatory instruments to regulate the 
social and environmental performance of upstream petroleum companies. 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify typical regulatory process problems that occur 
in the developing countries of South-East Asia, and the consequences of those 
deficiencies in the context of the upstream petroleum industry and regulator 
responsibilities for environmental management. Section 5.2 overviews the 
characteristics of the regulatory framework for environmental management in the 
developing nations of South-East Asia to identify sources of tension between industry 
and regulators. Section 5.3 is an overview of the origins and constraints of the Thai 
environmental law framework. Section 5.4 discusses the implementation problems 
associated with the Thai environmental impact assessment (EIA) process and the impact 
on petroleum company behaviour. Section 5.5 presents the conclusions of this chapter. 
5.2 SOUTH-EAST ASIAN REGULATORY SYSTEMS 
Most of the South-East Asian nations have developed policies and legislation to address 
environmental problems, and established specialised regulatory institutions to oversee 
environmental protection. Formulation of environmental legislation and regulations in 
these countries has tended to be facilitated with outside assistance. This assistance has 
often come via loan projects from the multilateral banks, such as the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank), or bi-lateral technical aid projects funded by 
donor governments of developed nations like Australia, Canada, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden, and the US. 
For example, in Indonesia the regulations for environmental impact assessment were 
adapted from Canadian regulations, through a Canadian government aid project. In 
Vietn3:m, Petro Vietnam is drafting industry-specific safety management regulations and 
other technical guidelines on emission standards with assistance from the Norwegian 
Petroleum Directorate (Nguyen, 1998). An inter-governmental organisation, the Co-
ordinating Committee for Coastal and Offshore Geoscience Programmes in East and 
South-East Asia (CCOP) , proposed a related project in association with the ASEAN 
Council on Petroleum (ASCOPE) and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. The 
project aim was to develop regional environmental standards and safety regulations for 
the petroleum industry in South-East Asia. The United Nations Development 
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Programme (UNDP) and CCOP have also promoted the development of anti-pollution 
legislation and regulation in member countries. 
As a consequence of such institutional strengthening projects , the legislation and 
standards of South-East Asian countries have commonly been modelled on those of 
industrialised countries, and often strongly reflect the influence of their foreign technical 
advisers (James, 1998). They may, however, be quite dissimilar or unrelated to those of 
their Asian neighbours, or even other regulatory agencies in the same country. 
Piecemeal formulation of environmental legislation and standards for specific 
government ministries or departments leads to problems of inconsistency and 
incompatibility, and inadequate linkages to the roles and responsibilities of other 
government agencies (Kiravanich, 1995). Lack of process continuity, and in some 
instances co-operation, between responsible authorities is often an impediment to 
integrated environmental management of industrial projects (Hossain, 1995). 
Aside from concerns about co-ordination and compatibility, many of the laws and 
standards adopted by South-East Asian countries are simply inappropriate for 
application in developing nations. Countries like Thailand and Indonesia generally lack 
suitably skilled and trained agency staff and local information needed to conduct their 
own scientific research and technology assessment, and set appropriate standards. 
Consequently they have tended to directly adopt standards based on those of developed 
nations, in particular the USA and Japan (O'Connor, 1994). They have failed to 
recognise that such standards have been designed for implementation in regulatory 
regimes with technologically advanced industries and strong regulatory monitoring and 
enforcement capabilities. 
Like their foreign models, these command-and-control instruments are expensive to 
implement and administratively demanding. The important issue of institutional 
capacity to effectively administer and enforce the new legislation and standards is also 
often overlooked or poorly addressed. Sophisticated and costly monitoring requirements 
remain beyond the financial and technical capabilities of most environmental regulatory 
agencies in developing countries. Furthermore, these agencies are often under-staffed 
and have too many work demands to be able to satisfactorily perform their mandated 
enforcement and monitoring tasks-a problem which tends to be particularly evident at 
the middle level of regulatory agencies in South-East Asian countries (Martin, 1998). 
For example, Thailand's Hazardous Substances Act places joint and several liability on 
all parties involved in production through to disposal of hazardous vvastes. However, 
there is reportedly no control over the importation of some hazardous materials, no 
standards or guidelines for safe handling, transportation and application in production 
processes, and inadequate coverage by existing emergency response plans (Office of 
Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP), 1997). Facilities for the treatment and 
121 
CHAPTER 5. REGULATORY APPROACHES AND PROBLEMS 
destruction of hazardous wastes from industrial sources are inefficient and ill-equipped 
to deal with the range of hazardous wastes that are being generated. Hazardous wastes 
can only be treated at two locations: Samae-dam and a landfill in Ratchaburi province. 
Other impediments include a lack of standards and procedures for collection, handling, 
storage, treatment and final disposal of hazardous wastes; poor collaboration between 
government, public, waste operators and waste generators (OEPP, 1997). 
This problem is accentuated in marine areas, where both budgetary constraints and 
jurisdictional limits hamstring the regulators. For example, an emerging issue in the 
Gulf of Thailand is the need to plan for the decommissioning and removal of aging 
offshore petroleum production structures, in accordance with the requirements of United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Wiwatpattarakul, 1995; 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), 1996; Pittard, 
1997). As of March 1995, there were 82 production-related offshore structures operating 
in the Thai sector of the Gulf of Thailand, and more are being installed each year. The 
existing domestic environmental legislation of the coastal states only applies within 
their territorial sea boundaries, whereas many of the petroleum installations are located 
in their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (that is, more than 12 nautical miles offshore). 
State legislative power regarding matters such as environmental impact assessment, 
pollution control, and hazardous waste management, beyond the territorial sea limit are 
restricted to regulating the use of offshore structures in the exploitation of natural 
resources lying within each state's continental shelf areas and EEZ through their 
petroleum legislation. Wiwatpattarakul ( 1995) has identified that Thai law does not 
currently adequately address responsibilities and liabilities in this regard, and similar 
constraints are evident in the neighbouring countries that share administrative 
responsibility for the Gulf of Thailand. 
Another characteristic administrative problem in the region is the reluctance of 
government bureaucrats to share information, both within their own departments and 
between government agencies. A specific problem in marine resource management, for 
example, is the lack of co-ordination among agencies responsible for resource use 
planning and management at both national and inter-governmental levels (Sosmena, 
1994). Longstanding political, economic and cultural rivalries between the nations of the 
region have often acted to impede cooperative environmental management initiatives at 
the senior government executive level (Seda, 1993; Sosmena, 1994). Even the United 
Nations Environment Programme's East Asian Seas programme has reportedly 
encountered reluctance from its member countries to release natural resource inventory 
information. 
The obstructive mechanisms that are in place to impede release of data, often drive both 
government agencies and the private sector to initiate their own environmental data 
collection programmes. This is simply because it is easier and quicker to collect the data 
122 
CHAPTER 5. REGULATORY APPROACHES AND PROBLEMS 
again, rather than atte1npt to obtain access to existing data sets. Needless to say, this 
process is time-consuming, expensive, inefficient, and unsatisfactory where long-term 
records are needed to develop appropriate resource management plans and monitor 
environ1nental impacts. 
These institutional problems are common to many of the developing nations of South-
East Asia. However, for the purpose of the research, Thailand is used as a case study to 
illustrate the specific problems that can arise from inadequate implementation of 
environ1nental legislation and regulations. The following section describes the 
characteristics of the environmental regulatory system of Thailand and explains why the 
current system does not help to facilitate corporate social and environmental 
respons1 veness. 
5.3 THAI ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 
Thailand is sometimes credited with having far-sighted and far-reaching environmental 
legislation, which could be interpreted as an indication that previous governments have 
been seriously concerned about, and committed to, environmental protection. However, 
it is important to recognise that virtually all of Thailand's key environmental legislation 
was enacted during three relatively short periods in its political history-in the early 
1960s, in response to effective lobbying by first generation conservation groups; during 
the brief period of intense civil pressure for political reform in the mid-1970s; and 
during the even briefer rule of the two interim governments led by Anand Panyarachun 
( 1991-1992). The somewhat opportunistic nature of the enactment of this legislation is 
one of the core reasons why many Thai governments, including the incumbents, have 
been widely and frequently accused of not demonstrating commitment to their 
enforcement. 
Environmental laws first emerged in Thailand in the early 1960s, as a result of an 
attempt by a small group of environmentally aware academics to persuade the 
government to take an active role in conserving the natural environment (Baker, 1995). 
In 1953, Dr Boonsong Lekagul1 and a group of fellow hunters-turned conservationists 
became concerned about the trend of large scale wildlife hunting and deforestation. 
They formed the first Thai conservation group, the Association for the Conservation of 
Wildlife (ACW) and began a push for the enactment of legislation aimed at protecting 
Thailand's natural resources, particularly forests and wildlife (Baker, 1995). The 
influence and lobbying of Dr Boonsong and his followers were rewarded with the 
1 Like its counterparts in the US and other nations, the environmental movement in Thailand began as a 
conservation movement. The 'father' of the conservation movement in Thailand, and a guiding figure 
behind many of today's environmentalists in Thailand, is Dr Boonsong Lekagul (Baker, 1995). 
123 
CHAPTER 5. REGULATORY APPROACHES AND PROBLEMS 
enactn1ent of the 1960 Wild Aninial Preservation and Protection Act and the 1961 
National Park Act. Shortly after the passage of the latter, Dr Boonsong persuaded then 
Prime Minister Sarit Thanarat to accompany him on a helicopter trip to assess the state 
of Thai forests 2. This trip was apparently decisive in convincing General Sarit to declare 
Khao Yai as Thailand's first national park (Baker, 1995). 
The first Enhance1nent and Conservation of National Environniental Quality Act was 
promulgated in 1975, and included provisions to establish the Office of the National 
Environmental Board (ONEB). Despite amendments to the Act in 1978 and 1979, it, 
and other laws dealing with environmental issues, were increasingly seen as inadequate 
and efforts were made to strengthen or replace them (Baker, 1995). These efforts came 
to fruition under the Anand Panyarachun3 administrations of 1992. Much of the new 
environmental legislation passed during the Anand period had actually been proposed 
years before, but it was only during his terms in office that passage was achieved. 
Ironically, the two short terms of the interim Anand governments are often credited with 
being the best government that Thailand has ever seen-probably because the 
appointment of Anand was so out of character with the Thai political scene, both before 
and after his terms. 
As a former diplomat and businessman, Anand was aware of the long-term harm to 
economic interests posed by environmental problems. The cabinet of his interim 
2 In 1936 it was estimated that forest covered some 70% of Thailand's total land area. By 1952 this figure 
had decreased to 58%. By 1961 this figure was 54% (Baker, 1995). More recent studies (1993) indicate a 
remaining forest cover of 26% (13 million ha) (OEPP, 1997). 
3 Following the coup on 23 February 1991 that brought down the elected government of General 
Chatichai, the military junta took power, calling itself the National Peace-Keeping Council. It set new 
elections for no later than April 1992, established an appointed National Legislative Assembly, and chose 
as interim Prime Minister, Anand Panyarachun. Anand's initial appointment came as a surprise to most, as 
he had a reputation as a liberal and was not known to have any personal connections with military leaders. 
Furthermore, Anand was known to be a key figure in the business-technocratic alliance. In his early 
career, he had been a Foreign Ministry official, and moved easily among technocrats. In 1979, he quit 
government service and moved to the chairmanship of major textiles conglomerate. Throughout the 
1980s, he took a prominent part in business associations, and became the political ambassador of 
metropolitan business. 
Elections were held in April 1992, and a new leader was democratically elected, but the military junta 
instead chose to appoint General Suchinda Kraprayoon as Prime Minister. This nomination caused 
widespread public upset, and an NGO-organised coalition worked to reverse this decision and install an 
elected Prime Minister. The climax of this opposition was the fatal May 1992 demonstrations in Bangkok 
that called for Suchinda's ousting. As a consequence, Anand was again brought in as interim Prime 
Minister until new elections were held in September 1992, when the civilian government of Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai was elected (Baker, 1995). 
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government was comprised of businessmen, senior technocrats, and academics, several 
of which were already prominent NGO leaders. These cabinets were supportive of 
NGOs and the need for new environmental legislation (Baker, 1995). Consequently, 
during their period in parlian1ent (when there was no effective opposition), they were 
able to quickly enact a swathe of reforms designed to complete the transition to an 
economy based on export-oriented industrialisation and a considerable amount of 
environmental legislation, while winning widespread popularity4 (Baker, 1995; 
Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). 
Seven key acts of environmental legislation were promulgated during the Anand 
government: the Wildlife Conservation Act, February 1992; Act for the Cleanliness and 
Orderliness of the Country, February 1992; Energy Conservation Act, February 1992; 
Hazardous Substances Act, April 1992; Factory Act, April 1992; Enhance,nent and 
Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act, April 1992 (that repealed the 
1975 Act); and the Public Health Act, April 1992. 
Under the Iniprovement of Ministries Act 1992, the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Energy was renamed the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MOSTE), 
and equipped with three new departments specifically concerned with the environment, 
including the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP). MOSTE was 
assigned responsibility to administer the Enhancement and Conservation of the National 
Environmental Quality Act 1992 (the ECNEQ Act). Under the provisions of this Act, 
the former Office of the National Environmental Board (ONEB) was upgraded from an 
advisory body to an active policy-making centre chaired by the Prime Minister, and is 
now known simply as the National Environmental Board (NEB). The NEB was 
bestowed with the power to enforce policies and standards if the responsible agencies 
fail to do so. 
While the ECNEQ Act and the other environmental legislation were intended to provide 
for effective administration, in practice their implementation often fails to deliver 
informed decision-making and effective environmental management. Several specific 
reasons for the failure of the Thai environmental protection framework have been 
identified. O'Connor ( 1994) and Baker ( 1995) suggest that financial, technical and 
human resource constraints are the most serious obstacles to more effective 
environmental management in Thailand. Wasant Techawongtham, the Bangkok Post's 
Deputy News Editor for Environment and Urban Affairs, believes that the influence of 
cultural norms and key social 'forces' in Thai society are the key factors: 
4 After the restoration of parliament in late 1992, there were apparently calls for Anand to enter party 
politics, but he refused. 
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"Manpower and budget shortages are not unique to this country. Enforcement 
agencies 1-1 1orldwide have to work under similar constraints, yet some manage to 
achieve a certain degree of credibility with good resource management, an ability to 
set priorities and the will to enforce the law with dignity and integrity. Sadly, these 
qualities are lacking in our enforcement agencies, with few exceptions . ... The problem 
i.vith this country, however, is that there are other variables-political, cultural and 
structural-which get in the way of good officials trying to do their job. Political 
meddling often puts a damper on officials' enthusiasm for stringent action. The 
tendency to compromise and go easy on businesses in deference to the privileged class 
is a cultural trait that cuts down on enforcement effectiveness. The tangled web of 
overlapping authority among agencies complicates and discourages enforcement" 
(Techawongtham, 1998). 
In short, the implementation problems stem primarily from the structure of the 
bureaucratic system, and the attitudes and behaviour of the bureaucrats that are 
responsible for administering the legislation and regulations. As Rigg (1995, p. 15) has 
observed: 
"Thailand's environ,nental crisis stems not from a failure to understand environmental 
problems, or at least appreciate that they exist, but to do something about it". 
To illustrate, in Thailand there are 24 departmental level agencies, within eight 
ministries, involved in water resources planning, development, and management 
(excluding the Mekong River administrators) (Vadhanaphuti et al., 1995). Regulatory 
controls on water quality have been drawn up by a multitude of agencies according to 
their respective areas of responsibility: (i) water quality for irrigation and fisheries 
(Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives); (ii) use of waters and seas for 
transportation (Ministry of Transportation); (iii) water quality in rural areas (Ministry of 
Public Health and associated local government agencies); and (iv) industrial pollution 
control and industrial effluent and emission standards and disposal procedures (Ministry 
of Industry: Department of Industrial Works and the Mineral Resources Department). 
However, standards developed by these government agencies are rarely compatible. 
They have been developed for differing purposes, and point discharge standards are 
often not linked to ambient environmental quality standards (such as surface fresh water 
sources, groundwater, and coastal water quality), that are the responsibility of the 
National Environment Board (NEB). 
In the context of upstream petroleum production operations, the ECNEQ Act requires 
operators of point sources of pollution to maintain daily operational records of 
wastewater treatment, waste disposal , and air pollution control facilities. They are also 
legally required to submit summary reports to the local authorities at least once a month 
(although this is rarely done) (O ' Connor, 1994). Under the Act, the Pollution Control 
Department (PCD) of MOSTE is given the primary responsibility for undertaking 
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investigations and instigating disciplinary action against polluters. In reality, the PCD 
has the authority to monitor and inspect, but no authority to enforce action (Bureau of 
National Affairs, 1997). To add to its problems, the PCD has only a few hundred 
pollution control officers who are responsible for inspecting over 50,000 establishments 
nationwide (O'Connor, 1994). 
Identified polluters must be refeITed by the PCD to the responsible government authority 
to take action. For example, pollution from a petroleum production operation must be 
referred to the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR). If the PCD requests the 
responsible authority to take action and no reply is received within a month, PCD 
officials can undertake another inspection of the polluting operation to determine what 
corrective measures should be taken. If no action is forthcoming from the polluter or the 
responsible authority, the PCD then has the authority to order corrective action, but it 
does not have the power to shut down a polluting operation (Bureau of National Affairs, 
1997). 
Where fines and penalties are imposed on polluters by regulatory authorities, they are 
rarely set at levels that constitute an effective deterrent. Where they are punitive, 
enforcement officials "niay too readily yield to the special pleading of financially 
precarious enterprises or, in some cases, to bribery" (O'Connor, 1994, p. 14). 
Corruption of regulators was raised as a concern by interviewees from foreign petroleum 
companies (see Chapter 4). In some cases, interviewees reported that regulatory 
enforcement officers appear to tum a blind eye to non-compliance by local companies, 
but target multinational companies. 
In reference to the problems of water resource management in Thailand, Tapvong (1995, 
p. 190) summarised the dilemma as follows: 
" the responsibilities of different government agencies overlap in a tangled web of 
bureaucracy. The considerable task at hand and the degree of bureaucratic inertia and 
intransigence has left environmentalists, NGOs, the public, and even government 
officials themselves, in despair" 
The influence of bureaucrats can be particularly problematic. The unitary5 nature of the 
Thai political system means that almost all decisions of any importance emanate from 
the central government in Bangkok. Provincial and local governments have little power 
to make policy, and essentially administer decisions made in Bangkok (Baker, 1995). 
There are times when Thai bureaucrats act as a force to resist changes, including those 
5 Thailand has a unitary system of government, which operates under a legal system adopted from many 
countries. It is a code system, derived from the Code Napoleon, which does not observe judicial 
precedent, nor use juries. 
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deemed by Parliament to be of national importance. Often policies advocated at Cabinet 
(Council of Ministers) level do not filter down to the working level, due to a lack of 
implementing laws, regulations, instructions, follow-up, or just bureaucratic 
reluctance-government officials can act at cross purposes to oppose a policy or 
decision they do not support. 
To illustrate, environmentalists have argued that some Thai environmental agencies 
have conflicting responsibilities. They suggest that an entire ministry should be devoted 
to environment protection and management. The Thailand Environment Institute (TEI), 
a highly regarded NGO, has suggested grouping the Departments of Forestry, Land 
Development, Irrigation, Fisheries, Mineral Resources, Pollution Control, the National 
Energy Policy Office, and the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning together 
(Inchukul, 1997b ). The Thai Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment 
(MOSTE) published a formal recommendation for such in August 1997 (Thammasat 
University, 1997). 
This idea was discussed by Thai government officials from environmental and related 
agencies, at a seminar in November 1997, but reportedly met with resistance (Inchukul, 
1997b ). Some officials argued that the plan "was in1practical and impossible to 
implement under the current bureaucratic regime". A Forestry Department official 
reportedly accused MOSTE officials of making the proposal "to strengthen their own 
positions and authority". He believed that the "objectives of the proposed ministry 
would contradict those of agencies that would come under it". In addition, opponents 
argued that some agencies such as the Forestry and Irrigation Departments had existed 
for more than 100 years and "had strong tvorking relationships with other departments 
within the same niinistry" (Inchukul, 1997b). 
Competition between government agencies is a significant impediment to effective 
environmental management, primarily because 'turf wars' discourage agencies from 
sharing information and working cooperatively to solve environmental problems that 
need to be addressed in an integrated manner. Commercial business concerns about such 
attitudes are reflected in the following quote from the environmental engineering 
industry periodical, Asian vVater and Sewage: 
"The complexity of the Thai government system and its reluctance to release 
information means that projects must be carefully tracked through the system ... It is 
important that key government officials be kept up-to-date on technical data and new 
processes. Careful attention must also be paid to the competition within the 
bureaucracy for control of major projects ... "(Wedel, 1995, p. 14). 
These examples point to entrenched bureaucratic power stn1ggles and resistance to 
change. These entrenched attitudes impede initiatives to improve the efficiency and 
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effectiveness of the regulatory system, and act to exclude other stakeholders from 
involvement in administrative decision-making processes. 
These barriers to change are clearly evident in the Thai environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) and associated licensing processes, which are described in the 
following section. The EIA process has been chosen to illustrate these concerns because 
it is a key stage in which there is ( or should be) dialogue between industry, regulators 
and other stakeholders in regard to the performance expectations of project proponents. 
5.4 THAI ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 
The Thai EIA process was established by the 1975 Enhancement and Conservation of 
National Environmental Quality Act, and later revised by the 1992 ECNEQ Act. 
In brief, the process is triggered by reference to notification lists of prescribed 
activities6. A proposed project that fits the description of a prescribed activity is required 
to proceed through the formal EIA process administered by MOSTE. Preparation of the 
EIA report is the responsibility of project proponents, who usually engage consultants to 
conduct the necessary technical studies and prepare the documentation. Once complete, 
the EIA report is submitted to OEPP for review by an expert committee ( of which there 
are several, to suit specific project types). If the expert committee deems the EIA to be 
satisfactory, the OEPP then recommends it for approval to the NEB. 
This prescriptive approach has proven relatively straightforward to administer, 
particularly for government agencies that are short-staffed and over-worked. However, 
projects with the potential to cause environmental damage may be overlooked if they are 
not prescribed activities, and it can take some time before the list of prescribed activities 
is amended to include such projects 7. Similarly, potentially low impact projects may be 
required to proceed through this lengthy process by virtue of the fact that they are 
deemed to be a prescribed activity, rather than being pre-screened and assessed on their 
merits. 
6 Notification No. 3 of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment Re: Prescription of Type 
and Size of Projects or Business of Government Agencies, State Enterprises, or Private Organisations 
Required to Prepare Reports on Environmental Impact Analysis was issued on 22 January BE 2539 (AD 
1996). The Schedule annexed to Notification No. 3 prescribes petroleum operations (pipelines, 
exploration, production, etc., regardless of the size of the project) as an activity for ~hich an EIA report is 
required. 
7 For example, in January 1996, over 20 years after petroleum exploration and production commenced in 
Thailand, EIA reports finally became mandatory requirements for exploration activities and gas pipeline 
installations (MOSTE Notification No. 3, 22 January, 1996). Previously (since 1992), field development 
and production projects and oil pipelines were the only prescribed upstream petroleum activities. 
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Thailand was one of the first countries in Asia to introduce EIA into its policy 
framework, yet 25 years later, the EIA process has failed to perform as an effective 
environmental planning tool. Key process design deficiencies include: (i) no legislated 
provision for public participation in the EIA report review process; (ii) no requirement 
to specify measurable performance criteria which can be used to monitor compliance 
with the EIA report and provide verification of environmental impacts that could guide 
the design and evaluation of future projects; and (iii) no provision for a compliance 
review after completion of construction of the project, and before issuance of an 
operating permit by the responsible authority. 
In practice, other faults emerge: (i) EIA reports are sometimes prepared after the 
construction of a project; (ii) environmental parameters are commonly presented and 
evaluated individually, such that complex interactions and indirect and chronic effects 
are often not evaluated; (iii) the approval process can be delayed due to the need for 
assessors to review extensive EIA report documentation which has been prepared to 
satisfy quantity rather than quality expectations; and (iv) proponents can avoid a 
regulatory requirement to prepare an EIA report by breaking down an otherwise 
"prescribed" activity/project into several smaller projects that are not prescribed 
(Thammasat University, 1997). 
There are several apparent reasons for this performance failure, namely limits on 
administrative powers, inadequate administrative resources, competing agenda of 
· administering agencies, and lack of transparency and public participation in the process. 
Particular problems that have arisen within the upstream petroleum sector are described 
below. 
5.4.1 Administrative Power Constraints 
Administrative jurisdiction limits undermine the effectiveness of the EIA process. The 
gazettal of MOSTE Notification No. 3 in January 1996 gave the OEPP legal authority to 
participate in the approval process for petroleum exploration activities. The OEPP has 
since issued a guideline for preparation of EIA reports for offshore activities (Draft 
Supplemental Guideline-Offshore Oil and Gas Project Drilling Exploration and 
Production Phase), in accordance with Section 46 of 1992 ECNEQ Act. Prior to this 
period, the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) assessed upstream petroleum 
proposals. 
EIA reports are submitted to the OEPP to initiate the review and approval process. The 
OEPP can request further details about a project if the EIA report is deemed to be 
incomplete or inadequate-a power that the OEPP reportedly exercises for half the EIAs 
submitted (Bureau of National Affairs, 1997). Although the OEPP can repeatedly 
request proponents to submit revised EIA reports, it does not have the legal authority to 
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prevent a project from commencing if the project has been approved by the responsible 
government agency. The OEPP lacks both licensing and enforcement authority. Only the 
responsible government agency (permitting agency) for the project can refuse to license 
a project (e.g. the Departn1ent of Mineral Resources (DMR) in the case of petroleum 
exploration and production projects). 
Once the EIA report is approved, the permitting agency has responsibility for 
monitoring compliance with the terms of the EIA approval, but it is often development-
oriented and has little incentive to rigidly enforce the conditions of approval for the EIA. 
Furthermore, there is commonly poor communication and co-operation between the 
OEPP and the permitting agencies, which makes enforcement of approval EIA 
conditions even less likely (O'Connor, 1994). 
The EIA process is, therefore, cynically viewed by some proponents and bureaucrats as 
a mere formality that rarely results in substantial modification of project design, let 
alone outright rejection of the project. This cynicism can compromise the proponents ' 
commitment to the EIA process, and hence the scope of work given to their consultants 
to undertake environmental studies and prepare EIA reports. During the Yadana gas 
pipeline controversy ( described in Chapter 6), these concerns were expressed in the 
national print media, as fallows: 
"EJA reports are inadequately funded by project developers themselves) who pressure 
the consultant firms they hire to downplay projected impacts and finish up their surveys 
as quickly as possible . ... There also needs to be more quality control of consultants' 
work) perhaps by penalising firms which produce shoddy reports, or taking away their 
licences altogether" (Fahn, 1998). 
5.4.2 Bureaucratic Rivalry and Inefficiencies 
As is the case in many countries, regulatory administrative responsibility for 
environmental management of upstream petroleum exploration and production 
operations in Thailand is shared between the petroleum agency (DMR)8 and the 
8 The DMR administers the P etroleum Act 1971 and amendments, and the pursuant Notifications of the 
Ministry of Industry. Ministerial Regulations issued pursuant to Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Petroleum 
Act provide guidelines and procedures for petroleum development and production operations. Some of 
these include specific environmental protection requirements (such as Articles 3, 14 and 40, Reg. No. 5 
1971; Article 1, Reg. No. 7 1971, and Reg. No. 11 1981). 
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envjronmental protection agency (MOSTE)9. From the perspectjve of the upstream 
petroleum industry, the Thai EIA process is compron1ised by the standard of 
administration and apparent bureaucratjc rivalry between MOSTE and the DMR. 
The DMR was involved with the petroleum industry as its primary regulator for some 20 
years prjor to the creation of MOSTE in 1992. Consequently, the DMR has an 
established working relationship with the petroleum industry to foster and facilitate 
exploration and production activities. According to some petroleum company 
interviewees, the DMR has promoted itself to the industry as a one-stop shop for all 
necessary regulatory operational approvals. 
Mr Nopadon Mantajit, Director General of the DMR, espoused the DMR's philosophy: 
"As the chief of the Department of Mineral Resources, the regulatory body of the 
upstream industry in Thailand, I believe in the principle of cooperation and working 
together in mutual respect. I do not like to play a role of policeman catching a thief, so 
we have put forth eve,y effort to work and discuss closely with our operators 
preventing and controlling the impact to the environment from petroleum operations. 
Presently, we are enjoying very good collaboration" (Mantajit, 1998). 
A senior departmental interviewee stated that the relationship between DMR and the 
upstream petroleum industry has been built on trust and open dialogue, and has resulted 
in what he believes has been responsible environmental management on the part of the 
DMR and the industry. For example, even in the absence of a statutory requirement for 
an EIA for exploration activities prior to 1996, DMR implemented a requirement for an 
informal environmental assessment to be conducted by companies and submitted to the 
DMR for review as part of approval processes for exploration and production activities. 
Another example is regulatory compliance inspections of offshore petroleum facilities. 
These are practically constrained by the need to travel offshore to visit petroleum 
facilities , which for legislated safety reasons requires prior consent from the platform 
operator (the petroleum company) and thus precludes random, unannounced inspections. 
In such situations, the DMR is highly dependent upon building a strong and trusting 
working relationship with the platform operators, to ensure that they recognise and 
accept their responsibilities to manage and monitor their operational impacts. 
9 Regulatory pro v1s1ons pertaining to environmental impact assessment, air and water quality, and 
hazardous waste handling and disposal are contained within the 1992 Enhancement and Conservation of 
National Environmental Quality (ECNEQ) Act and Hazardous Substances Act, respectively. Departments 
of the Ministry of Science, Technology and the Environment (MOSTE) administer both of these. 
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Most petroleum company interviewees suggested that the relationship betvveen the 
industry and DMR was positive and constructive. However, they did not share that view 
of MOSTE. MOSTE ,vas perceived by petroleum industry interviewees to have a strong 
command and control culture, and prefers to dictate terms rather than to engage 
industry. MOSTE departments, particularly the OEPP and the Pollution Control 
Department (PCD), were perceived as being reluctant to involve industry in project 
approval processes. 
A senior DMR interviewee expressed concern about OEPP ' s ability to effectively 
perform its new role, given its staff and budgetary resource limitations. Interviewees 
from petroleum companies and environmental consultancies also independently 
expressed concerns about the OEPP, namely that the OEPP is under-resourced, and 
cannot efficiently and effectively perform its responsibilities. The OEPP is widely 
perceived to be "overvvorked", causing backlogs in the assessment process. 
The OEPP also appears to lack staff with a technical and practical understanding of 
upstream petroleum activities. The OEPP' s lack of practical knowledge and experience 
in this field, and hence its steep learning curve, are perceived to result in an 
unnecessarily high level scrutiny of relatively low impact activities and consequential 
delays in the EIA approval process . One interviewee, a former Thailand Environment 
Institute (TEI) employee, suggested that the OEPP prefers not to receive complex EIA 
reports that contain project options, because of the associated extra evaluation work. It 
vvas suggested that every innovation implies something new for the OEPP, which 
demands more time and resources to understand, both of vvhich they simply do not have. 
Similarly, presentation of options by proponents also runs the risk of the OEPP and/or 
the expert review committee misunderstanding the project. One example involved a 
proposed petroleum exploration programme involving a seismic survey followed by 
exploration drilling. The OEPP officer specifically requested that two separate EIA 
reports be prepared to address each activity, despite the obvious duplication of effort 
that would be involved. The reason given was that combination of both activities in the 
same EIA report would "confuse the expert co1n1nittee 11 • 
The role and performance of the expert committee was a subject of concern to the 
inter~_tewees. Interviewees from petroleum companies and environmental consultancies 
complained that they are not given reasonable opportunity to explain project impacts 
and mitigation measures to the EIA review committees. The committee findings and 
recommendations are often considered by proponents and their consultants to be 
"general" or "middle-ground", ill-informed and poorly thought-through, and lack 
conclusive recommendations for follo,v-up management. Petroleum company and 
environmental consultancy interviewees suggested that this is in part due to the way in 
which the expert review committee is appointed and recompensed. The expert panel 
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members are reportedly paid a token amount, and therefore have no incentive to 
thoroughly read and critically review the often-volu1ninous EIA reports, particularly 
when they have competing work demands in their other roles as university and 
government agency staff. 
Solutions suggested by petroleum company interviewees included some form of 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) established between the DMR and the OEPP to 
make the EIA approval process more transparent and efficient, and/or the formulation of 
an industry standard for EIA in conjunction with the OEPP. Industry suggestions for 
improvements for the administration of the EIA process included a proposal to send 
OEPP staff on environmental management training courses, routinely run by 
multinational petroleum companies for their own staff, or to an independent petroleum 
industry training institute, such as some of those operating in the UK. 
However, the underlying process problems are not expected to be resolved easily. There 
appear to be bureaucratic tensions between MOSTE and the DMR that will take some 
time to resolve. Some interviewees perceived that DMR' s power base appears to be 
weakening, relative to MOSTE and its departments. An interviewee reported that there 
is a proposal to develop further environmental legislation targeting the petroleum 
industry, under the umbrella of the existing petroleum legislation or the ECNEQ Act. 
The legislation will be developed in consultation with the DMR and the PCD, but the 
intent is to give monitoring power to the PCD, because the DMR is perceived to have 
weaker in-house environmental technical expertise and insufficient resources to 
undertake its statutory monitoring role. 
Petroleum company interviewees expressed concerns relating to consequential 
uncertainty and inconsistency in regulatory processes and performance expectations, and 
process approval delays. This concern was compounded by a perception that DMR' s 
position as an industry advocate appears to be weakening in the face of a strengthening 
and more assertive MOSTE. Upstream petroleum companies operate on tight time 
frames to secure and maintain competitive market advantage. An important aspect in 
attracting foreign investments from upstream petroleum companies is the provision of 
an expert regulatory agency that understands the specific issues facing the petroleum 
resources industry, and has the resources and skills needed to promote rapid and 
efficient resource development. 
5.4.3 Lack of Third Party Involvement 
Project delays caused by regulatory approval inefficiencies may either cause companies 
to withdraw their business, or tempt companies to use their influence with captive 
regulators to take short-cuts, particularly if they perceive that the community lacks the 
political or regulatory power to act as an effective watchdog. 
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Critical evaluations of the Thai EIA process indicate that it has not been a very effective 
planning or decision-making tool. Its effectiveness is further undermined by the lack of 
transparency and limited provision for public participation. The lack of an adequate 
mechanism for stakeholder involvement limits the capacity of the process to adequately 
identify and address their needs within the conditions of project consent. 
"Potentially, one of the most important provisions under the 1992 ECNEQ Act is 
access to infonnation. In practice, however, there are still multiple obstacles to citizens 
who require data relevant to the environmental impact of particular projects. This can 
be put down in part to the persistence of bureaucratic modes that reject true 
participation" (Hirsch, 1997, p. 188). 
These concerns are recognised and reflected in Thailand's Policy and Prospective Plan 
for Enhancement and Conservation of National Environniental Quality, 1997-2016 
(OEPP, 1997): 
"Environmental promotion by individual [ government} agencies is poor, lacks a clear 
direction, and is not mutually supportive. At the same time a core policy and an 
effective plan for dissemination, an information network, and development strategies 
for environmental information are not available. Mechanisms are lacking that would 
foster cooperation among government agencies, the private sector, NGOs, and local 
people. Further, a continuing monitoring and evaluation program is not operated. 
Meanwhile, the weakness of local partnerships, and poor education and promotion 
programs that cannot change the behaviour of people and unify local attitudes toward 
environ,nent conservation are the main reasons that Thailand cannot solve 
environmental problems." 
The need for improved opportunities for tripartite participation in the EIA process was 
recognised by observers and participants, as a result of the lessons learnt from the 
Yadana gas pipeline project (described in Chapter 6). During an interview in May 1998, 
a Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) spokesperson suggested that many of the 
problems of the Yadana gas pipeline project stemmed from the gap between the 
community's expectation of the EIA process and its actual irpplementation. It was also 
perceived that problems arose from the terms of reference for the EIA that were issued 
by the OEPP, and narrowly adhered to by PTT and its environmental consultants. The 
guidelines were gene_ric and not sufficiently focussed on the key issues and impacts that 
were associated with the proposed project. The interviewee suggested that such issues 
could in future be resolved through joint discussions between the OEPP and the 
proponent to formulate the guidelines and a realistic time frame in which to undertake 
the necessary studies, and ensure that stakeholder concerns are addressed. 
Another industry interviewee independently observed that public misconceptions about 
the purpose of the EIA process contributed to the conflict over the Yadana gas pipeline. 
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The interviewee perceived that the public expected the Yaclana EIA to be a scientific 
research project, rather than a planning tool, and therefore based their criticism of the 
process on their desire for more detailed scientific studies. 
Some Thai academics saw the Yaclana project as a good learning opportunity for public 
participation in decision-making. In early 1998, a discussion was organised by the 
Social Development Studies Centre and the Peace Project of Chulalongkorn University, 
to find an alternative way to resolve the pipeline dispute. This was one of many efforts 
reportedly spurred by 200 academics from different universities, towards the 
organisation of public hearings regarding the pipeline scheme (J anchitfah, 1998). The 
aim of the academics was to broaden the views of the public, and to involve people in an 
issue that will affect their livelihood. Dr Nithi Iewsriwong, of Chiang j\1ai University 
was reported to say: 
"If you ask people to choose between the forest or gas, it will not make them 
understand the situation. It is a kind of deadlock question ... We should have learned 
from our past experiences. Is the project suited to the immediate needs of the country? 
Did it increase our national debt? How does it affect our environment? ... We should 
let the public know. They should be involved in this" (J anchitfah, 1998). 
Similarly, Dr Surichai Wankaew, Director of Chulalongkorn University's Social 
Development Studies Centre, in Kanchanaburi, was reported to say: 
"A public hearing helps the public learn of the defects of past development projects 
and the weaknesses of the Environmental Impact Assessment on the gas pipeline 
project. Public hearings help us come to a consensus about solving immediate 
problems in a non-violent way. In addition, public hearings will become the standard 
way for Thais to solve problems in a peaceful way. It will be also the base of 
democratic society in the future" (J anchitfah, 1998). 
These perspectives highlight the frustrations that arise from poor part1c1patory 
processes, and the importance of building a higher level of empowerment within the 
community, to enable them make informed contributions to decision-making. 
5.4.4 Implications for Industry Behaviour 
Ineffec_ti ve regulatory processes can lead to frustration and risk-taking by project 
proponents. A fundamental problem in Thailand is the difficulty of obtaining official 
English language translations of all legislation. There is also an apparent lack of legal 
consultants who specialise in environmental law in relation to petroleum industry 
operations. It is therefore difficult for foreign company managers to avail themselves of 
the necessary knowledge to ascertain whether or not they are in full compliance. These 
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circun1stances can develop into unacceptable business risks for companies , both in their 
h 10 d . h . h 11 ost country , an 1n t eu ome country . 
In response to concerns about access to information on regulatory requirements , an 
initiative has been instigated by the exploration and production companies in Thailand 
to pool their collective knovvledge on environmental, health and safety compliance 
requirements, to form a common information database. Their concerns reflect the 
precarious position in \vhich they find themselves-they are subject to onerous 
environmental la\vs on paper, but a less-than-transparent regulatory administrative 
regime. 
Furthermore, they often find that the institutional arrangements and infrastructure 
required to enable them to comply \Vith regulatory requirements, simply do not exist. 
The administrative constraints imposed by staffing and authority restrictions in 
regulatory agencies create problems for project proponents when the low staffing and 
skill levels of permitting and enforcement agencies effectively impede response time for 
permit applications . Approval delays are a particular concern at the exploration stage of 
petroleum operations. Severe scheduling constraints are often placed on operators by 
data acquisition commitments made in licence agreements \V-ith the host government, 
joint venture expenditure approvals, and the availability of third party seismic survey 
and drilling contractors. Delays in regulatory approval processes can cause operators to 
miss \Vindo\vs of opportunity to engage contractors, and thus delay their projects for 
long periods (sometimes up to 12 months or more), until the contractors are available 
a2:a1n . 
.__, 
These administrative delays can be compounded in jointly administered areas. In the 
~vfalaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area (IDA), both Malaysian and Thai legislation, 
standards and guidelines have been adopted and applied, even though they differ 
10 Se\'eral en\'i.ronmental laws in Thailand impose strict criminal liability in relation to environmental 
offences, including the 1992 ECNEO Act, the 1992 1Vild Animal Presen·ation and Protection Act and the 
Energy Consenation Act 1992. In circumstances of violation of these statutes, \Vith or \Vithout criminal 
irnent (mens rea ). directors/managers of offending companies are subject to criminal sanction unless that 
can show that they had no knowledge of the offending act or omission or did not consent to the same 
(Periera. 1995). Provisions for ci\·il liability are also included in the 1992 ECNEO Act and the 1992 
Ha-::,ardous Substances Acr. "Cnder both acts , damage or injury caused by contamination or leakage from a 
oi nt source/hazardous substance \\ill render the owner/user of the point source/substance liable to pay 
compensation or damages (including clean-up costs) . This responsibility applies regardless of \\'hether it 
was intentional or accidernal (\\1th the exceptions of force majure or war , an act of legal compliance, or 
the fault of an injured person) (Periera, 1995). 
11 En\ironmemal issues are of particular importance to uS public companies which, under US law, are 
obliged to disclose both their "CS and foreign environmental liabilities. 
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significantly in their origins, administration and standards. For petroleum exploration 
and production activities, operational and safety guidelines and procedures of both the 
Thai Department of Mineral Resources and the Malaysian PETRONAS are applied in 
the JDA, while production develop111ents are subject to environmental impact 
assessment by both the Thai and Malaysian environmental agencies 12 (Polachan, 1998). 
The inherently political nature of these arrangements can lead to lengthy approval 
processes requiring intensive government lobbying by the petroleum companies to 
expedite the approvals 13 . 
In the experience of this researcher, concerns about cumbersome approvals processes 
and uncontrollable regulatory process delays have caused some company project 
managers to choose to avoid following the formal EIA process in Thailand. Instead, 
some have chosen to rely upon their established working relationship with the DMR to 
argue their case, in the event that they are challenged by the OEPP. In some cases, DMR 
officials have indicated that they informally endorse this approach, so long as the 
proponents prepare an impact assessment report and submit it to the DMR prior to 
commencement of the proposed activity, as was previously the practice. 
Where petroleum companies have corr1plied with the formal EIA process, they have then 
often found that the OEPP had demanded the implementation of environmental 
monitoring programmes that seem to be unreasonable in the context of the predicted 
impacts of the project. Some interviewees perceived that their companies were being 
"used" by the regulators, under the guise of these monitoring requirements, to collect 
data for other purposes. This concern particularly applied in the case of companies 
operating offshore, where data collection is a relatively expensive undertaking, and the 
government departments are known to lack resources to collect baseline data. 
Similar complaints were made about inconsistency of discharge standards applied to 
licenses for production water discharges from offshore production platforms. An 
example was cited where two companies operating in adjacent locations in the Gulf of 
Thailand submitted EIAs for proposed new production facilities within a few months of 
each other. The operations were similar in design with similar potential environmental 
impacts, but the discharge standards imposed by MOSTE were quite different for the 
two projects, for no apparent scientific reason. 
12 Relevant legislation includes the Malaysian Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1984 (Act 311) and 
Environmental Quality Act 1974 (Act 127), and the Thai Petroleum Act 1971 and Enhancement and 
Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act 1992. 
13 Similar circumstances have been faced by petroleum companies operating in Area A of the Zone of 
Cooperation in the Timor Sea, where exploration and development proposals are subject to the regulatory 
approvals processes of Indonesia and the Commonwealth of Australia. 
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Petroleu111 company interviewees indicated that they were frustrated with the on-going 
need to argue for reasonableness with Thai regulators , but were uncomfortable about the 
practical need to sometimes bypass the regulatory system. Such concerns about 
inconsistency have prompted petroleum companies to negotiate on a case-by-case basis 
with the OEPP to attempt to agreement on reasonable and realistic monitoring 
conditions, in an effort to produce a more meaningful and better value-for-money data 
set. However, such negotiations require considerable time and effort on the part of 
industry, and not all companies are prepared to persevere with this approach . 
5.4.5 Capacity Building Opportunities 
The deficiencies in the current regulatory system are also recognised by Thai regulators, 
who have indicated that there is a role for capacity building by the petroleum companies 
whose interests are at stake. 
According to the Thai Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Science, Technology and 
Environment (MOSTE): 
"The time has come now ... to apply the resources of privatisation to support the sub-
regional environmental agencies, by means of contracts with private sector 
organisations which have the capabilities to furnish to the sub-regional agencies the 
products they must have in-hand to do their assigned jobs . ... The change will be a shift 
from "pretending to do" to actually doing, including recognition by all concerned of 
the true costs involved ... The Petroleum Industry, as one of the largest and most 
environm.entally sensitive (industrial categories), is in a good position to take the lead 
to help establish effective sub-regional [environmental management] operations" 
(Snidvongs, 1998). 
From a review of the problems in environment, health and safety management of 
production, transport, and refining of oil in Thailand, Snidvongs ( 1998) identified a 
number of local institutional strengthening needs, for which he seeks involvement from 
the petroleum industry. Examples include: 
i) Assistance to review the effective use of the EIA process for ensuring adequate 
provisions for environmental protection in the design, construction and operation 
of all petroleum-industry projects/operations. The scope of the review would 
include oil production, oil shipping and transport, oil refining, petrochemical 
industries, and gasoline station operations, including evaluation of use of EIA as 
now practiced and prospects for the future, with case illustrations. 
ii) Assistance to assess the extent of existing petroleum-related environmental 
protection facilities and operations in the country. The scope would include 
provisions for management of oil spills, adequacy of routine environmental 
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performance, and recon1mendations for filling the gaps. The recommendations 
would address options such as: additional legislation/regulations; additional EHS 
projects and progran1s by the private sector; more effective regulatory management 
of EHS hazards including use of EIA and monitoring and enforcement; and 
establishment of an appropriate national EHS database. 
Other Thai government agencies have also identified potential bilateral and multilateral 
projects to address current deficiencies in the regulatory administrative system. Their 
suggestions include: 
i) Facilitation of co-operation between industry and its service sectors and 
government agencies to formulate mitigation plans for industry impacts and 
facilitate technology transfer (Tridech, 1998). 
ii) Formulation of a standardised code of practice for oil and gas exploration and 
production in the South-East Asian region, to ensure uniformity of standards, and 
address concerns about transboundary pollution effects (Tanhan, 1998). 
iii) Establishment of uniform standards on effluent emissions, such as oil-in-water 
discharge limits in marine waters (Mantajit, 1998). 
iv) Facilitation of a joint oil spill combat exercise (Mantajit, 1998). 
v) A joint government/industry study on mercury input to the Gulf of Thailand, and 
the effects of bioaccumulation in the food chain (Mantajit, 1998). 
Supporters of industry involvement in institutional strengthening and capacity building 
suggest that such efforts accelerate the process of regulatory development, reduce 
uncertainty for industry, provide an opportunity for industry to make its preferences 
known in a constructive context, while personalising the regulatory system and 
demonstrating goodwill (James, 1998). 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Evidence of the effects of ineffective regulation and associated non-compliance clearly 
indicate that the current Thai administrative process does not function in the best 
interests of administrators, industry proponents, or the public. Many researchers 
(including Hammer and Shetty, 1995, and Abraham, 1998) have identified that the 
!:egulatory implementation problems experienced in South-East Asian countries have 
contributed to environmental deterioration, discredited government authorities, and 
undermined commitment to achieving environmental goals. 
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Several reasons for the failure of Thailand's environmental protection framework have 
been identified. These include: 
i) Inadequate coverage by legislation; the question of authority; inadequate 
enforcement; and the absence of voluntary compliance (Baker, 1995). 
ii) Ineffectiveness of the conventional command and control approaches; difficulties 
for environmental management practices to keep pace with the rapid increase in 
environmental problems; and a lack of awareness and responsibility in dealing with 
environmental management approaches at the polluting industries level 
(Meyerhoeffer, 1997). 
iii) Little integration of work that examines problems that are closely interrelated. This 
one-issue-at-a-time approach fails to acknowledge the degree to which problems 
impinge upon one another, and the extent to which a solution to one may 
accentuate another (Rigg, 1995). 
iv) Entrenched bureaucratic power struggles and political interference 1n 
administrative decsionmaking (Techawongtham, 1998). 
The Thai environmental approval and licensing processes are neither consistent nor 
transparent, and do not deliver uniform outcomes, in terms of licence conditions and 
decision-making schedules. Bureaucratic power struggles between government agencies 
make it difficult for industry to build trusting working relationships with all of their 
regulators. If the regulators are constrained by bureaucratic processes and lack of 
adequate financial and staff resources, and are focussed on internal power struggles, 
then they are not likely to be committed to delivering desirable outcomes. An 
environmental law is only effective if it is implemented and enforced. If the responsible 
regulator does not implement and enforce the law because they lack government 
commitment or adequate resources (such as funding and staff), then the perceived 
salience of that regulator by industry will be low. Furthermore, if third party 
stakeholders have no standing to enforce the law through civil action, or some other 
mechanism (such as political lobbying), then the industry has even less incentive to 
comply with that law. 
Similarly, an environmental law that is onerous in its obligations, and is strongly 
enforced, may be regarded by industry to be impractical and/or too expensive to comply 
with, when the 'moderating factors' are taken into account. The result may again be 
non-compliance or a contributing factor to the company's decision to take their business 
elsewhere. In the absence of good working relationships with regulators, companies 
have no incentive to invest additional time or expense in institutional strengthening. The 
impacts of these decisions may also be negative, either because non-compliance may 
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lead to pollution or some other environmental impact, or because closure of the business 
may have adverse socio-economic impacts on the local community. 
As the regulatory framework is currently structured in Thailand, neither industry nor the 
regulators have any driving incentive to improve their performance. Under these 
conditions it is suggested that part of the solution appears to lie in the need to provide 
for greater involvement of informed stakeholder participation in project scoping, 
decision-making and review processes, to improve transparency and efficiency. The 
pressure for performance improvement in both the industry and regulator sectors must 
come from external stakeholders. The question is how can that pressure be brought to 
bear in an effective manner and what impact might it have? Two recent case studies 
involving the petroleum industry in Thailand provide some insight to this question. 




"Man agers should never forget that stakeholders change in salience, 
requiring different degrees and types of attention depending on their 
attributed possession of power, legitimacy, and/or urgency, and that 
levels of these attributes (and thereby salience) can vary from issue to 
issue and from time to time" (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
CHAPTER 6. THAI CASE STUDIES 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 4 presented a profile of the upstream petroleum industry, and the external, 
mediating and moderating factors that may influence the social and environmental 
management strategies of petroleum companies. Regulatory compliance requirements 
are an important factor, but as indicated in Chapter 5, poorly designed and implemented 
regulatory systems are not effective drivers of improvements in corporate social and 
environmental responsiveness. It is suggested that some other mechanism is required to 
drive performance improvements-namely effective stakeholder empowerment. 
The purpose of this chapter is to use case study examples from Thailand to demonstrate 
how stakeholder dissatisfaction with the environmental management performance of 
regulators and petroleum companies can emerge and influence their behaviour. These 
examples provide some insight into how a responsive regulatory framework could be 
developed for implementation in Thailand. 
The first part of this Chapter defines the stakeholder environment through an overview 
of: (i) Thailand's recent political history and the key 'social forces' in Thai society 
(Section 6.2); (ii) Thailand's national resource development agenda (Section 6.3); and 
aspects of social opposition to Thailand's resource development policies (Section 6.4 ). 
The second part of the Chapter presents: (i) two case studies of recent projects that have 
involved social and environmental disputes between petroleum companies and sections 
of Thai society (Section 6.5); and an analysis of the case studies from the perspective of 
stakeholder claims and engagement strategies and managerial perception of stakeholder 
salience (Sections 6.6 and 6.7). Section 6.8 draws conclusions from the case studies and 
lessons that may applied to design of responsive regulation. 
6.2 SOCIO-POLITICAL FORCES IN THAI SOCIETY 
6.2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 presents an overview of Thailand's environmental regulatory framework and 
some of its apparent deficiencies. However, to understand why the system does not 
function effectively, it is necessary to fully appreciate the context within which it 
operates. The regulatory system of a country consists not only of its laws and 
regulations, but also its institutions (and their human, technical and data resources), 
governing traditions, cultural customs, and decision-making processes (James, 1998). 
The following sections provide an insight to the social-political fabric of Thai society 
and demonstrate how 'social forces' within Thai society influence government policy 
and decision-making. 
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As described by Baker (1995, p. 279), 
"Thailand is a constitutional democracy which has experienced fitful bouts of 
democracy or semi-democracy, interrupted by military rule, since the replacement of 
the absolute monarchy in 1932." 
The political leadership crisis that appears to have plagued Thailand since the end of the 
Second World War, is evident in the ascendancy chronology presented in Table 6-1. 
Table 6-1 Chronology of Recent Thai Government Leadership 
;~:1~·' 
P . d . %~ eno . . . Political iLeader. 




1958 - 1963 











April 1992 - May 
1992 
Field Marshal Pibun, following military 
overthrow of democratically elected 
leader Pridi Phanomyong 
Pot Sarasin 
General (later Field Marshal) Thanom 
Kittikachorn 
Dictatorship by Field Marshal Sarit 
Thanarat 





Right-wing government led by Tanin 
Krai wichien 
General Kriangsak Chomanan 
General Prem Tinsulanonda 
Civilian government led by Chatichai 
Choonhavan, rightist Chart Thai Party 
coalition 
'National Peace Keeping Council' -
appointed Anand Panyarachun as 
interim Prime Minister 
Military-appointed PM General 
Suchinda Kraprayoon 
-
- ----:-;c -----:, 
Reason For Leaving 
~: . '. 
•-;,:· 
Exiled under influence of General Sarit 
Thanarat 
Forced resignation following election 
Overthrown in a military coup led by 
General Sarit Thanarat 
Deceased 
Ousted in a student-led civil rebellion 
Lost election arising from civil society 
call for elected government 
Dissolution of Parliament 
Overthrown in a military coup 
Overthrown in a coup 
Dismissed as a result of dissatisfaction 
in the parliament 
Dissolution of Parliament 
Overthrown in a military coup amidst 
accusations of government corruption 
Scheduled election 
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Table 6-1 Chronology of Recent Thai Government Leadership 
Period Political Leader Reason For Leaving 
May 1992 - Anand Panyarachun reinstated as Scheduled election 
September 1992 interim Prime Minister 
September 1992 - Chuan Leekpai, leader of a four party Lost election amidst accusations of 
July 1995 coalition with a 5 seat majority cabinet corruption 
July 1995 - Banharn Silpa-archa, Chart Thai Lost election amidst accusations of 
November 1996 coalition corruption 
November 1996 Retired Army Commander General Resigned amidst accusations of 
-June 1997 Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, leading the corruption. General election followed. 
New Aspiration Party 
November 1997 - Coalition led by Chuan Leekpai 
present (2000) 
Sources: Hewison (1997b), Wright (1991), researcher's records. 
As the chronology suggests, cronyism and corruption have been endemic problems in 
Thai Government and Thailand's political economy. Amidst the atmosphere of frenetic 
natural resource development \vhich has ensued over the last 30 or so years, corruption 
has reportedly been rife during negotiations on deals between government agencies and 
developers. Community leaders are often "bought off' and vote-buying during 
government elections is believed to be widespread in the largely rural, poorly educated 
population base. 
Consequently, an urban-rural divide has appeared in the voting patterns of Bangkok and 
rural electorates. Bangkok voters blame rural voters for electing corrupt governments 
and are increasingly likely to view the electoral system as being loaded against the 
emergence of efficient and clean government (Hewison, 1997a). 
These issues and concerns reflect the influence and actions of key factions that have 
emerged within contemporary Thai society. Phongpaichit and Baker (1997) have 
identified six identified 'forces' in Thai society: mandarins, metropolitan business and 
technocrats, provincial business, salariat, peasants, and urban workers. 
- "Many [ of these forces] are strategic alliances of uncertain duration, while others are 
class interests in the process of definition. Most of these forces do not have a clear 
institutional base; a key feature of Thailand's transitional state is the extraordinary 
fluidity of the institutional frame. Many of these forces are engaged in attempts to 
create new institutions to solidify their power, while others are trying to adapt or 
destroy existing institutions" (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997, p. 22). 
The first five of these six 'forces' are of direct relevance to this study. 
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6.2.2 Mandarins 
The mandarins have their origin in the ruling class that dominated Thailand between the 
eighteenth and early twentieth century. This faction historically consisted of a 
landowning nobility and mandarin bureaucrats, who derived their status, income and 
power from their position in the structure of government. Their source of income and 
wealth was linked to revenues-official and unofficial-derived from state service, to 
which they managed to establish hereditary rights (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). 
Following the Second World War, this faction projected the ideology that they derived 
their authority from the supreme power of the monarchy, rather than from the 
constitution or any other democratic belief (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). Up until 
1988, this conservative faction dominated Thai society through their vanguard, the 
military. 
The influence of the bureaucrats (alias the mandarinate) is clearly evident in the state-
owned enterprises. Prior to the mid-1980s, infrastructure services were almost entirely 
provided by state enterprises, often in monopoly positions. These enterprises operated 
under various ministries and departments, but most of the state enterprises answered to 
the Ministry of Finance on their financial performance. Historically, state enterprises in 
infrastructure and utility services were known for their slow and expensive 
development, and inefficient management and corruption. In addition, they were 
frequently used as political tools or as sources of funds for politicians and the military 
(Handley, 1997). 
In 1984, Thai government planners announced a programme to privatise state 
enterprises responsible for infrastructure development or to privatise the infrastructure 
projects themselves. From 1987, privatisation became a central political focus (Handley, 
1997). Privatisation included various options: issuing shares on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) and slowly reducing government control; granting concessions to own 
and operate infrastructure services (permanently or temporarily); or corporatising the 
enterprise and its management. 
In the 1990s, General Chavalit Y ongchaiyudh 1 projected himself as the new leader of 
mandarin conservatism and, together with ex-soldiers and ex-bureaucrats in parliament, 
played an influential role in stemming the rising tide of representative politics. The long 
term agenda of this faction is to achieve political reforms to provide a more secure 
defence of their conservatism: 
"The core concern of mandarin conservatism is the protection of the bureaucrat's right 
to govern. This idea still conunands widespread support in the military and in parts of 
1 Thai Prime Minister between November 1996 and June 1997. 
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the civilian bureaucracy, especially the Ministry of the Interior. It has also solicited 
support among certaill sectiolls of business, among the urban lm,ver middle class, and 
ill the provinces" (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). 
This philosophy struck a chord with opponents of privatisation. The leadership of state 
enterprises often perceived privatisation as a threat to their established business 
practices, while staff perceived a threat to job security. In response, they commonly 
allied themselves with bureaucrats, politicians and military leaders to resist or redirect 
privatisation plans, and, inevitably, compromises were usually made (Handley, 1997). 
Most frequently, the compromises involved the SET, enriching many, but limiting 
progress towards the original goals of privatisation. 
For example, in 1993, the state-owned petroleum company, the Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand (PTT) listed its corporatised capital-intensive subsidiary, PTT Exploration and 
Production (PTTEP), on the SET. PTTEP had significant assets in oil and gas reserves 
that should have given its shares a high market price. However, according to Handley 
( 1997), the handling of the listing suggested that it was used mainly to enrich those who 
obtained share allocations early, rather than to earn the government a fair price for its 
hydrocarbon assets. The shares were priced at 33 baht (then equivalent to US$ l .30) to 
the public, but brokers reported that many were allocated to board members, 
1nanagement, selected senior bureaucrats, military officials and politicians. One 
underwriter reportedly suggested that the underlying asset value of the shares was 
deliberately and grossly understated to benefit initial ( and inside) subscribers to the 
share issue. 
"Only after the shares were placed with those who could get them, did PTT steadily 
release information on the extent of assets, hydrocarbon reserves and future earnings 
potential. The result was that the share price quickly doubled and continued to 
increase to reach a peak of above 300 baht ( US$12) within one year, ... despite the fact 
that there were no surprising additions to the company's assets after listing . ... In sum, 
the PTT management was not reformed and the state did not reap the value of its 
valuable assets. However, those investors with inside access to information and stock 
did profit. There was no public, political or bureaucratic objection to this. PTT E&P is 
still virtually controlled by PTT, which means its finances are still implicitly 
guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance" (Handley, 1997, pp. 110-11). 
This example demonstrates the extent to which corruption, cronyism and patron-client 
ties operate in Thai society, enabling bureaucrats to retain a firm hand on government 
agenda. 
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6.2.3 Metropolitan Business People and Technocrats 
This faction is grounded in the large business corporations that are based in the nation 's 
capital, Bangkok. Over the last 10 years or so, in response to the economic problems 
and opportunities of the country's rapid economic growth, and the threat posed by a 
provincial takeover of parliament and cabinet, this element of business has moved 
towards an alliance with those senior technocrats of the mandarin faction responsible fo r 
economic management. 
This small group derives its influence from the command of money and position. They 
are responsible for making and implementing economic and other policies. 
Metropolitan business has a well-organised lobby and acts as an almost invisible force 
in the political background. Their alliance with the economic technocrats has emerged 
around a shared proposition about the econo1ny, its manage,nent and its future : that 
Thailand will develop into a modern, wealthy society through the combined rationality 
of efficient technocratic manage,nent and efficient business development (Phongpaichit 
and Baker, 1997, p. 25). 
According to Phongpaichit and Baker (1997), this new generation of Thai technocrats 
emerged after the US withdrawal from the region in the mid 1970s, and the subsequent 
reduction in the role of foreign experts in Thai technocratic institutions. Many members 
of this new generation of technocrats have been trained overseas, especially in the US 
and Japan, and hence they commonly hold a wider perspective on the economy and its 
potential. They have helped to create a new arena of open debate over economic strategy 
and policy-making. 
While some of these technocrats come from traditional Thai bureaucrat families, many 
come from the second and third generation Chinese immigrant families that were the 
basis of the major business groups in Bangkok. From the early 1980s, these technocrats 
were often employed by the large metropolitan businesses because they offered badly 
needed business skills, as well as family (including marriage) and professional 
connections to strengthen the linkages between big business and the government. 
Through these linkages, technocrats and business leaders have been able to play an 
indirect role in moulding economic policy. 
Bonding between the technocrats and the urban business sector was strengthened in the 
late 1980s, when their growing influence over policy-making was checked by the 
formation of the new Chatichai cabinet, dominated by provincial business people. 
"Both groups found themselves locked in conflicts with provincial politicians in 
cabinet. Both realised that the electoral system would inevitably deliver a parliament 
with a heavy provincial bias" (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). 
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"In sum, senior technocrat and metropolitan business people have come together on 
the issue of rational management of the modern, globalising economy. For the 
technocrats, this issue represents the realisation of their professional purpose. For 
business, it is a strategy for sustaining the economy. They come together, also, in 
common opposition to what they perceive as the main threat against rational 
management-provincial business politicians, ,vho are seen as ready to sacrifice long-
term growth and stability to allow the provinces to catch up with the city, or just to 
engineer personal or sectional gain." (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997, p. 29). 
In the 1990s, the business sector continued to strengthen its alliance with the middle 
class. Business and the middle classes push ongoing restructuring of the state, its 
apparatus, its operational logic, and its ideology. 
"By its nature this process will continue to pose a threat to conservative values, the old 
order and institutions, and entrenched interests" (Hewison, 1996, pp. 88-9). 
6.2.4 Provincial Business 
Provincial business people becaine increasingly rich and powerful during the 1980s, and 
established a commanding position in the Thai parliament and cabinet. Their income is 
primarily drawn from four areas: (i) the cash crop expansion, in which local merchants 
play a critical and profitable linking role between the agribusiness company and the 
cultivator; (ii) investment in trading and service businesses buoyed up by local demand 
(these included highly profitable local monopolies such as distribution for local whisky, 
agencies for the sale of vehicles, and later, hotels, large retail developments and 
speculation in land); (iii) from government contracting for construction work and the 
supply of materials (budgets for building roads, water works, dams and public buildings 
in the provinces increased steeply from 1960, and large profits were able to extracted, 
particularly through collusion with local officials); and (iv) from an array of semi-legal 
and illegal businesses including logging, smuggling, gambling, gun-running and drug-
trading (Phongpaichit, and Baker, 1997). 
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"The close links with officials they developed in these business activities drew them 
into the political milieu. Their wealth and business networks proved highly effective in 
electoral politics. These magnates were well placed to manage the large multi-member 
parliamentary constituencies centred on the provincial capitals where they had their 
business bases. By distributing their patronage around the locality, mobilising their 
business networks for canvassing, handing out money during elections and promising 
to bring central government funds into the province they dominated the local 
electorates. Since provincial constituencies supplied almost 90% of seats, they also 
dominated the parliament, and eventually the cabinet, as demonstrated by the 
emergence of Chart Thai as the leader of the new coalition government at the 1988 
election" (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997, p. 30). 
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Since the September 1992 election, provincial politicians have dominated the Thai 
parliament (with the exception of Chavalit' s cabinet of 1996-97), and predictably these 
governments have been accused of corruption, vote-buying during election campaigns, 
and other socially-undesirable activities. The 1992-95 Chuan government and the 1995-
96 Banharn government were both ousted by electors as a consequence of their poor 
reputations (Hewison, 1996; Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). The present Chuan 
government, which holds a narrow majority in parliament, is regarded by many with 
susp1c1on. 
6.2.5 Salariat 
Over the 30 year period, between the 1960s and 1980s, a white-collar working class, 
labelled the 'salariat', emerged in Thailand. 
"They are children of the new, globalising world. They grew up in the period of 
American influence and matured in the age of global information-CNN, MTV, 
satellite news and the internet. They want to see Thailand as a modern nation-not just 
prosperous, but sophisticated and politically niature " (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997, 
p.33). 
A major influence on this faction was the experience of student-led pro-democracy 
period between 1973-7 6 and its repressive aftermath. The students who protested in the 
1970s were the vanguard of this new class, and many have gone on to join business, 
politics, the print media and academia, where they continue to be vocal critics of 
government policies and practices. At the core of salariat politics are "the radical ideas 
of the 1970s 1nello1rved by the experience of the subsequent two decades" (Phongpaichit 
and Baker, 1997). 
They support the drive for economic growth, but they want growth to bring a society 
marked by openness, transparency, fairness, rights and participation. Observers suggest 
that this group is "too s1nall, isolated and fragile" to mount a serious electoral 
challenge and thus has been unsuccessful in its attempts to enter Thai parliamentary 
politics (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). Excluded from the formal politics of 
parliament, they focus on controlling the agenda of public political debate outside the 
parliamentary system-through the press, the public platform, and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). 
The print media, in particular the Bangkok Post and The Nation, have emerged since the 
1980s, with the support of the salariat, to be formidable critics of contemporary Thai 
politics and business. The newspapers openly host debates on political reform; publicise 
the abuses of power that had previously seemed part of parliamentary privilege, expose 
politicians with dubious pasts, investigate scandals which ministers attempt to hide, and 
criticise government policies, especially on the subject of the environment. The Chuan 
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government ( 1992-95) was brought down after a campaign by the newspaper Thai Rat 
to expose abuses of a land distribution scheme in Phuket. Within six months, the 
successor Banharn government was also put on the defensive by press allegations of 
corruption on arms deals, stock manipulation and land speculation (Phongpaichit and 
Baker, 1997). The case studies presented later in this chapter indicate the i111portant role 
that the Thai print 111edia play in elevating the profile of environmental and social 
debates, and consequential effects they can have on corporate perceptions of associated 
business risks2. 
In addition to the print media, the other main outlets of salariat politics are NGOs 
involved in rural development, education, and provision of legal help and health care to 
those who were excluded from government schemes. Others work to extend civil rights 
through constitutional changes, legal and judicial reform, and liberalisation of the 
media. 
For example, the ECNEQ Act 1992 (enacted by Anand's pro-NGO administration) 
specifically acknowledges the legitimacy of NGOs and their role in environmental 
management decision-making. The Act stipulates that in the event that registered NGOs 
do not receive co-operation from the appropriate agency or agencies, they may request 
help from the NEB and that upon the NEB' s recommendation, the Prime Minister has 
the power to direct the agencies to render assistance. Given this statutory endorsement, 
Baker ( 1995) observed that NGOs have increasingly played a role as one of the extra-
bureaucratic forces in Thai society, sometimes countering the interests of economic or 
private interest groups and the government. 
The power of citizen opinion has been shown to be influential in achieving reform in 
Thailand when governments sense that their political power base is vulnerable. As 
observed by Palmlund ( 1997), recent Thai governments, eager to retain public support, 
have been sensitive to criticism from citizens and powerful NGOs, and have often 
reacted with changes in government policy. A significant example is the 1997 
enactment of a new national constitution, in response to public demands for 
constitutional reform. The new constitution was formulated with extensive public input 
2 It should be noted , however, that the relative freedom of speech expressed by the Thai print media is 
somewhat unique is South-East Asia, and is certainly not representative of the level of freedom that exists 
in other sectors of the Thai media, such as the government-owned television stations. 
152 
CHAPTER 6. THAI CASE STUDIES 
and is progressive in it provisions for community involvement in government decision-
making and citizen standing to enforce accountability by state agencies and enterpriscs3. 
6.2.6 Peasants 
Agrarian expansion, up to the middle of the 20th Century, created a large peasantry in 
Thailand. The first phases of industrialisation fallowing the Second World War 
converted only a minor percentage into urban-dwellers. Currently around 60% of 
Thailand's population still live in the villages. According to Phongpaichit and Baker 
(1997), both the old rulers and the new urban forces have conspired to exclude the 
peasantry from formal political representation. Their political influence is also 
undermined by two other factors. Firstly, the highly disparate character of the 
peasantry-at one end of the spectrum, peasants have been converted into moderately 
wealthy, export-oriented, industrial farmers; at the other end, many still practice a near 
subsistence production regime in the forest fringe. Secondly, for decades the State has 
taken care to dissipate any sign of peasant political organisation. While bankers, 
industrialists and traders have well recognised lobby associations, and even urban labour 
federations, the peasantry has not been permitted equivalent representation. 
Nevertheless, the expansionist nature of Thailand's development path means that 
peripheral areas and their inhabitants have been draw into mainstream political and 
economic currents (Hirsch, 1997). With this development has come the rise of peasant 
politics, which derives its power from its large constituency and growing resentment of 
the urban monopolisation of wealth and resources. Two processes, in particular, are 
believed to have shaped the rise of peasant politics since the early 1980s. Each is related 
to the rise of the urban economy. The booming urban economy draws in labour from the 
villages, returning them home equipped with new knowledge and ideas. This experience 
exposes them and, indirectly, their families, to the revelation of the widening income 
gap and attitude between the rural and urban populations. The experience also often 
3 1997 Constitution (The Council of State, 1997): Section 56. Para. 2. Any project or activity which may 
seriously affect the quality of the environment shall not be permitted, unless its impacts on the quality of 
the environment have been studied and evaluated and opinions of an independent organisation, consisting 
of representatives from private environmental organisations and from higher education institutions 
providing studies in the environmental field, have been obtained prior to the operation of such project or 
activity, as provided by law. Para 3. The right of a person to sue a State agency, State enterprise, local 
government organisation or other State authority to perform the duties as provided by law under 
paragraph one and paragraph two shall be protected. 
1997 Constitution (The Council of State, 1997): Section 59. A person shall have the right to receive 
information, explanation and reason from a State agency, State enterprise or local government 
organisation before permission is given for the operation for any project or activity which may affect the 
quality of the environment, health and sanitary conditions, the quality of life or any other material interest 
concerning him or her or a local community and shall have the right to express his or her opinions on such 
matters in accordance with the public hearing procedure, as provided by law. 
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equips the migrant workers with political tra1n1ng in urban protests and trade union 
organisation (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). 
Consequently, peasant politics are most commonly manifested in agitation, particularly 
in relation to their concerns about urban intrusion on rural resources of land, forests and 
water. NGOs have helped to organise peasant protests, to forge a link with 
environmentalism and to help articulate an ideology of peasant defence, based on the 
precept that the rural community and economy have a right to survive. This ideology has 
challenged the legitimacy of the 'development theory' that lay behind 'urban intrusions' 
such as hydro-electric dams, eucalyptus plantations and polluting factories 
(Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). 
The agenda of, and the interactions between, these key 'forces' within Thai society, 
have been highly influential in both setting and modifying national natural resource 
development agenda. 
6.3 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
6.3.1 Introduction 
State-led development began in Thailand in 1947 and continued in a somewhat 
unstructured manner until 1958. Following an economic assessment of Thailand in 
1957-58, the World Bank produced a report recommending that the Thai government 
become more involved in economic planning to boost the country's infrastructure and 
lead the way to future industrial development. In the same year, Field Marshal Sarit 
Thanarat came to power in a military coup. Acting on the advice of the World Bank, the 
new Sarit government initiated more organised intervention in the economy. An initial 
action was to establish an Economic Development Board, to help define goals and plan 
Thailand's development. Thailand's first National Economic Development Plan was 
issued in 1961. 
Thailand thus entered into an era of rapid social and economic development. During the 
1960s the annual growth rate in the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaged nearly 8%. 
After enduring an economic downturn in the mid- l 960s, Thailand again experienced 
impressive economic growth rates (Baker, 1995). Between 1987 and 1995 the average 
annual growth rate of the GDP was 9.5% (Tan, 1997). During the latter period, state 
mechanisms were reformed, the government engaged in a programme of privatising 
state enterprises, and foreign investment was promoted through liberalisation of the 
money market and the capital market (especially for infrastructure projects), and "an 
a!Jnost completely free energy market" (PTT, 1997a). In January 1997, PTT Governor 
Pala Sukawesh confirmed that the ·Thai government "is serious about privatising most 
state enterprises to make them more competitive, especially when full-scale business 
liberalisation gets underway after 2000" (Tham, 1997a). 
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6.3.2 Petroleum Sector 
Petroleum resource development is a prime business objective of the Thai government. 
Since 1991, the Thai government has developed a number of quite progressive energy 
policies, signalling a shift in the direction and character of Thailand's energy sector. The 
key objectives of Thailand's energy policies are to: (i) ensure continued availability of 
energy supplies; (ii) increase the role of the private sector in ,energy markets by 
deregulation, privatisation and the encouragement of competition; (iii) move towards 
market pricing of energy, allowing suppliers to cover costs and earn a reasonable rate of 
return; (iv) promote energy conservation through greater energy efficiency; and (v) 
minimise the environmental problems associated with energy consumption (IEA, 1996). 
The government's reforms have also specifically sought to give priority to gas as a fuel 
for power generation, as a substitute for fuel oil, and as a feedstock for petrochemicals, 
basic industry and agriculture. 
In 1996, Thailand produced 1,284 million cubic feet per day (MMCFD) of natural gas. 
Most of that (72.5%) was used for fuel for power generation (in power stations that have 
been built or adapted to use gas). 10.7% was used as fuel in industrial plants. The 
remaining 16.8% was processed in gas separation plants into liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG) for household and vehicle applications and separated as raw materials for the 
petrochemical industry (PTT, 1997b). 
The majority of Thailand's gas is currently produced from offshore fields in the Gulf of 
Thailand, although small oil and gas fields also exist onshore, such as the Thai Shell-
operated Sirikit field in central Thailand, and the Essa-operated Nam Phong field in the 
Northeast (see Figure 6-1). A number of foreign petroleum companies, small and large, 
have concessions in the Gulf of Thailand, but the activity is currently dominated by 
Unocal Thailand, and more recently, PTTEP, which took over operatorship of the 
Bongkot field from Total in July 1998. Some 95% of the natural gas used in Thailand is 
procured from the Gulf of Thailand's Erawan, Satun, Funan, Baanpot, and Platong, and 
other fields, operated by Unocal Thailand (PTT, 1997b). There have been only limited 
oil discoveries offshore, but condensate (very light crude oil) is produced in quantity 
from some gas fields such as Erawan. Condensate is loaded into tankers offshore and 
shipped to condensate refinery facilities near Rayong (Figure 6-1). 
Further prospective gas deposits are believed to exist in Thailand. A Thai Department of 
Mineral Resources study indicates that there are at least 6 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of 
dry gas4 in Northeast Thailand, 11 TCF of wet gas in the Gulf of Thailand and 4 TCF of 
4 
'Dry gas' is natural gas that is low in associated liquids, as compared with 'wet gas'. 'Associated gas' is 
natural gas found in association with oil, either dissolved in the oil or as a cap of free gas above the oil in 
the reservoir. 
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wet gas in the Andaman Sea. There are a1so believed to be another 1 MMCF of 
associated gas in central Thailand (PTT, 1997b ). The future prospects for oil and gas in 
the Gulf of Thailand are generally regarded as small by world standards, but in many 
cases are worthvvhile to explore. The typical field contains about 1 TCF of recoverable 
gas reserves (Bartlett and Baker-Rogers, 1995). 
Thailand's rapid industrial growth over the last decade or so has presented a number of 
challenges for the government, not least of which has been keeping pace with the 
demand for infrastructure development. Gas produced from the offshore fields is 
transported by pipelines to a gas processing plant located at Map Ta Phut (Rayong 
Province) on the industrialised eastern seaboard (Figure 6-1 ). All existing supply 
pipelines are owned and operated by PTT (IEA, 1996), however the shortcomings of 
state oil company-led resource development and supply are becoming evident. 
Traditionally, PTT has both funded and operated such infrastructure, but as a result of 
Asian currency crisis and associated financial upheaval in Thailand, PTT' s budget was 
significantly reduced by the Thai government. For example, the proposed 1998 budget 
of 29 billion baht (then equivalent to US$739 million) was reduced to 20 billion baht 
(then equivalent to US$510 million). 
In late 1998, Battersby ( 1998d) reported that private sector investment was being sought 
by the Thai Government to provide part of the 36 billion baht (then equivalent to 
US$910 million) needed for the following components of Thailand's First Gas Pipeline 
Master Plan (1997-2003)5 (PTT, 1997b): (i) a pipeline to link the Benchamas and 
Tantawan fields in the Gulf of Thailand; (ii) onshore gas pipelines to link Rayong and 
Bang Pakong; (iii) a pipeline link between the Khanom gas separation plant in Nakhon 
Si Thammarat and Surat Thani power station; (iv) pipelines to link the Surat Thani 
power station to Krabi and Thap Sakae; and (v) an offshore gas compression platform 
for the Gulf of Thailand. 
In addition to broadening the role of the private sector, improved relations between 
Thailand and other South-East Asian countries have been actively promoted by Thai 
governments in the interests of improving access to petroleum resources. During his 
term as Thai Prime Minister (1988-1991), Chatichai Choonhavan made a call for 
"turning Indochina's battlefields into market places" (Hirsch, 1995, p. 252), which 
signaqed the start of an intensive Thai government effort to build investment (state and 
private sector) and trade ties in Indochina and Myanmar. 
5 This was modified to become a down-sized second edition plan in 1997 in light of the economic crisis. 
The natural gas transportation system Master Plan (2nd Ed.) which began in 1998 will continue for nine 
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Thailand has chosen to adopt a policy of 'constructive engagement' with its former 
political rival, Myanmar. In December 1988, a team of 80 senior military officers, led by 
then army chief General Chavalit Yongchaiyut (later a Thai Prime Minister), visited 
Myanmar's newly installed military-run State Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC). Later, in July 1994, the presence of an invited delegation from Myanmar at 
the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Bangkok, indicated 
strengthening economic ties between the Thai and Myanmar governments and the desire 
to avoid politically isolating the SLORC regime (Hirsch, 1995). A recent outcome of the 
amicable inter-state relations are the gas sales agreements signed between the 
governments of Thailand and Myanmar, for the supply of natural gas from Myanmar's 
Yadana and Yetagun6 gas fields to Thailand. 
Cooperation is also being fostered between Thailand and its neighbours in the interests 
of settling territorial sea boundary disputes and opening access to offshore petroleum 
resources in the Gulf of Thailand. A significant constraint to offshore petroleum 
exploration and resource exploitation in the Gulf (and several other prospective offshore 
areas in the region) has been bi-lateral and tri-lateral disputes over territorial sea 
boundaries, which are subject to the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention of 
19827. 
The seabed of the eastern Gulf of Thailand is subject to unilateral jurisdictional claims 
by Vietnam (lodged by the former South Vietnam in June 1971), Cambodia (lodged in 
July 1972) and Thailand (lodged in May 1973) (Valencia, 1985). The south-western 
Gulf of Thailand is subject to overlapping unilateral claims by Thailand, Malaysia, 
Cambodia and Vietnam (see Figure 6-2). 
6 The Yadana project is described in Section 6.5.3. The offshore Yetagun gas/condensate field 
development is 32.3% owned by Premier (operator), 36.3% by Petronas Carigali, 14.2% by PTTEP and 
17 .2% by Nippon Oil Exploration. The field has around 1.8 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of gas and around 48 
million barrels (bbl) of condensate in reserves. The partners have signed a 30-year sale and purchase 
agreement with Thailand's PTT for an initial deli very of 200 million cubic feet per day (MMCFD) of gas 
by pipeline, starting in 2000 (Tham, 1998a). 
7 Article 74 of the 1982 United National Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) requires the 
delimitation of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) between states with opposite or adjacent coasts to be 
effected by agreement on the basis of international law in order to achieve an equitable solution. Pending 
agreement on a delimitation, state parties are obliged to make every effort to enter into provisional 
arrangements of a practical nature (Article 74.3). Such arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final 
delimitation. UNCLOS takes precedence over the preceding four Geneva Conventions, including the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf, but does not alter any inter-state agreements that have been made 
under these Conventions. In particular, bilateral agreements relating to the delimitation of the continental 
shelf will be respected, as will other international agreements or Conventions regarding the use of the sea 
and protection of the marine environment (Taverne, 1994 ). 
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As the disputed national continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
boundaries cut through hydrocarbon-prospective sedimentary basins, the issue of 
boundary placement is of substantial economic importance to the contending countries, 
and consequently the boundary settlement processes have often been politically difficult 
and lengthy (Siddayao, 1980; Valencia, 1985). However, increasing commercial interest 
in the natural gas reserves of the Gulf has prompted action to resolve the issues. 
In their bilateral dispute, Thailand and Malaysia reached agreement8 that it was in their 
best interests to expedite exploitation of the seabed resources in the area of overlapping 
claims. They will jointly explore and exploit the seabed and subsoil non-living resources 
in the defined Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area (JDA) for a period of 50 
years, and share equally the costs incurred and the benefits derived. 
During this time the two countries will continue to negotiate the boundary9 . Following 
settlement of the boundary dispute between Thailand and Malaysia in 1994, exploration 
activities in the JDA have moved on at a brisk pace. Exploration spending to September 
1997 had reached a cumulative US$210 million, well in excess of the US$43 million 
minimum stipulated in the first five-year contract phases that ended in April 1999. This 
makes the JDA one of Asia's most capital intensive wildcatting 10 areas (Ahmad, 1997f). 
6.4 NATURAL RESOURCE USE ISSUES AND SOCIAL ACTIVISM 
Over a period of about 25 years, under the rule of mandarinate-dominated governments, 
Thailand's economy has been transformed from an agricultural economy based on a 
narrow range of export commodities-rice, rubber, tin, and teak-to become one of the 
8 On 21 February 1979, the Prime Ministers of Thailand and Malaysia signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) establishing the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority. The MOU was ratified on 24 
October 1979. The Joint Authority assumed all rights and responsibilities on behalf of both parties for the 
exploration and exploitation of the non-living natural resources of the seabed and subsoil in the Joint 
Development Area (JDA), and also for the development, control, and administration of the area, as well as 
of deposits extending beyond the limits of the area (Valencia, 1985). Bi-lateral discussions were 
subsequently conducted on the mechanisms for administering the JDA, but inevitably they encountered 
some practical (legal) and political (lobby group influences) hurdles (Valencia, 1985). It took 11 years of 
complex negotiations before the idea became a reality with the establishment of the Malaysia-Thailand 
Joint Authority in May 1990. The first two production sharing contracts were signed in 1994. 
9 A similar pact has reportedly been agreed between Malaysia and Brunei, and the Philippines and 
Vietnam, while Vietnam has agreed to develop its continental shelf jointly with Thailand and Malaysia 
(the Malaysia-Vietnam Commercial Arrangement Area, offshore peninsula Malaysia) ( Oil & Gas Journal, 
1997b), and Thailand is reportedly negotiating to settle its dispute with Cambodia. 
10 A wildcat well is an exploration well drilled without knowledge of the contents of the underlying rock 
structure. 
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world's 'newly industrialised countries' (Baker, 1995). However, this industrialisation 
and rapid economic growth have relied in part on the country's substantial natural 
resource base. This base has been 'mined' to supply the burgeoning domestic demand 
for ti1nber, fuel-wood and new agricultural land, to supply raw materials to export-
oriented industry, and to generate the electricity to meet the demands of industry and 
increasing urbanisation. The result of this intensified use of Thailand's natural wealth 
has been an unsustainable path of resource development, so that now the resource base 
for continued growth is severely depleted (Hirsch, 1995; OEPP, 1997). 
Rapid development has also caused substantial environmental problems, including 
severe air and water pollution, deforestation and erosion, and inappropriate hazardous 
waste disposal (OEPP, 1997). Recent advances towards settling boundary disputes in 
the Gulf of Thailand have resulted in the opening up of new off shore acreage for the 
petroleum industry. Consequently, the level of exploration and production activity in the 
central Gulf region has increased, but so have the associated risks of pollution (water-
and air-borne) and damage to the marine ecosystem. 
Several factors prevented these problems from becoming political issues in Thailand 
until recently. Firstly, realisation of the extent of the problem was slow to develop. 
Secondly, Thailand had an authoritarian political system for many decades, and the 
leaders of this system often refused to take environmental issues into account when 
making economic policy. 
The introduction of new political forces has changed this situation (Baker, 1995). The 
substantial impacts of primary resource exploitation, and industrial pollution have been 
confronted by conflict from the 'peasant' and 'salariat' sectors of Thai society, in 
particular. Many of these resource conflicts have been localised. However, since the 
1980s, their profile has increased through the actions of environmental groups, 
campaigning journalists and rural NGOs. In the 1980s, a number of controversies 
emerged in the public arena and helped galvanise public opinion. Perhaps the most 
important event-one that for the first time attracted widespread popular interest-was 
the opposition to the proposed Nam Choan Dam on the Khwae Yai River in 
Kanchanaburi, which threatened to destroy a large part of one of the largest remaining 
forest regions in mainland South-East Asia. First proposed in 1982 by the Council of 
Ministers ( cabinet) of General Prem Tinsulanonda' s government, the dam was to be the 
last of a series of three on the River Khwae-the first two were completed in 1978 and 
1981 (Baker, 1995). 
Previous hydro-electric dam projects constructed by the state-owned Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) had produced a legacy of displaced villagers 
and destroyed forests, in the course of providing the urban areas (especially Bangkok) 
with electricity. The proposed Nam Choan Dam met with considerable opposition, 
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beginning with a campaign by the university environmental groups under the banner of 
an NGO. A debate in the media followed, which pitted EGAT against a miscellaneous 
group of students, government officials, and local residents. The plan was put aside for 
further consideration in October 1982. When it was revived in 1985, there was again 
intense public debate (Baker, 1995). The World Bank withdrew funding in 1987 (Seda, 
1993) and the plan was shelved in 1988 by Chatichai' s civilian governn1ent. 
According to Baker ( 1995), several factors account for the successful opposition to the 
dam. First was the growing public realisation of the adverse effects of the existing dams. 
The local populace wanted to know why it had to suffer so that Bangkok could have 
additional electricity. Secondly, as opposition groups gained experience, the techniques 
they used became increasingly sophisticated. Among the opposition were university 
scientists and Forestry Department officials who risked their jobs by speaking out. 
Student organisations and other NGOs joined in, along with several prominent political 
figures, among them former Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj. Newspapers challenged 
EGAT' s information. Eventually these disparate groups were able to forge an alliance 
between local resource defence and a broader environmentalism, and form an effective 
common front against the dam. The discovery of damaging scientific information and 
the co-ordinated use of newspapers, letters, and lobbying eventually proved successful. 
During the 1980s several other important environmental disputes occurred. From the 
mid- l 980s, a wave of conflicts arose over access to land in the forest fringe. Peasant 
colonies fought against plantation companies for control of land that the government 
defined as 'forest' long after the trees had disappeared. In November 1988, Thailand 
incurred flooding and mudslides that killed over 350 people and caused more than 
US$120 million in damage. The reason for the severity of the flooding was found to be 
that the fore st cover in Thailand had been so reduced that many areas were denuded, 
allowing water to rapidly run off hillsides and into narrow valleys. After touring the 
affected areas, Prime Minister Chatichai ordered all logging in Thailand stopped. 
Unfortunately, the ban has not been particularly successful. Government efforts to 
enforce the ban have been characterised as 'patchy' (Baker, 1995). 
From the early l 990s, another range of disputes has arisen over pollution and waste 
disposal-as industrialisation accelerates, factory sites have spread out from the 
Bangkok region, generating bulky and dangerous wastes, or polluting the local 
environment (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997). 
The rise in environmental awareness in Thailand is also due to the role played by the 
King and Queen of Thailand and other members of the Royal family. The Royal couple 
is held in high esteem by Thais and is deeply admired for their efforts to improve the 
well-being of their subjects. Both the King and the Queen are actively involved in 
supporting a number of environmental projects (Baker, 1995). Environmental protection 
projects are often initiated and dedicated to the King or Queen, particularly on their 
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birthdays or other anniversaries. To celebrate the 50th year of the King as Monarch in 
1996, the Forestry Department began a three-year reafforestation program to be 
implemented jointly by the public and private sectors. 
In summary, the environmental movement has become a significant force in recent 
years, and is now characterised by a broad-based coalition that incorporates a wide 
range of social, economic and political actors. As such, environmentalism in Thailand 
now represents an inclusive oppositional force to challenge the centralised decision-
making of the political elite (Hirsch, 1997). The traditional components of the 
bureaucratic systems must now take account of the claims made by extra-bureaucratic 
forces, a situation that was not the case up until the early 1990s (Baker, 1995). 
6.5 CASE STUDIES 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The preceding sections have introduced the social 'forces' that are currently active in 
driving Thai Government policies on natural resource development, and those which are 
involved in environmental activism. These 'forces' represent the key host country 
stakeholder groups that have an interest in petroleum industry activities in Thailand. In 
Chapter 2, the concepts of stakeholder influence and legitimacy claims were introduced 
within the broader framework of company strategic management practices. In the 
following sections, the discussion of stakeholder influences is developed in a local 
social and environmental context through two Thai case studies of interactions between 
stakeholders, petroleum companies and their regulators. 
The first case study centres on the issue of marine ecosystem contamination associated 
with discharge of mercury in produced water from gasfields in the Gulf of Thailand. The 
second case study probes ecological conservation, environmental risk and community 
rights concerns associated with the installation of the Y adana gas sales pipeline in 
Thailand. The case studies serve to demonstrate the influence of stakeholders and 
sensitivities in petroleum industry-regulator relations, as well as to expose some of the 
existing flaws in the government administration of Thailand's environmental law 
framework. 
6.5.2 Mercury Discharges to the Gulf of Thailand 
Coastal and marine resources are particularly important to the largely maritime nations 
of South-East Asia, where fish is a staple of their populations' diets. The ecological 
pressures of coastal development, together with intensive commercial exploitation of 
the Gulf of Thailand fisheries are having adverse impacts upon the local fish 
populations. Under these conditions, industrial operations in and around the Gulf of 
Thailand have come under increased scrutiny as the Thai government attempts to 
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n1aintain a balance between the competing needs of economic prosperity and 
environmental protection (OEPP, 1997; McDaniel et al., 1998). 
Discharge of dissolved mercury and other hazardous waste materials into the Gulf of 
Thailand is a particular concern I I. Concentration of mercury through the food chain has 
been reported in the Gulf of Thailand and along the course of the Chao Phraya River, 
especially in shellfish and fish-eating birds (Tapvong, 1995). The presence of mercury 
evokes a high level of public concern, related to memory of the cases of mercury 
poisoning reported from Minamata, Japan, where many people died or suffered adverse 
neurological health effects (McDaniel, et al., 1998). Amongst other sources, mercury is 
released to the marine environment from industry, including the petroleum production 
facilities operating in the Gulf of Thailand. Mercury is a naturally occurring element in 
the geologic formations underlying the Gulf, and is associated with natural gas and 
condensate that are extracted from some of its hydrocarbon reservoirs. 
The controversy over mercury discharges from natural gas production platforms in the 
Gulf of Thailand has been most publicly 12 associated with Unocal Thailand Ltd, a 
subsidiary of the US-based multinational, the Unocal Corporation. 
In 1962, as the Union Oil Company of California, it was the first petroleum company to 
be awarded exploration rights 13 by the Thai government. In 1968, the Thai government 
opened the Gulf of Thailand to exploration, and the company was awarded the first 
offshore concessions. Ensuing exploration in these concessions resulted in the 1973 
discovery of Thailand's first commercial natural gas field, and in 1981 Unocal Thailand 
commenced commercial gas production. Further exploration and development of other 
nearby gasfields in the Gulf was subsequently undertaken by the company, and eight 
11 Factories producing a wide variety of hazardous chemicals are supposed to have water treatment 
facilities, but often these are not operated and pollutants are released directly into waterways. Up until 
1994, Bangkok, a city with a permanent population of over 8 million people, did not have a water 
treatment system. The city discharged over 1.4 million cubic metres per day of untreated wastewater into 
nearby rivers and canals (Wedel, 1995), including the Chao Phraya River that discharges into the Gulf of 
Thailand. 
12 Mercury has also been found in gas produced from nearby fields developed by Total Exploration and 
Production Thailand, and now operated by PTT Exploration and Production Public Co. Ltd (PITEP). 
13 Unocal' s first concession was awarded on the Kho rat Plateau, onshore north-east Thailand. 
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additional fields, with over 70 platforms , have since been brought into production 14 
(refer to Figure 6-1 ). The company proudly states that its "invest,nents in the Kingdo1n 
[of Thailand] have been greater than any other US co1npany" (Unocal Thailand, 1997c). 
Unocal Thailand first discovered the presence of mercury as a trace contaminant in 
natural gas from its Platong field in 1985-four years after it commenced gas 
production in the Gulf (Unocal Thailand, 1997b ). In addition to the elemental form 
found in natural gas, trace amounts were found in condensate, tank sludge and produced 
formation water (Unocal Thailand, 1997b). The mercury occurrence was treated as an 
operational issue, which the company addressed by undertaking ecological studies, and 
then developing and implementing mercury separation and handling procedures. 
These activities were undertaken in consultation with, and with the approval of 
Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) 15 . According to Unocal Thailand (1997b), by 
volume, a total 96% of the mercury is removed by separation and treatment processes on 
the off shore production facilities ( 65 % ) 16, and at condensate (28 % ) and gas (3 % ) 
purchasers' processing facilities. The remaining 4% is contained in produced formation 
water, "which ( after initial treatment) is released into the Gulf from eight gas 
production plaiforms at the end of the gas production process". 
On 26 December 1995, some 10 years after Unocal Thailand first discovered the 
mercury contaminant, an article was published on the front page of a Bangkok 
newspaper referring to rising mercury levels in the Gulf of Thailand. The article cited a 
seminar presentation by a Chulalongkorn University 17 professor, which reported 
14 In 1998, producing fields comprised the Baanpot field (1983), the Platong and Satun fields (1985), the 
Kaphong field (1989), the Funan and Surat fields (1992), the Jakrawan field (1993), and the Gamin field 
(1996). Other fields are currently under development (the Pailin field), or scheduled for development 
(Pakarang, Trat and Pladang fields) . Recent increases in gas output have been largely due to Unocal 
Thailand's multi-million US dollar drilling programme in six fields. The programme proved the 
commercial viability of the Pladang prospect, delineated the Trat field, and extended the Satun, Platong, 
and Baanpot fields to boost JV reserves by more than 300 BCF. The Unocal Thailand joint venture 
reportedly aims to continue to increase production from nine fields in the southern Gulf as part of a 
US$1.38 billion three-year development programme (Koen and Ahmad, 1997). 
15 The Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) acts as the 'competent authority' on behalf of the 
Minister for Industry and administers the 1971 Petroleum Act. The Mineral Fuels Division of the DMR is 
specifically responsible for facilitating granting of petroleum concessions; enforcement of the Petroleum 
Act and its regulations; and enforcement of safety and environmental standards. 
16 Mercury-contaminated sludge is reinjected into decommissioned gas wells, with the approval of the 
DMR. 
17 Chulalongkorn University is an internationally recognised and respected university, based in Bangkok, 
Thailand. 
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detection of elevated mercury levels in fish collected near the offshore oil and gas 
production platforms in the Gulf. The newspaper article suggested that gas producers in 
the Gulf, including Unocal Thailand, had contaminated seawater, sediment, and fish 
around the platforms with mercury released in untreated produced water (McDaniel et 
al., 1998). 
The privately-owned print media had abruptly put Unocal Thailand on notice. The 
company had established itself as a successful business and formed a good working 
relationship with its primary government regulator, the DMR, but it could not therefore 
assume that it had won the trust and respect of the community-its legitimacy was being 
challenged. 
For the Unocal Corporation, the potential implications of this challenge for its business, 
both locally and regionally 18 , vvere serious. Its subsidiary had established and carefully 
nurtured a competitive advantage in Thailand by being the first foreign gas producer and 
the largest US investor. A good reputation and working relationship with the 
government would potentially assist in securing high quality exploration acreage in 
future bidding rounds, and securing future gas sales agreements; as well as expansion 
into emerging avenues such as private sector power generation, by other subsidiaries of 
the Unocal Corporation. 
Following the media story on 26 December 1995, the company received a "barrage of 
questions", for which it was, by its own admission, unprepared to respond, even though 
"the con1pany felt that the news report had misrepresented Unocal' s operations" 
(McDaniel, et al., 1998). Not only was the company unprepared to respond adequately 
to this criticism, it was also contractually prevented from doing so. Under the terms of 
its operating agreement with the Thai government, Unocal Thailand had agreed to rely 
on the DMR, as a trusted intermediary, to handle external communications for the 
company concerning sensitive issues. This was accepted customary practice for oil and 
gas companies in Thailand at the time. 
Unocal Thailand had in fact been monitoring mercury levels around its platforms for 
several years, and had regularly reported its results to the DMR. A series of ecological 
studies undertaken to identify the potential impacts of mercury on water and fish in the 
Gulf had shown that mercury levels around the platforms were within the range of 
18 Regionally, Unocal' s Thailand operations base had been used to launch the company into other ventures 
in neighbouring countries like, Myanmar, Pakistan , Vietnam, Cambodia, and China. As stated in Unocal 
Corporation's 1995 Annual Report, "Unocal' s low cost structure, flexible team-based organisation, and 
strong operating history overseas uniquely position us to benefit from the rapidly growing natural gas 
demand in Southeast and Central Asia. We are focusing our investment plan on integrated energy 
projects. This involves connecting growing energy markets to known resources and optimising risks and 
returns through deal structuring, financial innovation and strong alliances" (Unocal Corporation, 1995). 
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naturally occurring levels worldwide, and that it was safe to consume fish caught around 
the platform. Although this information had been relayed to the DMR, the results of the 
studies had never been made public. This government policy was consistent with the 
pre-1997 19 Thailand, in which information was often only released to the public on a 
'need to know' basis. 
At the outset of the public controversy, Unocal Thailand initially relied upon its 
established mode of comrnunication, and allowed the DMR to represent the company's 
views to the media. Continuing news coverage in the month following the original story 
illustrated the weakness inherent in the company's initial strategy. Reporters 
emphasised the existing information gap, often stating that Unocal Thailand refused to 
make the facts known to the public. Although the company was following standard 
protocol by communicating through the DMR, the concerns about mercury were 
compounded by Unocal Thailand's inability to communicate with the public, a practice 
that suggested that the company had something to hide. To the free press that has 
evolved in Thailand, the company's communication via a government intermediary 
conflicted with the media's demands for transparency, openness and direct interaction 
(McDaniel, et al., 1998). 
Unocal Thailand did make some attempts to contribute to the public messages delivered 
by the DMR, but these appear to have exacerbated the conflict rather than eased it. The 
company attempted to defend its levels of mercury discharge by favourably comparing 
them with naturally occurring levels resulting from river discharge, and discharges by 
other Thai industry20. In the presence of Thai government agencies, Unocal Thailand 
also criticised the Chulalongkorn University professor, by calling into question the 
analytical credibility of his data. (This action was in breach of a customary Thai taboo 
on publicly criticising respected academics and causing loss of 'face'). 
In response, a report in The Nation newspaper on 13 January 1996, stated that the 
abovementioned professor could not "reveal the data fro1n the most recent fish surveys 
because it is the property of Unocal1 who hired hiln to carry out the studies)) (Fahn, 
1996a). Another press story published on 24 January 1996 quoted a regional 
19 A new national Constitution was enacted in 1997 that , in theory, improves the standing of 'community 
right to know ' (Office of the Council of State, 1997) . 
20 Mercury is also known to be contributed from other point sources on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand. 
According to Fahn (1997c), mercury has been detected in fish , sediment and water samples near the 
industrial port and industrial estate of Niap Ta Phut on the Eastern Seaboard. "A petrochemical industry 
expert who has worked in Map Ta Phut is convinced that the problem largely stems from there. 'The 
amount of mercury being discharged from natural gas production platforms is quite small compared to 
that coming out of lvfap Ta Phut ... But the problem on the Eastern Seaboard hasn't been exposed for 
political reasons "' (Fahn, 1997c). 
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representative of the United Nations Environment Programme as stating, "We need to 
know what is going on. This is not a case of finding fault, but of siJnply getting the 
facts." The same article reported that "officials froni the Fisheries Departlnent, the 
Department of Mineral Resources and Unocal have so far refused to provide detailed 
infornzation on 1nercury levels in fish found in the Gulf" (Fahn, 1996b ). Critical 
newspaper reports continued into n1id 1996 ( e.g. Barigkok Post, 1996). 
As observed by Hinton ( 1998), industry and govern111ent typically approach an 
environmental issue by being very analytical, business-like, logical, and scientific. On 
the other hand, the public, generally, initially approaches the same environmental issue 
with a more human interest, and non-technical perspective of wanting to know how the 
issue affects their everyday lives. As a consequence, from the outset the two groups 
view the same issue or situation very differently. This difference in perception can lead 
to communication misunderstandings. In response, it is not uncommon for industry and 
government to take an inappropriate ( e.g. stonewall) approach to communication with 
the public, if they perceive the public as being "irritatingly irrational and to have been 
manipulated by socialistic environniental groups or the liberal ,nedia" (Hinton, 1998). 
The outcome of this 'stonewall' approach is the exclusion of stakeholders, which can 
lead to anger, fear and outrage (Sandman, 1993). 
Accordingly to a Unocal Thailand interviewee, the company was initially subject to 
pressure from the DMR to "keep quiet" while the public was calling for openness. 
However, once senior managers recognised the level of public concern, a senior Unocal 
representative spoke to a senior DMR manager to get approval to be open and in direct 
communication with the public. The company then set about revising its communication 
strategy. It chose to adopt the principles of risk communication, because it perceived 
that many risk communication 'outrage factors' were driving interest and public concern 
about mercury releases into the Gulf of Thailand. Senior corporate managers apparently 
understood that an effective communication exchange would be possible only by 
working within-rather than against-the cultural and social expectations of the host 
country. 
According to McDaniel, et al. ( 1998), many Unocal representatives, including members 
of upper management, participated in Unocal Corporation's Risk Communication 
trainin_g program in March 1996. Training sessions also included Thai government and 
agency representatives who were actively involved in Unocal Thailand's external 
con1munications. The company's revised strategy included several components that 
drew upon the company's understanding of Thai culture and local concerns. 
Personalism is very important in Thai culture. Many studies have shown the importance 
of patron-client ties and more horizontally-based ties (Baker, 1995; Hewison, 1997b ). 
Given this characteristic of Thai society, strategies that involve personal contact are 
favoured over more indirect or impersonal ones. The strategy that Unocal employed 
included: (i) the development of two-way communication (with the permission of the 
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DMR); (ii) the funding of additional health and ecological studies in the Gulf of 
Thailand with input from local stakeholders; and (iii) the identification and inclusion of 
key stakeholders in the process of planning further studies and impact mitigation. 
As a step towards reconciliation, the company also arranged a meeting with the 
Chulalongkorn University professor who had reported mercury levels in the Gulf. 
According to McDaniel, et al. (1998), the goals of this meeting were to ensure that the 
professor had the latest information about what Unocal Thailand was doing to reduce 
mercury discharges into the Gulf, and to ensure that he was included in the company's 
discussions of future actions. 
"Unocal also agreed to make public all of the company's previous data concerning 
mercury. The company provided a reporter from The Nation with access to all the 
previous health and ecological studies and went through the studies with him, 
answering any questions he might have. The President of Unocal Thailand made 
himself available to reporters, bringing along experts fro,n his environmental staff who 
are Thai nationals. Unocal also began holding regular press briefings in both English 
and Thai. A niunber of reporters were invited to take a press tour of the platforms" 
(McDaniel, et al., 1998). 
The process of making public the results of the previous studies reportedly led to a 
company decision to fund a series of new mercury studies. In scoping out the new 
mercury studies, Unocal Thailand identified key audiences who would be interested in 
the project, including company employees, especially those who fish 21 ; Thai 
government and agency representatives, including members of the DMR, the 
Department of Fisheries, and the Pollution Control Department (PCD); Thai fishermen, 
environmentalists, consumers, and other oil and gas producers. An oversight committee 
was established to involve key stakeholders in the planning and execution of the 
mercury studies. The panel included the Chulalongkorn University professor. 
"The participation of the key audiences was a necessary aspect of allowing all parties 
to save face. No one was left out for having an 'unpopular' point of view" (McDaniel, 
et al., 1998). 
The initial results of the study were publicly presented at an international toxicology 
conference in Bangkok in December 1996. Subsequent study reports have since been 
publicly released ( 1997-98). 
21 A particular focus of the new study was fish consumption patterns of Unocal Thailand's employees and 
their families. This issue was of concern because many employees liked to catch fish during their 
fortnight-long shifts on the offshore platforms, and then would freeze their catch to take home, thus 
potentially extending the health risk from mercury to their families. 
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Public relations literature published by the Corporate Comn1unications Department of 
Unocal Thailand in 1997 (Unocal Thailand, 1997a, 1997b) den1onstrates the company's 
heightened sensitivity about its legitirnacy and 'licence to operate'. Statements in a 
published leaflet dedicated to the 111ercury issue (Unocal Thailand, 1997b) make appeals 
to the readers to recognise and accept: 
i) Credibility accorded by third party experts: "It has been confirnied by third-party 
environniental experts that fish in the Gulf-including those around the conipany 's 
gas platfonns-are safe for conswnption and do not pose health hazards, as the 
1nercury content in a vast ,najority of the fish tissues has been found to be well 
belo-w the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (PAO) standard. 
Silnilarly, seawater sa,npling indicates that 1nercury levels in the Gulf waters 
around the platfonns are normal and consistent with worldwide levels". 
ii) Assurances that the company is managing the source of the problem: "Only the 4% 
portion found in the [produced forniation] water has yet to be completely 
removed. In other words, 96% of the trace 1nercury has been successfully dealt 
with by either Unocal or the buyers of the gas and condensate". 
iii) Assurances that the company has regulatory approval for its actions: "In the 
absence of an industrial vvaste treatJnent plant in Thailand, Unocal found the 
reinjection of the niercury-contanzinated sludge into e1npty gas wells ( a practice in 
other areas of the world) practical and environ1nentally safe for the Gulf of 
Thailand. The project was approved by the Department of Mineral Resources 
(DMR) and successfully undertaken in ,nid-1995". 
iv) Reassurance offered by using the latest technological solutions: "Unocal has found 
and applied water treatment technologies which can re1nove all but minor trace 
aniounts of the 1nercury. As yet, there is no technology available that will remove 
100% of the elenient . ... Reinjection is not currently available at all locations, so 
state-of-the-art water treatnient is still required. Unocal will continue to use both 
niethods as it looks for even better technologies for 1nercury re,noval. Based on all 
technologies available to date, the Pailin gas field, which is expected to come on 
streanz in late 1998, will feature the 1nost coniplete water treatJnent technology at 
any offshore gas field in Thailand'. 
v) Research and development expenditure: "Unocal spent US$] .3 million on water 
treahnent projects in 1996 and plans to spend US$4.5 - 6 million to complete the 
installation of water treatnzent systenis in 1997; a breakthrough year after long 
years of research by the conipany''. 
vi) Assurances of co-operation with regulators, and environmentally responsible 
behaviour: "Unocal will work closely with public agencies and will remain a 
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responsible gas producer for the Kingdoni of Thailand. Its co,nmitment is to 
reduce both the volwne of produced formation water subject to ocean discharge 
and to niini1nise even Ju rt her the trace amounts of niercury remaining". 
The company literature also lists the actions taken by Unocal Thailand between 1990 
and 1996 to investigate and address the mercury disposal problem. It makes particular 
reference to the ecological studies that it commissioned several "third-party 
international experts" to conduct, while being 
"supervised by authorities on the subject from both the public and the private sectors, 
as well as top academicians, to ensure accuracy and objectivity of results and reports " 
(Unocal Thailand, 1997b). 
In addition to the issue-specific initiatives outlined above, the company worked to 
improve its overall environmental management system. Amongst the initiatives taken in 
early 1996, was the promotion of its Environmental Care System, which incorporates 
five elements: Program Administration; Environmental Hazard and Issue Identification; 
Environmental Monitoring; Environmental Performance Assessment; and Community 
Awareness. 
In February 1997, Unocal Corporation formally launched its risk communication policy, 
which established a company-wide program of public outreach and open, two-way 
communication concerning operations, health, environment and safety issues (Unocal 
Corporation, 1997). 
"The policy reflects Unocal' s awareness that the company's continuing success and 
profitability depend upon maintaining a good relationship with the communities in 
which we operate worldwide. Specifically, our risk communication policy seeks to: 
• Provide our neighbours and the community with reasonable access to information 
about operations, health, environment and safety issues. 
• Cultivate trust and credibility in our relationship with the public. 
• Support proactive involvement in the communities in which we operate, including 
anticipating potential problems, as well as responding to incidents should they 
" occur. 
According to Unocal Thailand (1998), implementation of the policy requires each 
business unit to establish written risk communication plans designed to ensure that 
information is provided to external parties. The plans are to address such topics as site 
history, past environmental incidents, areas of potential vulnerability, key audiences and 
key concerns. 
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The company also enhanced it existing International Safety Rating System and its 
Environmental Care System so that the linked systems fulfilled the certification 
requirements for the ISO 14001 standard for environmental management systems. This 
action appears to have assisted the company to address its external communications and 
com1nunity awareness deficiencies. The 'Community Awareness' element includes 
keeping government agencies, officials and local citizens informed of the co1npany' s 
plans, activities and problems. This element also requires the company to be committed 
to participation in community betterment activities. When the co~pany audited this 
element against performance criteria of program establishment, health and 
environn1ental risk communication training, and information disclosure/communication 
channels, the element scored 24.2 % for the May 1996 corporate audit, but had improved 
markedly to 85.2% for the 1997 year end audit (against a target of 70%) (Unocal 
Thailand, 1998). 
In August 1997, Unocal Thailand received third party ISO 14001 certification for its 
environmental management system, an achievement which was positively reported 
(Bangkok Post, 1997 a) by the same Bangkok media that had earlier heavily criticised 
the company. Over the term of some 18 months, the company had managed to achieve 
credibility with the press and the public (McDaniel et al., 1998). A (non-Unocal) 
industry source interviewed by this researcher in May 1998, perceived the mercury issue 
to have been "not so much a public issue as a press issue, which since seems to have 
gone away". This observation suggests that the media had been satisfied that the 
company had taken notice of its protests and had addressed them adequately. 
Analysis of this case study in the context of stakeholder relations, organisational 
learning and corporate 'greening' is presented in Sections 6.6 and 6.7, along with a 
comparative analysis of the following second case study. 
6.5.3 Yadana Natural Gas Sales Pipeline 
Another environmental controversy involving the petroleum industry occurred in 
Thailand during the period 1995-98. The Yadana gas sales pipeline controversy in 
Thailand centred on the project proponents, the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) 
and its recently formed subsidiary, PTT Gas22 . The other key stakeholders and social 
'forces' in this case study are the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand's 
(EGAT), current and former Thai prime ministers (Chavalit, Chuan, and Anand), 
academics, national and grass roots NGOs, peasants, and the print media. 
11 
-- The role of PTT Gas is to strategically increase the national capability to procure domestic and 
overseas natural gas (particularly in the Asia region), in addition to a productive marketing scheme. 
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Widespread and effective oppos1t1on to new hydro-electric projects23 , and health 
concerns about lignite-fired power stations24, have forced the Thai government to look 
to other sources of electricity-generation-natural gas being an obvious choice given the 
presence of this resource in Thailand and in its neighbouring countries. Improved 
relations with its neighbours in the last decade or so, have opened opportunities for 
Thailand (and its private industry partners) to exploit natural gas reserves in Myanmar, 
Vietnam and Cambodia. 
In 1993, PTT commenced negotiations with the Myanmar government to purchase gas 
from the Yadana gas field in the Andaman Sea. In February 1995, PTT signed a 30-year 
gas sales contract with the Myanmar government to buy 525 million cubic feet of 
natural gas per day (MMCFD). The gas is to be used in electricity generation to meet 
Thailand's projected future energy demands. The Yadana pipeline project developer is a 
11yanmar-based corporation, the Moattama Gas Transportation Company (MGTC), of 
which the shareholders are Total Myanmar Exploration and Production (TMEP) (the 
operator) (31.24% ), Unocal Myanmar Offshore Co. Ltd (28.26% ), PTT Exploration and 
Production International25 (25.5% ), and the Myanmar state-owned petroleum company, 
Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (15%). 
The gas sales pipeline scheme involves transporting 650 MMCFD of gas from the 
Yadana field via a 346 km long subsea pipeline that reaches shore near the fishing 
village of Daminseik (in Myanmar). From there, 525 MMCFD of gas is transported in 
the 63 km long onshore pipeline passing through the tropical jungle and rough terrain of 
the Tenasserim district of Myanmar (an area long contested by ethnic Mon and Karen 
minorities) to the Thai border (refer to Figure 6-1). From the Thai border, the Yadana 
gas sales pipeline is the responsibility of the PTT. The Thai portion of the pipeline 
extends 260 km from near the settlement of Ban I-Tong in Kanchanaburi Province, to 
Ratchaburi (south-west of Bangkok), where the gas will be used to fuel EGAT's 
23 Hirsch (1995) suggests that the strength of opposition to the Pak Mun Dam is an indication of the 
political limits to continued dam construction within Thailand. Anti-dam protests began in April 1989 (the 
month that EGAT proposed the project), and continued through to mid-1994 when the construction work 
was completed. 
24 In October 1992, several hundred villagers in Mae Moh, a small village in northern Thailand, had to be 
hospitalised after inhaling toxic fumes emitted from a lignite-fired power plant near their homes. EGAT 
blamed the emissions on excessive sulphur dioxide. The Minister of Science, Technology and 
Environment promised that EGAT would pay compensation and would install pollution control measures 
under the supervision of his ministry. Despite these promises, several hundred more villagers, as well as 
thousands of livestock, fell sick in subsequent weeks, when the plant continued to operate at full power 
despite assurances that it would not do so (Baker, 1995). 
25 PTT Exploration and Production International is a subsidiary of PTT Exploration and Production 
Public Co. (PTTEP), which in turn is a publicly listed subsidiary of PTT. 
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Ratchaburi power station (as part of Thailand's Western Seaboard Development Plan) 
(PTT, 1997b ). The official target completion date for commencement of gas supply to 
the power station was 1 July 1998. 
Thai supporters of the project claimed that the gas from the Yadana (and Yetagun) fields 
is essential for industrial development in Kanchanaburi (Gilleland and Hopson, 1998). 
Opponents demanded the project to be scrapped altogether or the pipeline route be 
diverted from forest areas. They claimed, among other things, that the pipeline 
installation would cause irreparable damage to the ecology and the habitat of rare 
wildlife in forest areas along its route, that the lives of residents along the pipeline route 
will be endangered by possible rupture or sabotage, and that the money from the sale of 
gas will assist ongoing repression of ethnic and democratic opposition in Myanmar by 
the military junta. 
A chronological summary of the main e~ents that took place, from the time of the 
contract signing until the climax of the controversy in early 1998, is presented in Table 
6-2. 
Table 6-2 Chronology of the PTT Y adana Gas Pipeline Controversy 
Date 'Activity 
July 1992 French petroleum company, Total, signed a Production Sharing Contract with 
Myanmar's national oil company, Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), to 
appraise, develop and produce gas in the Yadana offshore field, located in the 
Gulf of Martaban, south-west of Yangon (Rangoon). 
February 1993 Total began negotiations with the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT) to sell 
gas to fire Thai power stations. 
October 5, 1993 The Chuan-led Cabinet approved Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT)' s electricity-generating development plan and urged the PTT to sign the 
Yadana gas-sales agreement with the Myanmar government to supply EGAT's 
power plant in Ratchaburi. 
September 9, 1994 Thai Industry Minister Sanan Kachornprasart signed an MOU with Myanmar's 
Energy Minister Khin Maung Thein in Yangon. 
February 2, 1995 Thai Prime Minister (PM) Chuan Leekpai signed the Gas Sales Agreement with 
Myanmar's Energy Minister in Bangkok. The Thai Cabinet approved the PTT's 
signing of a gas-sales contract with the Myanmar-based production consortium, 
- Moattama Gas Transportation. 
March 1995 Thai environmental interest groups called for the pipeline proponents to release 
details of likely environmental and social impacts of the project. 
June 1995 PTT engaged Team Consulting Engineers Co Ltd to conduct the Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA). 
July 1995 Chuan government defeated in elections by Chart Thai coalition, led by 
'provincial politician', Banharn Silpa-archa. 
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Table 6-2 Chronology of the PTT Yadana Gas Pipeline Controversy 
. . 
Da~ · 
May 7, 1996 
May 21, 1996 





February 26, 1997 
March 5, 1997 
March 11, 1997 
March 24, 1997 
April 10, 1997 
Late March 1997 
March 30, 1997 
April 13, 1997 
May 14, 1997 
" 
The Thai Cabinet approved the project in principle and gave perrnjssion to PTT to 
build the pipeline in the Huay Khayeng forest reserve, IA (first class) watershed 
area. Cabinet approval was conditional upon endorsement of the National 
·Environmental Board (NEB). Conservation groups and human-rights NGOs 
protested against the Cabinet's resolution. 
PTT submitted the EIA report to the Office for Environmental Policy and 
Planning (OEPP)'s expert committee on infrastructure projects for review and 
recommendation. 
The OEPP's infrastructure expert committee rejected the EIA, and ordered the 
PTT to conduct further studies on the project's impact on wildlife and the forest, 
and hold a public hearing. 
Work on the Thai section of the pipeline was delayed pending a technical hearing 
scheduled to take place in November 1996 (but later delayed until February 
1997). 
PM Barnharn's allegedly corrupt government was defeated in a general election. 
The New Aspiration Party came to power, led by 'mandarin', and former General, 
Chavalit Y ongchaiyudh. 
PTT held a technical hearing in Kanchanaburi, but failed to assuage villagers' 
anxiety about earthquakes and sabotage, and conservation groups' concerns about 
impacts on wildlife and habitat. 
PTT submitted the revised EIA to the OEPP' s expert committee. The EIA was 
again rejected, with insufficient wildlife data cited as the main reason. 
PTT submitted the second revision of the EIA to the OEPP' s expert committee. 
The OEPP expert committee finally recommended it for approval by the NEB, on 
the condition that further studies were carried out while the pipeline was being 
built. Environmentalists called upon the PTT to re-route the pipeline outside the 
forest. 
The NEB officially approved the EIA, and set up a provincial committee to 
monitor the environmental impacts of the project. 
PTT workers were accused of collaborating with kamnan and village chiefs in the 
Thong Pha Phum district to embezzle compensation money earmarked for 
payment to landowners. 
Construction work began on the Thai component of the pipeline. 
Environmental groups in Kanchanaburi mounted a public campaign to protest 
against the pipeline. 
PTT public relations director, Dr Songkiert Tansamrit publicly responded to 
public criticisms and put his company's side of the story in the Bangkok Post. 
Kanchanaburi Conservation Group withdrew from a sub-committee established to 
monitor the impact of the pipeline on the environment. The Group accused the 
PTT of lying and of failing to provide clear and adequate information. 
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Table 6-2 Chronology of the PTT Yadana Gas Pipeline Controversy 
Date 
May 30, 1997 
Early June, 1997 
June 8, 1997 
June 11, 1997 
June 27, 1997 
July 19, 1997 
August 5, 1997 
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Activity 
Media reported that Thai Industry Minister Korn Dabbaransi would press the PTT 
to readjust its public relations strategy in an effort to curb growing opposition to 
the Yadana gas pipeline project. 
The Chairman of the Tasco Mannesman joint venture, one of the companies 
contracted by PTT to lay the Ban I Tong to Ratchaburi pipeline, wrote a letter to 
Queen Sirikit, suggesting that PTT could use district roads 3273 and 323 as 
alternatives to the chosen route that would partly cut through forest reserves in 
Kanchanaburi. PTT engineer responded that the alternative route had already been 
studied and rejected because of the need for additional site work that would 
"more seriously damage the environment". PTT officials also suggested that the 
route alternative would be 70 km longer than the proposed route, so the contractor 
would stand to make more money from a route change. 
The NGO, Committee for Natural and Environmental Protection of 16 Institutes, 
issued a statement condemning the PTT' s continued construction of a gas 
pipeline. The NGO stated that despite the fact that the project was certain to affect 
local communities and the environment, "the PTT has distorted facts regarding 
the environment to thwart opposition . ... The fact that the project will result in a 
loss of an area in the tropical forest with invaluable bio-diversities has been 
overlooked, showing the PTT's lack of vision because nature and the environment 
are without boundaries". 
PM Chavalit Yongchaiyudh met with opponents and supporters of the Thai 
section of the Yadana pipeline in a bid to avert work delays that would potentially 
cost Thailand 41 million baht per day. The meeting was initiated partly in 
response to the Royal Household's advice to the Prime Minister "to consider" the 
project carefully in line with the petition lodged in March 1997 by Tiwiporn 
Sriworakul of Kanchanaburi, who said the project could destroy the forests. 
Villagers from Dan Makham Tia District, Kanchanaburi, rallied in front of 
Parliament and attempted to file a petition with PM Chavalit calling on the PTT to 
divert the pipeline away from their home town. 
The Bangkok Post reported that four environmental organisations (Wildlife Fund 
of Thailand, Friends of the Asian Elephant Foundation, Seub N akhasathein, and 
Green World Foundations) were proposing to sue the PIT for allegedly damaging 
forest land during building of the pipeline, and building the pipeline through a 
protected area without permission from the Royal Forestry Department. The 
organisations said that the NEB and the Cabinet should not have approved the 
project and signed the deal before there had been an EIA report giving it 
approval. They claimed that this breached environmental law. 
PTT representatives failed to appear at a scheduled meeting with the Lawyers 
Council of Thailand, where they were to discuss provision of information on 
contractual arrangements, environmental risks of the project, and compensation 
terms. (PTT officials were later reported as saying that the company was not 
answerable to the law society, although they would welcome its members to visit 
the PTT to obtain the information). 
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Table 6-2 Chronology of the PTT Y adana Gas Pipeline Controversy 
August 28, 1997 
Early September, 
1997 
October 8, 1997 
October 21, 1997 
June 23, 1997 







January 2, 1998 
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The Vice-President and Secretary of the Kanchanaburi Chamber of Commerce 
issued an open letter urging opponents of the pipeline project to stop their 
"senseless" protests: "Jfwe had to sacrifice JOO to 200 rai of land for pipeline 
laying and we can get the energy needed for building up our nation, then that 
should be acceptable". 
PTT filed a complaint against a local business man from Thong Pha Phum district 
for obstructing its project and violating the Petroleum Authority of Thailand Act. 
PTT reportedly agreed to temporarily halt work on the pipeline while talks were 
held with the opposing groups to settle outstanding issues. The talks were to be 
mediated by the Institute for Dispute Resolution from Khon Kaen University. 
(Talks broke down in early November when the Industry Minister did not give his 
blessing to the project). 
The Chavalit-led Cabinet ordered the Royal Forestry Department to revoke park 
status for 105 rai of the Sai Yoke National Park through which the pipeline would 
be built. Conservationists claimed that the cabinet order violated articles 46 and 
56 of the Thai Constitution, that guarantees the right of local people to participate 
with the state in conserving and using natural resources. 
PM Chavalit forced to resign. 
Chuan-led coalition government was elected to parliament. 
PM's Office Minister Supatra Masdit visited the proposed construction site in the 
Sai Y ok National Park and urged conservation groups to return to the negotiation 
table with PTT to explore possibilities of re-routing the pipeline away from the 
sensitive "lush forest" portion. The Minister promised to talk to PTT, to request a 
halt to the construction work while re-routing options were discussed, but was 
later accused by protesters of failing to honour this promise. 
Environmentalists and students began a sit-in protest in the Huay Khayeng forest 
along the pipeline's proposed route, again calling on the government to re-route 
the pipeline outside the forest. 
Chiang Mai University lecturer Nithi Iewsriwong and NGOs in northern Thailand 
issued a statement calling on the people to stop using all PTT, Unocal and Total 
products and services and to pressure the three companies to disclose information 
about environmental and economic impacts of the Yadana pipeline project. 
PTT extended an invitation to NGOs and people opposing the pipeline project to 
view the project, "to prove that the PIT had tried every way to minimise the 
negative impact of the project on wildlife and trees in 45 rai of forests." PTT 
undertook to decrease the width of the construction site from 20 m to 12 min the 
6 km stretch of forest. 
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Table 6-2 Chronology of the PTT Yadana Gas Pipeline Controversy 
Date 
January 6, 1998 
January 8, 1998 
January 9-12, 
1998 
January 22, 1998 
January 23, 1998 
January 25, 1998 
Early February 
1998 
February 12, 1998 
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Activity 
Four environmental NGOs authorised the Lawyers' Council of Thailand to file a 
lawsuit against the PTT, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and ex-Prime Minister 
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh. PTT and PM Chuan were accused of negligence for 
failure to reveal information on the project to the public, thus violating the Thai 
Constitution which recognises citizen's right to know about state plans and 
projects which could be harmful to the environment and society as a whole. 
General Cha val it was accused of approving the PTT' s plan to lay the pipeline 
through a first-class watershed in October 1997. His approval allegedly violated 
an earlier cabinet resolution of 9 July 1997 that prohibited any use of first-class 
watershed areas. The legal team also proposed to sue MOSTE for failure to 
enforce the ECNEQ Act, and for obstructing attempts by local people and NGOs 
to take part in the project's EIA study. 
Disturbed by construction work, an elephant herd living in the Huay Khayeng 
forest encroached on a villager's farm, and a baby elephant fell into a trap dug by 
villagers. 
PM Chuan temporarily suspended the pipeline construction and set up a legal 
committee to study the project's contract and determine whether penalties would 
actually be incurred by delaying the project completion. 
Village headmen in Kanchanaburi mobilised more than 15,000 villagers to 
support the project in front of the Provincial Hall, as a countermeasure to the on-
going forest sit-in protest by pipeline opponents. Organising groups included the 
Association of Kamnan and Village Chiefs, the local Chamber of Commerce, the 
Federation of Thai Industries, the local press club and farmers' groups. 
The Association of Kamnan and Village Chiefs threatened to remove 
conservationists from their protest site in the forest on the pipeline route. 
PTT reportedly filed a complaint against a core leader of the Kanchanaburi 
Conservation Group, accusing her of preventing workers from laying the pipeline. 
A group of prominent academics urged PM Chuan to set up a public hearing 
forum on the Yadana gas pipeline project. The objective of the forum would be to 
discuss the wider scope of the project including national policies on energy, the 
environment and foreign affairs, with an aim of avoiding similar incidents in the 
future. 
PM Chuan established a 'National Committee' chaired by former PM Anand 
Panyarachun, comprising "several well-respected members of society" to review 
the project, identify disputes between supporters and opponents of the project, and 
make project-specific recommendations to the government, as well as 
recommendations for creating a social standard in other development projects in 
order to prevent conflicts. 
i 
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February 25, 1998 
February 28, 1998 
March 2, 1998 
March 7, 1998 
March 11, 1998 
April 3, 1998 
April 15, 1998 
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The National Committee invited all stakeholders concerned with the project to 
attend hearings and provide relevant information. On the second day of the 
hearing, PTT admitted that it had misled the public in saying that the pipeline 
construction must be completed by 1 July 1998 or they would incur a substantial 
fine. PTT could in fact start taking gas delivery as late as 1 August 1998 without 
incurring the fine. PTT also admitted that EGAT may not be able to finish 
building the power plant to receive the gas by 1 July 1998. 
The National Committee submitted its report to PM Chuan and then to the public 
at Government House. The report stated that PTT had not been transparent in its 
implementation of the project , and that the EIA study had failed to adequately 
address the impact of the project on wildlife. 
Prime Minister Chuan announced that the project would proceed: " ... in my 
opinion, the project cannot be scrapped. Eighty percent of the construction has 
been completed. I have decided that the project must continue". 
Social critic Sulak Sivaraksa, commenced a sit-in protest at the forest construction 
site, calling for a new EIA for the project, following the findings of the National 
Committee's report. Other protesters joined him. 
Mr Sulak and 40 other protesters were arrested for allegedly obstructing the 
laying of the gas pipeline. Other protesters later withdrew from the forest. 
Piti Yamprasert, President of PTT Gas, expressed concern that Mr Sulak' s 
opposition would have a negative impact on the PTT by arousing international 
pressure: "I am relieved that Mr Sulak left the forest but worried that he would 
lodge a complaint against us at international institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund". 
Bangkok Post reported that the Governor of Kanchanaburi had forbidden students 
from educational institutes in the province from protesting against the Yadana gas 
pipeline project. 
Bangkok Post reported that the head of PTT has pledged to honour the 30-year 
gas contract made with the Yadana consortium, ruling out any lowering of the 
agreed gas delivery volume and the price. 
The following sections describe in more detail the key aspects of the controversy. 
In March 1995, Thai environmental interest groups called for the pipeline proponents of 
both the Myanmar and Thai components of the project to release details of likely 
environmental and social impacts of the pipeline (Bangkok Post, 1995). Issues of 
concern to these interest groups included disturbance to forests and wildlife in the 
Thai/Myanmar border region, seismic risk to the pipeline stability26, social disturbance 
26 The highland region on the Thai-Myanmar border is a seismically-active fault zone. 
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to local communities, and concerns about the local residents' safety, given threats by 
ethnic Mon and Karen activists to sabotage the pipeline. The interest groups' request 
received no response from the project proponents. A lack of access to information on 
the project was perceived by these groups to be a block to public participation in the 
decision-making process. The Bangkok Post ( 12 March 1995) reported the director of 
the NGO, Toward Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance27 , as saying: 
"We have been trying to find out whether an environmental impact assessment has 
been conducted by the PTT but cannot get an answer." 
In June 1995, PTT engaged a Thai environmental consultancy firrn to prepare the EIA 
report for the Thai component of the pipeline28 . By this stage, PTT had chosen the 
pipeline route and dismissed all other potentially alternative alignments. The single 
proposed route included a stretch through 26 km of conservation forest and 18 km of a 
first-class watershed area in Kanchanaburi Province, a route apparently chosen to avoid 
militarily-sensitive border regions29 . 
In May 1996, the Thai Cabinet (led by Prime Minister Chavalit) approved the project in 
principle and gave approval to PTT30 to build the pipeline in the Huay Khayeng forest 
reserve, a 'lA' (first class) watershed area, subject to the endorsement of the National 
Environment Board (NEB). Later that month, PTT submitted the EIA report to the 
OEPP' s expert committee on infrastructure projects, for review and recommendation to 
the NEB. The committee quickly rejected the EIA, and OEPP ordered PTT to conduct 
further studies of the impacts on wildlife and the forest, and hold a public hearing. 
Following a series of further reviews and revisions, the NEB officially approved the 
27 The Toward Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), is a relatively recent Thai initiative 
established by the NGO group Project for Ecological Recovery (PER) and others, which is designed to 
build grassroots regional environmental links (Hirsch, 1995). 
28 Note: At this time it was not a legal requirement for an EIA to be prepared for the pipeline project as it 
was not a 'prescribed activity'. The legislation was amended in January 1996 to designate pipeline 
projects as a prescribed activity. Pursuant to Sections 46 and 51 of the 1992 ECNEQ Act, Notification No. 
3 of the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment Re: Prescription of Type and Size of Projects 
or Busi,:z.ess of Government Agencies, State Enterprises, or Private Organisations Required to Prepare 
Reports on Environmental Impact Analysis was issued on 22 January 1996. The Schedule annexed to 
Notification No. 3 prescribes petroleum operations (pipelines, exploration, production), regardless of the 
size of the project) as an activity for which an EIA report is required. 
29 An alternative route that followed the Thai-Myanmar border down to Suan Phung district had been 
considered, but was discounted because of security concerns that minority groups in Myanmar might try 
to sabotage the pipeline. 
30 By this stage, the official project manager was PTT Gas, following restructuring of the parent 
corporation, PTT. 
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EIA on 24 March 1997. Construction work began on the Thai component of the pipeline 
in ]ate March 1997. 
At the suggestion of the NEB, a multilateral committee (comprising pipeline supporters 
and opponents) was established by PTT for the purpose of monitoring the 
environmental impact of the project, settlement of disputes resulting from pipeline 
installation, and providing information on the project to the public. The committee, 
chaired by the Kanchanaburi provincial governor, was reportedly empowered to oversee 
the activities of various agencies involved in the project implementation and impose 
environmental mitigation measures. It met for the first time in May 1997, but soon after, 
the two conservation groups represented on the committee withdrew, citing "a lack of 
transparency" resulting from the refusal of the committee chairman and project 
supporters to provide details of contractual controls on the pipeline installation 
(Inchukul, 1997 a). 
Between March 1997 and February 1998, environmental groups, including the 
Kanchanaburi Conservation Group, Wildlife Fund Thailand and Friends of the Asian 
Elephant Foundation, supported by a section of the local community, mounted a public 
campaign to protest against the pipeline. Opposition politicians also spoke out, claiming 
the contractors who were awarded the pipeline installation contract were linked to the 
government, and that PTT had agreed to purchase the gas from Myanmar at a price that 
was higher than other viable sources, such as the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development 
Area (Ahmad, 1997e). Other accusations were made of corruption and unfair dealing in 
relation to payment of compensation monies to pipeline route landholders . A leader of a 
provincial conservation group accused PTT workers of 
"collaborating with kamnan [ sub-district leaders} and village chiefs in the Thong Pha 
Phum district to embezzle compensation money earmarked for payment to 
landowners". 
It was alleged that compensation rates were kept secret because they wanted to pay 
affected villagers at a lower rate than that determined by the committee. PTT was also 
accused of collaborating with influential community members to coerce villagers into 
letting the gas pipeline pass through their land. 
"They never explained to the villagers the dangers of having the pipeline on their land. 
They just told them to sign the land documents and take the cash. As a result all of 
them concurred" (Ridmontri, 1997a). 
All the while, PTT maintained an uncomprom1s1ng stance regarding the project's 
deadline (1 July 1998) and the pipeline route. 
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The Thai Ministry of Industry criticised PTT' s public relations can1paign for 
intensifying the conflict with environmental groups. A spokesperson for the Ministry 
suggested that PTT had not done enough to explain to the public the objectives of the 
project, details of how the pipeline would be laid, and its environmental effects. In the 
spokesperson' s opinion, PTT had fariled to explain the importance of the project 1n 
shoring up rising domestic energy consumption in the future (Bangkok Post, 1997b ). 
Opposition groups, supported by the influential Bangkok-based English language 
newspapers, Bangkok Post and The Nation, also protested against a lack of transparency 
in the planning and EIA approval process: 
"The PTT had the ti,ne to carry the,n [wildlife studies} out, but it didn't have a sense of 
urgency. The oil company knew the DEPP would succumb to political pressure and 
pass the EIA rather than cause a delay in construction that would force the payment of 
penalties. And that is exactly what happened. The OEPP meekly accepted the PTT1s 
promise to carry out further studies, and passed the report to the National Environment 
Board, which approved it forthwith" (The Nation, 5 May 1997 (Fahn, 1997a)). 
A spokesperson for the protest groups was reported as saying: 
"We are not against development projects per se, but we want the PIT-and other 
similar project agencies-to realise that we want them to inform and consult us. If the 
PTT had consulted the locals first of all, the EIAframework could have been set earlier 
and they could have exa,nined alternative options for gas pipeline routes" (J anchitfah, 
1997). 
In an article in the Bangkok Post on 4 October 1997 (Ridmontri, 1997b ), PTT and the 
government approval process were again heavily criticised: 
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"Without the legal requirem,ent for the PTT to conduct an EIA [ at the time it 
commenced project planning in 1995 }, the NEB was not obliged to weigh the validity 
of the EIA conducted by the PTT itself or to reject the project if the EIA failed to pass 
environmental muster. Its approval was a matter of course. Without this crucial legal 
mechanism, the technical hearing last February, at which the PTT revealed 
engineering details to conservation groups and the setting up of the monitoring 
committee thereafter, were meaningless. Everything had been accomplished without 
any input from conservation groups. 
The state-minded monitoring co,nmittee did not question anything about the project for 
fear it would contravene government policy. It was dominated from the beginning by its 
bureaucratic niembers and others with vested interests, such as kamnan, village chiefs 
and the local media-the latter expecting to do very well from advertising from the 
PTT and businessmen who will benefit fro,n the cheap energy. 
The appeals by conservation groups to make the contracts public were met with claims 
that this would threaten "national security". Representing "national security" are a 
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handful of factori es in the western industrial estates that will benefit directly from the 
power generated from. the gas. Whether common villagers benefit is of no concern, and 
the destruction of forests, whether it be over 50 km or 6 km, is seen as a small sacrifice. 
Having failed to make any ground as members of the monitoring committee, its 
grassroots and conservation groups can only provide information on what they see as 
the ill-effects of the project and keep an eye on the PTT' s contractors. After all, the 
official record and reality are two different things. 
As for the new monitoring committee, which incidentally is made up solely of 
government representatives, it can be expected to fare as well, or as poorly, as its 
predecessor. This is inevitable as long as the PTT insists on going ahead with the 
project without answering any of the important questions and continues to distort the 
views of its opponents." 
There is some evidence that PTT began to seriously consider some of the local 
concerns, albeit later in the year. In a Bangkok Post article of 7 December 1997, 
Ridmontri (1997c) reported that PTT was making a genuine attempt to rmn1m1se 
destruction of vegetation in the sensitive 50 km section of the pipeline route: 
"Despite cabinet approval that the PTT cut all trees along the 50 km forest section, Mr 
Songkiert [ PTT Public Relations Director J said for the sake of nature, the PTT would 
remove and transplant valuable trees such as hardwood to other areas that are 
appropriate for them. Lert Chanthanaphap, a forestry lecturer at Kasetsart University 
who is hired by the PTT to oversee the transplant work, said trees with circumferences 
less than 60 cm would be removed and transplanted immediately . ... He said: 'We 
should praise the PTT for trying to transplant trees. We have to accept that the mission 
will not be one hundred percent successful but this shows that the PTT listens to the 
public and is committed to do the best for social good and the environment.' The 
transplant operation started on December 5 to celebrate the King's birthday." 
Nevertheless, in a Bangkok Post article published on 7 February 1998, Dr Songkiert 
Tansamrit, PTT' s Public Relations Director reportedly stated that PTT could not yield to 
its opponents' demands for involvement because the project began when the previous 
constitution31 was in force, "barring public participation" in decision-making in 
government development projects (Ridmontri, 1998a). This is arguably a narrow 
interpretation of the previous Constitution-Article 47 provided for people to 
participate in the debate on projects and activities that affect their livelihood (J anchitfah, 
1998). 
In early February 1998, amidst the ongoing protests and conflict (including clashes 
between protesters and pipeline workers), a group of prominent academics urged Prime 
31 Thailand's current Constitution was promulgated on 11 October 1997. 
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Minister Chuan Leekpai32 to set up a public hearing forum on the Yadana gas pipeline 
project (Chinvarakorn and Achakulwisut, 1998). A 'national committee', chaired by 
former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, was established to review the project, 
identify disputes between supporters and opponents of the project, and make project-
specific recommendations to the government. The committee conducted a five day 
hearing in mid February 1998. The following were key revelations of the National 
Committee hearing (Dhongchai, 1998): 
i) The clailn that any failure to meet the 1 July 1998 deadline will incur hefty fines is 
unfounded. On 15 February 1998, PTT confirmed the conservationists' assertion that the 
date of commencement was 1 August 1998. Any penalty can only be imposed after that 
date. 
ii) Furthermore, EGAT's Ratchaburi power station construction is behind schedule, due to 
funding constraints, which will further delay acceptance of gas fr01n Myanmar, a 
situation which PTT can negotiate with the Myanmar government. 
iii) EGAT' s assistant director, Mr Sirithat Klankwamdi, testified that the construction of the 
Ratchaburi power station will increase the reserve electricity supply to 25%, based on the 
current forecast of electricity demand-the present reserve of electricity is calculated by 
EGAT to stand at 12% (as at February 1998). This reserve is considered to be in excess 
of requirements, particularly as power demand has decreased during the country's 
econonuc cnsis. 
iv) Since signing the gas purchase agreement with Myanmar in 1993, PTT and EGAT had 
changed their plans for supplying the Thai electricity grid, such as bringing on-line 
additional gas from the Gulf of Thailand. As a consequence the generating capacity of the 
Ratchaburi power station may be downsized to 2,000 MW ( cf proposed capacity of 3,500 
MW), leaving a surplus of gas coming from the fixed take or pay contract with the 
Myanmar suppliers. 
At the close of the hearing, Mr Anand stated: 
"/ want to clarify that this conflict is not the fault of the PTT, the cabinet or the 
government. But it is the social failure of the decision-making process in this country. 
There will be no winner or loser in this case" (Inchukul, 1998). 
Following the completion of the public hearing, PTT was subject to damning criticism 
by The Nation newspaper on 24 February 1998 (The Nation, 1998a): 
"The deceptions, misleading statements and bare-faced misrepresentations of the PTT 
in support of its own agenda keep piling up. . . . It used the fines written into the 
32 Prime Minister Chavalit resigned in June 1997. His successor, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, was 
elected in November 1997. 
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contract it signed as a stick to beat back the arguments of conservationists, who had 
sought a delay and review of the project to lessen its impact on sensitive forests along 
the border. However, despite repeated demands, the PTT never allowed the public to 
see the contract itself. Now we know 1,vhy. After EGAT announced during the hearings 
that the power plant would be delayed, perhaps for several months, PTT officials 
reported that it would not lose that much money after all: the Bt40 million it must pay 
to Burma would go toward future gas purchases . ... 
The implication is clear: the PTT apparently believes that a delay caused by EGAT's 
construction woes is more acceptable than a delay aimed at trying to protect one of 
Thailand's few remaining forests .... 
There are plenty of other instances where the PTT has misled the public: The PTT has 
often claimed that the pipeline's entry point into Thailand at Ban I-Tong village in 
Kanchanaburi was agreed upon by both Thai and Burmese officials, implying that it is 
the best route for both sides. But at the hearings last week, the state oil company 
conceded that it was Bunna which insisted on selling the gas at Ban I-Tong-thus 
forcing the pipeline to pass through Thailand's Huay Khayeng forest, a lA watershed 
reserve-or not selling it to Thailand at all. The PTT claimed that it would take special 
care when working in forest areas, limiting the track to a width of 12 metres instead of 
the normal 20 metres. But a video taken of the logging in Huay Khayeng forest in 
January, and presented by Kanchanaburi conservationist Phinan Chotirosseranee at 
the hearing last week, showed that the operations were carried out carelessly. As some 
of the bigger trees were felled, they carved out a wide swathe of damage, knocking 
down other trees beyond even the 20 metre limit. PTT and Forest Industry 
Organisation officials reportedly stood and watched it all happen .... 
The PTT's approach seems to be to say whatever it thinks is necessary in support of the 
project, no matter how economical it is with the truth. ... If he [Piti Yimprasert, 
President of the PTT's natural gas business] had simply stated what the threats were 
and what had been done to counter them, most observers would have been satisfied . ... 
PTT must work harder to improve its environmental expertise. Its reforestation 
campaign is commendable, but protecting the environment is not just a matter of 
planting trees or donating money to fix problems. It must raise awareness about 
environmental effects at every level of its operations in order to minimise problems in 
the first place". 
This media report was supported by the official review report handed down by Anand' s 
National Committee to the public and Prime Minister Chuan on 25 February 1998. The 
report concluded that: 
"The process in deciding and implementing the project lacks transparency and fails to 
consider people's feelings, especially those affected directly" (cited by Ridmontri , 
1998b). 
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"The project's decision-making is not transparent, and the EIA was conducted without 
public participation. Instead there was only public relations . ... It [the PTT] adheres to 
the old paradigm that the power of a state agency is above the rights and freedom of 
the people" (cited by Fahn and Hongthong, 1998). 
The National Committee found that PTT's failings in terms of public participation and 
environ1nental impact were key factors in the dispute. Committee Chairman, Mr Anand 
was reported as saying, 
"The entire committee agrees that the conflict surrounding the pipeline project was 
caused by a lack of information, so the government must learn from this case that it 
must distribute information and hold public hearings before approving any project" 
(Fahn and Hongthong, 1998). 
The National Committee suggested that the government act immediately to ease the 
impact on communities along the route and set up a body to monitor the mitigation of 
the social and environmental impacts. The Committee recommended that the body 
comprise more local people than officials and be chaired by a member of the NEB, with 
the OEPP as the secretariat. The previous committee, headed by the Kanchanaburi 
Governor, was perceived to have been ineffective because it was dominated by officials 
(Fahn and Hongthong, 1998). 
In response to the National Committee's report, PTT Gas' President, Piti Yimprasert 
was reported in The Nation on 26 February 1998 as saying, 
"What is the definition of the public? If it only refers to villagers affected by the 
project, then I insist that we have given the,n enough information, and more than 90% 
of them agree with construction" (Fahn and Hongthong, 1998). 
Piti' s statement of 26 February drew a scathing retort in an editorial in The Nation on 27 
February 1998 (The Nation, 1998b ): 
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"The PTT's own EIA shows how ludicrous this argu,nent is: a poll their consultants 
carried out showed that only two of 136 local people sampled understood what the 
project is; 110 said they had no knowledge about it at all. But it is precisely this issue 
of "public interest" which is at stake and is the root cause of the dispute, not only with 
this gas pipeline project, but also other controversial infrastructure projects 
throughout the country. The PTT and other such agencies do not seem to understand 
that public interest is not local interest. The PTT might think that the public interest is 
being served with gas from Burma to generate electricity, and community interest is 
served by getting support from the local village headmen after offering incentives and 
assistance. But public interest is far more subtle than that. The PTT is a state-owned 
agency and therefore "owned" by every single Thai. It is a national asset. So, too, is the 
watershed forest which is home to endangered wildlife and through which the pipeline 
is being built. Impartiality is therefore required to decide which asset must be 
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sacrificed for the other, and by how much". 
A review of PTT' s overall approach to this project seems to reflect an organisation 
whose culture is still strongly embedded in its origin as a state-owned enterprise. 
According to an article in the Bangkok Post on 8 March 1998 (J anchitfah, 1998): 
"The PTT believes they have acted for the good of the country, and that their actions 
have been legitimised by cabinet resolutions, the chamber of com1nerce and provincial 
authorities. These official organisations agree with the PTT that opponents of the gas 
pipeline project are "ill-intentioned", violent protesters. They believe they have done 
their bit to conserve the environment." 
When interviewed for this research in May 1998, the PTT Public Relations Director, Dr 
Songkiert Tansamrit, lamented that government officials have traditionally initiated the 
EIA process in Thailand. Further, the top-down management style adopted by PTT' s 
senior management did not acknowledge the corporate social responsibility to provide 
for early or adequate on-going community involvement in its projects-it is too late to 
involve the public in a meaningful way, once the EIA has been prepared. As a result of 
his experience with the Yadana project, Dr Songkiert indicated that he is now a firm 
believer that there needs to be provision for early community involvement in the EIA 
process. Earlier in the year, following the release of the National Committee report, he 
was reported as saying that the national committee review process set a welcome 
precedent for resolving conflicts about large projects. 
"At least the PTT will use this process of public hearing as an integral part of future 
projects" (Ridmontri, 1998b ). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, PTT Gas is also engaged in the Trans Thailand-Malaysia 
(TTM) gas project, which comprises construction of gas pipelines and gas separation 
facilities in southern Thailand. In April 1998, the Thai parliament's house committee 
reportedly voiced concerns over the environmental impact of the onshore section of the 
pipeline and called for the government to hold a public referendum into the project. This 
call was apparently not heeded by the government, but it was publicly stated that 
Thailand would have a public hearing prior to project approval (Battersby, 1998c ). 
According to a PTT Gas employee interviewed in July 1998, a new division (initially 
with four staff) had been established within PTT Gas, with a brief to conduct on-going 
environmental monitoring of the Yadana pipeline, and manage environmental studies 
for future projects. The interviewee stated that as a result of lessons learnt from the 
Yadana project, the engineering and environmental studies for new pipeline projects are 
being approached in a different way. At the time of interview, the company was 
reportedly conducting a pipeline route selection study, involving engineers and 
environmental scientists, and permitting personnel to identify landowners and 
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compensation issues. In this new pipeline project, the interviewee stated that PTT Gas 
had undertaken public consultation in the project area (Songkhla). (A Unocal Thailand 
employee interviewed in July 1998 independently stated that PTT had sought advice on 
community consultation from Unocal in regard to its new pipeline project). 
The PTT Gas interviewee also stated that the company had taken heed of the 
community's concern over the credibility of PTT-appointed environmental consultants. 
Preparation of the EIA was put out to tender by consultants in early 1998, but PTT Gas 
subsequently changed its mind and assigned the EIA preparation to the environmental 
studies department of the Prince of Songkhla University, which has the trust and respect 
of the local community. 
6.6 STAKEHOLDER CLAIMS AND STRATEGIES OF ENGAGEMENT 
The following comparative analysis of the two case studies, draws upon the theoretical 
framework of influence-response relationships in stakeholder-organisation relations that 
was developed in Chapter 2. Summaries of the case study findings are presented within 
this framework in Table 6-3 and Figure 6-3 (Unocal Thailand mercury issue) and Table 
6-4 and Figure 6-4 (PTT Yadana gas sales pipeline). 
In the Unocal Thailand case study, the media and the Chulalongkorn University 
professor essentially represent the community's stakeholder claim. As indicated 1n 
Table 6-3 and Figure 6-3, these stakeholders' claims possessed the attributes of 
legitimacy and urgency, but they lacked power. As such, they can be classified as 
dependent expectant stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997). 
Similarly, the opposing stakeholders' claims in the PTT case study only possessed the 
attributes of legitimacy and urgency, and also therefore were dependent expectant 
stakeholders. However, PTT' s supportive stakeholder group included local government 
officials and village leaders, which gave this group the additional attribute of power, 
thereby placing them in the category of definitive stakeholders (Table 6-4 and Figure 6-
4). Following the release of the National Committee report in February 1998, the PTT 
project opponents acquired this attribute of power through the support of the report 
findings, but this empowerment came too late for them to achieve their aims for this 
particular project. 
In both cases, the proponents (Unocal Thailand and PTT) had 'state approval' for their 
projects, but their opposing stakeholders, who possessed discursive legitimacy to speak 
for Thai society ( or at least sectors of it), deemed that the companies did not possess 
social legitimacy in relation to their projects. As such, the opponents were attempting to 
change the social domain in which the proponents were accustomed to operating. 
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In the Unocal Thailand case, the media sought to redefine the routine operation of 
mercury discharge as a polluting activity which endangered ecological and community 
health. In the Yadana pipeline case, the project opponents sought to focus public 
concerns on wildlife and habitat conservation and inadequate public participation in 
decision-making processes, to challenge PTT' s view of the project as serving the 
"national interest". 
6.7 MANAGERIAL PERCEPTION OF SALIENCE 
In developing the conceptual framework of corporate responsiveness presented in 
Chapter 2 (Figure 2-5), it is suggested that ma·nagerial perception of stakeholder 
salience can have a marked influence on how company managers react to stakeholder 
claims, and that managerial perception is in tum affected by the individual's 
backgrounds and positions. 
In the case studies, the two proponents (Unocal Thailand and PTT) appear to have 
chosen different approaches to responding to the challenges issued by stakeholder 
claims, despite the apparent equal standing of the respective opposing stakeholder 
groups. The fundamental difference in approach appears to stem from the managers' 
perceptions of stakeholder salience. In preceding chapters it has been suggested that 
managerial perception of stakeholder salience is influenced by three categories of 
factors: 'external', 'moderating' and 'mediating'. Figures 6-3 and 6-4 highlight the 
specific factors that appear to have been most influential in each case study. These are 
discussed in the following sections. 
6.7.1 External Factors 
As suggested in Chapter 2, the external factors (market behaviour, legal-regulatory 
influences and social expectation) can be directly related to the concept of corporate 
social and environmental responsibility. A driving force behind this concept is the 
inherent threat that if companies do not take appropriate action to demonstrate that they 
are being responsive to society's expectations over the long term, the public may take 
the initiative to alter business' role in society. Changes may be introduced through the 
introduction of more government regulation, or some other form of unwelcome formal 
intervention in business' operations (Carroll, 1996). 
It is not uncommon for stakeholders to demand that companies perform at levels which 
'go beyond regulation'. As observed by Mechai Viravaidya, Chairman of PTTEP's 
Board of Directors, in Thailand there is a growing recognition of the shortcomings of its 
environmental legislation and government resources. The public now expects industry 
to drive itself to improve performance and respond to community expectations, and rely 
less on the government to set and enforce drivers (Viravaidya, 1998). 
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Table 6-3. Unocal Thailand Case Study-Stakeholder Relations 
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Figure 6-3 Influence-Response Relationships: Unocal Thailand Case Study 
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• Collaboration (2) 
• Compliance 
• Contention ( 1 ) 




EMPLOYED BY UNOCAL 
THAILAND: 
• Reciprocal Collaboration (2) 
• Regulation 
• Marginalisation ( 1) 
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EXTERNAL FACTORS: 
• Market behaviour 
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MODERATING FACTORS: 
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• Human resource availability 
• Opportunity, cost 
MEDIATING FACTORS: 
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• Corporate ethics 
assessment 
KEY: D indicates apparent presence of influence or strategy. (1) Indicates initial strategy used with or by 
· Unocal's opposing stakeholders (2) Indicates final strategy used with or by Unocal 's opposing stakeholders 
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Table 6-4. PTT Yadana Gas Pipeline Case Study-Stakeholder Relations 
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Figure 6-4 Influence-Response Relationships: Yadana Gas Pipeline Case Study 





STRATEGIES OF ENGAGEMENT 
EMPLOYED BY OPPOSING 
STAKEHOLDERS: 
• Collaboration (S) 
• Compliance 
• Contention 




EMPLOYED BY PTT: 
• Reciprocal Collaboration 
• Regulation 
• Marginalisation (0) 
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EXTERNAL FACTORS: MODERATING FACTORS: MEDIATING FACTORS: 
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• Legal-regulatory influences 
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• Capital availability 
• Human resource availability 
• Opportunity, cost 
• Leadership 
• Corporate tradition/culture 
• Corporate ethics 
assessment . . __ 
KEY: D indicates apparent presence of influence or strategy. (0) Only applicable to PTT's opposing stakeholders 
' (S) Only applicable to PTT's supporting stakeholders 
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In both case studies, social expectation, expressed through community outrage, appears 
to have been the primary influential external factor affecting managers' perception of 
stakeholder salience. The influence of other external factors was not so apparent, as both 
proponents were already operating in compliance with the prevailing legal framework, 
and market behaviour did not appear to play a direct role. Although, it could be argued 
that Unocal' s response reflected a concern that the issue could potentially arouse a 
market reaction either in the short-term or at some later point. 
Unocal Thailand appeared to perceive the public backlash as a warning that required 
positive action, whereas PTT appeared to perceive it as a time- and resource-consuming 
nuisance. Unocal' s reaction supports other researchers' observations of multinational 
company behaviour in developing countries. Referring to foreign subsidiaries of 
multinationals operating in Greater China and Latin America, Moser and Tsai ( 1998) 
suggest that these subsidiaries are often subject to greater external institutional pressure 
relative to other company types. This pressure is exerted by the corporate headquarters, 
the host government and 'informal legislators' (NGOs/media). DiMaggio (1988, cited 
by Moser and Tsai, 1998) suggests that in the interest of commercial survival in a 
foreign host country, multinational companies "accede to the demands of other actors 
on which they depend for resource and legitimacy". 
In comparison, Moser and Tsai ( 1998) found that local companies generally only 
respond to local institutional pressure. This response was evident in PTT' s reactions to 
stakeholder claim-its primary influence was the Thai Government. 
6. 7 .2 Mediating Factors 
It has been suggested that the mediating influences of business unit and corporate 
leadership, company culture and ethics are important in determining company responses 
to external challenges. The innovative, committed leadership of Unocal Thailand, 
supported by corporate leaders in Unocal Corporation, appears to have been a key factor 
in the success of Unocal Thailand's response to the mercury issue controversy. These 
attributes are also evident in the company's on-going environmental management 
initiatives, and its 'bridging' activities with its host community. The company's 
approach appeared to be demonstrative of a 'prospector' culture (Miles and Snow, 
1978),_ which characteristically thrives on change, favouring strategies of business line 
and/or market development using a more creative and flexible management style. The 
managers recognised that the company's communication and community participation 
practices did not meet Thai society's expectations, and that substantial changes to 
approaches and procedures were required immediately. Unocal Thailand appeared to 
adopt a multiple stakeholder stance in its response to the mercury issue, and in the 
upgrade of its company-wide management system. Companies subscribing to this 
approach will often go beyond the minimum obligations of corporate governance, 
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advocating that the performance of the company should be measured in a much more 
pluralistic way than through its bottom line (Johnson and Scholes, 1997). 
A Unocal Thailand employee interviewed for this research stated that Unocal' s 
corporate business focus is on Asia and establishment of sustainable business in this 
area is a key performance objective. Hence, the mercury controversy was perceived as a 
threat to the company's aims, and senior management quickly assessed it as an issue 
that needed to be addressed and positively resolved. Both the business unit management 
and senior management within Unocal Corporation provided positive, proactive support 
for additional ecological monitoring studies, and research and development programmes 
to improve treatment and disposal of the produced water. The amount of expenditure 
required to address these issues was substantial (US$550,000 to conduct research on 
n1ercury levels and impacts, US$200,000 for follow-up monitoring, and US$6.5 million 
spent on developing and implementing the water treatment technology), but corporate 
management reportedly considered this financial outlay to be minor in comparison with 
the value of the corporation's current and future investment in the region. Furthermore, 
the internal organisational learning and technological developments gained from this 
work were perceived by management to be valuable benefits that could be shared with 
other Unocal subsidiaries around the world. 
The company's strategic vision is evident in the following statement by the Director, 
Health, Environment and Safety, Unocal Thailand, in the company's "1998 GO-HES 
Review and Action Plan" (Unocal Thailand Ltd, 1998): 
"We are quite proud that the value of our pro-activeness was demonstrated during 
1997 with the relatively quick resolution of the mercury issue, the acceptance of our 
environniental impact assessment for the drilling in the Andaman Sea and by being one 
of the first E & P companies in the world our size to obtain ISO 14001 Certification. 
vVe see this as identifying Unocal as an industry leader and providing us a competitive 
advantage for future developments". 
In comparison, the leadership demonstrated by PTT' s entrenched bureaucratic 
management culture appears to have limited the vision of that organisation, and 
encouraged a 'buffering' approach to external challenges. PTT' s approach to the 
Yadana gas pipeline challenge reflected a 'defender' culture (Miles and Snow, 1978)-
the company appeared to perceive change as a threat. PTT was introduced in Chapter 4, 
as the state-owned petroleum enterprise that is in the process of undergoing 
corporatisation and privatisation in response to the perceived need to become more 
efficient, competitive and profitable in the local and regional energy sector market: 
"The new corporate reorganisation of PTT has been focused on a more business-
oriented role with international standard measure for operational appraisal. Human 
resource development is encouraged to cater for the state-of-the-art technology 
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selection for the work system improvement for reduced costs and quickening work 
stages on a par with leading private sector agencies. However, PTT will not ignore its 
major function as a state tool in creating energy security of the country concurrently 
with a resolute stand point in environmental preservation" (PTT, 1996). 
Despite its rhetoric, PTT applied a bureaucratic approach to handling the Yaclana 
controversy and employed a strategy that sought to provide continuity and security to its 
preferred modus operandi. PTT management appeared to regard the opposition it 
encountered as being a problem that had arisen from external project constraints 
imposed by the government's contractual obligations and the urgent need to serve the 
"national interest". As such, PTT claimed that it was doing its best, under the 
circumstances, and, therefore, should be allowed to continue as originally planned. 
Overall, it appeared to adopt a 'short-term shareholder stance' (Johnson and Scholes, 
1997). Its primary focus was on attending to the interests of its shareholders, in this 
case, the Thai Government. 
Evidence suggests that PTT may take some time to evolve from its entrenched state 
enterprise culture. According to Handley ( 1997), PTT is regarded as one of the more 
efficient Thai State enterprises, but has historically been under strong army influence 
and, as indicated earlier, there is evidence to suggest that its privatisation has been 
resisted and compromised by internal political agenda. 
An interviewee from PTT' s publicly-listed subsidiary, PTTEP, observed that PTT still 
has an entrenched state government enterprise mentality and took a bureaucratic 
approach to community consultation, which led to the community backlash over the 
Yadana project. Another petroleum company interviewee observed that PTT has 
historically only managed relatively small projects and therefore, when the company 
embarked on the Yadana project, key staff lacked experience of big projects and an 
understanding of the associated issues and level of public interest. The interviewee 
suggested that PTT' s lack of experience was reflected in its initial poor handling of 
public relations, and its decision to take a "cheap approach" in engaging its EIA 
consultant, with the result that the EIA was of poor quality. Another inherent problem in 
PTT' s approach was perceived to be the company's "engineering mindset" which 
limited the organisation's vision to technical matters-they failed to see that society's 
perceptions have been changing and that environmental law expectations are evolving. 
To summarise, it is suggested that the individual approaches taken by Unocal and PTT 
reflect the differing managerial perceptions of stakeholder salience and cultures of these 
organisations. 
6. 7 .3 Moderating Factors 
Moderating factors, as defined in this study include organisational adaptability, capital 
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technology. In terms of their influence on managerial decision-making processes , both 
proponents (Unocal and PTT) appeared to possess adequate resources in the form of 
available capital , human resources and technology to address the issues in question, but 
Unocal appeared to demonstrate relatively superior organisational adaptability (compare 
Figure 6-3 with Figure 6-4). 
Organisational learning and stakeholder salience are believed to be key influences on 
corporate social and environmental responsiveness. Post and Altman ( 1992) suggest that 
"effective responses to social concerns occur where managers have explicitly processed 
lessons learned from past experience". According to a Unocal Thailand interviewee, 
when the mercury controversy emerged, personnel within the Unocal Corporation drew 
upon previous learning experiences. They had observed the public relations impact of 
public outcry over mercury concerns in other projects in the US. Therefore, when they 
saw the same issues arising in Thailand, they recognised the potential problems and 
quickly took action. This example reinforced the earlier learning, so there was no 
hesitation in taking action, and the controversy was not dismissed as a one-off issue to 
be ignored. 
Unocal' s response to the mercury controversy appears to be an example of 'double-
loop' organisational learning (Argyris and Schon, 1978). The company recognised that 
it not only needed to constructively address the issue at hand, but also revise its whole 
approach to operating within Thailand's changing social framework. From the 
company's perspective (McDaniel et al., 1998), this incident highlighted a number of 
issues, including: 
• "the need to develop "an approach to environmental issues through an understanding of 
the 'outrage factors' which make people upset"; 
• "the ilnportance of working within-rather than against-the cultural and legal 
expectations of different lands"; and 
• "the process of identifying and involving stakeholders and credible sources of 
information". 
Neale ( 1997) suggests that, while organisational learning is a necessary condition for the 
environmental innovation that is required to demonstrate corporate social and 
environmental responsiveness, it should be accompanied by a willingness to ally with 
others to achieve real change. Unocal Thailand appeared to demonstrate a high capacity 
for learning and a high capacity for alliance building, thus enabling the organisation to 
develop and implement innovative ideas in association with its stakeholders. 
A Unocal Thailand employee interviewed in May 1998, said the company has launched 
a "Friendship to Communities Programme". The company was said to be planning a 
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new project in the Gulf of Thailand, to which it was applying lessons learnt from the 
Yadana pipeline and mercury issue controversies. The company is striving to be open, 
communicative and inclusive from the early planning stage, and is involving the public 
in development of the terms of reference for the project's EIA. Stakeholders have been 
identified to include NGOs, joint venture partners, other exploration and production 
companies, local environmental groups (e.g. Songkhla Action Group (SAG)), media and 
government departments. SAG was reportedly identified through the Prince of Songkhla 
University and other key contacts, but, in order to win their trust and engage their co-
operation, Unocal Thailand needed to demonstrate sincerity-SAG had expressed a 
concern that it did not want to be "used" to endorse the company's activities. 
Unocal Thailand has also been actively promoting its learning experiences amongst its 
industry peers. For example, the company was encouraging neighbouring Gulf of 
Thailand operators to all use the same laboratory to analyse samples collected in their 
respective mercury monitoring programmes, so that the results can be validly compared 
and compiled in a common database. 
"Through our environmental management system, Unocal Thailand has been actively 
studying the impacts and evaluating treatment technologies for produced formation 
water since 1990, disclosing our information to the government at every stage. We 
have generated an extensive database of both baseline and repetitive sampling results. 
More importantly, this effort over the past seven years has led to a variety of 
breakthrough technologies including skim tanks with Vortex tubes, hydrocyclones 
combined with a Unocal patented process of chemical flocculation, and, in some cases, 
deep well injection . ... It is the kind of data that will allow industry and government to 
jointly make sound management planning decisions" (Marcotte, 1998). 
The reported changes to PTT Gas' operating procedures in mid-1998 suggest that PTT 
also possesses a measure of organisational adaptability, but it appeared to have been 
driven by institutional pressure, as compared with the apparently strong element of 
innovation in Unocal' s actions. The extent to which PTT has undergone double-loop 
organisational learning as a result of the Yadana gas pipeline experience is unclear. 
According to Neale ( 1997)' s model of organisational learning and capacity for alliance 
building, PTT demonstrated a theroretically high capacity for learning, but a low 
capacity for alliance building with its opponents. It appeared to be trapped in the 
'groupthink' organisational mindset, which inevitably led to confrontation with its 
opponents. As observed by a petroleum industry interviewee "[PTT] is state-owned and 
therefore still thinks that they can do what they want". 
Some of PTT' s industry peers have expressed a level of scepticism about how long it 
will take PTT to fully learn the lessons of the Yadana project experience. A petroleum 
company employee, interviewed in May 1998, indicated that he did not believe that an 
appreciation of the key issues had yet been cultivated within middle management of 
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PTT. The interviewee perceived that development of such an appreciation would be a 
slow process-largely because he believes that it takes longer to change the culture of a 
state enterprise as compared with a private sector company. The interviewee observed 
that the Yadana pipeline controversy was PTT' s first "bad experience", and therefore 
some of PTT' s staff consider that it just may have been "bad luck". In comparison, he 
suggested that EGAT, another state enterprise, has been through many learning 
experiences with its power projects and over time has learnt to be more environmentally 
aware and communicative than PTT. (This observation was also independently made by 
an interviewee from the print media). 
To conclude, the outcomes of the learning experiences of the case study proponents 
suggest that the more progressive responses to social and environmental concerns were 
initiated by Unocal Thailand, because it recognised the 'bigger picture' implications of 
its actions and the need to protect its reputation. In particular, the public challenge to its 
'licence to operate' appeared to be especially important for Unocal Thailand, whose 
competitive advantage, it believes, lies in being "first", "biggest" and "best". 
6. 7 .4 Legitimation Strategies 
From an issues management perspective, a company must determine how best to engage 
its stakeholders, so that their respective interests and goals are not irrevocably opposed 
to one another. The cultural context, and the outcome of the analysis of the stakeholder 
environment often determine the company approach. Unocal Thailand's actions 
appeared to reflect the 'stakeholder synthesis' approach (Goodpaster, 1991). The 
company recognised that it had moral responsibilities to its stakeholders and should 
conduct itself ethically, while protecting fiduciary interests of its shareholders at the 
same time. PTT's action appears to reflect the 'strategic' approach (Goodpaster, 1991), 
that is, it seemed to view its stakeholders primarily as factors to be taken into 
consideration and managed while the company pursued its project for the benefit of its 
shareholders (the Thai Government). 
In the Unocal case study, the company's managers appeared to change their perception 
of the stakeholder claim relatively quickly, and moved to adopt an inclusive and 
collaborative strategy to engage the regulators and academic authorities, while adopting 
an apparently 'co-optative' (Hardy and Phillips , 1998) strategy to handle media 
relations. As described by McDaniel et al. (1998, p. 5), 
"Unocal Thailand discovered that, although it had performed mercury monitoring and 
conducted health and ecological studies in the past, the company could not gain 
credibility with the press or the public without a proactive strategy to make those 
results available . ... It is important for a multinational company to understand the 
practices and customs guiding the media in the countries where it does business, and to 
establish lines of communication that are as open as possible within the cultural 
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context. Unocal Thailand initially made the error of assuming that the practice of 
communicating with the press through a Thai agency would last indefinitely. Once the 
situation demanded the personal involvement of the company's top managers, Unocal 
Thailand had to hurry to get prepared." 
Collaboration, as an engagement strategy, may be seen as a means of reducing 
uncertainty, acquiring resources, and solving problems (Hardy and Phillips, 1998; 
Larsson et al., 1998). Unocal Thailand saw an opportunity to use collaboration as a way 
to positively engage and empower its stakeholders and co-opt them to assist with 
resolving the concerns. Its management responses to the challenge were characteristic of 
the company 'legitimation' strategies that have been described by Epstein and Votaw 
(1978) and Lindblom (1994). 
Collaboration may also be used as an engagement strategy to defend against incursions 
by new stakeholders who want to redefine the domain in a way that threatens existing 
patterns of advantage (Dutton and Duncan, 1987). In the Yadana case study, PTT 
supporters appear to have been engaged in collaboration with the proponent for the 
purpose of marginalising some of the opposing locals' concerns and claims. Dr Surichai 
Wankaew, Director of Chulalongkorn University's Social Development Studies Centre, 
in Kanchanaburi, was reported to say that some participants in the controversy had 
attempted to localise the issue by the divide-and-rule strategy, branding the gas pipeline 
project protesters as "ill-intentioned people" or the opposition (J anchitfah, 1998). 
PTT' s approach also demonstrated usage of its superior political weight and power to 
manipulate and repress its critics. As reported by Ridmontri and Techawongtham ( 1998) 
during the pipeline controversy, 
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"At first, only the local Kanchanaburi Conservation Group and a couple of other 
environmental NGOs demanded the PTT reassess the environmental impact. Perceived 
as the underdog, they captured the public's attention and sympathy earlier and caused 
some consternation to the developer. The PTT fought back. But being new to fighting 
for public opinion, it was clumsy at first. It provided very few facts to the public and 
was seen as using coercion and threats against complaining residents. It stonewalled 
the opponent's demand for details of the contracts it signed with the gas exploration 
consortium and its contractors." 
- [Now J "The PTT is showing the most savvy in dealing with its foes by agreeing to 
engage in a series of talks with its opponents, even at the expense of halting 
construction for a few days during the talks. But all attempts not surprisingly have 
failed to yield any substantive results. Indeed, it can be seen as an attempt by the PTT 
to buy time and pacify its opponents, stringing them along until they become exhausted 
and the PTT gains the upper hand. Its sincerity to resolve the dispute is questionable 
given its insistence that the pipeline route could not be diverted even from the 6 km 
stretch of fertile forest, allowing no room for compromise ... For their part, the 
opponents can rely on their only source of support - from sympathisers among NGOs, 
I 
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students' groups, academics and environmental lawyers - to get their message across 
through the press. But their meagre resources cannot compare 1-vith the PTT's, and this 
shows in the disarray of the movement, the low morale of its troops, and their leaders' 
feeling of isolation and frustration. Most of the public appear to be no better informed 
of their cause. If it has shown any interest at all, it is that it will benefit from cheap 
energy. The opponent's threat to sue the PTT was not taken seriously and is unlikely to 
succeed. They also have got nothing from all the negotiations with the PTT". 
The strategies adopted by Unocal Thailand and PTT may also be analysed using the 
strategic choice n1odel of Ghobadian et al. (1998). Unocal Thailand appeared at the 
outset of the mercury controversy to be a 'compliance plus' company. It had adopted a 
relatively proactive stance in addressing its mercury production and disposal problem, 
and had introduced n1anagement systems to enable the company to monitor and verify 
its operations, and implement change. However, as a result of the communication 
challenge issued by its opponents, Unocal Thailand appeared to adopt the characteristics 
of a 'speculative commitment' company. While its actions were commendable, it is 
suggested that they were primarily financially driven (commercial risk), and therefore 
are not demonstrative of an 'excellence or leading edge' company, despite the 
company's self-perception as "an industry leader" (Unocal Thailand Ltd, 1998). _ 
In comparison, PTT' s behaviour in the Yadana gas pipeline case study appeared to fit 
Ghobadian et al. (1998)'s description of a 'compliant' or 'restrained commitment' 
company. The company's performance was fundamentally reactive, and it appeared not 
to have recognised the degree of its social and environmental responsibility for the 
issues involved. 'Restrained commitment' companies characteristically may feel the 
need to make environmentally avvare statements of intent, but experience little in the 
way of external pressure to convert these attitudes into actions. Ho\vever, if 
circumstances shift and pressures develop, a 'restrained commitment' company may 
develop active policies to meet its previously espoused environmental commitments. 
'Restrained commitment' companies are therefore expected to have well developed 
contingency plans, based upon the managers' perception of likely moves in external 
factors, and the potential offered by the company's moderating factors (Ghobadian et 
al .. 1998). In the Yadana pipeline case study, PTT' s contingency plans appeared in the 
form of aggressive public relations activities, and collaboration vvith the project 
supporters to rebuff the challenges of the project opponents. 
6.8 CONCLUSIONS 
The case studies demonstrate the intensely competitive nature of the agenda of the 
existing social 'forces' in Thai society, and support the observations of environmental 
and social activism by other researchers (e.g. Baker, 1995; Hirsch, 1995; Lohmann, 
1995; Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997; and Rigg, 1995). 
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Since the Second World War, Thailand has experienced the emergence of a new society 
of industrialisation, in which each of the main forces in the political environment has 
established its own political space. Rigg ( 1995) observed that the need for 
environmental protection is now broadly accepted by the Thai Government to be 
important, whether for environmental, socio-economic or political reasons ( or for all 
three). Over the last 50 years or so, the profile of the environment has moved from 
receiving little attention from policy-makers, politicians, the media and assorted interest 
groups, to now heading the agenda of many of these. A powerful intellectual movement, 
promoting local perspectives on the environment and its value and protection, has 
emerged with the clear message that state approval of an activity does not imply 
community approval or acceptance. This message is graphically expressed in the 
following quote from The Nation: 
"How appropriate that the one major body of water named after our country is a total 
environmental mess. The Gulf of Thailand's fish stocks are seriously depleted, its coral 
reefs degraded and mangrove forests denuded. What's more, it must absorb immense 
quantities of toxic and organic filth. ... Greater attention has been paid to what may be 
the most dangerous pollutant, mercury, and the role of natural gas producers Unocal 
and Total in discharging this neurotoxin into the Gulf Public exposure has helped spur 
the,n to tackle this problem more urgently, but keep in mind that we largely depend on 
the oil companies to monitor their own activities, and tell us the results. There are also 
many other sources for the mercury ( and other dangerous chemicals) found in the Gulf 
which have yet to be revealed, particularly on the Eastern Seaboard. Some state 
agencies-the Harbour Department, the Department of Mineral Resources, . the 
Fisheries Department, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-may have 
information on these contaminants, but they are not talking to each other, much less 
the public. Their negligence borders on the criminal. The Pollution Control 
Department may yet become the independent auditor we so desperately need, but it still 
lacks the budget, manpower and equipment to do the job thoroughly. In the meantime, 
industry is expanding, not just in Thailand but around the Gulf We all have to sound 
the alarm now, using our power as consumers, as voters and custodians of the planet" 
(The Nation, 8 April 1997). 
In both case studies, newspaper reporters were highly influential, testifying to the great 
degree of freedom that the privately-owned print media holds in Thailand, and hence the 
power it can exert when tea1ned up with other stakeholders who hold one or more of the 
key attributes. The social forces use the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency to 
stake their claims to salience. The freedom of the press, combined with a rising level of 
environmental awareness, has made it possible for Thai NGOs to use the media as one 
of their strategies for effecting change (Baker, 1995), as demonstrated throughout the .. 
last 20 years or so of Thai social activism. 
The two case studies also testify to the complexity of stakeholder-organisation 
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managerial perception will change in response to a strengthened stakeholder claim 
appears to be linked to the behaviour altering factors identified by other researchers, like 
Ghobadian et al. (1998). In the Unocal and PTT case studies, mediating and moderating 
factors, such as corporate culture, leadership and organisational adaptability, appear to 
have been particularly important. The differences between lessons learnt from past 
experience, the company managers' perception of the company's legitimacy, and their 
view of the saliency of external stakeholder claims, were clearly evident and explicable. 
Company responses to environmental issues and stakeholder challenges to the social 
domain are also dependent on managers' perceptions of the situation, and their 
perceived responsibilities. The following example serves to highlight this point. Total 
Exploration and Production Thailand (TEPT) was, until July 1998, operator of the 
Bongkot gasfield in the Gulf of Thailand. (PTTEP assumed the operatorship in July 
1998). Like Unocal Thailand, TEPT encountered mercury in its produced gas, and 
discharged mercury in produced water. According to Fahn ( 1997b), 
"Despite being warned about mercury contamination by Unocal officials, Total 
apparently did not survey the situation around its own platforms until the issue was 
made public last year [ 1996]. The company acknowledges in the May 1997 issue of 
PTIT Focus, an industry quarterly, that its first survey took place in 1996 . ... Total's 
operation is s1naller than Unocal's and has only been in operation a few years, so 
mercury levels are not expected to be as severe. But Total's lack of transparency 
surrounding the survey may cause the results to be viewed with suspicion . ... There is 
some indication that Total has been under pressure to address the situation by its 
partners in the Bongkot venture: the Petroleum Authority of Thailand Exploration and 
Production Plc (PTIEP), which is the largest shareholder with a 40% stake, British 
Gas, which controls 20% in the venture and Norway's Statoil ( 10%) . ... PITEP is due 
to take over the operation of the Bongkot field next year [ July 1998] and is apparently 
concerned that it may become responsible for the mercury problem." 
In this instance, Total, as the retiring operator, appears not to have a long or even 
medium-term interest at stake, and therefore little apparent concern about external 
stakeholder interests. Whereas its joint venture partners, particularly the incoming 
operator, PTTEP, apparently perceived the issue to have a degree of urgency, and hence 
had a different attitude to the issue. PTTEP' s attitude was more in line with Unocal' s 
perception of the negative long-term implications of adverse stakeholder reaction. 
The case studies demonstrate that it is possible to understand, and by inference predict, 
why and how individual companies adopt particular short-term management strategies , 
as well as longer-term strategic stances. These case studies also provide some insight 
into company-stakeholder relationships, and engagement strategies. The findings of the 
case studies (see Tables 6-3 and 6-4) appear to support Hardy and Phillips' ( 1998) 
observation that stakeholder engagement strategies of 'collaboration' and 'contention' 
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appear to represent the greatest potential for synergy and innovation. While 'contention' 
is often thought of in negative terms, both 'collaboration' and 'contention' in 
stakeholder relations can produce positive outcomes, providing corporate managers are 
prepared to respect the viewpoint of their opponents and work within the cultural 
framework of the society in which they operate. The case studies demonstrate that 
politically astute stakeholders \vill learn how to form alliances with other interested 
parties in order to acquire the attributes they need to improve their standing, so that they 
can use their collective power, legitimacy and urgency to achieve their aims. 
This insight, when carefully applied, could be used by regulators to determine ways of 
harnessing the corporate virtue of socially-minded companies, and to coerce the more 
internally-focussed and conservative companies to be socially and environmentally 
responsible and responsive to the expectations of a broader range of stakeholders. These 
observations could also assist regulators to design mechanisms for tripartism that 
harness the problem-solving benefits offered by both collaboration and contention. 
The fallowing chapter develops these ideas \Vi thin the framework of corporate social 
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[There is a] "fundamental problem-public distrust of the industry to 
adhere to strong environmental, health and safety standards; public 
distrust in the capacity of regulators to effectively protect public 
interests. ... How can industry better align its business goals with 
public expectations. How can business better involve the public in 
decision-making, share control, and demonstrate industry is protecting 
the environment The bottom line is how does industry establish a 
relationship with regulators and the public to build a solid foundation 
of trust" (Klein, 1998, p. 11 ). 
CHAPTER 7. CORPORATE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Corporate social and environmental responsiveness is described in Chapter l as the interaction of the corporation with the legal, social and environmental performance 
expectations of the societies in which it operates, and how it accounts for those 
obligations. This study seeks to improve our understanding of the factors influencing 
corporate social and environmental responsiveness, in the context of upstream (production and exploration) petroleum companies operating in South-East Asia, and 
specifically Thailand. 
The opening quote to this Chapter suggests that the petroleum industry needs to demonstrate social and environmental responsiveness to convince the broader 
stakeholder community that the industry should continue to hold its 'licence to operate'. 
The hypothesis of this study, however, suggests that compelling commercial pressures 
act against philanthropic interests and may discourage industry from working towards 
that objective: 
The social and environmental responsiveness practised by companies is moulded by 
their assess,nents of the business risks posed by the stakeholder environment. In the 
absence of an appropriate balance of power between companies, their regulators and 
third party stakeholders, conipany management practices will tend towards a minimalist 
position to maximise financial returns. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to identify how that balance of power could be 
established using regulatory mechanisms. The insight gained from the empirical 
observations and secondary information (presented in the preceding chapters) is used to identify ways in which regulatory approaches in Thailand, and other similar regulatory 
systems, could be improved to achieve the design objectives of 'responsive regulation'. 
Analysis of the findings of the preceding chapters, and development of 
recommendations , is undertaken using an approach similar to that outlined by Gunningham and Sinclair ( 1998) for the development of regulatory policy. Following 
their general approach, the questions addressed in this Chapter are as follows: 
i) vVhat are the desired policy goals-what defines demonstrable corporate social dnd environniental responsiveness from the perspectives of the broad stakeholder 
conimunity? 
ii) vVhat are the unique characteristics of the problem at hand-what is the strategic 
context, i.e. the internal strengths and weaknesses of the upstream petroleum 
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iii) Who are the potential regulatory participants and policy instrunients-who has 
influence over industry performance and how can that influence be applied to 
achieve the criteria that define responsive regulation? 
iv) What are the opportunities for consultation and public participation-what role 
can the community play? 
These questions are addressed in Sections 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5, respectively. Section 7.6 
presents the conclusions of this Chapter. 
7.2 WHAT IS THE GOAL? 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(WBCSD), in association with the Thailand Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (TBCSD) and the Thailand Environment Institute (TEI), engaged in a 
stakeholder dialogue program in 1999. The purpose of this program was to frame the 
Thai debate on corporate social and environmental responsibility (CSER), and identify 
ways in which industry, government and community groups could work together. The 
program consisted of interviews with 15 Thai opinion leaders from the business and 
non-business community, and a full day workshop with approximately 25 local experts 
from various fields including business, media, government and NGOs (WBCSD, 
1999b). 
An outcome of this stakeholder dialogue was a definition of CSER, as the sum of the 
following principles (WBCSD, 1999b ): 
i) the continuing or increasing commitment by business to behave ethically and 
contribute to economic development; 
ii) improving the quality of life of business' workforce and their families as well as of 
the local community and society at large; 
iii) prevention and mitigation of impacts on the natural and social environment; 
iv) demonstrable transparency and protection of consumer interests; 
v) improvement of the public's attitudes towards the environment through education; 
vi) being good corporate citizens; and 
vii) demonstrable good governance. 
Responsive regulation aims to provide a judicious mix of persuasion and punishment 
with which to harness the virtue within organisations. For the purpose of this discussion, 
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the goal of responsive regulation is therefore defined as the provision of a regulatory 
fran1ework in which industry adherence to the abovementioned principles of CSER is 
encouraged. 
7.3 WHAT IS THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT? 
Development of an appropriate responsive regulatory model relies upon an 
understanding of the strategic context in which the upstream petroleum industry 
operates. As discussed in Chapter 2, the strategic context is the relationship between 
petroleum companies and their operating environment. The context is identified through 
the characteristic strengths and weaknesses of petroleum companies (internal factors), 
and the threats and opportunities posed by their operating environment ( external 
factors). 
The conceptual framework of corporate responsiveness developed in Chapter 2 (Figure 
2-5), is used to frame this discussion. The expectations and influence of government and 
the community may be viewed as the 'external factors', that are expressed as 
stakeholder claims. Corporate responses to those stakeholder claims are defined by 
managerial perception of saliency, which is influenced by 'moderating' and 'mediating' 
factors (collectively referred to as the 'internal factors'). The following SWOT 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis (presented in Tables 7-1 and 
7-2) is framed using the 'moderating' and 'mediating' factors to represent the internal 
strengths and weaknesses of petroleum companies, and the 'external' factors to 
represent the threats and opportunities. This analysis draws upon the profile of the 
industry presented in Chapter 4, and the empirical information presented in Chapters 5 
and 6. 
Table 7-1 Internal Strengths and Weaknesses of Upstream Petroleum Companies 







Companies that have strong, visionary 
senior managers, committed to CSER 
and supported by their boards and 
shareholders, can be powerful agents 
of positive change, e.g. BP Amoco 
ARCO. 
Companies whose cultures value 
;.:,: Weaknesses 
Companies with leaders that do not 
actively support/believe in CSER, 
and/or do not have the support of their 
shareholders will usually not 
proactively demonstrate CSER. 
Companies whose cultures are closed 
social and environmental performance, I and/or arrogant, and have a narrow 
and are open to constructive definition of their stakeholders. 
stakeholder engagement. 
Mode~ating a"rid -·: 
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Companies that have an ethical 
approach to investment, development 
and operation of their business, and 
are concerning with maximising host 
community benefit and minimising 
harm to society and the environment. 
Tends to be a strength in companies 
that are accustomed to operating in a 
range of geographic localities and/or 
are have relatively flat management 
structures that devolve responsibility 
to business line/country managers. 
Large companies and those with a 
portfolio of profitable producing 
assets are usually well equipped with 
internal and external sources of 
capital. 
Generally a strength in large 
companies that have in-house social 
and environmental experts, and/or 
have trained and supported line 
management staff with expertise in 
social and environmental issues 
management. 
Positive opportunities in companies 
that are financially stable and have 
leaders and owners committed to 
improvements in technology and 
management practices. 
The industry has a technological 
culture and is strong in technology 
development skills. Large, financially 
Companies whose ethical approach is 
based on maximising opportunity for 
financial return with little regard for 
the cost borne by the host community 
and/or the environment. 
Often poorly-developed/constrained in 
companies with an entrenched 
groupthink culture, e.g. State-owned 
companies, and/or companies with 
multi-layered hierarchical 
organisational structures. 
Constraints often apply to small 
companies and those that have 
marginal resources to develop/operate. 
Limited resources in small companies 
and other companies that do not 
employ and support staff with expertise 
in social and environmental issues 
management. 
Limited opportunities in companies 
that have marginal resources to 
develop/operate, are capital-
constrained, and/or lack leadership and 
owner support for CSER. 
Limited opportunity to use 'green' 
technology on existing or proposed 
field developments if they are marginal 
secure companies, in particular, I in terms of cost-benefit. 
generally have access to 'green' 
technology. Opportunities exist to use 
this technology in developing new 
resources, and retro-fitting existing 
plant, provided that cost-benefit return 
can be demonstrated. 
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Table 7-2 Opportunities and Threats Posed to the Upstream Petroleum Industry's 







Markets that reward use of 'green' 
production processes, and socially 
and environmentally responsible 
producers. 
Shareholders and financiers that 
favour 'green' production, and 
measure performance on 'triple 
bottom line' indicators. 
Responsive regulatory framework 
that provides a transparent, 'even 
playing field', but allows flexibility 
to enable companies to choose fit-
for-purpose management practices to 
achieve agreed performance targets. 
Threats 
Tight supply/demand market that selects 
cheapest commodity, and/or does not 
place a financial value on 'green' 
production. 
Shareholders and financiers that are 
focussed on maximising financial 
return/profit. 
Impractical prescriptive laws and 
regulations that cannot be realistically 
complied with, and/or inhibit innovation 
to achieve improvement in outcomes. 
Administrative frameworks that inhibit 
stakeholder access, leading to 
stakeholder frustration and outrage. 
Individual and public interest groups Host community that does not 
that are willing and equipped to realise/experience net community 
broker agreements to work benefits from petroleum production. 
cooperatively or in collaboration with 
the petroleum industry for mutual Impaired empowerment of the public in 
gain. some political arenas. 
Educated communities that are Political agendas that oppose the 
willing to take a role in bi-partite and industry, and access to resources. 
tri-partite policy formulation and 
industry supervisory committees. 
Using this conceptual framework to define the determinants of a company's 
responsiveness strategy, it can be seen that corporate responsiveness will be highly 
dependent upon the way the company managers perceive the interaction between key 
external and internal factors, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
The SWOT profile highlights that there are both positive and negative characteristics 
associated with the internal and external influences on the behaviour of petroleum 
company managers, regulators and the community. As indicated in Table 7-1, the 
petroleum industry has many internal strengths to draw upon to develop leading social 
210 
CHAPTER 7. CORPORATE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
and environmental management policies and practices. Given the dynamic character of 
their business, petroleum companies have developed a strong culture of adaptability, 
innovation and organisation, and typically employ well-educated, technically skilled 
staff. Where these strengths are applied, they can lead to the types of progressive social 
and environmental management practices that are now demonstrated by corporations 
like BP Amoco ARCO. However, not all companies have the same capital and staff 
resources to work with, or the same high public profile to protect, and therefore the full 
spectn1m of performance, from good to poor, is still evident across the industry. Left 
alone, the poor performers will likely continue to operate with minimal regard for social 
and environmental issues, and focus on maximising financial returns. 
For the purposes of defining a responsive regulatory model, the potential for improved 
social and environmental management practices lies with the strengths and 
opportunities, while the weaknesses and threats need to be addressed to remove or 
reduce impediments to improvement. 
7.4 WHO ARE THE REGULATORY PARTICIPANTS? 
In order to select the optimal avenues through which to apply incentives to companies to 
improve their social and environmental performance, their dependencies need to be 
clearly identified and targeted. These dependencies help to identify the potential 
regulators and their policy instruments. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, all petroleum companies whether state- or publicly owned 
have common operating requirements, namely project finance (for exploration, 
development and production), access to petroleum resources (through government 
administered licensing schemes), and markets for their products. The key opportunities 
for applying pressure to the companies therefore lie in: 
i) Ethical, social and environmental performance screening by investors (lending 
institutions, stockmarkets, governments, joint venture partners); 
ii) Selective buying policies by the market/customers; 
iii) Peer pressure from within the industry via industry associations to adhere to 
performance standards; 
iv) Definition and enforcement of regulatory instruments by governments; and 
v) Public scrutiny through community right to know schemes, international 
management system standards and corporate reporting mechanisms. 
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The opportun1t1 es for use of these mechanisms in a responsive regulatory model are 
quali tatively evaluated in the following sections, using indicators of responsive 
regulation. As discussed in Chapter 1, responsive regulation is defined in practical terms 
according to its suitability to simultaneously satisfy the following indicators or criteria: 
effectiveness (contributing to improving the environment); efficiency (improving the 
environment at the minimum cost); equity (showing fairness in the burden sharing 
among players); and political acceptability (demonstrating liberty, transparency and 
accountability). 
7 .4.1 Investor Screening and Performance Standards 
Although petroleum companies vary considerably with respect to origin, size, structure, 
strategy, management, innovation, flexibility, and performance, their behaviour is 
primarily driven by two objectives: (i) high profits and growth, and (ii) the stability and 
long-term survival of the company. Both require maintenance of investor confidence 
and a steady supply of operating capital. There are essentially three sources of 
investment capital for petroleum companies: owner and joint venture partner capital; 
lending institutions; and the stockmarket (shareholders) . 
Owners and Joint Venturers 
Exploration and production activities are capital-intensive, and in the case of 
exploration, may produce no investment returns. Hence, petroleum companies usually 
seek to share the ri sks and investments with other partners by entering into a legally-
binding joint operating agreements. However, by entering into these agreements, joint 
venture participants place their corporations' assets, earnings and staff at risk, as well as 
incurring liabili ty risk fo r their actions and those of third parties. In the case of the 
larger, high profile companies, their public image and reputation are also put at risk. 
To reduce their risk profile, some petroleum companies prescribe social and 
environmental management performance standards for the operator of the joint venture 
businesses in which they participate. As described in Chapter 4 , this can be an 
influential self-regulatory mechanism, as the companies involved have a vested interest 
in enforcing the application of those standards. However, the application of this tool is 
self-limiting, in the sense that joint venturers usually screen their partners on the basis of 
investment risk, and tend to select partners that are like-minded. Consequently, those 
companies that see the benefits of demonstrating socially and environmentally 
responsible behaviour are unlikely to partner with recalcitrants. 
The exceptions will be those situations, like production sharing contracts, where 
companies are obl iged to partner with the local state-owned enterprises in order to gain 
access to resources. In these cases, the companies may have little power to require 
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standards of performance in excess of the basic requirements , because expenditure 
approval is controlled by the state-owned enterprises, who may not to be as sensitive to 
reputation damage as public companies (as demonstrated in Chapter 6). 
In summary, for those companies that are already on a path towards improvement, 
enforcement of socially and environmentally responsible joint venture operating 
standards will assist them to perform according to their espoused policies. However, this 
1nechanism is unlikely to directly influence the recalcitrants, unless the latter are 
publicly compared with the better performers, and are discriminated against by third 
parties on the basis of that comparison. 
Therefore, while this regulatory mechanism demonstrates efficiency and equity, and 
some degree of political acceptability, it is limited in effectiveness to a selective portion 
of the industry. 
Stock Exchanges and Shareholders 
Many petroleum companies are publicly listed on stock exchanges and are owned by, 
and financially accountable to, some mix of private and institutional investors. In 
practice, company managers have some freedom to sacrifice profits in the interests of 
non-shareholder groups, but they are nevertheless discouraged from doing so by the 
antagonistic market setting in which they operate. These companies often complain that 
investors are short-termist, and therefore they place management under undue pressure 
to produce dividends, at the expense of reinvestment in technological improvements, 
research, staff training and social and environmental management. A belief that the 
market demands short-term returns prompts companies to avoid capital expenditure that 
would arguably enhance the company's social and environmental performance and 
reputation, and be beneficial to the company in the long term. 
This concern about the market for control assumes that shareholders' decisions to buy 
and sell shares are influenced purely by the expected financial return. However, the 
behaviour of some shareholders, especially ethical investment bodies, may be affected 
by other factors, such as ethical and philanthropic business practices. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, a new trend of social and environmental shareholder activism and ethical 
investment funas appears to be modifying the nature of shareholder expectations of 
corporate performance in some sectors of the investment market. These investors still 
only constitute a small portion (5 -10%) of investors, but in time are expected to apply 
more influence to the marketplace. By way of example, the Dow Jones Sustainability 
Group Index, and a screened investment fund (the Australian Eco Share Fund) recently 
launched by Westpac Investment Management (Mather, 2000), indicate that the 
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mainstream financial markets in the Asian region are now seeing a viable business 
emerging in assigning CSER ratings to companies. 
This market mechanism shows potential to positively influence company behaviour, so 
long as the socially and environmentally responsible companies are able to return profits 
comparable with or better that those of other companies (Feldman et al., 1997; Mather, 
2000). As discussed in Chapter 4, the stockmarket is a mechanism that aligns 
management conduct with shareholder preferences, and it is still reasonable to assume 
that the majority of shareholders are motivated more or less exclusively by financial 
concerns. The decisions of ethical investors to sell shares in less socially and 
environmentally responsible companies, in favour of more responsible companies, may 
be counter-balanced by the decisions of others to buy these shares that may now be 
perceived as bargains. Similarly, where ethical investors retain or acquire shares in a 
company that announces an ethically attractive, but profit-reducing policy, the result is 
likely to be outweighed by decisions on the part of other shareholders to sell. 
The other regulatory instrument that is offered through this avenue is stock exchange 
listing rules. Many stock exchanges have now established rules requiring listed 
companies to make annual public disclosures of their environmental liabilities. Failure 
to disclose, and falsified returns can result in de-listing. This mechanism has been 
enforced in the US and Australia, for example, and extends to disclosure of all of the 
listed corporations domestic and international business interests. 
Shareholder and stock exchange screening are both regulatory 1nechanisms that satisfy 
the criteria of equity, political acceptability and efficiency. However, they are currently 
limited in their effectiveness across the industry, as they do not apply to all listed 
companies, and are not applicable to those companies that are wholly privately or state-
owned. 
Lending Institutions 
Lending institutions, such as multilateral banks, are major sources of project finance for 
the petroleum industry, especially for projects in developing countries, where there may 
be a lack of local investment funds. The banks are becoming a significant source of 
pressure on industry performance, as they in turn are subject to scrutiny by their owners 
(investors and governments). There have been some notable, high-profile controversies 
over bank-funded projects associated with adverse environmental and social impacts, 
such as the hydro-electric dams in Laos and China, and mines in Indonesia and Papua 
New Guinea. As a consequence, over the last decade or so, international funding 
institutions, like The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the US-based 
Export-Import Bank (EXIM) have been driven by political forces to take a more 
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Recently, the investment practices of the Australian Government's export financier (the 
Export Finance Investment Corporation, EFIC) have also been subject to strong 
criticism by the NGOs, the Mineral Policy Institute and AID/WATCH (MPI and 
AID/WATCH, 1999). 
The banks literally hold the purse strings and therefore have considerable power over 
their borrovvers. Of all of the financier-based regulatory mechanisms discussed above, 
this mechanism offers the greatest relative potential for satisfying the criteria of 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity and political acceptability. This is particularly so , if 
banks are themselves compelled by stakeholders to implement ethical lending criteria. 
7.4.2 Market Influences 
The opportunities for applying green buyer pressures to the upstream petroleum sector 
are somewhat limited. The primary purchaser of crude oil is the downstream sector, 
rather than the public consumer. This market is strongly cost driven, and does not 
generally discriminate on the basis of how 'green' the crude oil product is. Even when 
multilateral sanctions are applied to oil producing countries, these sanctions have 
usually been applied for political reasons, not on the basis of environmental 
considerations, and therefore are not linked to company-level management practices. 
The downstream sector (refineries and petrochemical manufacturers) obtains its crude 
oil products from numerous sources, not just its own corporation's upstream petroleum 
producers. Therefore, it is difficult for public consumers to differentiate between 
petroleum products in terms of their knowledge of the product origin, and the 
environmental and social conditions under which it was produced. 
Although public consumer boycotts were applied to Exxon and Shell fuel retail outlets , 
respectively, during the Exxon Valdez and Brent Spar controversies , this type of action 
is exceptional, and limited in its influence to the high profile companies. Many of the 
smaller upstream production companies do not have associated downstream or retail 
companies, and therefore do not have a market brandname and are not known to the 
public consumers. 
Macrotrends in energy markets, such as a 'green' push towards more sustainable energy 
sources like solar povver, are also unlikely to have a significant impact on the upstream 
petroleum industry in the foreseeable future. Despite initiatives of large corporations 
like BP Amoco ARCO and Royal Dutch/Shell to invest in solar power technology, these 
companies and the rest of the industry continue to invest heavily in the petroleum 
exploration and production sector, and the currently buoyant vvorld oil price indicates a 
strong demand for oil-based products . 
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Buoyant oil prices also do not necessarily encourage petroleum company expenditure on 
social and environmental management initiatives. While a decline in commodity prices 
will prompt managers to consider expenditure reductions or withdrawal from the 
market, the converse does not apply. In this dynamic market, a rise in oil and gas 
commodity prices is often viewed as a short-term cyclical trend that should be optimised 
in terms of profit, and therefore will not necessarily lead to a loosening of the purse 
strings in favour of environmental 111anagement expenditure. The extreme global oil 
price fluctuations that have occurred during the course of this study ( 1996-2000) are 
proof of this volatility. 
Perhaps the most promising opportunity for the use of market forces is in the bidding 
processes for access to exploration and production acreage. As low production cost 
petroleum resources become scarcer, there is greater competition between companies to 
win the right from host governments to exploit cost-effective resources. Discerning 
governments can use this demand to impose tighter licence conditions on social and 
environmental performance by explorers and producers, and/or discriminate on the basis 
of the cleaner production technologies offered by the bidders. 
Some companies with access to cleaner production technologies perceive that they have 
a competitive advantage relative to other petroleum companies. They advertise their 
superior performance in the community, and lobby regulators to rule that their 
technology should set the minimum performance benchmark. However, this leveraging 
mechanism is limited in its application across the production sector, being most 
applicable to the large companies that are already focussed on capitalising on the 
existence of environment-enhancing economic incentives. Major companies are often 
more sensitive than smaller independents to the need to establish and maintain access to 
resources, particularly if a potential field is geographically located within their strategic 
area of focus, and could therefore be linked into their existing supply network. 
By comparison, small firms are often short-term focussed, partly because they are 
dependent upon the spot-market for sale of their products. This part of the market is 
notoriously unstable, being very vulnerable to the raiding, dumping, and predatory 
pricing practices of larger firms and cartels. Consequently, the flow of revenue to small 
firms is very unstable, and affects their ability to both develop new projects and make 
long-term investments ~n environmental quality. Inevitably, they are focussed on 
minimising the costs of production, and therefore often seek out opportunities in less 
discriminating jurisdictions, or in marginal fields where they do not face competition 
from the major companies. 
Market preferences therefore also offer limited opportun1t1es for improving the 
behaviour of the laggard and low-profile companies. The larger companies that have a 
market-recognised brandname are most susceptible to consumer pressure, and 
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consequently many of these companies have already recognised the need to protect that 
reputation. 
It is concluded that this regulatory mechanism is efficient and politically acceptable, but 
is not particularly effective (limited in application) or equitable (the cost of industry 
reputation management is borne by the brandname companies). 
7.4.3 Industry Standards 
The petroleum industry is what Rees (1994) refers to as a 'community of shared fate', 
that is, the poor performance of one or more companies may adversely affect the 
interests of the entire industry. The major companies, with high profile brandnames 
have much at stake in this arena, and the ref ore tend to take the lead in establishing 
industry associations to set performance standards and mobilise peer pressure to 
encourage other companies to adhere to those standards. 
Many of the industry associations have developed codes of practice and guidelines for 
their members as self-regulatory mechanisms to set industry performance standards. For 
example, the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA) 
has "self regulation through the formulation and acceptance of codes of practice in key 
areas of business activity JJ as one of its Key Objectives (APPEA, 1996, p. 4 ). 
In many cases, these codes and guidelines have been developed to fill a perceived gap in 
legislative or regulatory control of particular activities, given that regulatory control 
often lags well behind issue emergence (Stone, 1996). For example, following the 
highly publicised oil spill from the Exxon Valdez tanker, the American Petroleum 
Institute (API) adopted a set of environmental principles for implementation by its 
member companies. These principles urge member companies to educate their 
stakeholders about environmental and safety issues, and to maintain good public 
relations. They also urge the industry to participate in regulatory processes to create 
responsible laws and standards for safeguarding the community, workplace and 
environment (API, 1990). 
The industry bodies commonly lobby governments for the right to self-regulate using 
their established codes of practice: 
"Prescriptive regulations in comparison with 'industry inspired solutions ' are often 
less effective and more costly in achieving their objectives. In many areas the 
petroleum industry has a demonstrated record of self-regulation. We implement world 
best practice and are often ahead of the regulators" (Schubert, 1992, p. 47). 
However, the process of developing these codes and guidelines is typically a voluntary, 
consensus-based process. So, while third parties, such as NGOs, may be consulted, the 
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final product will reflect what the industry is prepared to accept. The 'industry' in this 
context may represent a cross-section of small and large companies, with strongly 
differing views, so that the agreed code often reflects some form of compromised 
position. Alternatively, companies less interested in CSER, may opt out the code 
formulation process, and therefore while the final code may reflect the views of more 
responsible companies, the other factions of the industry will not endorse it because they 
were not party to the agreement. 
Another weakness in this self-regulatory approach is the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism for these codes. Typically, while companies may become signatories to 
these codes, rarely do petroleum industry associations audit company compliance with 
the codes, or expel members that do not comply with the codes. For example, neither the 
APPEA Code of Environmental Practice nor the Petroleum Institute of Thailand's 
Environmental Code of Practice are audited or enf arced. In those cases where there is a 
third party audit programme in place, as for the Australian Minerals Council Code for 
Environmental Management, the maximum penalty for poor compliance is public 
shaming. Hence, because endorsement of the codes is usually not mandatory, only those 
companies that genuinely intend to comply with code will participate in the program. 
Third party verification of compliance is therefore commonly viewed from the outside 
as promotional propaganda. 
As observed by Fuchs and Mazmanian (1998, p. 199), 
" business-business cooperation does not necessarily lead to positive changes in 
environmental performance. Some scholars claim that the standards and principles 
developed by industry are just cosmetic changes in an attempt to pre-empt future 
government regulation ( Chatte,jee and Finger, 1994 ). After all, these standards 
actually do not include specific performance or emission standards and in the view of 
Clapp ( 1997) provide little incentive to achieve environmental performance beyond the 
level of compliance or put effort into developing and adopting cleaner technology." 
The potential power of codes as a regulatory instrument is often compromised by diluted 
performance requirements, and the lack of industry will to enforce their implementation 
or punish non-conformers. Unlike the chemical industry's Responsible Care 
programme, there is currently no widely applied code of practice for the upstream 
petroleum industry that drives continuous improvement or provides for public 
participation and scrutiny. 
Therefore, while these industry codes and guidelines are positive initiatives, and 
potentially are an equitable and efficient regulatory mechanism, their effectiveness and 
politically acceptance may only be assured if adherence is made mandatory through 
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7.4.4 Regulatory Instruments 
The traditional form of industry regulation is via legal statutes and regulations , 
administered by government regulatory agencies. Petroleum companies rely upon 
licenses issued by governments to explore for, produce and market petroleum; to 
establish and operate supporting infrastructure and services; and to dispose of their 
waste products. 
A common message put forward in the Thai stakeholder dialogue on CSER was that 
"strict governniental enforce1nent of the law (particularly environmental regulation) is 
crucial for improvenient" (WBCSD, 1999b ). Exponents of direct regulation (command 
and control 1) espouse the importance of having strong legal and regulatory measures to 
counteract market forces, and to ensure that companies perform to meet social and 
expectations-laws are society's codification of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. 
They argue that without the pressure of this type of legal framework, companies would 
not make progress quickly enough to meet the expectations of society. The underlying 
concern is that while there are many companies that will take action voluntarily, not all 
will, and it is the laggards that need to be disciplined by direct regulation. 
Anecdotal evidence presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 indicates that if the host country 
does not have a strong regulatory regime, petroleum companies will pay less attention to 
expenditure on regulatory compliance, in favour of other operating demands. This 
particularly so if company managers are not concerned that the governments will 
actually enforce environmental legislation. The possible costs resulting from 
prosecution or reputation damage for non-compliance may be dismissed as problems for 
another day, based on a belief that they can be negotiated through captive regulators, or 
through political connections (in the case of state-owned petroleum companies). 
There is compelling empirical evidence from other sources to suggest that industry 
typically requires some form of regulatory oversight to ensure that minimum 
performance standards are maintained (Haines, 1997; J ackall, 1988). There are also 
recognised links between socially and environmentally responsible behaviour by 
companies and the existence of a sound regulatory framework (Arscott, 1989; 
Gunningham, 1994; Moser and Tsai, 1998). For example, many of the technological 
research and development initiatives of the US petroleum industry over the last three 
decades, have been driven by strong environmental laws and enforcement in the US , in 
particular Federal legislation pertaining to air and water emissions (the Clean Air Act 
and the Clean Water Act). Arscott ( 1989) reported that these regulatory drivers 
1 The essence of "command and control" regulation is that legislatures proscribe certain behaviour and set 
up a regulatory agency to monitor and enforce compliance with the legal standards (Gunningham, 1998a). 
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prompted the upstream petroleum industry to develop new methods for disposal of 
drilling fluids, produced water and other oilfield wastes to protect human health and the 
environment. The Federal Endangered Species Act 1973 also required the industry to 
pay 111ore attention to protection of wildlife and fishery resources and develop co-
operative agreen1ents between the oil and gas industry, the fishing industry, indigenous 
peoples, government agencies and environmental groups. 
Similarly, a study of corporate environmental responsibility within the oil and gas sector 
in Latin America (Moser, 1998) identified strong legislation and enforcement as the 
most important factors in influencing environmentally responsible behaviour. (Other 
important factors included obligations to fully implement corporate internal policies, 
and pressure from NGOs and the media). 
In their study of multinational petroleum and chemical companies operating in Latin 
America and Greater China, Moser and Tsai (1998) observed the best overall 
environmental behaviour in those cases where the companies had recently established 
facilities and where there was strong and enforced local legislation. Under such 
circumstances, not only were the companies able to fully apply their own internal 
policies, such as the application of contemporary environmental technologies, but the 
presence of strong local legislation also provided an external incentive to implement 
internal policies to their fullest. A number of environmental managers interviewed by 
Moser and Tsai reportedly emphasised the importance of strong external legislation for 
the implementation of internal environmental policies. 
Command and control regulation has the advantage of being a dependable regulatory 
instrument, but also has a number of disadvantages. Critics express concerns that direct 
regulation tends to be overly prescriptive and stifles creativity and long-term innovation 
(Hampson, 1993). The US has established a reputation for prescriptive direct regulation, 
strong regulatory enforcement, and a penchant for litigation. However, this model has 
not won favour because it is often perceived that companies become so obsessed with 
compliance and staying out of court, that they are discouraged from showing any 
initiative to try any new innovative approaches. Furthermore, the litigious nature of the 
business environment means that great expense is incurred fighting court battles, which 
might otherwise be more usefully applied to social or environmental protection 
pro grammes. 
The direct approach to regulation adopted by many developed and developing countries, 
has typically been narrowly prescriptive and expensive to implement and administer. In 
Thailand, the direct regulation approach appears to be failing because is was adopted 
without an adequate supporting framework. Legislation, regulations, and standards have 
often been poorly designed for the conditions in which they are to operate. Furthermore, 






CHAPTER 7. CORPORATE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
government to make the system work effectively. Regulators are commonly 
inadequately equipped to effectively implement and enforce regulatory requirements, 
while senior bureaucrats and politicians are often engaged in turf wars that preclude 
effective co-ordination and cooperation. 
Therefore, while the Thai stakeholder dialogue on CSER identified a need for strict 
environmental law enforce1nent, it is questionable whether that approach will yield the 
desired outcomes, if the law-making and administrative processes outlined in Chapters 5 
and 6 prevail. Enforcement of a flawed system is unlikely to meet the criteria of 
effectiveness, efficiency, equity or political acceptability. 
7.4.5 Management System Standards and Corporate Reporting 
Petroleum companies have traditionally assumed that their licence to operate was 
primarily contingent upon financial backing and government regulatory approvals. They 
often have not perceived a need to explain their management strategies to other 
stakeholders, or justify their actions in regard to issues like investment in countries with 
controversial political regimes. However, advocates of corporate social and 
environmental responsibility suggest that petroleum companies should turn their 
attention to acquiring their legitimacy (licence to operate) not only from regulators, but 
also directly from the public (Bray, 1997; Grolin, 1998). 
In recognition of these external pressures, the major companies, in particular, have 
started to integrate environmental issues in their overall business management (Estrada 
et al., 1997). Some large petroleum companies, like BP Amoco ARCO and Royal 
Dutch/Shell have implemented corporate social and environmental reporting systems. 
Others have chosen to start their greening process by implementing environmental 
management systems (e.g. to comply with the ISO 14001 standard). For example, in 
April 1997, the Thai company, PTTEP became the first petroleum exploration and 
production company in Thailand and the South-East Asian region to achieve ISO 14001 
certification for its environmental management system (EMS). A company 
spokesperson stated that the impetus for this voluntary initiative was to prepare the 
company ''for an ever increasing environment conscious world", ''for increasingly 
stringent regulations" and "to take on a bigger role in the E & P industry" (Dr Praya 
Phinyawat, PTTEP President, 1998). 
"PTTEP has voluntarily taken on two of the ,nost demanding international HSE 
standards through the adoption of the ISO 14001 and ISRS (International Safety Rating 
System) ... In doing so, the company is committed to pollution prevention, and risk 
minimisation, with continuous improvement program. The company also aims to co-
operate with other oil companies, other industries, the authorities, the universities and 
other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in effort to protect our environment . .. . 
221 
CHAPTER 7. CORPORATE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSIBILITY 
We believe that [sic] oil and gas industry does not have to equate with polluted, dirty 
products or dangerous and environment endangering activities . ... The indust,y needs 
to be more aware of and to be responsive to the people's and community's perceptions 
and concerns" (Phinyawat, 1998). 
These self-regulatory initiatives are positive and provide an opportunity for the broader 
stakeholder community to gain a better understanding of the management practices of 
these companies. However, alone, they do not provide a mechanism for regulators or the 
public to apply any pressure to set the pace or scope of con1panies' continuous 
improvement programs. Like industry codes of practice, their value is limited by the 
rules of voluntarism. Those companies that recognise the importance of responsible 
management practices will implement self-regulatory initiatives, but on their terms. 
While those companies that are not interested or committed will not adopt such systems. 
Therefore, company certification to the ISO 14001 EMS standard, and other initiatives 
like Corporate Environmental Reports are not particularly effective as industry-wide 
self-regulatory mechanisms, unless these are mandated by regulators, and company 
performance is reported to, and scrutinised by the community. This point was aptly 
made by Mechai Viravaidya speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the PTTEP Board 
of Directors2, 
"[W]e gather for such meetings and discuss issues and programs pertalnlng to 
environment, health and safety and produce a lot of self-serving documents or 
brochures that may inform the public, but it will not change our behaviour or 
perfonnance in this industry. It is only good knowledge for an active public. Therefore, 
if we want to improve ourselves, we need to improve the public's knowledge, attitude 
and behaviour . ... The best thing for EHS [ environment, health and safety] is a well 
informed public. They will look at us in a transparent manner and keep us on our toes 
until the day we do improve . .... They will be the ones who judge us in the future" 
(Viravaidya, 1998). 
7.4.6 Synthesis 
The proponents who support the case for self-regulation and a role for voluntarism argue 
that businesses are, if not automatically good citizens, at least prepared to become so, if 
2 It should be noted that such candor is not typical of industry spokespersons. Mechai Viravaidya is a 
prominent Thai social activist and environmentalist. In 1974 he established one of the first NGOs (the 
Population and Comnrnnity Development Association) to become involved with community development, 
family planning and primary health care (Bamber, 1997). During the 1992 Anand-led interim 
governments, he was appointed as Minister to the Office of the Prime Minister, where he was known to 
have worked strenuously to strengthen NGOs and increase their participation in government decision-
making processes (Baker, 1995). 
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they are given encouragement (Maltby, 1997). However, the preceding discussions 
suggest that neither the investor nor the commodity markets' appreciation of CSER are 
yet (and may never be) developed sufficiently to drive petroleum company behaviour 
towards philanthropic interests. Without other incentives, the industry's own 
improvement initiatives are tempered by the need to be mindful of market economics 
and stay cost-competitive. Therefore, none of the market or industry-initiated 
performance drivers satisfy the criteria of 'responsive regulation' in their own right. 
Furthermore, while collectively they address most of the criteria, they are limited in their 
effectiveness to influence the entire spectrum of upstream petroleum companies. 
Clearly, there is a continuing need for a government regulatory presence to define 
industry regulatory tools, and periodically review those tools to drive continuous 
improvement. However, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the power and benefit provided 
by regulators is dependent upon the calibre of the system in which they operate. The 
answer, therefore, is not simply to enforce the existing statutes and regulations, or to 
continue to develop them in the same manner as in the past. Ineffectual regulatory 
systems do not operate in the interests of the regulators, the industry or the broader 
stakeholder community. 
There are many regulatory options potentially available to regulators to apply either as 
standalone mechanisms, or as a 'toolbox'. In addition to the approaches described in this 
Chapter, there is a host of other economic instruments, such as property-rights, 
performance binds, deposit-refund systems, community-right-to know schemes (like the 
US Toxic Release Inventory) that are potentially available. However, for reasons 
explained above, the mechanisms that are used must be suited to the context in which 
they are to be applied. Based on evidence presented in Chapters 5 and 6, it is highly 
questionable whether Thailand's bureaucracy and administrative structure are yet ready 
to embrace and effectively apply these approaches. There is little value in introducing a 
new system that will not be adequately supported, both financially and politically. 
Instead, it is suggested that effort would initially be better directed to empowering the 
community, through education and NGO support, to take a more balanced role in 
scrutinising the day-to-day decision-making processes of government, such as the 
environmental impact assessment process, for example. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, some government ministries in Thailand have now 
recognised the need to create a role for the private sector (including industry) and the 
community, to play a more direct involvement in environmental management (OEPP, 
1997; Tridech, 1998). However, there needs to be some agreement amongst these parties 
about the priorities for action, and their respective roles and responsibilities in this 
cooperative effort. 
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An outcome of the WBCSD-faciliated stakeholder dialogue in Thailand was some 
definition of the rights and responsibilities of business, government, and society in 
making business more sustainable through market mechanisms (WBCSD, 1999b ). 
These are listed in Chapter 1 and summarised as follows: 
i) The governn1ent' s key role and responsibility is to be the regulator and enforcer, 
and to create reliable regulatory framework conditions that reward good company 
behaviour. 
ii) The role of business is to strive to achieve legal compliance, as well as to 
implement voluntary self-regulatory initiatives, such as international environmental 
standards (e.g. ISO 14000 EMS series), and codes of practice. 
iii) The main role of civil society is to act as a watchdog and pressure government to 
enforce regulation and "modernise" infrastructure, pressure business to behave 
responsibly, increase environmental and social awareness within civil, business 
and communities and governmental institutions, and raise consumer demands for 
"greener" products and for buying responsibility. 
The preceding sections have discussed at some length the contextual limitations that 
apply to petroleum companies and regulators in jurisdictions like Thailand. Repeatedly, 
within these discussions opportunities have appeared for greater harnessing of 
community involvement to scrutinise the performance of industry and the regulators and 
apply investment screening and political pressure to drive improvements. The following 
discussion therefore focuses on the opportunities to enhance the role of public 
participation. 
7.5 WHAT ARE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION? 
7 .5.1 Strategic Context 
In the past, whether for lack of democracy or because of an overly technocratic 
orientation, South-East Asian governments have often been reluctant to encourage 
public involvement in environmental affairs (O'Connor, 1994). Now, there is evidence 
emerging that increasingly educated and civil-minded populations are applying pressure 
to these governments and the industry they foster, to improve their environmental 
management. They are actively seeking greater accountability in environmental 
management, both in local and regional contexts (Hirsch, 1995). 
Palmlund ( 1997) suggests that the energy for change in Thailand come from citizens 
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"In so far as there is a change strategy, it is to encourage citizens to raise concerns at 
the local level and to press for changes in decision processes to realise improved and 
environmentally sustainable habitats. The aim, is to secure a participatory citizen voice 
in these processes, forming partnerships for implenientation, securing transparency 
and accountability for official actions, pressing for devolution where local action is 
constrained through lack of authority and for legislation where necessary to support 
these changes" (Palmlund, 1997, p. 109). 
The power of citizen opinion has been shown to be influential in achieving reform in 
Thailand when governments sense that their political power base is vulnerable. As 
observed by Palmlund ( 1997), recent Thai governments, eager to retain public support, 
have been sensitive to criticism from citizens and international powerbrokers, and have 
often reacted with changes in government policy. A significant example is the 1997 
enactment of a new national constitution, in response to public demands for 
constitutional reform. The new constitution was formulated with extensive public input 
and is progressive in it provisions for community involvement in government decision-
making and citizen standing to enforce accountability by state agencies and enterprises. 
This constitution has provided a legal framework through which the Thai public may 
now play a legitimate role both as a watchdog on business and regulator performance, 
and as a collaborator to develop new management approaches. 
7.5.2 Watchdog Role 
One of the roles of a watchdog is to set standards for accountability and performance. In 
those societies where corruption within government is endemic, the community is 
concerned about the calibre of the regulators. The regulators typically have their own 
agenda, driven from within their own agencies, as well as from pressure from 
politicians, and therefore cannot be relied upon to represent the broad community's 
interests. In Thailand, Mr Panas Tassaneyannond, Director of the Environmental Law 
Centre in Thailand made the following observation: 
"We are unluc/...,,;1 to have a government that is not concerned about the environment. It 
struggles to keep its power, rather than do the right thing" (Tassaneyannond cited by 
J anchitfah, 1998). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, many of the governments in South-East Asia are actively 
encouraging investment by the petroleum exploration and production industry, which is 
seen as a much-needed source of foreign investment and a potential source of energy 
self-sufficiency and possibly significant future export earnings. However, development 
of the upstream petroleum sector in South-East Asia is occurring in an environment in 
which industrial development has commonly been allowed (by governments) to take 
place at the expense of the natural environment and local community interests. Most of 
these countries are heavily reliant upon their primary production sectors to provide 
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livelihoods for their indigenous populations. Population growth and development 
demands are rapidly increasing and placing enormous pressures on regional terrestrial, 
coastal and marine resources, e.g. fishing, mining, agriculture, forestry, etc. 
The quality and sustainability of those resources is now subject to greater scrutiny 
(OEPP, 1997; Tridech, 1998). One example is that of fisheries (a traditional primary 
source of protein), which have been adversely affected by water pollution from 
domestic and industrial effluent (Dixon et al., 1994). The Thai Government has publicly 
directed concerns about development pressures on the coastal and marine environment 
at the petroleum industry (Tridech, 1998). 
Every aspect of the petroleum industry involves contact with the environment. Pollution 
can emanate from several sources including oil spills in drilling operations or during 
transportation, dumping of chemical drilling fluids and contaminated drill cuttings into 
the sea during offshore operations, gaseous emissions from flaring, silting from land 
clearing and offshore infrastructure installation, to name just a few. These activities can 
have both local and regional impacts. Pollutants can cross international political 
boundaries via natural water flows and atmospheric motion. The petroleum industry is 
therefore perceived by sectors of the local and international community to have 
contributed to the environmental problems now faced by the region. The upstream 
sector is also sometimes perceived as a competitor by other natural resource-based 
industries, in the bid to access areas that have multiple use potential. The local 
community is therefore often wary about the motives and benefits of this industry sector. 
As a consequence, the petroleum industry is often subject to public suspicion and 
opposition when it embarks upon new projects. Achieving and maintaining legitimacy 
to operate in this region is a major challenge facing the industry, particularly for the 
multinational companies, which have a relatively high public profile, not only in their 
host countries, but also in their home countries and in the international arena. Where 
once legitimacy of petroleum operations may have been inferred by host countries when 
they awarded exploration and production concessions or entered into production sharing 
contracts, increasing empowerment of communities has created more complex demands 
on achieving and maintaining legitimacy. 
Petroleum companies and industry associations actively seek an opportunity to be 
involved in regulatory reform and institutional strengthening, as a means of achieving 
informed regulatory debate, and certainty and reasonableness in approval and licensing 
processes. From the petroleum industry perspective, it is important that decisions that 
affect areas of low prospectivity should include some flexibility to accommodate new 
information and understanding of resource potential, and new technology, and should 
not deny access irrevocably to particular interests (Wells, 1995; APPEA, 1997). These 
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the industry's business, as demonstrated by the following quote: 
"An important component of dialogue with government must be to entrench the 
principle of multiple land and marine use and to ensure that we continue to have 
access to prospective acreage. vVe must also ensure that at the time of conimitment and 
approval of exploration expenditure, companies also have reasonable certainty of 
being able to develop any commercial discoveries. The upstream petroleum industry 
will find it increasingly difficult to attract exploration funds if there is significant doubt 
regarding approval to develop)) (Schubert, 1992, p. 47). 
Supporters of industry involvement in government institutional strengthening and 
capacity building argue that such efforts accelerate the process of regulatory 
development, reduce uncertainty for industry, provide an opportunity for industry to 
make its preferences known in a constructive context, while personalising the regulatory 
system and demonstrating goodwill (James, 1998). For example, interviewees from 
multinational companies cited examples of company involvement in legislation 
development and agency staff training activities in developing countries, including 
Azerbaijan, Myanmar, Vietnam and Venezuela. 
The industry argues that this approach is justifiable because reactive governments may 
quickly introduce legislation or regulations for the purpose of placating discontented 
citizens. The commercial repercussions of sudden government policy shifts can include 
increased political risk and environmental liabilities for industry, while also straining 
industry-regulator relations. The new controls that result from hasty political decisions 
may impose stricter performance requirements on industry, without heed to practicality 
or actual outcomes. The intended outcome will often therefore not be realised. 
For example, the Thai Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP) and the 
National Environmental Board (NEB) are reportedly under intense pressure from some 
local academics and environmentalists over environmental issues associated with the 
petroleum industry. These concerns partly stem from the mercury disposal problem in 
the Gulf of Thailand and projects like the PTT Yadana gas pipeline. Industry 
interviewees suggested that the OEPP is being pressured to demonstrate that it is taking 
action by developing and enforcing more stringent environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) guidelines and pollution control and waste management standards. The upstream 
petroleum companies in Thailand are apparently concerned about this initiative, because 
past experience has demonstrated that Thai government ministries (especially MOSTE) 
have favoured command and control-based legislation, and such legislation has been 
developed without consulting the petroleum industry and sometimes without 
considering the practical implications of implementation. It is suggested that 
formulation of such reactive regulatory controls is unlikely to engender support from 
either regulators or industry, and therefore are destined to fail. 
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"It is not necessary for all countries within the region to be identical in their 
approaches to HES issues, but there should be a compatibility of objectives, goals and 
targets from country to country" (Marcotte, 1998). 
Nevertheless, it is hardly surprising that the public does not consider these lobbying 
practices to be politically acceptable, because they are perceived to lack transparency 
and preclude an opportunity for other stakeholders to be involved in the process. There 
are concerns that the petroleum industry does not satisfactorily manage its social and 
environmental impacts, and yet legislation on environmental issues was, and continues 
to be, written in direct consultation with the very industry whose interests are at stake. 
The issue of regulator capture is a particular concern. Critics assert that industry and 
government can become so aligned as to exclude the interests of local communities 
(Moser and Miller, 1997; Moser, 1998). Closer relations between regulators and the 
regulated in the pursuit of co-operation can encourage the evolution of regulator capture 
and corruption (Ayers and Braithwaite, 1992). As observed by Fuchs and Mazmanian 
( 1998, p. 199), 
"We need to keep in niind, however, that it is only a small step from cooperation to 
capture. In consequence, cooperation between industry and government, or between 
industry and NGOs nzight actually lead to a weakening of regulations and a decrease 
. . '' ln greening. 
The relationship between petroleum companies and regulators is particularly 
controversial when the regulator is also the industry's facilitator, as is the case with 
many of the petroleum agencies. For example, Stone (1996) suggests that single client 
agencies, such as Australia's petroleum industry regulators, have come to identify with 
and serve the interests of the clients they regulate rather than the clients they serve. 
Similar criticism could be directed toward the Thai Department of Mineral Resources. 
The National Committee review report on the Yadana gas pipeline project ( discussed in 
Chapter 6) recommended that the Thai government improve laws related to the 
decision-making process for mega-projects, to provide for public participation prior to 
approval, and ready access to project information for the public and the media 
(Ridmontri, 1998b). The Committee Chairman, Anand Panyarachun, was reported to 
say: 
"This should be the last project of its kind to be approved despite the lack of 
transparency and proper environmental survey" (The Nation, 1998b). 
The editorial commentary on this situation made a strong plea for recognition of the 
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"The lesson here is that the project sponsors-be it the PIT or any other state 
agency-should not be in charge of organising public hearings or paying for the 
environmental impact studies. Instead, another impartial body or mechanism should be 
set up to carry out these two vital tasks with transparency and accountability. Only 
then can a social consensus be achieved. The new Constitution has laid the 
groundwork for such impartiality. It now requires effective implementation. That is up 
to Premier Chuan Leekpai, who must capitalise on the gas pipeline issue and follow the 
committee's recommendations to change the laws governing how so-called ''public 
interest" development projects are approved" (The Nation, 19986). 
While these recommendations were widely welcomed by environmental reform 
lobbyists, the history of environmental law in Thailand indicates that the suggestions to 
improve the statutory process will not be acted upon quickly. Nevertheless, the evidence 
presented in Chapter 6 shows that elements of Thai society, supported by an influential 
free media, have demonstrated that they are prepared to speak out about social and 
environmental issues. They will openly challenge traditional grounds of industry 
legitimacy (scientific arguments and government approvals), and the performance of 
both state-owned and private companies and regulators. These challenges cause 
embarrassment for both the industry and regulators, and are easily given widespread 
national and international publicity through the Internet. 
Interest groups contesting past projects in Thailand have made gains from strategic 
alliances with diverse stakeholders in which each social 'force' is able to optimise its 
influence. Villagers can speak in their 'own' voice at meetings and demonstrations, 
while newspapers expose abuses, dissident academics speak credibly in scientific or 
economic language against corporate consultants, students take the political offensive, 
bureaucrats fight turf wars within ministries, and phuu yai ('big people') approach other 
phuu yai at the top levels. Meanwhile, non-governmental organisations arrange forums 
at which the diverse members of alliances learn how to co-ordinate with each other and 
use one another's' strengths (Lohmann, 1995). For example, Baker ( 1995) observed that 
local grassroots organisations are usually led by local people who are almost certainly 
not part of the establishment and commonly do not have personal relationships with 
policy makers. They often need the support of more influential partners in order to gain 
power. 
This collaborative approach was evident in the Yadana pipeline case study, where the 
project opponents sought the support of respected academics to push for a public review 
of the project's approval process. PTT was impelled to change its perception of the 
stakeholder claims in February 1998, when these stakeholders acquired the attribute of 
'power' through the support of the National Committee's report findings. Prior to that, 
the local grassroots organisations had lacked access to decision-makers. 
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As a regulatory mechanism, therefore, scrutiny and contention by NGO-community-
media coalitions can be highly influential, as demonstrated in Chapter 6, and the Brent 
Spar incident described in Chapter 1. However, it is a reactive mechanism that requires 
a great deal of energy on behalf of the participants. It is also often perceived as an 
antagonistic process that builds barriers against industry and regulators. Therefore, while 
it is a necessary and important role for the public to play in regard to driving 
improvement, there are equally beneficial roles for the public to participate in proactive 
problem-solving, through collaborative programmes with regulators and industry, as 
also demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
7 .5.3 Collaboration 
The preceding sections have established that industry management of social and 
environmental issues would benefit from collaborative participation by regulators and 
stakeholders from the broader community. There are many potential opportunities for 
collaborative tripartite programs in Thailand and other South-East Asian countries. A 
positive start for Thailand might be the establishment of collaborative information 
gathering and dissemination programmes to foster informed decision-making. A 
concern, which has consistently arisen throughout this research, is the way in which 
information is gathered, disseminated and used in environmental policy formulation and 
decision-making. Information is key to all decision-making processes, but often its role 
and importance are often poorly understood. Public participation is also often impaired 
because the necessary information is not made available to stakeholders, for political or 
commercial reasons, or simply because the stakeholder' s needs are not recognised or 
considered (Waddock and Boyle, 1995). 
Furthermore, the judicial system is often not perceived by the public to serve their needs 
to achieve change, because of the entry costs involved and, in the Thai situation, the 
absence of a legal mechanism to set case law precedents. 
From the petroleum industry perspective, there are concerns regarding how terms are set 
for data collection programn1es. For example, interviewees reported that in the course of 
seeking permitting approvals for their projects, they have sometimes been asked by 
regulators to collect baseline or monitoring data that are peripheral to the project, but are 
relevant to other objectives of those regulatory agencies ( or vocal stakeholders). 
Decision-makers that are not confident to work with uncertainty may require 
unreasonable volumes of information, necessitating comprehensive, lengthy and 
expensive data collection programs, rather than focussing on key issues and their 
management. As observed by Ritchie and Kingham (1997): 
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account, rightly or wrongly, of the weight of public opinion and attitudes whether real 
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or manipulated . ... The "good science" approach with embedded confidence limits has 
been overtaken by th e external demand for unqualified assurances. As a consequence 
some monitoring effort must now be directed at particular types of problems, often 
species-led, which might be a diversion of limited resources but, in a world which is 
driven by information rather than knowledge, popular pressure cannot be ignored." 
In other cases, the intended use of the information is not carefully considered before 
information gathering is initiated. In such cases the information that is collected may be 
of little practical use, because its focus is inappropriate, or the information is supplied in 
a format that cannot be used (Pincerrato and Oliver, 1996). Lack of co-ordination leads 
to poor planning, and overlapping, repetitious and unco-ordinated data collection 
programmes that fail to address the important issue of identifying actual chronic and 
acute impacts of not only the petroleum industry's operations, but also those of other 
resource users. These databases are not adequate to answer the questions of stakeholders 
in regard to the nature of chronic, acute and cumulative impacts in spatial or temporal 
terms (Farrell and Yeates, 1992; Parry, 1995). 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 illustrate that there is a need to improve the community's 
understanding of the environmental impact of petroleum exploration and production 
activities, and for the public and NGOs to educate the petroleum companies about the 
social impacts of their activities on local communities. A better understanding of these 
impacts could then be used to design more responsive regulatory tools to address the 
issues in the local context, and move away from the existing command and control tools 
that are clearly not working. 
Co-operation between industry and its external stakeholders to develop environmental 
standards and regulatory processes to encourage innovation, can increase stakeholders' 
understanding of present and future requirements in the business community (Boons , 
1998). It can also increase the probability of buy-in and support from the business 
community to implement the standards and comply with the processes (Hastings, 1999). 
Recognition of local decision-making protocols and the influence of cultural values and 
motives are important in the development of cooperative relationships with the 
community (Chen et al., 1998; Doney et al., 1998; Hastings, 1999) 3. 
3 In general terms, East Asians are often referred to as having a characteristically 'collectivist' culture, 
relative to the 'individualist' culture perceived to be associated with 'Western' societies (Lewis, 1996; 
Milner and Quilty, 1996; Naisbitt, 1997). Individualism is basically defined as placing emphasis on the 
individual and the individual ' s interests, whereas collectivism focuses on the collective rather the 
individual good (Marshall, 1994). The distinctions are, however, relative to each other-both 
individualists and collectivists may have individual and collective goals, but they differ in the relative 
priority placed on them, that is, they may different rationalities (Chen et al., 1998). 
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In Asian cultures, decision making is influenced by a politics of inclusion, and complex 
questions are approached by broadening the circle of inquiry to include all points of 
view, and then seeking an arrangement that is good for the collective community 
(J an1es, 1998). The social norms that characterise Thai society are appropriate for a 
collaborative, mutual gains approach toward problem solving. Given its tradition of 
allowing everyone to save face, Thai culture is by its nature very inclusive. 
"Thais typically want to include as many people as possible in the public process, and 
to do so in a way that ,ninimises the possibility of conflict and confrontation" 
(McDaniel et al., 1998, p. 4). 
As is evident in the Chapter 6 case studies, a key aspect in building stakeholder trust is 
the approach taken by industry and regulators to communicating with the community. A 
potential constraint to community acceptance of petroleum company initiatives is the 
perceived credibility deficit of both the industry and its regulators. In many societies, 
credibility and respect are accorded on the basis of hierarchy. In Thailand, the most 
respected persons are members of the Royal Family, Buddhist monks, village elders and 
teachers/university professors. Thai government representatives and members of Thai 
industry also possess a medium amount of respect, but foreign industry is at the bottom 
of the "ladder of credibility". 
"Industry spokespersons, therefore, often enter the public participation process with a 
credibility deficit. In order to participate in a dialogue, industry representatives need 
to become credible spokespersons who are trusted by the public" (McDaniel et al., 
1998, p. 3). 
Given concerns about the agenda and credibility of industry, the prime mover for 
collaborative initiatives could be local and/or international NGOs. Enlightened NGOs 
have recognised the need to work with industry in a collaborative manner to achieve 
their desired longer term aims (Hastings, 1999; Neale, 1997). Organisations like the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace are increasingly prepared to take 
on the role of stin1ulating environmental innovation, and in recent years have been 
working in international circles to encourage the industry to form alliances for 
environment improvement projects. As stated by Chris Rose (Campaigns Director, 
Greenpeace UK) 
"We have to move on from being hunters, hunting out and spotlighting problems, to 
becoming farmers, nurturing solutions ... Somehow, we have to evolve" (The Times, 27 
September 1995, cited by Neale, 1997). 
Similarly, Thilo Bode, soon after his appointment as Executive Director of Greenpeace 
International, emphasised that solutions campaigning, and seeking business allies, 
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"Industry is the main player in society ... That's why we need to talk to th em " 
(Financial Times, 10 January 1996, cited by Neale, 1997, p. 100). 
In Thailand, the Thailand Environment Institute has been involved in piloting the 
introduction of the ISO 14000 series standards in various industry sectors. (PTTEP' s 
ISO 14001 EMS was a product of this initiative). There are also many other local public 
interest groups and NGOs in that are actively involved in social and environmental 
reform in Thailand (Baker, 1995). 
Smart regulation needs to be developed in consultation with the key stakeholders to 
acknowledge and address the regulators' financial, labour and skills constraints, 
industry's concerns about the need to maintain flexibility, and the community's 
expectations of performance outcomes. Companies, public interest groups and the 
community may benefit from such collaborative alliances. For example, companies gain 
early access to the views and demands of public interest groups, which in the long term 
may help strategic planning and result in cost savings. The public interest groups may 
benefit due to an increased probability of success in gaining involvement with 
constructive outcomes that benefit themselves and the wider community (Hartman and 
Stafford, 1997; 1998; Hastings, 1999). This collaborative approach is therefore 
potentially effective, efficient, equitable and politically acceptable. 
7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
McPhail and Davy ( 1998) suggest that the business opportunities ans1ng from 
environmentally responsible behaviour include developing innovative approaches to 
environmental problems (sometimes in the face of regulation) and improving efficiency 
or reducing wastage with associated economic benefits. They acknowledge that the 
opportunities arising from socially responsible corporate behaviour are less tangible in 
economic terms, but may include improving the prospects of access to future 
exploration concessions within the same country or elsewhere, reducing potential 
conflicts with local communities, which can result in costly delays, and improving 
employee commitment-all of which may collectively confer competitive advantage on 
the more socially responsible corporations. 
However, these benefits are not always immediately obvious or attractive to petroleum 
companies, if their market environment is focussed on short-term financial returns. 
While petroleum companies may espouse to honour their policies and demonstrate 
corporate social and environmental responsiveness, their performance will exhibit 
bounded rationality driven by commercial considerations. Anecdotal evidence presented 
in Chapters 4 and 6 suggests that only those companies that have had a bad public 
experience or have seen the writing on the wall appear to sense the imperative to step 
away from the commercially-driven status quo. In the absence of an empowered society 
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in which all petroleum producers are required to perform to more stringent social and 
environmental standards, there are limited market-based incentives to encourage all 
companies to move away from the status quo. 
Therefore some regulatory balance needs to be achieved to encourage the good 
performers to continue to improve their performance, and to control the m1n1mum 
performance standards of the laggards. 
The findings of this research suggest that opportunities for improvement may lie in the 
harnessing of corporate social responsibilities through peer and third party stakeholder 
pressure. Peer pressure enforcement of environmental management (and other) practices 
has some merit, but is also constrained by pragmatic considerations. Companies are 
sometimes reluctant to criticise the social and environmental management practices of 
others, in case they suffer the consequences of future reprisals when those companies 
are a potential partner or competitor. Therefore, it cannot be assumed or expected that 
they will always adequately consider the needs of the broader stakeholder community. 
There is clearly an important role to be played by the industry's traditional regulator, the 
government. However, in countries like Thailand there is a strong case for revising 
regulatory frameworks to address their flaws, and to incorporate other mechanisms to 
establish performance criteria and share the burden of responsibility for monitoring 
compliance. A tripartite model of community-industry-regulator participation holds 
some promise, but its design will need to take account of the strategic context in which 
it is to operate. In the case of the upstream petroleum industry operating in countries like 
Thailand, that are characterised by under-resourced and bureaucratic government 
administrations, this situation may be summarised as follows: 
i) Regulators are not adequately equipped to single-handedly administer regulatory 
mechanisms that require regular and intensive monitoring routines. 
ii) Community participation is constrained by financial, educational and political 
barriers. They will require assistance to equip themselves to play a regular and 
active role as a watchdog and a collaborator. 
iii) Little financial incentive is typically provided by the market to introduce 
innovation to corporate social and environmental management practices if they will 
cost more, or cause delays to commencement of production. 
iv) Multinational and other high profile petroleum companies will take an active role 
in designing and implementing social and environmental responsible practices, but 
need some form of constant driving incentive to justify the investment. 
v) Recalcitrant and low profile petroleum companies will require the most 
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'encouragement' to improve performance. Pressure may need to be applied to these 
companies via several regulatory mechanisms. 
On the basis of these findings it is suggested that regulatory reform should address the 
following priorities: 
i) The need for appropriate information upon which to base informed decision-
making about the nature of industry impacts, and to determine appropriate 
regulatory tools. The information needs to be relevant, valid, and publicly 
available. Information requirements are broad ranging and include scientific data, 
knowledge about existing management arrangements, and strengths and 
weaknesses of specific regulatory mechanisms. 
ii) The need for regulatory flexibility to enable the use of a mix of regulatory 
instruments ( direct, self-regulatory, economic, etc.) tailored to meet specific 
situations. For example, a more prescriptive approach might be warranted to 
regulate companies that are known to have a poor environmental performance 
record, while greater use of mandated self-regulatory instruments might be 
appropriate for companies that have demonstrated a long-term commitment to the 
country and to responsible management of their operations. 
iii) Defined roles for third party interests to be involved in design and enforcement of 
the regulatory instruments, their conditions of use, and their implementation. These 
interests are also broad-based and include local communities, local and 
international NGOs, financial institutions, and petroleum industry associations. 
Process transparency and access of all interested parties to the decision-making process 
will be necessary to achieve these reforms. In Thailand, this mechanism would appear to 
have been established in the 1997 Constitution. However, entrenched bureaucratic 
modes of repression may work to undermine this power. The general public will likely 
require assistance and support from NGOs, the media, and respected community 
spokespersons to have these rights recognised and integrated into planning and decision-
making processes. Support could also be provided by the petroleum industry through 
collaborative partnerships. It appears that it is in both the short- and long-term interest of 
the industry to be able to operate within a society that understands its business and is 
prepared to form partnerships to proactively support corporate social and environmental 




"We hear repeatedly from defenders of corporate libertarianism that 
the greening of management within a globalised free market will 
provide the answer to the world's social and environmental problems. 
With financial markets demanding short-term gains and corporate 
raiders standing by to trash any company that isn't externalising every 
possible cost, efforts to fix the problem by raising the social 
consciousness of managers misdefine the problem. There are plenty of 
socially conscious managers. The problem is a predatory system that 
makes it difficult for them to survive. This creates a terrible dilemma 
for managers with a true social vision of the corporation's role in 
society. They must either compromise their vision or run a great risk of 
being expelled by the system" (Korten, 1995, p. 212). 
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8.1 THIS STUDY 
The hypothesis of this study is that 
The social and environmental responsiveness practised by companies is moulded by 
their assessments of the business risks posed by the stakeholder environment. In the 
absence of a socially acceptable balance of power between companies, their regulators 
and third party stakeholders, company management practices will tend towards a 
minimalist position to maximise financial returns. 
The findings of this study (summarised in this Chapter) suggest that sustaining the 
business incentive of upstream petroleum companies to continuously improve their 
corporate social and environmental responsiveness, will depend upon the existence of a 
regulatory framework that encourages, not punishes, innovation. 
'Smart' or 'responsive' regulation is about finding the right mix of regulatory 
instruments to suit the context in which they are required to perform. The objectives of 
smart regulation are to: (i) ensure accountability and responsibility by regulators and 
industry; (ii) allow industry sufficient flexibility to be innovative and adapt to the 
continually changing demands of the marketplace, without being constrained by overly 
prescriptive regulations; and (iii) provide a safety net for society's interests. 
In order to develop a regulatory framework for the petroleum industry in which these 
objectives can be achieved, it is important to understand the· dynamics of the 
relationships between the industry and its stakeholders. 
Firstly, it is necessary to understand how petroleum companies operate, and how they 
make decisions that will directly affect their social and environmental management 
performance. That is, to identify those factors which mould business management 
strategies and set performance standards. 
Secondly, it is important to design regulatory solutions that are viable within the society 
in which they are to operate. Namely, that they recognise the origins and characteristics 
of its laws and regulations, its institutions (and their human, technical and data 
resources), governing traditions, cultural customs, decision-making processes and its 
regional context. Legitimacy theory suggests that companies -can only continue to exist, 
if the society in which they are based perceives them to be operating to a value system 
which is commensurate with the society's own value system. 
To develop an understanding of the factors influencing corporate social and 
environmental responsiveness in the context of the upstream (production and 
exploration) petroleum sector, this empirical study has analysed examples of how 
petroleum company managers perceive and respond to environmental performance 
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expectations imposed by their stakeholders. The intent of the study is to provide an 
informed insight to this industry with a view to identifying how best a mix of regulatory 
mechanisms can be used to harness 'corporate virtue'. 
The key findings of this study are summarised in the following sections, framed by the 
study propositions that were employed to guide this inquiry. 
8.2 INFLUENCE OF REGULATORY APPROACHES 
Proposition 1. Conimand and control regulatory approaches are unsuitable for 
application in developing economies where the enforce1nent capacity of regulators is 
constrained by political and financial factors. In these circunistances, companies may 
exploit regulatory and/or political loopholes in the interests of business expediency. 
Statutory environmental management requirements throughout the South-East Asian 
region vary considerably. Each of these countries has developed country-specific 
petroleum laws and environmental laws, drawing upon guidance from a wide range of 
other national and international standards. As a consequence, there is no uniformity of 
performance requirements (e.g. oil-in-water discharge limits) in force for the region, 
despite the high potential for transboundary environmental impacts, particularly in the 
marine environment. 
Legislation and regulations often lag behind community expectations, largely as a result 
of the lengthy political processes that must be followed in order to enact new legislation. 
Consequently, the host community is commonly found to be seeking changes, such as 
greater transparency in government processes and more provision for public 
participation in planning and decision-making, in direct conflict with prevailing 
regulatory provisions and government policies. Public challenges to the Yadana gas 
pipeline project, and disposal of produced mercury in the Gulf of Thailand ( described in 
Chapter 6), appeared to partly stem from society's perceptions that environmental laws 
and regulations are deficient and that the administering institutions are not serving their 
needs. 
The review of the Thai environmental legislative framework, presented in Chapter 5, 
revealed a number of reasons that have led to such conflict. These review findings, 
together with the observations of other researchers (including Hammer and Shetty, 
1995; Hirsch, 1995 ; Hossain, 1995; Mantajit, 1998; Phongpaichit and Baker, 1997), 
suggest that the key factors are as follows: 
i) The dominance of State systems that are highly elite-centred, and focussed on 
internal power struggles between bureaucrats and other 'social forces', rather 
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power of the mandarin bureaucrats is entrenched in the government framework-
particularly in the military and the Ministry of the Interior. 
ii) The subordination of legal, bureaucratic and other public institutions to the 
interests of ruling elites and the spread of non-accountable and corrupt practices 
throughout government. Regulatory agencies are not supported with adequate 
funding, trained staff, or the political will to implement and enforce the legislation 
and regulations for which they have responsibility. Like most of the South-East 
Asian countries, Thailand's regulatory administration is currently ill-equipped to 
effectively implement any environmental protection standards, or honour 
international environmental treaty obligations. In particular, they lack the financial 
and technical resources to adequately enforce regulations pertaining to industries 
operating in remote locations, such as petroleum producers in the Gulf of Thailand. 
In many cases, government agencies basically cannot, will not, or in some cases, 
do not know how to, initiate the necessary management programmes. 
iii) Ineffective conventional co1nmand and control approaches to legislation that have 
difficulties in keeping pace with the rapid increase in environmental problems and 
changing stakeholder expectations. There is a lack of knowledge, resources and 
accountability amongst regulators to effectively deal with environmental 
management issues at the industry level. Prescriptive, rules-based processes lack 
flexibility to provide economic incentives to encourage industry to implement 
voluntary self-regulatory initiatives and demonstrate continuous improvement in 
environmental management. There is typically no legally recognised mechanism to 
enable companies to implement other forms of improvement measures in place of 
inappropriate prescriptive monitoring and reporting processes. These rules-based 
processes also commonly lack flexibility to enable broader community 
stakeholders to participate fully in decision-making pertaining to industrial 
development. This constraint is reinforced by an absence of political will to 
identify and engage stakeholders in project approval processes. 
iv) Civil dissatisfaction with systems of representation, arising within weak or long-
suppressed sectors of society that have historically lacked the means to effectively 
hold political leaders and public officials to account. In the absence of access to 
power within the Thai mandarin-dominated bureaucracy, the vanguard of the 
salariat strives to define an arena of open political debate 'outside the system', for 
example in the print media. The peasantry, excluded from political access , is 
developing ways to exert its numerical power through modem forms of agitation , 
which use the media and NGOs to target resources exploited by the urban 
economy. Hovvever, this action is usually antagonistic and while it may achieve 
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individual project improvements, it does not effectively influence industry-wide 
policies. 
The shortcomings of the regulatory system are compounded by the behavioural 
characteristics of industry, described in Chapter 4. Upstream petroleum companies n1ay 
enter and exit countries or particular geographic areas over a relatively short period, as 
they search for exploitable hydrocarbon reserves. An operational environment 
characterised by this combination of high risks and high rewards, and constant change, 
has moulded the culture and business practices of these companies. Within this industry 
sector, this study has revealed the following traits that can undermine corporate 
commitment to regulatory compliance or to go beyond compliance and address 
corporate social and environmental responsibilities: 
i) Managerial decision-making is heavily biased towards assessment of investment 
risks and returns, and the need to remain flexible to make expenditure cuts in the 
short-term interests of the business. A decline in commodity prices or a perceived 
increase in political risk will prompt managers to consider expenditure reductions 
or withdrawal from the market. Conversely, a rise in commodity prices will be 
viewed as a short-term cyclical trend that should be optimised in terms of profit, 
and therefore will not necessarily lead to a loosening of the purse strings in favour 
of social and environmental management expenditure. 
ii) There is considerable variability between company cultures and business managers 
in the way they perceive the stakeholder environment. As demonstrated in 
Chapters 4 and 6, decision-making is influenced by the culture and ethical stance 
of the company, the personal experience and aspirations of the company managers, 
the financial and resource (power) base of the company, and the strategic direction 
that the corporate entity wants to pursue. Many of the large petroleum companies 
operate through small branch/in-country offices or affiliated companies. In these 
situations, the company's incumbent country manager may wield considerable 
control over how the company's business is conducted in that location. Operations 
managers who are pre-occupied with the 'bottom line' may compromise corporate 
social and environmental management objectives and standards. Even large well-
intentioned multinational companies cannot necessarily control the social and 
environmental performance of their subsidiaries, if the local business units 
withhold information from corporate managers. 
iii) The diverse and competing internal and external influences acting on companies 
require their managers to prioritise their actions according to the way they assess 
the business risks posed by the regulatory environment, as the minimum 
performance benchmark. If the host environment does not have a strong regulatory 
regime, companies will pay less attention to expenditure on regulatory compliance, 
240 
j 
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
in favour of other operating demands. If activities like environmental impact 
assessment and environmental monitoring are not host country compliance 
requirements, then these tasks may be avoided or only given token attention. 
Where petroleum company managers in developing countries observe that poorly 
managed and more polluting industries are allowed to operate without any apparent 
sanction, they can often self-justify a choice not to adhere to high standards of 
performance and incur the associated expenditure, when their local competitors can 
openly operate to lesser standards. 
/ iv) Respect for the law may also be eroded under the pressure to boost short-term 
results, particularly if company managers are not concerned that the governments 
will actually enforce environmental legislation. The possible costs resulting from 
prosecution or reputation damage for non-compliance may be dismissed as 
problems for another day, based on a confident belief that they can be negotiated 
through captive regulators, or through political connections in the case of state-
owned petroleum companies. 
When these regulatory and industry sector characteristics are combined, the likelihood 
of success of existing regulatory controls in developing countries like Thailand appears 
to be low. As discussed in Chapters 5 to 7, in this type of business environment, 
industry is not positively encouraged by its government regulators to show initiative or 
commit to continuous improvement of its social and environmental performance. 
Critically, there is no indication that these impediments will be removed in tbe _" 
foreseeable future, particularly while the governments and industries in South-East 
Asian countries are recovering from the substantial negative impacts of the regional 
economic crisis that occurred in the late 1990s. 
Nevertheless, the evidence presented in Chapter 6 shows that elements of Thai society, 
supported by an influential print media, have demonstrated that they are prepared to 
speak out about social and environmental issues. They will openly challenge traditional 
grounds of industry legitimacy (e.g. scientific arguments and government approvals), 
and the performance of both state-owned and private companies and regulators. These 
challenges cause embarrassment for both the industry and regulators, and are easily 
given widespread national ana international publicity through the Internet. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, with appropriate support, these 'social forces' could be 
encouraged to channel their energy and commitment to perform a formalised role as 
both watchdog and collaborator to drive improved regulator and industry performance. 
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8.3 LEGITIMATION STRATEGIES 
Proposition 2. Co1npanies niake strategic choices in the formulation of their business 
plans. Company 1nanagers will adopt self-regulatory initiatives and move beyond 
co1npliance where they perceive that they will derive benefits, such as avoidance of 
increased regulatory compliance costs, improved internal management of operating 
risks, and improved reputation; and/or where setting higher industry standards will give 
them an advantage over their competitors. 
In the long term, energy sector analysts suggest that there are three megatrends facing 
the petroleum industry: (i) open markets and competition, such as deregulation of the 
gas market; (ii) technology improvements, which have significantly reduced costs and 
increased the efficiency of extracting, converting and utilising energy; and (iii) 
environmental concerns. 
The findings of Chapters 4 to 7 support the proposition that external, mediating and 
moderating influences play an important role in determining the corporate business 
strategies of petroleum companies. In terms of social and environmental management 
practices, both external factors (market pressures, legal-regulatory obligations, and 
community expectations) and internal factors (e.g. culture, ethics, leadership, etc.) affect 
the strategic choices made by company managers. 
The influence of the external factors is dependent upon the demands of stakeholders. In 
this regard, stakeholders may be viewed as regulators, company shareholders, and the 
broader community. Each group is influential, but is typically accorded differing levels 
of salience. 
Shareholder Influences 
Market pressures are of paramount importance. Although petroleum companies vary 
considerably with respect to origin, size, structure, strategy, management, innovation, 
flexibility, performance, etc., their behaviour is primarily driven by the need to be 
profitable and maintain longevity. 
Managers of publicly-listed companies often argue that their corporate social and 
enviro~mental performance is constrained by market forces and the obligation to return 
profits to its shareholders in the short-term. Corporate governance systems are often 
based on the principle that management is appointed by and accountable to 
shareholders, who exercise their control by using their voting rights or by disposing of 
their shares. 
Thus, short-term cost minimisation drives these companies. Typically, little financial or 
policy incentive is typically given to innovative social and environmental management 
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practices if they will cost more, or cause time delays relative to the conventional 
approval process or "basic necessities" in the host country. Even if superior 
environment-enhancing production methods and techniques become available, 
companies have a strong economic interest in continuing to operate sites of production 
using existing capital. Innovation in environmental control at existing sites of 
production may be limited to just the extra standards imposed by government regulatory 
agencies. Only where there is a clear, supported directive from the operator's head office 
or the joint venture, is there a deviation from this general practice, which is otherwise 
driven by commercial considerations. 
That the market demands short-term returns, prompts companies to avoid expenditure 
that would arguably enhance the company's social and environmental performance and 
be beneficial to the company in the long term. For example, a reputation as a business 
that is concerned for the environment is likely to bring benefits to the company, yet 
implementation of the programs that lead to that reputation may be expensive in the 
short run. As a consequence, this market pressure is likely to lead to management opting 
for short-term payback wherever possible. 
This concern about the market for control assumes that shareholders' decisions to buy 
and sell shares are influenced purely by the expected financial return. However, the 
behaviour of some shareholders, especially ethical investment bodies, may be affected 
by other factors. A new trend of social and environmental activism amongst 
shareholders appears to be modifying the nature of shareholder expectations of 
corporate performance. Public companies are now being required to deal with two broad 
types of shareholders: (i) the traditional shareholder groups that are primarily interested 
in the company's financial performance, such as large institutional investors like 
pension funds and many private share holders; and (ii) growing numbers of 'social 
activist' shareholders. The latter are currently vocal minorities, and in most cases, the 
company shareholder majorities have been able to overrule the protests of 'social 
activist' shareholders. However, the actions of the latter highlight the increasing 
willingness of key shareholder groups to actively express their concerns about corporate 
social responsibilities, and their ability to harness the resources of the media and the 
Internet to give them a global profile. Examples of their activism include the stakeholder 
protests and lawsuits that have arisen from the involvement of the petroleum industry in 
the exploitation and export of gas from Myanmar. The outcomes of these actions can 
cause companies to suffer the consequences of adverse international publicity and incur 
significant financial costs. 
Many of the large petroleum companies have learnt this lesson the hard way, and are 
now paying more attention to demonstrably addressing their corporate social 
responsibilities. Industry leaders like BP Amoco and Royal Dutch/Shell have recognised 
that if they are to maintain their social licence to operate within a changing society, they 
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need to publicly demonstrate commitment to environmentally sustainable and socially 
responsible business practices. 
Reputation and Competitive Advantage 
Competitive advantage pressures dictate that where companies perceive a threat to 
resource access or product sales, the larger petroleum companies, in particular, will 
implement their social and environmental management initiatives within a broader 
framework of strategic management, so as to position themselves ahead of their 
competitors. For example, in some cases, technological advances in emissions control 
and treatment of wastes are being used by companies to improve their capability to 
comply with increasingly stringent pollution control regulations, as well as to lobby 
government for the rights to access sensitive environmental areas. Companies with 
access to such technologies perceive themselves to have a competitive advantage 
relative to other petroleum companies. 
Company size has an impact on investment in corporate social and environmental 
management strategies. In general, large firms seem more able (and willing) than small 
firms to capitalise on the existence of environment-enhancing economic incentives in 
the industry. Major companies are often more sensitive than smaller independents, to the 
need to protect their international reputation. There is evidence to suggest that the large 
companies, in particular, are dete1mined to gain and maintain a competitive advantage 
based on their environmental performance, as they perceive that their ability to respond 
to external demands in regard to environmental concerns will be crucial to their 
competitive position in the future. By comparison, small firms are often short-term 
oriented, partly because they are dependent upon the volatile spot-market for sale of 
their products. Consequently, the flow of revenue to small firms is very unstable, and 
affects their ability to both develop new projects and make long-term investments 1n 
environmental quality. 
Access to new areas to explore for, or develop resources is critical to the continuity of 
the upstream petroleum industry. The industry has been actively developing the 
technology to enable it to successfully exploit resources in deepwater basins and remote 
locations. However, political access to resources may sometimes be the main 
impediment to their business. Changing social expectations in terms of community 
benefits from foreign investment, heightened concerns about protection of sensitive 
ecosystems and the rights of indigenous communities have led to access exclusions 
through political sanctions and community protests. 
Resource-based industries, like the petroleum industry, are invariably part of a much 
larger political economy agenda of their home and host countries. Investment in 
resource development projects that form part of a controversial political agenda, can 
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lead to petroleum companies facing significant oppos1t1on at local and international 
levels, as has been the experience of Royal Dutch/Shell in Nigeria, Texaco in Ecuador, 
and Total and Unocal in Myanmar. 
The environmental and socio-political issues facing the upstream petroleum industry 
operating in the South-East Asian region have local, as well as regional and global 
dimensions. Expectations of corporate social and environmental responsibility emerging 
in the international arena will increasingly affect business in South-East Asia. 
Companies will face closer scrutiny from shareholders, lending institutions, NGOs, the 
media and, increasingly, their own staff. Commercial activities in one part of the world 
will help determine a company's reputation, and profitability elsewhere around the 
world. Empirical observations suggest that those companies best able to adapt to this 
operating environment are those which anticipate problems, maintain communications 
, with NGOs and key interest groups, and present clear, reasoned explanations of their 
policies during crisis incidents. 
8.4 DRIVERS FOR CORPORATE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESPONSIVENESS 
Proposition 3. Companies most amenable to making changes that improve their social 
and environmental management practices will be those ·whose nianagers have 
undergone learning processes as a result of corporate experiences within their own 
organisation, or those of their peers; and/or are subject to stringent corporate 
governance systems, home-country environniental standards and regulatory controls. 
The key requirements of a proactive greening strategy, identified in Chapter 2, appear to 
be: 
i) corporate recognition of the need for change; 
ii) leadership of change; and 
iii) a system to implement the change and to ensure on-going continuous improvement 
of the greening process. 
Fundamental to the greening process, is the ability and commitment of the companies' 
decision-makers to learn and apply their learning to achieve improved performance. 
Corporate liabilities and due diligence requirements (particularly for multinational and 
foreign companies), and associated risk management expectations imposed by joint 
venture participants and financiers, are emerging as strong initiatives for the industry to 
'go beyond regulation'. With the ever-present threat of more regulatory control and 
greater public scrutiny of their actions, petroleum companies are being openly 
245 
CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
challenged to demonstrate that they are willing and capable of responsibly managing 
their business. 
Evidence presented in Chapters 4 and 6 indicate that this management challenge appears 
to have been recognised and accepted by several petroleum companies, albeit by 
imposition in some cases. Through industry associations, and son1e individual company 
initiatives, the petroleum industry is demonstrating that it collectively recognises that 
the existing environmental laws and administrative arrangements are often lagging 
behind the broader community's expectations and the industry's need for efficiency and 
efficacy. Within the duration of this research many significant positive changes have 
occurred within the industry. Some of these changes, such as recognition of the 
importance of third party stakeholder engagement, have clearly demonstrated the 
momentum that can be generated once lessons have been learnt and can be related by 
corporate managers to competitive advantage. The changing response patterns among 
leading-edge companies are manifest in "the way we do business around here", in the 
integration of business functions, in the co-operation among people and organisations, 
and in the generation of new ideas and concepts. 
From a public policy perspective, development and implementation of a proactive 
(innovative) strategy is a more desirable and socially beneficial approach for industry to 
adopt (relative to a defensive strategy), and would seem to offer more opportunity for 
progressive, far-reaching improvements in industry-driven environmental management. 
As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 6, strong corporate leadership can be highly 
influential in setting company social and environmental performance objectives and 
standards of operation. Evidence presented in Chapter 4 indicates that corporations at 
the leading edge of innovation and environmental enhancement in the petroleum 
industry (such as BP Amoco ARCO and Royal Dutch/Shell) seem to share a common 
set of values. These appear to derive from shared cultural and professional backgrounds, 
as well as shared experiences inside and outside their organisations. There is also 
evidence in Chapter 4 that smaller independent companies also now feel empowered by 
the actions of their peers to pursue ethical stances. 
Lessons have also been learnt within the industry, through the impacts of downsizing 
and outsourcing, and the associated decline in safety and environmental performance. 
These -probleI))s arose from a decline in provision of adequate staff training, poor 
communication links and understanding of responsibilities within project teams that 
comprised many autonomous contractors, and/or a lack of commitment to any long-term 
performance objectives. Lessons learnt from these experiences are now being applied to 
alliancing contracts between petroleum companies and their contractors, based on four 
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commitment to behavioural change; (iii) teamwork and enhanced communications; and 
(iv) benchmarking and continuous improvement. 
However, other empirical examples, discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, indicate that not all 
companies have 'seen the light'. The extent to which socially and environmentally 
responsible management practices are adopted appears to depend upon how corporate 
social and environmental responsibilities are perceived by senior management. Equally 
abundant evidence suggests that some companies will continue to act as laggards and 
pursue a minimalist approach to corporate social and environmental responsibility, for 
as long as they can extract a profit from pursuing their core business in their 
traditionally isolationist approach. 
Based on the empirical examples presented in Chapters 4 and 6, the companies most 
amenable to accepting and addressing their corporate and social responsibilities 
generally appear to be the large publicly listed petroleum corporations. Their 
international reputation is of considerable importance to them, as it affects political 
access to resources, acceptance by host governments and communities, and their share 
price ( capital availability). Importantly, these companies are usually also more 
financially secure and better resourced (personnel and technology) to invest in such 
practices, as compared with smaller companies. 
Intermediate-sized companies are variable in their approaches. Their public reputation is 
less important to them in the international arena, but may be of local importance for 
brokering contractual agreements with joint venturers and governments. Their 
assessment of business risks tends to be determined on a case-by-case basis, driven by 
the influence of cost-benefit ratios. 
State-owned enterprises and small independent companies appear to have the least 
internal and market-driven incentives to go beyond compliance and participate in 
philanthropic activities. In the case of state-owned enterprises operating in their home 
countries, they can usually rely upon their government owner to ensure political security 
and therefore they are less sensitive to public perception of their reputation, as 
demonstrated by the PTT case study in Chapter 6. Small companies on the other hand, 
tend to have a low public profile and operate highly cost-sensitive businesses and 
therefore neither have the external pressure to operate beyond minimum compliance, nor 
the capital and staff resources to perform other than core business activities. 
On the basis of these generalisations, linear approaches developed to describe corporate 
environmental strategies (discussed in Chapter 2) identify behavioural categories to 
which companies can be assigned, e.g. non-compliant/laggard, compliant, compliant 
plus, leader. However, the empirical evidence gathered in this study demonstrates that 
on a case-by-case basis companies may quickly move between those categories in 
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response to context-specific pressures. Therefore, there are always exceptions to such 
the rules. So, while categorical models of corporate management strategies may be of 
use to regulators and policymakers as a check to ensure they have covered the range of 
strategic choice positions, they do not capture the dynamics of corporate behaviour. 
The Thai case studies demonstrate differences in corporate attitudes to social 
responsibility. Corporate responses to environmental issues and stakeholder challenges 
to its social domain appeared to vary according to managers' perceptions of the 
situation, and hence their determination of stakeholder salience. In these case studies, 
mediating and moderating factors, such corporate ethics, corporate culture, leadership, 
and organisational adaptability, appear to have been particularly important. 
Modifications to strategic approaches were observed to occur over a relatively short 
time period in response to perceived changes in stakeholder salience, as stakeholders 
gained one or more of the key components of power, legitin1acy or urgency. 
In this regard, the model of Ghobadian et al. (1998) is perhaps a more realistic 
representation of the bounded rationality that applies to corporate strategic decision-
making. Nevertheless, even their model could tempt us to categorise corporations based 
on what we observe and hear about them, and then mislead us to believe that we 
understand where each entity 'fits'. In the current business environment that is 
characterised by on-going re-structuring and re-engineering of petroleum companies, 
mergers of companies will inevitably change their organisational cultures and business 
objectives, so even they may not be able to accurately define their corporate ethos at any 
given time. Therefore, while strategic choice models can be a useful guide to 
categorising company behaviour, their usage should be combined with frequent 
reassessment of the dynamic influence of external, moderating and mediating factors on 
corporate responsiveness. 
It is concluded that the influences on corporate social and environmental responsiveness 
can be described using a model that integrates aspects of the theories of strategic 
management, organisational behaviour, and stakeholder mapping and engagement. The 
conceptual framework constructed by this researcher to show the influence-response 
relationships between company managers and the stakeholder environment, has proved 
to be a reliable framework guide to demonstrate how internal and external influences 
mould corporate social and environmental responsiveness. 
8.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of my research support the hypothesis posed for testing. Empirical 
evidence demonstrates that social and environmental management practices of 
petroleum companies are moulded by their assessments of business risks posed by the 
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strategic planning process, or reactjve, that js, in response to an incident, or increasing 
external pressure. The risk management strategies that evolve from this process are 
moulded by company managers' perceptions of external factors (market pressures, legal-
regulatory obligations, and community expectations), and the context of moderating 
factors ( organisational adaptability, capital availability, human resource availability, 
technology availability, and assessment of the relative costs and benefits of strategy 
options). The perception of managers is also influenced by their own situation, 
personality and past learning experiences, and the culture, ethics and decision-making 
norms of their company. 
Their strategic management choices, be they proactive or reactive, are bounded by 
rationality. As the opening quote to this Chapter from Korten ( 1995) highlights, the 
practical reality and financial pressures of conducting profitable businesses in a highly 
competitive market are the key influences on the day-to-day operations of petroleum 
companies. The petroleum industry operates within a commodity market that is 
characteristically dynamic, and often requires rapid reactive responses from companies 
in order for them to maintain their market position. Most commonly these responses 
involve some element of cost-cutting. When the host environmental regulatory system 
and stakeholder standing are perceived to be ineffective, company managers can easily 
find other higher priorities to which they should tum their attention. In the absence of an 
appropriate balance of power between companies, their regulators and third party 
stakeholders, company management practices will tend towards a minimalist position to 
maximise financial returns. 
The findings of this research suggest that inappropriate legislation, regulations and 
administrative approaches result in poor process and outcomes and, in some cases, may 
deter companies from pursuing their corporate social and environmental responsibilities. 
Governing regulatory frameworks need to incorporate sufficient flexibility to allow 
companies to pursue market opportunities, while also harnessing the power of peers and 
third parties to maintain corporate social and environmental responsiveness performance 
standards. Changes in performance objectives towards greater corporate social and 
environmental responsiveness will inevitably take time. Long-held assumptions and 
working practices will need to be continuously challenged. 
Without some form of effective external pressure that challenges their market 
reputation, such as media and NGO campaigns, ethical performance demands from 
lending institutions, shareholders, and preferential buying by customers, the need to 
maintain a competitive financial edge discourages companies from voluntarily 
committing expenditure beyond minimum compliance, if there is no tangible financial 
return to be gained for their efforts. Some form of regulatory change is therefore 
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required to drive both the industry and its regulators to be more accountable and 
responsible for addressing the broader demands of society. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, stakeholder dialogue and targeted protest campaigns around 
the world have made it clear to business and regulators that civil society expects 
industry to pursue the principles of corporate social and environmental responsibility. 
Industrial development has commonly been allowed (by governments) to take place at 
the expense of the natural environment and local community interests. However, the 
local communities are now bearing the burden of this unfettered development, through 
the loss of environmental quality, and adverse impacts on public health and wellbeing. 
Inevitably they will also bear a taxation burden as governments seek funds to address 
the pollution problems. 
As natural resources become more scarce, population increase, and there is greater 
public demand for improved living conditions, these societal expectations will be 
expressed more frequently and vehemently. Local community stakeholders have 
legitimacy and a sense of urgency, and with education are developing techniques to 
harness the power attribute they need to become definitive stakeholders, as 
demonstrated in the Chapter 6 case studief.. 
However, it must also be recognised that a global trend to deregulate and privatise, has 
led to reductions in government spending, downsizing of regulatory agencies and 
diminished regulatory enforcement capabilities. The pressing challenge for regulatory 
reformists in developing countries, in particular, is to design cost-effective, efficient, 
equitable and politically acceptable regulatory frameworks to reduce the burden of 
regulatory enforcement on resource-constrained governments, while ensuring that 
evolving stakeholder expectations of industry performance can be addressed are met, 
and the business continuity of industry is preserved. The latter will not be achieved by 
increasing the regulatory compliance burden through command and control approaches. 
Smarter, more cost-effective regulatory tools are required to enable industry to stay 
market-competitive, as well as to make financial, technological and personnel resources 
available to develop innovative, tailored solutions to environmental and social 
problems. 
8.6 RECOMMENDATIONS 
How can private and public sector policymakers apply the findings of this research to 
design and implement regulatory approaches to improve corporate social and 
environmental nianagement practices of upstream petroleum companies? 
The key to achieving appropriate regulatory reform is acknowledgement of the 
constraints and opportunities of the context within which the system must operate. As 
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governments lack the financial resources and political will to equip the regulators to be 
strong and effective enforcement agencies. There is also evidence of entrenched 
bureaucratic agenda in so1ne government circles, characterised by cronyis1n and self-
gain, that are not aligned with the public good. This situation is unlikely to change in the 
foreseeable future. 
These governments are actively encouraging the petroleum industry to be long-term 
investors in developing and supplying energy resources to serve the growing energy 
demands of these countries, and to encourage other energy-dependent industries to 
establish. However, they are also subject to increasing pressure from society (local and 
international) to be more accountable for their planning and decision-making in regard 
to industrial development, and to make industry more accountable for their performance. 
In the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework, these governments are not able 
to meet those demands on their own. They must find other ways to balance the demands 
of growth, and social and environmental responsibilities. 
On the basis of this research, it is suggested that following contextual observations be 
used to design an appropriate regulatory and policy regime for the upstream petroleum 
industry in countries like Thailand: 
i) The industry is mature, but will continue to go through changes in response to the 
evolving external nature of the energy market. Innovation and technological 
change drive the industry, so there needs to be flexibility in the regulatory system 
to allow their technologies and practices to evolve and not be constrained by 
prescriptive standards that focus on process instead of outcome. 
ii) There are distinctive cultural and size differences between petroleum companies . 
The dominant group is the increasingly smaller (through mergers) number of large 
companies (most of them are transnationals). All have very high public profiles 
and reputations that are of commercial value. They are highly vulnerable to adverse 
publicity, to shaming by public interest groups and the media, and to other formal 
sanctions beyond those imposed by conventional command and control regulation. 
There is also a large number of smaller companies that are particularly difficult to 
regulate (especially independent explorers in remote areas). They have very 
different characteristics to the large companies and are likely to respond to very 
different pressures and incentives. They are often unsophisticated and in some 
cases economically marginal. They trade with (partner with), and are to some 
extent dependent upon, the large companies, and are also highly dependent upon 
spot market prices for their products, and their sources of venture capital (be it 
shareholders and/or lending institutions). 
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iii) The long-term viability of the industry is now perceived by most large petroleum 
companies to depend upon gaining and maintaining the trust of the public. The 
industry currently suffers from a relatively poor public image. They are regarded by 
some sectors of the public to be unscrupulous exploiters. For example, 
multinational companies often attempt to bridge cultural gaps by adapting to local 
customs and business practices in their host countries, but as they do this they are 
then challenged from their home jurisdiction for not adhering to the standards, 
practices and laws, or ethics of their home country. To resolve this issue, there 
needs to be a common international focus on achieving best practice performance, 
without commercial penalties for investing in the necessary equipment and training 
to achieve this outcome. 
iv) There are strong regional and local industry associations with the capacity to exert 
considerable influence over the behaviour of its member companies ( especially 
true of those in the developed countries). These associations are aware of the 
urgent need to put the industry's house in order, to offset government and public 
pressure to impose more stringent regulatory constraints in the industry. In 
Thailand, there appear to be opportunities for building stronger linkages between 
the PTIT and international industry associations like the E&P Forum, to build local 
capacity in line with international trends in improving industry environmental 
performance. 
v) Environmental and social changes inflicted by industry projects have the potential 
to impact on a broad range of stakeholders. NGOs can play an important role in 
raising these concerns and forging collaborative links with the industry to address 
these concerns jointly, in a manner that avoids self-serving, bureaucratic 
interference from the government sector. In Thailand, linkages between the local 
NGOs, like the TEI and international NGOs, like the WBCSD, will add political 
weight and international recognition to these initiatives. 
Some petroleum company managers will clearly use their vision and resources to push 
the frontiers of innovation and corporate social and environmental responsibility 
because they perceive they can harness commercial advantage from this approach. 
However, others either do not have the same long-term vision or concern, and/or believe 
they can continue to find shadows in which to operate where they can negotiate or 
ignore chalfenges to their legitimacy. The findings of this research suggest that 
opportunities for improvement may lie in the harnessing of corporate social and 
environmental responsibilities through peer and third party stakeholder pressure. The 
industry depends upon market acceptance for its survival. As demonstrated in Chapter 7, 
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Marketplace pressure may also be harnessed through shareholder investment 
preferences, stock exchanges, and lending institutions that provide venture capital. 
These stakeholders, together with special interest NGOs and the media, have the ability 
to apply financial and shaming pressure to companies to drive continuous improvement 
of their social and environmental responsiveness. 
Within the petroleum industry, joint venture partnership and industry associations also 
provide mechanisms for applying performance pressures to poor performers. They are 
well aware that reputation has a value in the marketplace, and that the industry is judged 
by the performance of the worst performer. 
Therefore while governments may not be able to dedicate more personnel resources to 
enforcement of performance standards, some reform of legislation to broaden corporate 
governance requirements to address CSER within directors liabilities, and strengthening 
of public standing and public involvement in planning and development approvals 
processes, will empower third parties to take a more active role in sharing the 
enforcement burden. Other benefits may include encouragement of more constructive 
engagement in finding multilateral solutions to local and regional environmental 
problems. 
On the basis of these findings it is suggested that in the first instance, regulatory reform 
in countries like Thailand should address the following priorities: 
i) The need for information upon which to base informed decision-making about the 
nature of impacts, and to determine appropriate management performance 
standards. The information needs to be relevant, valid, and publicly available. 
Information requirements are broad ranging and include scientific data, knowledge 
about existing management arrangements and perceived strengths and weaknesses. 
ii) The need for regulatory flexibility to enable the use of a mix of regulatory 
instruments ( direct, self-regulatory, economic, etc.) tailored to meet specific 
situations. For example, a more prescriptive approach might be warranted to 
regulate companies that are known to have a poor environmental performance 
record, while greater use of self-regulatory instruments might be appropriate for 
companies that have demonstrated a long-term commitment to the country and to 
responsible management of their operations. 
iii) Defined roles for third party interests to be involved in design and enforcement of 
the regulatory instruments, their conditions of use, and their implementation. These 
interests are also broad-based and include local communities, local and 
international NGOs, financial institutions, and petroleum industry associations. 
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Co-operation between industry and its external stakeholders to develop environmental 
standards and regulatory processes to encourage innovation, can increase stakeholders' 
understanding of present and future requirements in the business community, as well as 
increase the probability of buy-in and sustained commitment from industry. A better 
mutual understanding of both the practical constraints and potential opportunities can be 
used to design more responsive regulatory tools to address the issues in the local 
context, and move away from the existing command and control tools that are clearly 
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To cease producing oil and/or gas from a well when it becomes 
unprofitable. A wildcat well may be abandoned after it has proven non-
productive. The abandonment process comprises removal and salvage 
of part of the well bore casing and placement of cement plugs in the 
borehole to prevent migration of fluids between the different 
formations penetrated by the borehole. 
Asian Development Bank. 
Australian Institute of Petroleum. 
Australian Manufacturing Council. 
American Petroleum Institute. The leading US standardising 
organisation on petroleum drilling and production equipment. 
The universally accepted scale adopted by the API for expressing the 
specific gravity of oils. 
APigravity= 141.5 -131.5 
specific gravity at 60°F 
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association. 
A well drilled as part of a drilling programme to determine the physical 
extent, reserves and likely production rate of a field. 
ASEAN Council on Petroleum. 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
Natural gas found in rissociation with oil, either dissolved in the oil or 
as a cap of free gas above the oil. 
The unit of volume measurement used for petroleum and its products. 
1 bbl= 159 litres (approx.); 6.29 bbl= 1 cubic metre. 
Billion cubic feet; 1 bcf = 0.83 million tonnes of oil equivalent. 
A geological term describing a stratum (layer of sediment or 
sedimentary rock) of considerable thickness and uniform composition 
and structure. 
The steel pipe that is cemented into a well to prevent the wall from 
caving in and stop unwanted fluids from entering the hole from the 
surrounding rocks. 
Co-ordinating Committee fo~- Coastal and Offshore Geoscience 
Programmes in East and South-East Asia. 
The process of continuously pnmping drilling mud down through the 
drill string and up the annulus during drilling operations. 
An oil and/or gas field judged to be capable of producing enough net 
income to make it financially viable to develop. 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYM S, TECHNICAL TERMS AND UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 
Completion The process by which a finished well is either sealed off or prepared 
for production by fitting a wellhead. 
Concession A licence area that is leased to a company for a given period for 
exploration and development under specified terms and conditions. 
Condensate A mixture of pentanes and higher hydrocarbons. 
Coventurer A person or company joined with others in a particular venture. 
crude oil The oil that is produced from a reservoir (after any associated gas has 
been removed); often referred to as simply crude. 
CSER Corporate social and environmental responsibility. As defined below 
for CSR, with the inclusion of environmental expectations. 
CSR Corporate social responsibility. Defined as the social responsibility of 
business that encompasses the economic, legal, ethical and 
philanthropic expectations placed on companies by society (Carroll, 
1996). 
cubic foot A standard unit used to measure quantity of gas (at atmospheric 
pressure); 1 cubic foot= 0.0283 cubic metres. 
Cuttings The fragments of rock dislodged by the drill bit and brought to the 
surface in the drilling mud. Washed and dried samples of the cuttings 
are analysed by wellsite geologists to obtain information about the 
formation drilled. 
Development phase The phase in which a proven oil or gas field is brought into production 
by drilling production wells. 
Development well A well drilled with a view to producing oil or gas from a proven field. 
directional drilling A technique whereby a well is deliberately deviated from the vertical in 
order to reach a particular part of a reservoir. 
discovery well The first oil or gas well drilled in a new field; the well that reveals the 
presence of a petroleum bearing reservoir. 
DMR Department of Mineral Resources, Royal Thai Government. 
Downstream Refers to the transportation, refining, distribution and sales sectors of 
the petroleum industry, as compared with the upstream sector activities 
of exploration and production. 
drilling contractor A company that undertakes to provide the equipment and manpower 
needed to drill a well on behalf of an operator. 
drilling fluid Circulating fluid, one function of which is to force cuttings out of the 
wellbore and to the surface. While a mixture of clay, water and other 
chemical additives is the most common drilling fluid, wells can also be 
drilled using air, gas or water as the drilling fluid. 
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drilling mud A mixture of clays, water and chemicals pumped down the drill string 
and up the annulus during drilling in order to lubricate the system, 
carry away rock cuttings, maintain the required pressure at the bit end, 
and provide an aid to formation evaluations. 
drilling rig The complete machinery and structures needed for drilling a well. 
dry hole A well drilled without finding gas or oil in commercial quantities. 
dry natural gas Natural gas that is low in associated liquids; mostly methane with only 
minor amounts of ethane, propane and butane and little or no heavier 
hydrocarbons in the gasoline range. 
E & P companies Petroleum exploration and production companies. 
E & P Forum The Oil Industry International Exploration and Production Forum. 
ECNEQ Act The Thai Enhancement and Conservation of the Natural Environment 
Quality Act, 1992. 
economic project A project that appears likely to yield an acceptable net income after 
paying all costs, royalties, taxes, etc. 
effluent Waste liquid, gas or vapour from processes. 
EGA T Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand. 
EHS Environment, health and safety. Also referred to as HES (health, 
environment and safety) and HSE (health, safety and environment). 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment. 
EIS Environmental Impact Statement. 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone. 
EMS Environmental Management System. 
ESCAP Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 
EU European Union. 
exploitation well A well drilled to permit more effective extraction of oil from a 
reservoir. It is sometimes called a development well. 
exploration drilling Drilled carried out to determine whether hydrocarbons are present in a 
particular area or structure. 
exploration licence A licence to explore for oil or gas in a particular area issued to a 
company by the governing State. 
exploration phase The phase of operations in which a company searches for oil or gas by 
carrying out detailed geological and geophysical surveys, followed up 
where appropriate by exploratory drilling in the most promising places. 
exploration well A well drilled without knowledge of the contents of the underlying 





















joint venture (JV) 
kamnan 
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS, TECHNICAL TERMS AND UNITS OF MEASUREMENT 
Where one company acquires an interest in an exploration or 
production licence by paying some of the past or future costs of another 
company which is relinquishing part of its interest. 
Where a company relinquishes part of its interest in an exploration or 
production licence to another company in return for part-payment. 
A geographical area under which an oil or gas reservoir lies. 
A homogenous body of rock. 
Water occupying pore space in rock formations. 
A field containing natural gas but no oil. 
The process whereby separated associated gas is pumped back into a 
reservoir for conservation purposes or to maintain the reservoir 
pressure. 
A pipeline used to transport gas between two places either offshore or 
onshore. 
hectare(s). 
Crude oil with a high specific gravity and a low API gravity due to the 
presence of a high proportion of heavy hydrocarbon fractions. 
Well bore. 
Compounds containing only the elements hydrogen and carbon. They 
may exist as solids, liquids or gases. 
Cone-shaped centrifuges used for removing sand, silt and other solid 
particles from drilling mud. 
International Maritime Organisation. 
A well used to inject gas or water into the reservoir rock in order to 
maintain reservoir pressure in secondary recovery or (in the case of 
gas) for conservation purposes. 
Indonesian Petroleum Association. 
International Standards Organisation suite of standards for 
Environmental Management Systems. 
A form of contract most often used by companies jointly engaged in 
petroleum exploration and production activities to regulate their 
respective rights and obligations as an unincorporated joint venture. 
An investment undertaken by a consortium, usually with one member 
( or participant) acting as operator. 
Thai term for a sub-district level community leader. 
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l. A legal document executed between a landowner, as lessor, and a 
company or individual, as lessee, that grants the right to exploit the 
premises for minerals or other products. 
2. The area where production wells, stock tanks, separators, and other 
production equipment are located. 
An authority to explore for or produce oil or gas in a particular area 
issued to a company by the governing State. 
A section of continental shelf in a particular national sector bounded by 
latitude and longitude lines, generally at one-degree intervals; a licence 
block is usually sub-divided into smaller area. 
A stage in the allocation of offshore licences in which a State places a 
number of specified areas in its sector on offer to oil companies at one 
time. 
Crude oil with a low specific gravity and high API gravity due to the 
presence of a high proportion of light hydrocarbon fractions. 
Liquefied natural gas. Natural gas that has been liquefied by 
refrigeration or pressure in order to facilitate storage or transport; it 
generally consists mainly of methane. 
Liquefied petroleum gas. A mixture of light hydrocarbons derived 
from oil-bearing strata which is gaseous at normal temperatures but 
which has been liquefied by refrigeration or pressure in order to 
facilitate storage or transport; it generally consists mainly of propane 
and butane. Also known as condensate. 
The loss of substantial quantities of drilling mud into a formation; also 
called loss of returns. 
metres. 
A field that may or may not produce enough net income to make it 
worth developing at a given time. Should technical or economic 
conditions change, such a field may subsequently become commercial. 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. 
Million barrels of oil equivalent. 
milligrams per litre. 
Moattama Gas Transportation Company. 
The ownership of any minerals that may exist in the strata beneath a 
particular area. 
million cubic feet per day (of gas). 
Multinational corporation. A company that has investments 1n more 
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Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise. 
The Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment, Royal Thai 
Government. 
Mineral Policy Institute 
Malaysia-Thailand Joint Development Area. 
The act of pumping mud downward to the drill bit and back up to the 
surface by normal circulation or reverse circulation. 
The Union of Myanmar, formerly Burma. 
A mixture of light hydrocarbons (generally mainly methane) found 
naturally in the Earth's crust, often in association with oil. 
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma 
National Environment Board, Royal Thai Government. 
The income from a project that remains after payment of all costs, 
royalties, etc. 
Non-governmental organisation. 
Office of Environmental Policy and Planning, Royal Thai Government. 
The adjective applied to any structure or activity located or carried out 
at sea, as opposed to on land (onshore). 
A mixture of liquid hydrocarbons of different molecular weights. 
A geographical area under which an oil reservoir lies. 
A pipeline used to pump crude or refined oil between two places, either 
offshore or onshore. 
The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
An individual, partnership or corporation that has the legal authority to 
drill wells and undertake production if hydrocarbons are found . The 
operator may either drill the wells or employ a drilling contractor for 
the purpose. The operator is often part of a consortium, such as a joint 
venture, and acts on behalf of this consortium. 
Pollution Control Department, Royal Thai Government. 
Indonesian State-owned oil corporation. 
An intermediate chemical derived from petroleum, hydrocarbon liquids 
or natural gas, e.g. ethylene, propylene, benzene, toluene and xylene. 
A generic name for hydrocarbons, including crude oil, natural gas 
liquids, natural gas and their products. 
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Petroliam Nasional Berhad. Malaysia's state-owned oil company. 
Those reserves that at present cannot be regarded as 'probable' but are 
estimated to have a significant but less than 50% chance of being 
technically and economically producible. 
Undeveloped oil and/or gas reserves considered to be recoverable from 
penetrated formations, but lacking information to be classified as 
proven reserves. 
1. The phase of the petroleum industry that deals with bringing the well 
fluids to the surface and separating them, and with storing, gauging, 
and otherwise preparing the product for the pipeline. 
2. The amount of oil or gas produced in a given period. 
Drilling of wells in order to bring a field into production. 
A licence to produce oil or gas in a particular area issued to a company 
by the governing State. 
The phase in the life of a field in which oil or gas is produced. 
A platform from which development wells are drilled and which carries 
all the associated processing plant and other equipment needed to 
maintain a field in production. 
A well used to remove oil or gas from a reservoir. 
An oil and/or gas field whose physical extent and estimated reserves 
have been determined. 
Those reserves which are on the available evidence are virtually certain 
to be technically and economically producible (i.e. having a better than 
90% chance of being produced). 
Production Sharing Contract. Contract entered into by a company and 
an authorised State enterprise, in which the company (Contractor) 
undertakes to render technical and financial services, and within this 
framework, undertake and finance the petroleum operations described 
in the contract. As financial compensation for rendering these services 
the Contractor will receive a certain part of any production that might 
result from the company's work. 
Petroleum Institute of Thailand. 
Petroleum Authority of Thailand. 
PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited. 
That proportion of the oil/ gas in a reservoir that can be removed using 
currently available techniques. 
A stratum in which oil or gas is present. 




The net profit after tax expressed as a percentage of the total money 
invested in an enterprise. 
Equity capital raised to finance a development that has technical, 
economic and other risks attached to it and thus cannot guarantee a 
return on the investment. 
Royalty A share of the production or revenue reserved by the grantor of an oil 
lease or licence. 
secondary recovery Recovery of oil and gas from a reservoir by artificially maintaining or 
enhancing the reservoir pressure by injecting gas, water or other 
substances into the reservoir rock. 
Sector An area of the continental shelf in which the mineral rights belong to 
one particular State. 
Sedimentary basin An area in which thick layers of sedimentary rocks have been laid 
down over a long period of time. 
Seismic An acoustic method using a source and multichannel recording to 
compile sections or profiles under the earth or seabed; one of the main 
geophysical methods used (e.g. high resolution, 3D, refraction, etc.). 
seismic exploration An exploration technique involving the use of seismic methods to 
determine the detailed structure of the rocks underlying a particular 
area by passing acoustic shock waves into the strata and detecting and 
measuring the reflected signals. 
SET Stock Exchange of Thailand. 
SLORC Myanmar's State Law and Order Restoration Council. Renamed the 
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. 
source rock The rock in which oil or natural gas originates. 
SPDC Myanmar's ruling State Peace and Development Council (formerly 
known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). 
SPE Society of Petroleum Engineers. 
Spud To begin drilling a well. Spudding in is the process of starting to drill a 
well by making a hole using a large-diameter drill bit. 
supply base An onshore base from which supply boats operate. 





Thai Business Council for Sustainable Development. 
Trillion cubic feet (of gas). 
Thailand Environment Institute. Secretariat for the TBCSD. 
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Total Exploration and Production Thailand. 
An onshore installation designed to receive oil and/or gas from a 
pipeline or from tankers. 
Thai Federation of Industry. 
Tension-leg production platform. 
Total Myanmar Exploration and Production Company. 
A long ton weighs 1,018 kg (2,240 pounds); a short or net ton weights 
909 kg (2,000 pounds); a metric ton equals 1,000 kg (2,200 pounds). 
A geological structure in which hydrocarbons build up to form an oil or 
gas field. 
United Kingdom of Great Britain. 
United Kingdom Offshore Operators Association Limited. 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in 
1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
United Nations Development Programme. 
United Nations Environment Programme. 
When owners of oil and/or gas reserves pool their individual interests 
in return for an interest in the overall unit, which is then operated by a 
single company on behalf of the group, thus increasing efficiency. 
The company in charge of development and producing in an oil field in 
which several companies have joined together to produce the field. 
Refers to the exploration and production sectors of the petroleum 
industry as compared with the downstream sector activities of product 
transportation, refining, distribution and sales. 
United States of America. 
Substance in a gaseous form. 
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
A process whereby treated water is pumped into reservoir rock in order 
to maintain the reservoir pressure. 
World Business Council for Sustainable Development 
The hole in the rock made by the drill bit. 
The activities and methods necessary to prepare a well for the 
production of oil and gas; the method by which a flow line for 
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The control equipment fitted to the top of a well casing, incorporating 
outlets, valves, blowout preventers, etc. 
Natural gas that contains large amounts of associated liquids. 
An appraisal well drilled with minimum preliminary information about 
the underlying structure and conditions; it usually follows a wildcat 
well that reported shows of oil or gas. 
World Wide Fund for Nature. 
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